They have characteristics, yes, but not empirically measurable properties. — Theorem

How would there be a property that's not empirically measurable (whether it's been measured yet or not)?

Aristotle’s philosophy was framed in the context of a different epoch. — Wayfarer

There wasn't an epoch in which there were real abstracts or in which properties were somehow separable from substance, etc. It's maybe understandable why Aristotle made the mistakes that he did, but that doesn't make them not mistakes.

What is not being appreciated, is that the OP is written 'post Descartes'. Descartes divided the whole issue along completely different lines to Aristotle. So from a post-Cartesian point of view, of course Aristotle's conception of matter doesn't make sense. But the question uncritically operates from a post-Cartesian point of view, which of course we nowadays all embody, without understanding what that shsift in perspective really entails. In order to properly critique the Aristotelian conception of 'hyle' requires an understanding of the context in which such an idea made sense. — Wayfarer

The Cartesian division, body and mind is a step backward from Aristotle. That's the division, along with its problems, that Plato dealt with. The problems, in dividing reality along those lines are irresolvable as Plato demonstrated. Aristotle's solution was to divide the entirety of reality by dualist principles (matter and form). So as where Aristotle made a move to bring dualism into the range of intelligibility, the Cartesian shift is a move which makes dualism appear incomprehensible.

How would there be a property that's not empirically measurable (whether it's been measured yet or not)? — Terrapin Station

What do you mean "how"? Non-measurable properties inhere in substances the same way that measurable properties do. They're just aren't measurable. Examples would include phenomenal, intentional and normative properties.

But I wasn't actually talking about properties, I was talking about entities like prime matter and substantial form which do not have properties and do not exist in and of themselves. They exist only as metaphysical components of material substances and are postulated in order to explain change, identity, individuation, properties, powers, etc. You can deny their existence if you want, but you can't appeal to lack of empirical evidence without both begging the question and making a category mistake.

Examples would include phenomenal, intentional and normative properties. — Theorem

Those are brain states. Brain states are measurable.

Why would you think you need to explain change, anyway, by the way?

If there were a lack of change, would that need to be explained?

Those are brain states. Brain states are measurable. — Terrapin Station

No, they're not. That should be painfully obvious from the fact that they have literally nothing in common with brain states.

Why would you think you need to explain change, anyway, by the way? — Terrapin Station

Because some people argue that change is not real, while others argue that permanence is not real.

If there were a lack of change, would that need to be explained? — Terrapin Station

I have no idea.

No, they're not. — Theorem

Yeah, they are. What they have in common with brain states is that they're identical to them. That seems painfully obvious to me.

Because some people argue that change is not real, while others argue that permanence is not real. — Theorem

So just in case someone argues that x is not real, then x needs to be explained?

Yeah, they are. What they have in common with brain states is that they're identical to them. That seems painfully obvious to me. — Terrapin Station

I deny that they are identical by pointing out that they share nothing in common and you retort by re-asserting that they are identical. Nice one!

Look, brains are wet, solid, made of neurons, weigh about 3 pounds on average, have a volume of about 1450 cubic centimeters on average, etc. Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have none of those properties and it is blindingly obvious that that they are not even the kinds of things that could have those properties. If you can't see that, then I think we'll have to end the conversation here.

So just in case someone argues that x is not real, then x needs to be explained? — Terrapin Station

No, not always. Look, if the question "what is the nature of change?" holds no interest for you, or makes no sense to you, then fine. I'm not going to try to convince you that it's a question worth pursuing.

I deny that they are identical by pointing out that share nothing in common and you retort by re-asserting that they are identical. Nice one! — Theorem

If "they share nothing in common" is sufficient as a comment, why isn't "they are identical" sufficient? Why should I be doing more than you're doing?

Look, brains are wet, solid, made of neurons, weigh about 3 pounds on average, have a volume of about 1450 cubic centimeters on average, etc. Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have none of those properties — Theorem

Likewise, here, I simply have to say, "Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have those properties"--why wouldn't that be a sufficient comment if your denial is a sufficient comment?

Sorry, Terrapin. We've gone as far as we can go. Thanks for chatting.

Look, brains are wet, solid, made of neurons, weigh about 3 pounds on average, have a volume of about 1450 cubic centimeters on average, etc. Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have none of those properties
— Theorem

Likewise, here, I simply have to say, "Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have those properties"--why wouldn't that be a sufficient comment if your denial is a sufficient comment? — Terrapin Station

I think it's raining outside, but I'll go and check to make sure. I checked and, yes, it is. How much did my thought weigh? On your view, is that a meaningful question or is it a category mistake?

There wasn't an epoch in which there were real abstracts or in which properties were somehow separable from substance, etc. It's maybe understandable why Aristotle made the mistakes that he did, but that doesn't make them not mistakes. — Terrapin Station

Aristotle did not say that properties were separable from substance, he expressly denied it. He was an immanent realist about universals and rejected Platonic realism.

How much did my thought weigh? — Andrew M

Didn't we do this already? (Or was it someone else?--I don't recall). It doesn't make sense to talk about the weight of all physical phenomena. I didn't pick apart each property he was listing in the post, and I didn't talk about the fact that mental phenomena are not identical to the entirety of the brain at all times--it's a subset of brain structure/function, because I knew it was pointless to get into details with him.

Didn't we do this already? (Or was it someone else?--I don't recall). It doesn't make sense to talk about the weight of all physical phenomena. I didn't pick apart each property he was listing in the post, and I didn't talk about the fact that mental phenomena are not identical to the entirety of the brain at all times--it's a subset of brain structure/function, because I knew it was pointless to get into details with him. — Terrapin Station

I don't think we've discussed this before. But note that it wasn't a minor detail, it was his main point. It doesn't make sense to talk about the weight, or volume, or solidity of thoughts, feelings, sensations or values at all. They are dispositions and occurrences, not substances.

Nonetheless they are still fully grounded in the physical and natural world. And that was also Aristotle's position as contrasted with Plato's.