Because moral truth (for you) can depend on more than what is in your own mind, it must also consider what is in the minds of others.

To not consider others at all differs from the common fundamental conception of what morality is supposed to do (otherwise it's just regular greedy planning). It's not just what I believe is best for me, it's what I believe is best for me while considering what is best for others.

The intra classification was just an over-fancy way of saying that we must also negotiate our own competing internal values in addition to negotiating the values of others.

If the very definition is that it's preferences of interpersonal behavior, why would we need to point that out again? And why would anyone think that it's not influenced by, in response to, etc. other people. Wouldn't that be obvious?

Wouldn't that be obvious? — Terrapin Station

Because consideration in this case means more than just being aware of. A serial killer carefully considers the ramifications of their preferred interpersonal behavior, but they do not extend "moral consideration".

A hard moral relativist might conceptualize raw preferences (any behavior) as encompassing the moral sphere, but there's more to the equation: the way our preferences relate to others, the preferences of others, and our circumstantially available courses of action.

Behavior which extends no moral consideration toward others is not moral behavior.

A serial killer carefully considers the ramifications of their preferred interpersonal behavior, but they do not extend "moral consideration". — VagabondSpectre

That I don't at all agree with. They reach a different "conclusion" than most people. That doesn't mean that they're not reaching moral stances.

That I don't at all agree with. They reach a different "conclusion" than most people. That doesn't mean that they're not reaching moral stances. — Terrapin Station

You can call them moral stances in so far as they are stances that impact others, but we can also say that such individuals are not "practicing morality" because they do not value or consider the needs of others.

Can you imagine a world without morality? Where nobody has the care or foresight to account for how their behavior impacts others? The way you frame morality, a world of psychopaths/sociopaths would still contain morality, but there would be no shareable or useful moral meaning; if how we affect others doesn't matter, then morality doesn't matter.

You're writing "consider the needs of others" but I'm guessing you have in mind something more like "acquiesce to the needs of others." There's no evidence that serial killers don't think about the needs of others. They simply reach different conclusions there.

In acquiescing to the needs of others, are you also acquiescing to the needs of serial killers, for example?

And no, I can't imagine a world without morality, because I don't believe it's possible given what human minds are like. Unless someone is a "vegetable," they're going to have stances on acceptable versus unacceptable interpersonal behavior.

Oh but we can. FGM is indeed erroneous... — VagabondSpectre

That's irrelevant to morality. Whether it's immoral is what's relevant. You'd have to connect the two, but there's no necessary connection, and to say that this is an example where something is immoral because it is erroneous (according to some standard) is just to make a moral judgement founded in moral feeling. That we share the same judgement is not that we're correct in any kind of transcendent sense.

You've said a lot, but it isn't really doing anything. The same basic problems remain.

Oh but we can. FGM is indeed erroneous... — VagabondSpectre

FGM is not a maths sum, it cannot be erroneous. A person committing it could be in error in thinking that doing so will lead to an outcome they desire/value, but the only way to check that would be to wait until the end of their life (including any afterlife, if they believe in such a thing) and tot up the total effect of the action. We can, and do, of course make predictions about the likely result of this calculus, but as with all predictions in complex systems they will vary depending on the model used. (and just pre-emting a possible "but some models are better than others" retort, just re-read this paragraph, my response would be the same. We can't possibly tell until the end of all time when we do the final count).

The individuals being unwillingly extorted into carrying out FGM aren't who I'm calling stupid/immoral/unenlightened... — VagabondSpectre

Then who are you calling stupid/immoral/unenlightened (three very different accusations by the way)? Do you think the people in those societies doing the ostracising are somehow less constrained by their culture?

I think we can safely say that removing clitorides doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails. — VagabondSpectre

There you go undoing exactly what you just said. So if removing clitorises "doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.", then which is true of the actual people who do it - are they stupid, immoral, or unenlightened? They must be one of those three because they are carrying out a practice where the damage does not outweigh the gain. They must either be cruel and want to damage their own children, or they are stupid and can't work out that the damage does not outweigh the gain. Yet you just said that you are not calling the people extorted into carrying it out stupid or immoral.

It's not clear at all that you agree FGM is morally errant. Why else would you object so profusely when I condemn the practice? — VagabondSpectre

You have not condemned the practice, and I have not defended it. You claimed that it was objectively immoral, and I claimed it was subjectively so. Your claim is that it objectively causes more harm than good, even if we share values about what 'harm' and 'good' are. I'm saying that such calculations are not so simple in complex societies where a lot of things would have to change all at once to make that true for any given individual.

