no issue with that - if as equal moral relativists we accept each others relative moral judgments. If that is what you are saying. — Rank Amateur

What you just said is too ambiguous for me to say whether or not I agree with it. I don't morally accept someone else's moral judgement if it doesn't accord with my own. I don't accept that murdering children is okay. And that's what matters. Some people seem to be blind to this. Again, I'm not an amoralist just because I'm a moral relativist. That connection is illogical.

Spot on!

i have no issue with that at all - but the relative art critic must accept relative judgment of other relative art critics

but the relative art critic must accept relative judgment of other relative art critics — Rank Amateur

Accept it how? Accept that they have a different judgment? Or accept it in the sense of saying, "Well, that's as good as my own judgment"?

Okay, subjectively two competing stances aren't on equal ground, are they? — Terrapin Station

I think competing stances between moral relativists are on completely equal ground - by definition

I think competing stances between moral relativists are on completely equal ground - by definition — Rank Amateur

If moral stances are preferences, and you have preference A, how is preference ~A just as good to you?

can't play these word games with you. I have restated the concept like 4 times to you - i can't do it any better sorry - I am out of other ways to say it

can't play these word games with you. I have restated the concept like 4 times to you - i can't do it any better sorry - I am out of other ways to say it — Rank Amateur

There's no word game to this. I'm not hinging anything I'm saying on any particular words.

I'm trying to explain the point of view to you so that you can understand it. I'm trying to keep things very simple and ask very simple questions.

Sure, every art critic has their own judgements which will differ from others. The point is that some judgements are better than others just as some works are better than others, and we know this is true, and it can be detremined in extreme cases of difference, but in cases of subtle difference precision is not possible.

we are talking past each other - i don't feel you understand the point I am making - I am very sure that is my fault - but I am out of ways to explain it

The point is that some judgements are better than others just as some works are better than others, and we know this is true, and it can be detremined in extreme cases of difference, — Janus

I don't at all agree with that by the way. (Given that you're implying that some judgments are better than others objectively, or that it's true that they are, etc.)

I understand it, but I'm trying to explain the conceptual framework issues that are causing your lack of understanding of the relativist view.

how can one relative judgement be better than another relative judgment - by definition they are equal - they can only be unequal if there is some objective criteria they can be evaluated against - and then they are not relative anymore.

ok - can you try it one more time in a complete though ?

Look at it this way, with something that's less controversially a matter of preferences:

Say that Joe prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish.

Bob, though, prefers horseradish to pizza.

Is Joe going to say, "From my perspective, Bob's preference is just as good as mine"?

Wouldn't that imply that Joe doesn't actually have a preference between pizza and horseradish? If one preference is just as good to Joe as another from his perspective, then he shouldn't have a preference in the first place. This is pretty wrapped up in how preferences work/what they are.

Some judgements are better than others; the word "objectively" is meaningless in this context, unless it refers to something like 'in accordance with the best subjective feelings'.

Some judgements are better than others; the word "objectively" is meaningless in this context, unless it refers to something like 'in accordance with the best subjective feelings'. — Janus

The best subjective feelings per some individual's subjective judgment? (But likely not others?)

I think the notion of objectivity is confusing you here. You are thinking that two subjective judgements must be from an objective point of view equal. There is no such objective point of view; all points of view are subjective. Yet some points of view are subjectively better than others; which means more in accordance with the best and highest subjective feelings and views.

No, not per any particular individual's judgement. Think of it this way; some subjective views are poison, and others are manna. The subjective view that torturing babies is good, for example, is poison, subjectively speaking. The subjective view that it is good to feel compassion for all beings is manna, subjectively speaking.

No, not per any particular individual's judgement — Janus

There's no "not in any particular individual's judgment 'better'," so that's a problem.

There's no "not in any particular individual's judgment" assessment of poison versus not poison.

Aztecs are known for cutting the living hearts out of their human sacrifices. Thuggees, in India, as a matter of faith felt they ought to strangle strangers. Anyone willing to dismiss these as mere exercises of a relative morality themselves neither right nor wrong probably should be excused from this thread.

A big clue is that neither Aztecs nor Thuggees felt themselves free to carve or strangle just any old anyone, rather they had criteria. The point being that there were people they had no intention of murdering. Implicit is that they murdered for some reason. Thus, under their beliefs, their acts were understandable - capable of being understood pursuant to some impetus to murder. Not at all the same as you're ok I'm ok. The question then arises were their reasons good, and we here now are satisfied that their reasons were not good.

And because they usually were selective about who they murdered, it's reasonable to suppose there were people they did not want to murder, or have murdered, including themselves! Implicit here are the absolute standards that the relativist chooses not to see, for some reason. I say "chooses" because while moral relativism may appeal to thirteen-years-old boys, nearly all grow out of it as they approach adulthood; that is, it's a choice for the post-pubescent crowd.

That is, look closely enough and there's a right and a wrong, a moral and an immoral. But it's not too difficult to make excuses for not looking.

And, Kant a joke? Sometimes the joke is on him who thinks it's a joke.

Accept it how? Accept that they have a different judgment? Or accept it in the sense of saying, "Well, that's as good as my own judgment"? — Terrapin Station

Exactly. That's what I meant in my reply to him about what he said being too ambiguous.

Of course there is. Individual subjective views are more or less consonant with general subjective human good will. Only the sociopath (if they are being honest) is going to say that it could be morally better to feel enmity, or even indifference, to all beings, than to feel love for them.

That is, look closely enough and there's a right and a wrong, a moral and an immoral. But it's not too difficult to make excuses for not looking. — tim wood

If it's so clear, all you need to do is to point out how we'd observe/check/etc. the objective moral stances.

The answer, of course, can't be merely what anyone thinks/feels, because that wouldn't be evidence of anything objective. The answer would have to point to something independent of persons' opinions, the independent thing that their opinions can get right or match, versus get wrong or fail to match.

Look at it this way, with something that's less controversially a matter of preferences:

Say that Joe prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish.

Bob, though, prefers horseradish to pizza.

Is Joe going to say, "From my perspective, Bob's preference is just as good as mine"?

Wouldn't that imply that Joe doesn't actually have a preference between pizza and horseradish? If one preference is just as good to Joe as another from his perspective, then he shouldn't have a preference in the first place. This is pretty wrapped up in how preferences work/what they are. — Terrapin Station

That's a good way of explaining it. Hopefully those who make the error you're explaining will see why it is an error, and why it makes no sense whatsoever.

Individual subjective views are more or less consonant with general subjective human good will. — Janus

More or less similar to the norm or the statistically common views, sure. You're not suggesting that something being statistically common makes it right, are you? Because that's simply the argumentum ad populum fallacy.

I don't think it's a good way of explaining it at all. Culinary and moral preferences are not at all of equal consequence to human life. Aesthetic tastes are somewhere in between.

It's not an argument ad populum; it's an acknowledgement that there is an inherently normative aspect to what makes a healthy human subject; and valuing torturing innocents, for example, is not, never can be, an aspect of a healthy human subject.

Aztecs are known for cutting the living hearts out of their human sacrifices. Thuggees, in India, as a matter of faith felt they ought to strangle strangers. Anyone willing to dismiss these as mere exercises of a relative morality themselves neither right nor wrong probably should be excused from this thread. — tim wood

Anyone who obstinately persists in their own misunderstanding of what the other side is arguing should take a time out and consider the principle of charity.

Now go and sit on the naughty step.

Culinary and moral preferences are not at all of equal consequence to human life. — Janus

But the explanation had nothing at all to do with whether anything is of equal consequence. That's a pretty serious misunderstanding of the gist of the analogy.