Child vaccination springs to mind: both parents prefer their kids to be healthy, but only one of them is actually achieving it. — VagabondSpectre

People can get wrong just will achieve some particular state, but that does no work to make the moral part more or less objective.

"It is right to promote the health of your child" might be at least a simplification of the moral part, and that's the part that's not at all objective.

"X does/does not cause autism," etc. is the stuff that one can get correct or incorrect. There is no moral aspect to that, though.

They're more important than etiquette because they concern the "preferences" which we value and seek to protect above all others (eg: the desire to go on living). Etiquette is about avoiding annoyance and petty confrontation, morality is about avoiding suffering and other existential threats. — VagabondSpectre

Plenty of people--almost everyone to some extent, values etiquette, too. The distinction from etiquette is simply because there are two different classes of interpersonal behavior we make these sorts of judgments about--one falls under the rubric of etiquette, and many consider it extremely important, and the other falls under the rubric of morality.

I get that, which is why - having rejected moral objectivism as without warrant - I pragmatically opt with moral relativism, which means that moral statements, suitably interpreted or suitably qualified, are truth-apt, and some are true, whereas others are false. There is truth to be found in or relating to morality. You just have to look it at in the right way. — S

In my opinion this catches the whole point beyond argument. It is not so much "truth," as in this or that in itself is true a priori, but rather "the truth of" at this place and time. And taken in full view, it's the same truth as in "this is a chair," when said of a chair. It is a functional truth.

Will this truth stand against the destructive tendencies of relativism? I do not think so, but neither will anything else.

But there's a difference between opinion and being true. Opinion can be false or wrong; the true cannot be (or it wouldn't be true).

Opinion can be false or wrong; — tim wood

How can opinions in the sense of "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," etc. be wrong?

Or are you only talking about opinions in the sense of "It's Dr. Tata's opinion that garlic can help fight LDL cholesterol"?

How can opinions in the sense of "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," etc. be wrong? — Terrapin Station

How about because your examples are not opinions. "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," are categorical statements, true or false as what they aver is true or false. An opinion is a judgment with respect to some criteria. "In my opinion, X is better than Y." Depending on your basis, your opinion can certainly be right or wrong.

How about because your examples are not opinions. "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," are categorical statements, true or false as what they aver is true or false. An opinion is a judgment with respect to some criteria. "In my opinion, X is better than Y." — tim wood

If someone likes cauliflower, they're going to say that cauliflower is better than some food they don't like. "In my opinion, x is better than y" is another way of saying that one likes x (more than one likes y.)

So again, how can they be right or wrong about that? Don't just tell me they can be. Tell me how they can be.

If they say they like cauliflower, that's either true or false. True if they like, false if they don't. So much for that.

If they say cauliflower is better than, say, brussels sprouts, then it's a fair question to ask why. Eventually you get to a categorical proposition that is eo ipso either true or false as above. Or not, and then its a matter of belief.

And people will say. "I believe thus and such." This is statement about belief, not the content of the belief. And reasonable, rational people recognize that beliefs are not soluble in any critical analysis. It's not their business to be critically analyzed for truth or falsity, it's the business of beliefs - respectable beliefs, anyway - to be believed.

How about contemptible beliefs? And here we enter considerations of actions, behaviours. And so on. Opinion eventually leads to fact of some or other kind or error of fact, or belief not subject to verification as fact.

Does this answer? And can you think of an example of an opinion that does not fall under this methid of evaluation?

If they say they like cauliflower, that's either true or false. — tim wood

It's true or false that they have that opinion, yes. It's not true or false that cauliflower is good, which is another way of stating the same opinion. It would be true or false that they think it's good, though.

Anyway, you're ignoring what I'm asking you.

... And this is exactly why the moral subjectivists do what they do, because of bullshit like this. Vaccinating your child (or not) is not an objectively moral action. To do so, you have to trust the medical establishment (where is the moral requirements that you do so?), you have to trust the pharmaceutical company (again, where is the moral requirement here?), you have to trust the statistics (no moral requirement), you have to trust that your child has the same health prospects as an average child (again, empirical, not moral data).