When did I say that the west is perfect? The west is "enlightened" in that we know better than to practice or tolerate FGM. From our vantage point, we can see why FGM is not good. — VagabondSpectre

What exactly do you think our 'vantage point' is? What data have we found out that we could provide to women who want their daughters to undergo fgm, that they, in their less advantageous position, are lacking? That it hurts? I suspect they already know that. That it's risky? Do you think they just hadn't noticed the infections and deaths? That it interferes will a woman's sex life? I think in many cases, that's the point. So, what bit of data do you think they're lacking that our enlightened culture has discovered?

The idea that god exists and has some intentions about how we ought behave is an empirical claim, and it can be tested with empirical science and evidence based reasoning — VagabondSpectre

Not even going to give this any credence. How on earth would science test the theory that you will not get into heaven if you've been vaccinated?

Virtue ethics is really only good so far as it is useful to the people who wield it. — VagabondSpectre

You're just not getting it are you? I'll try it in bold. How can you possibly measure useful when some people's idea of use extends to future generations and even the afterlife? How on earth do you intend to measure that? Are you going to just pop to the end of the world and see how it all worked out? Don't forget to drop in to heaven, valhalla, the spirit world and Mount olympus on your way back.

Ah Ah Ah, you said virtue ethics wasn't utilitarian! Where's the contrast? You've just described utilitarianism by intuitive guesswork. — VagabondSpectre

Yes. You've just answered your own question. Intuitive guesswork. I explained it perfectly clearly olin my last post. The consequences of any action are so complex to work out for anything but the immediate future that it is more important to feel right about your actions than it is to have calculated their consequences. It's not rocket science.

Consider how instinctively you leapt to the defense of genital mutilators and anti-vax parents (although the latter might be a bad example if you're ignorant of the science). You know FGM is wrong, but you won't allow yourself to cast judgment upon the practice because it's not universally "true" that FGM is immoral, 'cause subjective preference. Wouldn't it be better (morally, even) if you had an argument that could persuade the perpetrators of FGM that it is wrong? (Let's say, a utility-inclusive argument?) — VagabondSpectre

Firstly, I haven't leapt to the defense of anyone or anything. I'm saying that data is not sufficient to produce a moral duty even in a situation of shared moral values because data is inevitably limited. One cannot simply present the 'scientifically approved way' of getting x from y and then demand that everyone who wants to get x from y follow it.

You're treating really complex social and psychological issues as if they were maths equations. If a company wanted to build a bridge, they'd consult an engineer, but even in such a simple situation as bridge-building, they wouldn't necessarily just take the engineer's advice. They might need to think about the cost effectiveness, their business model, the advertising, whether the materials meet their sustainability policy, whether there's uncertainty about the design, whether their insurance will cover the risk. And that's just a bridge. You're suggesting the whole complex of social interaction and individual choice can be handed over to a few experts.

FGM is not a maths sum — Isaac

They must either be cruel and want to damage their own children, or they are stupid and can't work out that the damage does not outweigh the gain. Yet you just said that you are not calling the people extorted into carrying it out stupid or immoral. — Isaac

He's got you there, @VagabondSpectre. I think your biggest problem is in not recognising the amoral as amoral, because your feelings get in the way of impartial judgement. That's why you seem to be misjudging others as condoning FGM. But they're not, they're just recognising that there's FGM, and there's relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", there are related factual and statistical matters, and then there's our moral feelings and judgement. There's no necessary connection linking them all together. There's no inherent moral quality in FGM, or relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", or in related factual or statistical matters. You seem trapped into thinking that it's somehow more than what it is, without realising that you're projecting.

I think that you're making this much more complicated than it needs to be. It seems obvious to me that you're just making the same sort of classic mistake which is more apparent in saying that it's objectively immoral not to brush your teeth every day, because not brushing your teeth every day increases the risk to your dental health. There's nothing objective in the morality of that.

That's irrelevant to morality. Whether it's immoral is what's relevant. You'd have to connect the two, but there's no necessary connection, and to say that this is an example where something is immoral because it is erroneous (according to some standard) is just to make a moral judgement founded in moral feeling. That we share the same judgement is not that we're correct in any kind of transcendent sense.

You've said a lot, but it isn't really doing anything. The same basic problems remain. — S

My point is that FGM is indeed morally erroneous per the fundamental moral values of the concerned victims and perpetrators. Shared or un-shared, FGM disservices their extant values (one could say that practicing FGM is itself a value, but in reality (usually) it is (erroneously) thought to serve more fundamental values that ultimately relate to well-being). If FGM is taken as a value unto itself (eg: by divine command), it can still be pitted against fundamental well-being related values, although we would be limited by our ability to undermine their faith.

