Child vaccination springs to mind: both parents prefer their kids to be healthy, but only one of them is actually achieving it. — VagabondSpectre
They're more important than etiquette because they concern the "preferences" which we value and seek to protect above all others (eg: the desire to go on living). Etiquette is about avoiding annoyance and petty confrontation, morality is about avoiding suffering and other existential threats. — VagabondSpectre
In my opinion this catches the whole point beyond argument. It is not so much "truth," as in this or that in itself is true a priori, but rather "the truth of" at this place and time. And taken in full view, it's the same truth as in "this is a chair," when said of a chair. It is a functional truth.I get that, which is why - having rejected moral objectivism as without warrant - I pragmatically opt with moral relativism, which means that moral statements, suitably interpreted or suitably qualified, are truth-apt, and some are true, whereas others are false. There is truth to be found in or relating to morality. You just have to look it at in the right way. — S
Opinion can be false or wrong; — tim wood
How can opinions in the sense of "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," etc. be wrong? — Terrapin Station
How about because your examples are not opinions. "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," are categorical statements, true or false as what they aver is true or false. An opinion is a judgment with respect to some criteria. "In my opinion, X is better than Y." — tim wood
If they say they like cauliflower, that's either true or false. — tim wood
... And this is exactly why the moral subjectivists do what they do, because of bullshit like this. Vaccinating your child (or not) is not an objectively moral action. To do so, you have to trust the medical establishment (where is the moral requirements that you do so?), you have to trust the pharmaceutical company (again, where is the moral requirement here?), you have to trust the statistics (no moral requirement), you have to trust that your child has the same health prospects as an average child (again, empirical, not moral data).
If, it were an absolutely incontrovertible fact that your child (not just the average child) were going to be more healthy as a result of vaccination, and you knew that with absolute certainty or had no cause to doubt any of the information you've been given, then it would begin to approach objectively moral to do so. — Isaac
If, it were an absolutely incontrovertible fact that your child (not just the average child) were going to be more healthy as a result of vaccination, and you knew that with absolute certainty or had no cause to doubt any of the information you've been given, then it would begin to approach objectively moral to do so. — Isaac
I accept that people don't automatically understand this stuff, and I even understand why they reject vaccines; they're just wrong about it. — VagabondSpectre
"It is right to promote the health of your child" might be at least a simplification of the moral part, and that's the part that's not at all objective. — Terrapin Station
Think about how often, in practice, someone promotes the opposite...
"It is right to undermine the health of your child?"
Physical and mental health are such basic necessities to well-being and happiness that in practice nobody ever disagrees with the idea that promoting the health of children is morally important/obligatory. — VagabondSpectre
We have to be talking about preferences about interpersonal behavior (that's more significant than etiquette). We can have such preferences with respect to vaccinations, but not any old preference re vaccinations would count, and the facts about it, in themselves, just don't have anything to do with morality. — Terrapin Station
Even if literally no one ever felt otherwise, what would that have to do with the issue? Are you saying that it has something to do with how common a particular sentiment is? — Terrapin Station
Basically you could also argue that science itself amounts to personal preference about which empirical beliefs to adopt, but you would be focusing on the wrong thing. — VagabondSpectre
The problem with morality is that there is no objective state of affairs to match with respect to the moral part. — Terrapin Station
If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence — javra
if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings, — javra
c) it is objectively true these core characteristics entail common, or universal, core wants (e.g., that of living life with minimal dolor), — javra
it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them, — javra
Do you agree that it is either a good decision or a bad decision or vaccinate your child? — VagabondSpectre
Yes, the truth of vaccine effectiveness can be difficult for laymen to behold, but the truth is out there. In reality, the statistical benefits of vaccines far outweigh any risks (the validity of statistical analyses are not a matter of personal preference). — VagabondSpectre
Do vaccines lead to more disease and suffering, or less disease and suffering? — VagabondSpectre
You're basically agreeing that, potentially, the only different between a moral doctor who supports vaccinations and an immoral and superstitious parent who is refuses to vaccinate their child is ignorance. — VagabondSpectre
First, I wouldn't say that anything is objectively true. I see that as a category error. — Terrapin Station
When you say "the moral part", you're appealing to a meta-ethical definition of morality as theoretical. When I say it, I appeal to morality as an applied [meta]-physics in service of human values. — VagabondSpectre
I was making use of terminology previously used in this thread. The rest seems to also be about nitpicking semantics. Ignore what I said, then. — javra
?? I'm referring to stances a la "x is good/right conduct," "x is bad/wrong conduct," "x is morally permissible," "x is morally obligatory" etc. So no, that's nothing meta-ethical. — Terrapin Station
"x causes autism," "x doesn't cause autism" and the like are nor morality/moral stances. — Terrapin Station
You're saying that moral "truth" has to not depend on human preference, because human preference is not objective. That's meta-ethical. — VagabondSpectre
No, but the stances we take on issues like these factual issues do impact our moral actions and arguments. — VagabondSpectre
In other words, whether or not it is true that X causes autism can determine whether or not an action is moral — VagabondSpectre
Are you seriously suggesting that trusting the government is a moral obligation? — Isaac
It can't do that objectively. It can do that subjectively, relative to an individual's preferences, though, sure. — Terrapin Station
It can't do that objectively. It can do that subjectively, relative to an individual's preferences, though, sure. — Terrapin Station
When people say morality is "mere" preference, they're ignoring the bulk of what it is we do when we do morality, — VagabondSpectre
My view is that morality is evolved thought, and in that sense is a something and not a nothing, certainly more than an individual's mere opinion. — tim wood
It's true or false that they have that opinion, yes. It's not true or false that cauliflower is good, which is another way of stating the same opinion. It would be true or false that they think it's good, though.
Anyway, you're ignoring what I'm asking you. — Terrapin Station
It's not true or false that cauliflower is good, — Terrapin Station
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.