If, it were an absolutely incontrovertible fact that your child (not just the average child) were going to be more healthy as a result of vaccination, and you knew that with absolute certainty or had no cause to doubt any of the information you've been given, then it would begin to approach objectively moral to do so. — Isaac

Do you agree that it is either a good decision or a bad decision or vaccinate your child?

Yes, the truth of vaccine effectiveness can be difficult for laymen to behold, but the truth is out there. In reality, the statistical benefits of vaccines far outweigh any risks (the validity of statistical analyses are not a matter of personal preference). Refusing the empirically proven vaccines not only puts the child at greater risk, but it also threatens our "herd immunity" by giving pathogens a host/vector to infect more people (in the height of the anti-vax movement, there are a lot of recent stories about localized disease outbreaks being caused by unvaccinated children).

I accept that people don't automatically understand this stuff, and I even understand why they reject vaccines; they're just wrong about it. Anti-vax parents would not need to side with the subjectivists if they could actually address the content of the specific moral dilemma. Do vaccines lead to more disease and suffering, or less disease and suffering? We want to have less disease and less suffering as a moral prerogative, so which path should we choose?

If, it were an absolutely incontrovertible fact that your child (not just the average child) were going to be more healthy as a result of vaccination, and you knew that with absolute certainty or had no cause to doubt any of the information you've been given, then it would begin to approach objectively moral to do so. — Isaac

You're basically agreeing that, potentially, the only different between a moral doctor who supports vaccinations and an immoral and superstitious parent who is refuses to vaccinate their child is ignorance.

I accept that people don't automatically understand this stuff, and I even understand why they reject vaccines; they're just wrong about it. — VagabondSpectre

Again, the problem here isn't that people can be correct or incorrect about the effectiveness, the dangers, etc. of vaccination versus foregoing vaccination. It's that those facts aren't in themselves moral facts. Even having preferences about vaccinating versus not vaccinating is not sufficient for us to be talking about morality. We have to be talking about preferences about interpersonal behavior (that's more significant than etiquette). We can have such preferences with respect to vaccinations, but not any old preference re vaccinations would count, and the facts about it, in themselves, just don't have anything to do with morality.

"It is right to promote the health of your child" might be at least a simplification of the moral part, and that's the part that's not at all objective. — Terrapin Station

Think about how often, in practice, someone promotes the opposite...

"It is right to undermine the health of your child?"

Physical and mental health are such basic necessities to well-being and happiness that in practice nobody ever disagrees with the idea that promoting the health of children is morally important/obligatory.

So yes, you can saw we have a preference-based or relativist/subjectivist-based moral value to protect children, but since nobody ever disagrees with this in practice we get to wield it as if it is an objectively true moral value.

People never disagree (reasonably anyway) with the idea that we should protect children, so we don't often have to worry about debating/negotiating our starting moral values, we can skip right to the factual empirical questions of how to actually achieve those values.

Think about how often, in practice, someone promotes the opposite...

"It is right to undermine the health of your child?"

Physical and mental health are such basic necessities to well-being and happiness that in practice nobody ever disagrees with the idea that promoting the health of children is morally important/obligatory. — VagabondSpectre

Even if literally no one ever felt otherwise, what would that have to do with the issue? Are you saying that it has something to do with how common a particular sentiment is?

We have to be talking about preferences about interpersonal behavior (that's more significant than etiquette). We can have such preferences with respect to vaccinations, but not any old preference re vaccinations would count, and the facts about it, in themselves, just don't have anything to do with morality. — Terrapin Station

When the facts change from our perspective, the moral status of the actions in question can also change from our perspective (to vaccinate or not to vaccinate).

Basically you could also argue that science itself amounts to personal preference about which empirical beliefs to adopt, but you would be focusing on the wrong thing. Yes preference plays a role (e.g: humans prefer precise and reliably predictive models), but once we set out with specific goals and tasks in mind, there are always better and worse possible methods and outcomes. In the case of science, better outcomes mean greater precision and predictive power (and while, like all knowledge, scientific understanding exists on a spectrum of certitude (it is inductive), it is so high on the spectrum that it's reasonable to say that science approximates objective truth).