FGM is not a maths sum, it cannot be erroneous. A person committing it could be in error in thinking that doing so will lead to an outcome they desire/value, but the only way to check that would be to wait until the end of their life (including any afterlife, if they believe in such a thing) and tot up the total effect of the action. We can, and do, of course make predictions about the likely result of this calculus, but as with all predictions in complex systems they will vary depending on the model used. (and just pre-emting a possible "but some models are better than others" retort, just re-read this paragraph, my response would be the same. We can't possibly tell until the end of all time when we do the final count). — Isaac

Every prediction we make is within a complex system, and we have no absolute certainty. According to this argument humans cannot know anything whatsoever about the future, so any predictive model, including science, is useless. That renders science kind of incoherent.

There you go undoing exactly what you just said. So if removing clitorises "doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.", then which is true of the actual people who do it - are they stupid, immoral, or unenlightened? They must be one of those three because they are carrying out a practice where the damage does not outweigh the gain. They must either be cruel and want to damage their own children, or they are stupid and can't work out that the damage does not outweigh the gain. Yet you just said that you are not calling the people extorted into carrying it out stupid or immoral. — Isaac

There's a difference between a parent who is extorted into carrying out FGM and a parent who extorts their child to undergo FGM. As you said, society ostracizes them, so we can apply or diffuse the pragmatic moral guilt upon those agents in society who wantonly contribute to its perpetuation.

When a parent does carry out FGM because they believe it is best for their child, they've either made a factual error (and in this case a moral error, because it subverts their own primary values), OR, they're victims of an environment (an environment which includes pragmatically blameable others) which needlessly forced FGM upon them, which then becomes the pragmatically blameable party(s)).

We can call the perpetrators stupid or immoral (in this case it's stupidity leading to moral error/immorality), and we can call the entire practice of FGM unenlightened.

Your claim is that it objectively causes more harm than good, even if we share values about what 'harm' and 'good' are. I'm saying that such calculations are not so simple in complex societies where a lot of things would have to change all at once to make that true for any given individual. — Isaac

Whether I establish an individual act of FGM as objectively bad per our shared values, or whether I establish the entire practice of FGM as objectively bad, it matters not. I chose it as an example because it isolates a practice that does not comport with the ultimate outcomes it is meant to bring about (this means the cultural-moral reasons for FGM as a practice, not the fact that individuals are being extorted into doing it).

What exactly do you think our 'vantage point' is? What data have we found out that we could provide to women who want their daughters to undergo fgm, that they, in their less advantageous position, are lacking? That it hurts? I suspect they already know that. That it's risky? Do you think they just hadn't noticed the infections and deaths? That it interferes will a woman's sex life? I think in many cases, that's the point. So, what bit of data do you think they're lacking that our enlightened culture has discovered? — Isaac

The data comes from experience/observation in and with FGM-free societies. To persuade someone, first we isolate the underlying reasons that FGM is practiced, where they are known, and we challenge them. Depending on the reasons there is plenty of insight we could offer. FGM certainly interferes with sex life, and if someone morally values controlling the sex lives of others there may be nothing immediate we can do to sway them, but I suspect that controlling the sex lives of others is itself an errant proxy for more fundamental values or beliefs (e.g: the belief that too much sex is detrimental to well-being). If we can convince them that women are capable of sexual restraint despite an intact clit, or that sex isn't actually so harmful (i.e: the well being that FGM creates does not outweigh the well-being that it destroys), then we would have a good shot. If someone believes that clitorides should be removed for religious reasons, then we have to attack the religious beliefs directly.

They lack data which gives them perspective on the factual inaccuracy of superstition, or data concerning the effects of sexual liberty in society.

Not even going to give this any credence. How on earth would science test the theory that you will not get into heaven if you've been vaccinated? — Isaac

By examining the evidence that reportedly indicates god or heaven or god's stance on vaccines and heaven. People tend to think they have good evidence for these kinds of things even when it's quite obvious they do not.

How can you possibly measure useful when some people's idea of use extends to future generations and even the afterlife? How on earth do you intend to measure that? Are you going to just pop to the end of the world and see how it all worked out? Don't forget to drop in to heaven, valhalla, the spirit world and Mount olympus on your way back. — Isaac

We attack those beliefs (beliefs which concern matters of fact, and can be well supported, or not supported at all, by evidence) by examining the evidence supporting them.

If someone believes that heaven exists, hence the utility of not picking up sticks on Sunday, but it can be shown that their portrayal of heaven or god is unlikely or incoherent (if they can be persuaded that heaven or god might not or probably does not exist, or is entirely unknowable to us), then their perception of utility would change accordingly.

