No, i will not admit my use of correct vs your use of right makes my position unreasonable. Especially since i didn't take any position in the options. And gave you an non or the above option to describe it yourself. — Rank Amateur

Empty words. You are a dogmatist, and you aren't being reasonable, whether you like it or not, unless you attempt to support the following:

My view is slavery was always wrong, and the culture that allowed it was incorrect. — Rank Amateur

well if this is your view on moral judgments

No, because I'm ultimately an individualistic moral relativist. I only accept cultural relativism as just another way of pointing out moral relations. It is useful, and it reflects a sort of truth. But I don't actually depend on any cultural reference, because I can just say, for example, that murder is wrong relative to my judgement. That's about me and my judgement, not any culture. — S

then my answer to this

Empty words. You are a dogmatist, and you aren't being reasonable, whether you like it or not, unless you attempt to support the following:

My view is slavery was always wrong, and the culture that allowed it was incorrect.
— Rank Amateur — S

Is is my individual moral judgement, and it requires no support at all.

Still want to get back to this. Your view is there is no truth statement we can make about the rightness of slavery without a cultural reference. Is this correct? — Rank Amateur

Agree completely , the issue is, do you think that means, as S does, that there is no truth statement we can make about slavery without cultural context.

Turning this around, and using ↪S word. Cultural norms are always right, the subject of their judgments are variable.

And does that mean that it is objectively true, that the prevalent cultural norms, whatever they are, are by definition right? — Rank Amateur

If you want to boil things down, then no. The cultural is not the foundation of morality. This is what I was arguing about with T Clark earlier. The cultural is just a reference point. Ultimately morality is my morality, my moral judgement, my moral feelings. I can consider your morality, but mine is king.

It is my individual moral judgement, and it requires no support at all. — Rank Amateur

Moral judgement relates to right and wrong, not to correct and incorrect. You can judge correct and incorrect, but that's not a moral category of judgement. And if you're just saying that slavery has always been wrong relative to your moral judgement, then that's fine. It has always been wrong relative to my moral judgement also.

Moral judgement is right and wrong, not correct and incorrect. And if you're just saying that slavery has always been wrong relative to your judgement, then that's fine. It has always been wrong relative to my judgement also — S

ok - agree

now if I say relative to my judgement there is nothing wrong with slavery. Other than saying you disagree, and use whatever you can muster to attempt to change my mind. If I don't change my mind, and according to your moral view - I am just wrong relative to you, and right relative to me. And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery.

ok - agree

now if I say relative to my judgement there is nothing wrong with slavery. Other than saying you disagree, and use whatever you can muster to attempt to change my mind. If I don't change my mind, and according to your moral view - I am just wrong relative to you, and right relative to me. And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery. — Rank Amateur

It looks like you're finally getting it! If by no "real truth" you mean no objective or absolute truth to be found in moral statements, then yes! So it is either error theory, where all moral statements are false, or moral relativism, where truth and falsity is recovered.

And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery. — Rank Amateur

No true statement of morality that we can make. Correct.

And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery. — Rank Amateur

Yes!

Thanks and thanks - that is fine, we just disagree then.

Thanks and thanks - that is fine, we just disagree then. — Rank Amateur

But again, you haven't shown that your disagreement is reasonable. Can you demonstrate a "real truth"?

ok - then we just disagree. Which is fine - I think there is a truth statement we can make about slavery.

But again, you haven't shown that your disagreement is reasonable. Can you demonstrate a "real truth"? — S

what would be the motivation for me to argue a truth statement to an individual moral relativist. No matter what I say, you can just always say - "not relative to me"

So unless i find some compulsion to change you relative view - why would i bother?

Ok - then we just disagree. Which is fine - I think there is a truth statement we can make about slavery. — Rank Amateur

No, it's not fine, because this is philosophy, and that's not being philosophical. That's more of a religious mindset. Urgh. Kill it with fire.

And to be clear, I assumed a translation of the above quote which maintains logical relevance. Meaning that you're talking about "real truth", i.e. objective or absolute truth, and in relation to moral statements. If you won't be clear about that, then I guess I'll have to be clear about it for you, although that's a bit of a pain.