Moral propositions are not too unlike scientific ones; they propose causal relationships that may or may not be universally true, and the more accurate or reliably predictive they are, the more useful to us, as tools, they become. If we agree about our starting moral goals (like the starting goals of science), then we can treat the dilemma of how to realize our moral goals as a purely empirical question, and we can even try to answer them using the scientific method (thereby eschewing preference for the remainder of the problem). Finding the right starting moral values (and negotiating different or competing values) can be important, but it's just the foothill of a much more pressing pile of moral dilemmas that need empirical solving, such as whether or not vaccines promote child health.

Even if literally no one ever felt otherwise, what would that have to do with the issue? Are you saying that it has something to do with how common a particular sentiment is? — Terrapin Station

How common a particular sentiment is can be very important, or not at all. It depends on the nature of the sentiment (how strongly people value it, whether it is achievable, whether it competes with other values, etc...), the environment that moral agents find themselves in, and the landscape of other values.

If all humans valued erecting great pyramids over all else, including our own lives, (in other words: if pyramid building was our only significant source of happiness), then we would all be building pyramids at any cost. Consider that certain economic arrangements might be more or less conducive to pyramid building: a form of government which is organized to maximize pyramid construction by any means might be said to be the most morally praiseworthy form of government [possible (and not immoral to any degree, because it does not transgress on the preferences of any individual).

Now suppose that only most humans are into pyramid building while others are obelisk obsessed. A system of government which makes slaves of these unwilling in the name of pyramid building might be objectively less moral than a system which does not. Instead of allowing citizens a narrow range of freedom, diversity in existential values is generally better accommodated by a form of government which allows people to make their own decisions.

Yes these are massive simplifications, but with some issues things can indeed be simple. If we fleshed out real enough (or used real world) examples, then we could come to useful and highly accurate moral statements like "X form of government is morally inferior to Y form of government". Of course we have to take into account our starting value hierarchies, to what extend they are shared, differ, or directly compete. And yes, our "moral truths" only amount of inductive approximations, but so does all other truth; it's an epistemic limitation inherent to our limited information gathering capacity and our ignorance of the physical world.

If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence, if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings, and if c) it is objectively true these core characteristics entail common, or universal, core wants (e.g., that of living life with minimal dolor), then: it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them, this being a core reality that is universal to all subjective beings.

A possible candidate for this core preference universal to all subjective beings: the preeminent, basic, and generalized want of not having one’s intentions, or context specific wants, obstructed or barred (to be barred from doing what one wants to do will arguably always lead to some degree of displeasure in the short term if not also in the long term); or, more succinctly, the minimization of dolor, of suffering.

Then, considering such core and universal preference: parents who hold child vaccinations to be good and parents that hold child vaccinations to be bad, for example, will both operate from the same core preference universal to all subjective beings: say, that of minimizing dolor, this then of itself being an/the objective good (which is just as much an objective truth as is the existence of subjective beings to which this universal core preference pertains).

Given the objective good of the here hypothesized universal preference of minimizing personal dolor among all subjective beings, there will then be an objectively better and worse means of optimally actualizing this objective good—in the given example, via either vaccinating children or not.

But in short, if there is an objective good, it will not be found outside of subjective beings (like rocks over there are) but, instead, it will be an invariant and intrinsic preference universal to all subjective beings, one that is as objectively true as is the very presence of subjective beings.

Devil’s in the details. Nevertheless, to deny such objectively true good is to deny that subjective beings share any core characteristics of want/desire/need which defines all of them/us as subjective beings. Again, such as the generalized, hence universal, want of minimizing personal dolor—a preference whose universality among subjective beings can well be argued to be an objective truth.

I’m not intending by this to prove the reality of an objectively true good. I’m only adding to what previous posters mentioned: that a preference based ethics is in no way contradictory to the presence of an objectively true good.

Basically you could also argue that science itself amounts to personal preference about which empirical beliefs to adopt, but you would be focusing on the wrong thing. — VagabondSpectre

But all we'd have to do is point out that that's rather a matter of whether we're matching some objective state of affairs.

The problem with morality is that there is no objective state of affairs to match with respect to the moral part.

The problem with morality is that there is no objective state of affairs to match with respect to the moral part. — Terrapin Station

When you say "the moral part", you're appealing to a meta-ethical definition of morality as theoretical. When I say it, I appeal to morality as an applied [meta]-physics in service of human values.