Yes. You've just answered your own question. Intuitive guesswork. I explained it perfectly clearly olin my last post. The consequences of any action are so complex to work out for anything but the immediate future that it is more important to feel right about your actions than it is to have calculated their consequences. It's not rocket science. — Isaac

But you tried to distinguish between virtue ethics and utilitarianism as the latter being consequentialist, while the former not necessarily so. My point was that ultimately virtue ethics is subject to utilitarian selection by evolutionary forces.

Firstly, I haven't leapt to the defense of anyone or anything. I'm saying that data is not sufficient to produce a moral duty even in a situation of shared moral values because data is inevitably limited. One cannot simply present the 'scientifically approved way' of getting x from y and then demand that everyone who wants to get x from y follow it. — Isaac

There are some courses of action that are so clearly counter-productive to their purpose that in practice they cannot be reasonably justified. I'm not saying people should be blamed for not knowing better (though in practice we ought rebuke them), I'm saying that A) in a specific situation or context and specific goals, some actions are actually more/less productive than others, and that B) more data can help us better approximate which actions are more or less productive than others.

Let's go to my last resort example: imagine you and I are strangers in an elevator. We both want to go on living, and we're both carrying ice-picks. It would, for us, objectively, be "better" if we did not violently stab-each-other with our ice-picks. Alternatively, you are alone in an elevator with an ice-pick, and you want retain 20-20 vision. For you, objectively, gouging your own eyes out would be a worse course of action than not gouging your eyes out. Do you have any qualms related to data-insufficiency in either of these scenarios?

You're treating really complex social and psychological issues as if they were maths equations. If a company wanted to build a bridge, they'd consult an engineer, but even in such a simple situation as bridge-building, they wouldn't necessarily just take the engineer's advice. They might need to think about the cost effectiveness, their business model, the advertising, whether the materials meet their sustainability policy, whether there's uncertainty about the design, whether their insurance will cover the risk. And that's just a bridge. You're suggesting the whole complex of social interaction and individual choice can be handed over to a few experts. — Isaac

As far as our nearly universal human values are concerned, FGM is the Tacoma Narrows of bridges.

What you don't seem to be getting is that when we make moral decisions from a consequentialist perspective (decisions based on our ability to predict outcomes) sometimes we can actually do so with reasonable confidence. When we don't ground our predictions in sound empirical inquiry, we get useless bridges.

A difficult question for sure, but I think that one would have to balance the advantages of people being more likely to be right about stuff, with the disadvantages of the power that authorities would then wield to manipulate events. In most areas of science, we have mechanisms in place to prevent such a misuse of power, mainly having a large enough number of people involved and an uncensored publishing industry, but that is only a pragmatic issue. If we start saying that the mere pragmatism of being able to trust our experts (because we have good safety measures in place) becomes a moral obligation to do so (which is what I was arguing against) then we run the risk of it becoming enculturated and we can't by any means guarantee the continued good functioning of our system. — Isaac

I'm trying to envision a society which runs with a different ethos. It seems to me that the Enlightenment paradigm of a mechanical Nature, coupled with the Christian notion of the world as having been created for human use, and the Darwinian idea of survival of the fittest and the competition of all against all, and economic models based on the the idea of unlimited growth and "trickle down" economics" has led to a lack of moral sensibility in modern life.

I think the essence of moral sensibility consists in seeing ourselves as part of the seamless web of nature, and seeing our lives as inextricable threads of the social fabric. On that view what we do to nature and what we do to others we do to ourselves.

So, trusting experts presupposes that the experts we trust are not corrupt to the point that they cannot be trusted; in other words it presupposes general good will. Whether or not the actual experts in our actual society are corrupt to the extent that they are not trustworthy is indeed a difficult question.

What criteria could be used to answer such a question? Do we need specific criteria for all our judgements? Aesthetic and ethical judgements do not seem to be subject to rigidly determinable criteria. But we think in terms of the rigid mechanistic paradigm we have inherited from the early modern and Enlightenment thinkers wherein there is just one right answer to every problem. I think what's needed is more a change of paradigm than a change of criteria within the existing paradigm, a new worldview rather than specific answers to specific problems that are part of the problematic of our whole current general approach.

In theory, yes. But I don't see how either of those 'if's are ever going to be the case. — Isaac

I agree that they will never be the case within the current paradigm.

True, but this presumes the law-makers are not also so afflicted, and the law-makers are just people. If society is morally bankrupt, then surely law-makers, scientists, experts in general, who are drawn from that society will be morally bankrupt too? — Isaac

Yes, exactly! But it's always a matter of degree and individual variation, of course.