If there is some philosophical rule that says we have to agree - it has been widely ignored for a very long time. Understanding is important - agreement - not so much.

No, I think there are truth statements we can make about slavery. It’s true there was a time when slavery was prevalent, it’s true slavery is not now so prevalent. It is true slavery was deemed a necessary aspect of business, it is true slavery was a necessary aspect of war and it is true slavery was a necessary aspect of colonization. But those are obviously not moral truth statements.

No, I don’t assign truth values, or correctness, to cultural norms. I bitch a lot about the one I happen to be in, but that also is not a moral judgement on it.

And does that mean that it is objectively true, that the prevalent cultural norms, whatever they are, are by definition right? — Rank Amateur

I don’t agree with defining by right-ness, either. It is objectively true, that the prevalent cultural norms, whatever they are......are just that.

Have you ever thought about benefit, as a criterion for moral decisions, and morality in general?

what would be the motivation for me to argue a truth statement to an individual moral relativist. No matter what I say, you can just always say - "not relative to me"

So unless i find some compulsion to change you relative view - why would i bother? — Rank Amateur

No, we were talking about what you called "real truth" (in relation to moral statements), remember? What you call "real truth" can't be relative if it is absolute, and it can't be subjective if it is objective. Don't revert back to truth, as though they are one and the same. You seem to forget that there is truth and true statements under moral relativism, just of a different kind.

If you were to demonstrate such a moral "real" truth, then you would have refuted moral antirealism, which covers a whole range of ethical positions, including moral relativism, moral subjectivism, moral nihilism, emotivism, and error theory. So please, go ahead and try. I would love to see you give that a go.

Validity is a logical idea, and it obtains when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false and/or impossible for premises to be true. — Terrapin Station

Not so. "Validity" as a term of art from logic simply refers to the form of an argument. Plenty of invalid arguments have true conclusions. Plenty of valid arguments have false premises.

moral stances aren't true or false.

Really? Murder is immoral is a moral stance. Please demonstrate - prove - that it is not true. It is certainly moral stance. That leaves the content, that murder is immoral. It won't do to appeal to opinion or relativity. It's no proof of anything to say that so-and-so says it's so - excepting that so-and-so does say it, and that is what you prove.

Re perspective, the reason for the question is that there is no person from whose perspective all moral stances are "equal." So we must be talking about the perspective of someone other than an individual considering moral stances. So what perspective are we talking about?

Perhaps no personal stance. I agree that personal stances are personal. But not all stances are grounded therein, are they. To demonstrate those, and that they are not merely personal, is a function of reason. Do you accept reason? And do you accept that reason has a place at this table?

If there is some philosophical rule that says we have to agree - it has been widely ignored for a very long time. Understanding is important - agreement - not so much. — Rank Amateur

We don't have to agree on the issue. Just admit that you're not being philosophical about it, and we can move on. Being philosophical about it does not consist in, "I just disagree, and I offer no explanation or attempt to support my position or anything of that nature".

you have already said that all truth is relative to your view of it. Again unless I feel some need to change your views on the nature of morality, why would I argue truth with someone who says relative to him. There is no point

Not so. "Validity" as a term of art from logic simply refers to the form of an argument. Plenty of invalid arguments have true conclusions. Plenty of valid arguments have false premises. — tim wood

Yeah, it's a term of art from logic defined as impossibility that a conclusion is false and/or conclusions are true.

See for example: https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

I'll move on after we straighten this out.

You have already said that all truth is relative to your view of it. Again unless I feel some need to change your views on the nature of morality, why would I argue truth with someone who says relative to him. There is no point — Rank Amateur

I have explained the problem here already. You just aren't getting it and you're sending us around in circles.

You said that you believe that there is a "real truth" in relation to moral statements, did you not? By that, were you not suggesting that you believe that there is a truth in relation to moral statements which is absolute? If so, and if you can demonstrate that, then by doing so, you will have refuted moral relativism and a number of other ethical positions. I could not reply that it is relative without contradiction.

What part of that do you not understand? Do you claim that you can demonstrate that or not? Yes or no?

This isn't about me, it is about you.