I suspect we completely agree, which would be clear if we could be more specific about what we're each addressing (if we had better language).

If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence — javra

First, I wouldn't say that anything is objectively true. I see that as a category error.

There are objective facts (states of affairs) in my view, but no objective truths. "Truth" isn't the same as "fact." Truth is a relation of a proposition to something else, and that relation is necessarily a judgment on my view. Judgments are mental phenomena. Hence truth isn't objective.

Aside from that, I unfortunately have no idea what "hold presence" might refer to. ("Hold presents," yes, just in case it's Christmastime. ;-) )

if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings, — javra

Aside from the same comments about "objective true," I wouldn't use "valid" that way, but that might not matter for anything. "Subjective," by the way, I use to refer to mental phenomena. And that's it. I'm not implying anything else with that term.

c) it is objectively true these core characteristics entail common, or universal, core wants (e.g., that of living life with minimal dolor), — javra

"Common" isn't the same as "universal," is it? I don't think that any wants are really universal, by the way. But plenty are statistically common.

it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them, — javra

I don't buy the notion of "implicit understanding." Also, you seem to be using "what is good for them" so that it's referring to something other than whatever an individual's opinion is.

It's really laborious to go through a long post like this . . . the above was just about a sixth or seventh of your post.

Do you agree that it is either a good decision or a bad decision or vaccinate your child? — VagabondSpectre

What I agree with is neither here nor there. 99.9% of the world could agree with it and would still not make it morally right to believe certain facts as presented. Believing people is not a moral question, morality, as we generally speak of it, seems to be about intent, not belief, and it rather clouds the issues for you to start using it so differently now.

Yes, the truth of vaccine effectiveness can be difficult for laymen to behold, but the truth is out there. In reality, the statistical benefits of vaccines far outweigh any risks (the validity of statistical analyses are not a matter of personal preference). — VagabondSpectre

You may well be in the privileged position to have first hand access to the relevant information, in which case I don't doubt you could make an excellent moral choice. I, like most people, have only access to what an ultimately very small group of people have told me. Are you seriously suggesting that trusting the government is a moral obligation?

Do vaccines lead to more disease and suffering, or less disease and suffering? — VagabondSpectre

If you had the slightest understanding of epidemiological statistics you would know that such a question cannot possibly be answered with any certainty, and even if it could, such a study could only be carried out by a few large organisations with access to the data. Again, is trusting the word of some organisation or other a moral obligation?

You're basically agreeing that, potentially, the only different between a moral doctor who supports vaccinations and an immoral and superstitious parent who is refuses to vaccinate their child is ignorance. — VagabondSpectre

No, unless you have direct access to the actual data then it is trust, not ignorance.

First, I wouldn't say that anything is objectively true. I see that as a category error. — Terrapin Station

I was making use of terminology previously used in this thread. The rest seems to also be about nitpicking semantics. Ignore what I said, then.

When you say "the moral part", you're appealing to a meta-ethical definition of morality as theoretical. When I say it, I appeal to morality as an applied [meta]-physics in service of human values. — VagabondSpectre

?? I'm referring to stances a la "x is good/right conduct," "x is bad/wrong conduct," "x is morally permissible," "x is morally obligatory" etc. So no, that's nothing meta-ethical.

"x is good/right conduct" and the like are what morality/moral stances are.

"x causes autism," "x doesn't cause autism" and the like are not morality/moral stances.

I was making use of terminology previously used in this thread. The rest seems to also be about nitpicking semantics. Ignore what I said, then. — javra

It's difficult to agree with something if I'm not sure what it's claiming, and I'm not sure if you're just using words in different ways than I would or if you believe that different things are the case than I do.

?? I'm referring to stances a la "x is good/right conduct," "x is bad/wrong conduct," "x is morally permissible," "x is morally obligatory" etc. So no, that's nothing meta-ethical. — Terrapin Station

You're saying that moral "truth" has to not depend on human preference, because human preference is not objective. That's meta-ethical.

"x causes autism," "x doesn't cause autism" and the like are nor morality/moral stances. — Terrapin Station

No, but the stances we take on issues like these factual issues do impact our moral actions and arguments. In other words, whether or not it is true that X causes autism can determine whether or not an action is moral (especially when disagreement about objectives are neither here nor there).