He's got you there, VagabondSpectre. I think your biggest problem is in not recognising the amoral as amoral, because your feelings get in the way of impartial judgement. That's why you seem to be misjudging others as condoning FGM. But they're not, they're just recognising that there's FGM, and there's relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", there are related factual and statistical matters, and then there's our moral feelings and judgement. There's no necessary connection linking them all together. There's no inherent moral quality in FGM, or relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", or in related factual or statistical matters. You seem trapped into thinking that it's somehow more than what it is, without realising that you're projecting. — S

In societies where FGM is broadly enforced for reasons pertaining to well-being, I wouldn't consider it amoral because it's motivated by the moral value of human well-being (Yes, this may only hold true under a meta-ethical definition of morality as a strategy in service of human moral values, and an ethical definition of human well-being as a fundamental human moral value).

I think that you're making this much more complicated than it needs to be. It seems obvious to me that you're just making the same sort of classic mistake which is more apparent in saying that it's objectively immoral not to brush your teeth every day, because not brushing your teeth every day increases the risk to your dental health. There's nothing objective in the morality of that. — S

It's objectively true that brushing your teeth has moral utility if personal dental health is of moral value, and it's also true that not brushing your teeth has less moral utility. What is morally obligatory might be a different question from what is more or less moral. What people will choose ultimately has to do with how they are persuaded by the perceived risks and rewards. If we can say that not brushing our teeth is objectively immoral per our values, we can also say that it is not severely immoral because the relative costs are not necessarily that high.

--------

The reason why I try to frame morality in this way is because in practice, various moral frameworks are almost always oriented toward serving basic human values (exceptions like divine commands themselves are often proxies for actually useful values. E.G: charity is useful for society not because it gets people into heaven, but because it strengthens the ability of individuals to contribute to society). What is persuasive is what matters most, and any objectivity we can get in the game of moral suasion is extremely useful.

Will this truth stand against the destructive tendencies of relativism? I do not think so, but neither will anything else.
— tim wood

First it was "mere" and "nothing". Now it is "destructive".

These are clear examples of loaded language. Maybe try to be more reasonable and less emotional. — S

Well, let me not be destructive, then. Perhaps a relativist reply to your comment. Here goes: what you think doesn't matter, because, after all it's all relative.

What do you think? Was that a good and constructive reply? Or do you think it was just a might destructive, in that it was dismissive of your reasoning on a basis that simply ignores your thinking altogether as, well, just relative.

But why would you care - why do you care? - as you're just a relativist anyway?

We're talking about your notion that those statements are about meeting some specific criteria, no? It's like all of a sudden you forgot the specific idea at issue, even though you brought it up and we'd been going back and forth about it for a few posts.


The orange in question might taste good, look good, be good.
— tim wood

So you're saying that rather than being an utterance of preference, approval etc. "X is good" utterances imply meeting a criterion that . . . x is good??? Seriously? — Terrapin Station

What specific criteria? So far as I know, there are no specific criteria for goodness, because goodness needs to further defined, and as well, the subject identified, both in a context. But this lack of specificity at this level of abstraction doe not mean that the concept is meaningless, any more than my not knowing your name means you do not have one.

And it is you that said the concept as applied, (that this or that is good in some way in respect of some criteria) was hopelessly meaningless. So far this is a non-sense exchange. I merely assert that an expression in ordinary language that is generally accepted as meaningful is appropriately so accepted, and is in fact meaningful You say there is not even the chance for meaning. Your claim; you demonstrate, or Hitchen's Razor for you!

Every prediction we make is within a complex system, and we have no absolute certainty. According to this argument humans cannot know anything whatsoever about the future, so any predictive model, including science, is useless. That renders science kind of incoherent. — VagabondSpectre

This is nonsense. Why would a predictive model become useless just because it is not certain? We are not 'certain' it will be sunny tomorrow, just because the weather forecast said it will be. How does that make weather forecasts "useless". The point I'm arguing against is that you seem to be saying that if the weather forecast says it's going to be sunny tomorrow, anyone carrying an umbrella just in case is morally bankrupt, they should believe wholeheartedly in what the modal tells them and act accordingly. It like talking to a religious fanatic.