Validity is a logical idea, and it obtains when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false and/or impossible for premises to be true. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, it's a term of art from logic defined as impossibility that a conclusion is false and/or conclusions are true. — Terrapin Station

From your source:
"A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false."

I think you might gain from reading the article again, or at least once, and by noting the differences between what you copied and what it actually says. Sometimes differences make a difference!

From your source:
"A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false."

I think you might gain from reading the article again, or at least once, and by noting the differences between what you copied and what it actually says. Sometimes differences make a difference! — tim wood

What do you think the important differences are (between what you're quoting there and what I said)? (I know what you might answer, but that will give me a chance to explain other things to you that apparently you're not familiar with or never understood up to this point)

You have already said that all truth is relative to your view of it. Again unless I feel some need to change your views on the nature of morality, why would I argue truth with someone who says relative to him. There is no point — Rank Amateur

Also, you don't seem to recognise or appreciate how sophisticated my ethical position is. It is pragmatic and flexible, not rigid. If you want to talk about truth-values in relation to moral statements in an absolutist or objective sense, then we can do so. That leads to nonsense or falsity. I would be an error theorist, rather than a moral relativist, in that situation.

What do you think the important differences are? (I know what you might answer, but that will give me a chance to explain other things to you that apparently you're not familiar with or never understood up to this point) — Terrapin Station

Well I'd welcome that! Sometimes education occurs on this site, and I value every instance of it.

The important difference is that what you suppose to be about content (soundness) is actually about form (independent of content).

All m is P
All S is m
Therefore all S is P, is a valid deductive argument. (It even has a name, Barbara). Are you prepared to argue the content is true?

Explain. You have an attentive reader!

The important difference is that what you suppose to be about content (soundness) is actually about form (independent of content). — tim wood

Say what? That wasn't a response I expected.

I didn't say anything about soundness. I didn't define soundness. So from where are you getting that I'm supposing something to be about content or soundness?

Here's what I said again: "Validity obtains when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false and/or impossible for premises to be true."

You can break that up, make it simpler, so that we're saying that validity obtains in three cases:

(1) when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false
OR
(2) when it's impossible for premises to be true
OR
(3) both (1) and (2), or in other words, when it's impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false

Soundness, on the other hand, is defined as a valid argument with true premises.

The definition of validity doesn't imply true premises, as one situation wherein validity obtains is (2), when it's impossible for the premises to be true. If it's impossible for the premises to be true, then the premises aren't true, and the argument isn't sound. Nevertheless, it's valid.

(1) above can obtain when a conclusion is a tautology. In that case it's irrelevant what the premises are.

(2) above can obtain when the premises are contradictory. In that case it's irrelevant what the conclusion is. (And this is the source of the "everything follows from a contradiction" saying.)

(3) is only the case when the conclusion follows from the premises. Relevance logics require (3)--they require that the premises and conclusion have something to do with each other (hence why they're relevance logics), and dispense with the traditional interpretation of validity that allows (1) and (2).

Also, you don't seem to recognise or appreciate how sophisticated my ethical position is. It is pragmatic and flexible, not rigid. If you want to talk about truth-values in relation to moral statements in an absolutist or objective sense, then we can do so. That leads to nonsense or falsity. I would be an error theorist, rather than a moral relativist, in that situation. — S

If you want to do some of the heavy lifting, feel free to make an argument against my position that:

Slavery is morally wrong in all circumstances, in every time, and no matter the individual that is evaluating it.

I would be interested in hearing your argument. If you feel no compulsion to change my mind, I am fine with that as well.

Re perspective, the reason for the question is that there is no person from whose perspective all moral stances are "equal." So we must be talking about the perspective of someone other than an individual considering moral stances. So what perspective are we talking about? — Terrapin Station

If moral relativism were true, then from the point of view of the disinterested observer all moral positions on any issue would be equally valid.

If moral relativism were true, then from the point of view of the disinterested observer all moral positions on any issue would be equally valid. — Janus

In other words, you'd have to be saying that "from the point of view of someone who has no moral preferences at all, but who is considering the moral preferences of others" . . . it's just that there isn't actually anyone who is conscious but who fits that description.