Fair enough. Never mind my post. I don't have the heart to enter into discussions about the proper significance of all the terms you've pointed out.

You're saying that moral "truth" has to not depend on human preference, because human preference is not objective. That's meta-ethical. — VagabondSpectre

In the bit we were just talking about, I was pointing out that the facts you're talking about have nothing to do with ethics. I wasn't saying anything about the requirements for moral truth etc.--at least not aside from the requirement that we're actually talking about morality "x is good/right conduct" etc. and not stuff that has nothing to do with morality "x causes/does not cause autism" for example.

No, but the stances we take on issues like these factual issues do impact our moral actions and arguments. — VagabondSpectre

Sure. That just doesn't enable us to say that any part of the moral stuff is objective (to any extent).

In other words, whether or not it is true that X causes autism can determine whether or not an action is moral — VagabondSpectre

It can't do that objectively. It can do that subjectively, relative to an individual's preferences, though, sure.

Yeah, it's probably too much to go through due to very different paradigms or something . . . but that's one reason I prefer to keep posts short.

Are you seriously suggesting that trusting the government is a moral obligation? — Isaac

I haven't brought the government into this. In fact, all I suggested was that there is indeed a correct answer to the question of whether or not vaccines are harmful/worth the risk. At first I didn't even give an explicit answer to the question, although I did allude to my own position. I was just using it as an example to make the point that some courses of action are objectively morally superior/inferior to others per our values, and that sometimes when we disagree about matters of fact, we disagree about which choices are best as a result.

It can't do that objectively. It can do that subjectively, relative to an individual's preferences, though, sure. — Terrapin Station

In the same way that the scientific method "objectively" serves the subjective starting goal of acquiring predictive knowledge, morality can "objectively" serve the subjective starting goals of human beings. This makes moral truth relative to the values of interested moral agents, but there is obviously still an objective component to our moral arguments.

When people say morality is "mere" preference, they're ignoring the bulk of what it is we do when we do morality, which is figuring out how to best accommodate our existing values (a largely empirical question). This is why I'm accusing you of having a malformed meta-ethical definition: just because morality is not universal doesn't mean we cannot or need not strive for objectively better moral arguments for the situations/values we find ourselves in and with.

It can't do that objectively. It can do that subjectively, relative to an individual's preferences, though, sure. — Terrapin Station

"Subjectively, relative" - No.

The fact itself is objective, and the way it relates to existing values is objective. Only the values are subjective.

In other words, if you know the starting moral values, and you know the matters of facts, then you can objectively evaluate the moral superiority/inferiority of moral arguments.

When people say morality is "mere" preference, they're ignoring the bulk of what it is we do when we do morality, — VagabondSpectre

When I say that morality is mere preference, what I'm saying is that "x is good" and the like are mental phenomena and do not occur elsewhere. That's all that I'm saying. I'm not ignoring anything, I'm simply focusing on a very specific ontological claim.

Some people believe that "x is good" occurs in the world extramentally. It does not.

My view is that morality is evolved thought, and in that sense is a something and not a nothing, certainly more than an individual's mere opinion. — tim wood

I agree. I hold that morality is an emergent property of living in a society. There are at least some knowable moral truths. For example, you don’t boil babies. This is a moral truth, not just mere opinion where individuals feel disgust.

It's true or false that they have that opinion, yes. It's not true or false that cauliflower is good, which is another way of stating the same opinion. It would be true or false that they think it's good, though.

Anyway, you're ignoring what I'm asking you. — Terrapin Station

But it is true (or false) with respect to the appurtenant criteria. Which is how it is with every true proposition. Or it's an expression of belief and thereby beyond the reach of analysis. In every case, though, the claim is qualified. Cauliflower is good either is a fact in respect of some criteria, or a belief, and there is no criteria. Perhaps you're misled by most folks omitting the complete statement.

What is it you think I'm ignoring. And to be sure, I asked you for a example.

It's not true or false that cauliflower is good, — Terrapin Station

It’s true or false that cauliflower is good for nutrition, just as it’s true or false that boiling babies is good for society. A psychopath might enjoy boiling babies, but it is still morally wrong.