As you said, society ostracizes them, so we can apply or diffuse the pragmatic moral guilt upon those agents in society who wantonly contribute to its perpetuation. — VagabondSpectre

Have you really so little idea about how social groups function? There's not a small group of men sat in shed working out what their culture is going to be and then laughing maniacally about how cruel they've managed to make it. Cultures evolve over millenia as a result of thousands of individual choices and the complex interplay of social contracts, there's no one group to blame for it being the way it is. FGM is a result of a long history of bad decisions made under difficult circumstances. It needs to be dismantled with care, respect for the victims (including those who feel pressured into arranging it) and understanding that it is part of an interconnected Web of history of which we too are a part. This "enlightened westerner" telling the backward natives what they're doing wrong" shit is from the 50s, I had hoped we'd moved on from that.

When a parent does carry out FGM because they believe it is best for their child, they've either made a factual error (and in this case a moral error, because it subverts their own primary values), OR, they're victims of an environment (an environment which includes pragmatically blameable others) which needlessly forced FGM upon them, which then becomes the pragmatically blameable party(s)). — VagabondSpectre

Right. So
a) Which is it, and in what way are you qualified to judge?
b) In the case of the second option, in what way are you qualified to judge who exactly is to blame (as opposed to themselves being a victim of their environment). Where's your objective scientific fact about who is responsible for creating the environment in which some people feel forced to commit FGM?

They lack data which gives them perspective on the factual inaccuracy of superstition, or data concerning the effects of sexual liberty in society. — VagabondSpectre

This (and that above it) is patronising bullshit. You started this off with the 'scientific facts' and even then, there's reasonable cause to doubt, but look how quickly it's descended into judgement masquerading as fact. They lack the data about the effects of sexual liberty in society? Are you seriously suggesting that what information we have about the effects of sexual liberty in society amounts to objective fact, like gravity, or the earth being round?

We don't like their cultural practices, they think they're for the best. That's all there is to it. I'm more than happy to use whatever rhetorical device works to actually get FGM to stop, including presenting cultural preferences as if they were objective fact. If it works, I'm on board with it. But this is a philosophy forum. We're discussing moral truths, not trying to convince anyone to abandon FGM.

If someone believes that heaven exists, hence the utility of not picking up sticks on Sunday, but it can be shown that their portrayal of heaven or god is unlikely or incoherent (if they can be persuaded that heaven or god might not or probably does not exist, or is entirely unknowable to us), then their perception of utility would change accordingly. — VagabondSpectre

Really. Had much luck with that? You still haven't answered my first question. What scientific evidence do you intend to present that heaven does not exist? Evidence that it might not is not good enough, because your claim is the people who did not vaccinate their children because they believe doing so will prevent them entry to heaven are "objectively wrong". Not "might be wrong". Nor even "probably wrong".

My point was that ultimately virtue ethics is subject to utilitarian selection by evolutionary forces. — VagabondSpectre

The key word there being 'ultimately' in the case of atheist virtue ethics, that means at the very least several generations away, if not, the end of time. For theist virtue ethicists, 'ultimately' includes the afterlife, so the fact that both systems 'ultimately' are about consequences, is trivial, and meaningless to this discussion.

I'm saying that A) in a specific situation or context and specific goals, some actions are actually more/less productive than others, and that B) more data can help us better approximate which actions are more or less productive than others. — VagabondSpectre

No, you're not. You're adding a third C) that we in modern Western society actually have that data and anyone who doesn't believe we do, in whatever field we claim to have it, is morally 'wrong'. You missed that. Without this last claim I entirely agree with you. There is a fact of the matter about whether vaccination is in the best long term interests of societal health. There is a fact of the matter about whether FGM is in the best interests of the victims within their current culture. There is a fact of the matter about whether attacking each other with ice picks is the best way to maintain a peaceful society. I'm not disputing that, I'm disputing your fanatical belief that 21st century wester society is in possession of all of those facts with such certainty that anyone who disagrees is just objectively wrong.

What you don't seem to be getting is that when we make moral decisions from a consequentialist perspective (decisions based on our ability to predict outcomes) sometimes we can actually do so with reasonable confidence. When we don't ground our predictions in sound empirical inquiry, we get useless bridges. — VagabondSpectre

What you don't seem to be getting is that 'reasonable confidence' does not translate to 'objectively right', and that the "soundness" of much scientific enquiry in the less physical sciences (like medicine, sociology, psychology) is justifiably moot.

we think in terms of the rigid mechanistic paradigm we have inherited from the early modern and Enlightenment thinkers wherein there is just one right answer to every problem. I think what's needed is more a change of paradigm than a change of criteria within the existing paradigm, a new worldview rather than specific answers to specific problems that are part of the problematic of our whole current general approach. — Janus

Yes, this is key I think. I phrase it in terms of dealing with uncertainty. We don't know more than we do know, by which I mean that the proportion of all there is to know about a matter that we actually do know is very small. I think the bulk of what we call ethics actually revolves around how to make decisions in the face of this uncertainty.

The arguments about fundamental values are, in my opinion, misguided. I think there's enough similarity in the way people feel about the very basic human values that most groups (particularly within cultures) can have a meaningful discussion about ethics without having to worry about the fact that it is all relative deep down. That basic level of fundamental agreement has already been dealt with. No one (who we'd want to discuss ethics with) thinks boiling babies is 'good', and so the fact that our agreement is about subjective feeling is irrelevant.

What matters is how we decide what course of action best brings about the fundamental values we (mostly) already agree on, within our community.

What specific criteria? — tim wood

How am I supposed to know? It was your idea. It's an idea that I don't agree with, hence why I was challenging it.

You say there is not even the chance for meaning. — tim wood

What I'm explaining is that if "X is good" is saying that x matches some standard or criterion for x, so that it's simply a way of saying that x has some objective property, then that doesn't at all capture the conventional idea of the "good" assessment.

It's objectively true that brushing your teeth has moral utility if personal dental health is of moral value, and it's also true that not brushing your teeth has less moral utility. — VagabondSpectre

Your blind faith is quite astonishing. Yes, today the best evidence is broadly that. Up to 2016, the advice was to use toothpaste, until a systematic review showed toothpaste to be of no statistically significant benefit to plaque removal. Only a few years ago it was to brush your teeth after meals, until it was discovered that this wears away the softened enamel and actually makes matters worse. Then it was to use alcohol mouthwash, until it was discovered that this may slightly raise the risk of oral cancer in some people. Then it was to floss, until it was shown that this may cause more gum problems than it solves.

Triclosan in some toothpastes has been shown in animal studies to modify hormone regulation and may encourage antibiotic resistant bacteria.

SLS in toothpaste has been linked by double-blind trial to aphthous ulcers.

All this is just from Wikipedia. The aim is not provide a knock-out blow against toothbrushing, the point is to try and at least put a chip in the rose-tinted glasses through which you view modern medical advice. It's a lot more complicated than you're making it out to be.

Medicine is a field made up, like any other, of normal flawed human beings. Some are ignorant (particularly about statistics), some mean (promoting what sells over what works), some are stubborn (listed as one of the biggest block to getting advisory organisations to accept evidence based medicine), some too enthusiastic (new discoveries gain statistically significantly more support regardless of their long-term results), some are well-meaning, dedicated and intelligent. To take the results of this mileau as if it were gospel truth is ridiculous.

My point is that FGM is indeed morally erroneous per the fundamental moral values of the concerned victims and perpetrators. — VagabondSpectre

Okay, so you're a subjective relativist like me.

In societies where FGM is broadly enforced for reasons pertaining to well-being, I wouldn't consider it amoral because it's motivated by the moral value of human well-being (Yes, this may only hold true under a meta-ethical definition of morality as a strategy in service of human moral values, and an ethical definition of human well-being as a fundamental human moral value). — VagabondSpectre

Well it is amoral. Let's be clear. Your evaluation is just that. There's no moral value inherent in anything, and your evaluation doesn't magically make it so. There is nothing reasonable in simply saying that something or other is a moral value in any other sense than that it is so relative to a standard, which is in turn relative to feelings. If I don't feel the same way about this standard, then it simply doesn't apply to any moral judgements or evaluations that I make. All you're really telling me is how you feel about something. Good for you?

It's objectively true that brushing your teeth has moral utility if personal dental health is of moral value, and it's also true that not brushing your teeth has less moral utility. — VagabondSpectre

Personal dental health is not of moral value. It's either morally valuable to you or it isn't. And there's nothing meaningful or relevant in saying that something has moral utility. That's not the issue at all.

If we can say that not brushing our teeth is objectively immoral per our values... — VagabondSpectre

We can't. Obviously it is only so relative to our values, so that's obviously not objective.

Well, let me not be destructive, then. Perhaps a relativist reply to your comment. Here goes: what you think doesn't matter, because, after all it's all relative. — tim wood

That's a non sequitur.

What do you think? Was that a good and constructive reply? Or do you think it was just a might destructive, in that it was dismissive of your reasoning on a basis that simply ignores your thinking altogether as, well, just relative. — tim wood

I think that it is fallacious. And it is doubly so if it is intended to represent what I'm doing. I've done the opposite by emphasising that morality is no less important under moral relativism.

But why would you care - why do you care? - as you're just a relativist anyway? — tim wood

Why wouldn't I care? You're making an illogical connection here.

And I'm not a relativist, I'm a moral relativist. I haven't claimed that everything is relative.

That's a non sequitur. — S

If point was, why should we care about the opinion about morality - from a moral relativist, if he him/herself's core belief is the position only applies to them - than I don't see it as a non sequitur.

Well, first off, it's obviously not a matter of personal preference. Moralities are systems of values associated with particular societies, traditions, and cultures. — T Clark

:up: And so we can conclude that morality is a matter of collective (social) preference, can't we? :chin:

I don't really understand S's position. He says he's a moral relativist. The trouble with relativism is that it ultimately destroys its own ground. But S doesn't like "destruction" or the like, as loaded language.

And he seems unaware that Kant answered moral relativism for all time with his categorical imperative.

That leaves S with the ethics of a fox in a hen house, or just no ethics at all.

And this:

I'm not a relativist, I'm a moral relativist. I haven't claimed that everything is relative. — S

Apparently some things are and some things are not relative. I begin to wonder if S even knows what "relative" means. What, S, is an example of something that is not relative - I assume that for you all moral judgments are relative.

Or perhaps by "relative" you mean only that everything is referenced (I..e., "relative") - indexed to - to something else. If that is all you mean, then agreed; but then everything is relative, not just some things.

If ↪tim wood
point was, why should we care about the opinion about morality - from a moral relativist, if he him/herself's core belief is the position only applies to them - than I don't see it as a non sequitur. — Rank Amateur

I think the reason @S said it was a non sequitur was the conflation of normative with meta ethics. The opinion of a subjective relativist about what is' right' in some moral question may be of no consequence, but that doesn't mean their opinion with regards to meat-ethics is. Meta-ethical positions are argued by reference to shared standards like logic and reason. Normative ethical positions are argued from a position of shared values (although all too often, not even that, making such discussions hopelessly pointless).

To say that a relativist speaking of a variety of value positions must therefore also speak from an equally heterogeneous position with regards to logic and reason is the non sequitur.

If ↪tim wood point was, why should we care about the opinion about morality - from a moral relativist, if he him/herself's core belief is the position only applies to them - than I don't see it as a non sequitur. — Rank Amateur

Why shouldn't we care? Again, your reaction seems to indicate an illogical connection. You wouldn't care if I had the moral belief that black people are an inferior race, or that murder is okay? That's just how morality is - it is relative - and yet we evidently do care. We care because we live as part of a society, and our respective moral views matter socially.

I think i see your point - What i was asking was - If Tim Wood's point was IF you are a moral relativist ( either a meta or normative one), then how can you have any basis to question the moral judgments of others. If that was the claim - i see the conclusion as following - and not a non sequitur.

Well, first off, it's obviously not a matter of personal preference. Moralities are systems of values associated with particular societies, traditions, and cultures.
— T Clark

:up: And so we can conclude that morality is a matter of collective (social) preference, can't we? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

No, because my personal moral views matter, irrespective of those of society as some sort of "collective". What if I was the only non-racist in a racist society?

Why shouldn't we care? That's how morality is, and yet we do care. We care because we live as part of a society, and our respective moral views matter socially — S

The issue I was pointing to is not that the moral relativist shouldn't care, but why would he comment. My understanding of moral relativism would be something like this " that action is different than my moral belief, oh well, guess his is different ". I thought moral relativity encompasses an acceptance of the moral positions of others. So what would be the moral relativists standing - in passing a moral judgement on others be ? In that case he is no longer a moral relativist, he just thinks his moral view is right. That is not my understanding of moral relativism -

Aside - that is the most times I have ever used "moral relativist" in one paragraph in my whole life.

The issue I was pointing to is not that the moral relativist shouldn't care, but why would he comment. — Rank Amateur

Why wouldn't he?

My understanding of moral relativism would be something like this " that action is different than my moral belief, oh well, guess his is different ". — Rank Amateur

Then you have a very poor understanding of moral relativism. Unfortunately, these sort of misunderstandings are common. I don't accept that the moral beliefs of others are just different. Obviously I think that, for example, someone who has the moral belief that murder is okay, is wrong - wrong relative to my strong feelings against it. I'm no different to you in this regard.

I thought moral relativity encompasses an acceptance of the moral positions of others. — Rank Amateur

You thought wrong.

So what would be the moral relativists standing - in passing a moral judgement on others be ? In that case he is no longer a moral relativist, he just thinks his moral view is right. That is not my understanding of moral relativism - — Rank Amateur

No, of course he is still a moral relativist, because obviously he interprets his moral view being right in accordance with how a moral relativist would do so, and not in a contradictory way involving a different interpretation. You can't just smuggle in an outside interpretation and pretend that the moral relativist is being inconsistent.