But to be honest, the biggest reason I keep reading is that some of the nonsense people write is hilarious... — Isaac

True dat. :lol:

understand, my bad - my issues is source - mea culpa - typed too fast - apologies — Rank Amateur

No problem.

The categorical imperative is a misrepresentation. Anscombe actually said “...his rule on universalized maxims is useless without stipulations....”.

“....A maxim is the subjective principle of volition...”
(Kant FPMM, 1785)

"...Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time will it to be a universal law"; this is the sole condition under which a will can never contradict itself; and such an imperative is categorical....”
(ibid)

It is clear the maxim, the subjective principle, being universalized is antecedent to an imperative behavior. It is the rule that’s claimed to be useless, and the categorical imperative is not a rule. It is a law. The difference is critical to deontological moral philosophy in general, and Kant’s mandate for pure practical reason, the concept of an autonomous, freely determinant will, in particular.

“....there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, (...) and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. (...) the categorical imperative, is not limited by any condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary, may be quite properly called a command....”
(ibid)

Hypothetical imperatives are rules, and if Anscombe’s thesis is to have power, she must only refer to these alone, in which case the they would be useless without a stipulation, which is not necessarily given:
“....When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition...”
(ibid)

The view to constructing a maxim, with respect to hypothetical imperatives, is nothing more than addressing whatever arbitrary want the description of the action provides. The view to constructing a maxim, with respect to a categorical imperative, involves a command of will, by which the description of the action must abide without exception.

Furthermore, there are as many hypothetical imperatives as there as circumstances that call for a moral determination and their respective maxims are just as many, as suits the mood of the will determining them. But there is one and only one categorical imperative, which demands the maxim one wills to become universal law, from which a certain act must follow necessarily by rule of law such that the act and the law do not contradict themselves, be chosen wisely. This proposition reduces to the proposition that the determinant will (the law) and the judgement of volition (the act) do not contradict themselves.

Is there remaining a question as to what form a relevant description of an action corresponding to a universalized maxim would have? While it is true Kant does not include a description per se, he makes it quite clear what the action is doesn’t matter. If one acts as if the maxim to which the imperative relates were a universal law, he is justified in calling himself morally worthy. — Mww

... Or you could have just said "did you mean Categorical Imperetive, or did you mean maxim?"

Which makes it, in principle, objective. — ChrisH

Yes, I suppose it does, but what's important to me in the use of the terms is the pragmatic meaning, the reason why the distinction is of use to me. But I take your point.

I do not know how you get this. The entire point is that's all that you-all will acknowledge, is a feeling. I argue that the monstrousness of these bad actors is bad in itself. You-all apparently need to personally suppose it bad, but do not acknowledge it as badness. More to the point, you-all have stated that inasmuch as (presumably) the bad actors did not think their actions were bad, then it's nonsense to say they were bad.

Question: do you suppose reason and its products to be universalizable? 2+2=4 is an expression of a certain kind of reason. Is it true, or is it true-for-you but not true, or maybe not true at all, but you just go with it? Which, please? — tim wood

There's nothing about your post which hasn't already been addressed. What is the point of this crazy merry-go-round? Serious question.

Importantly, (and please acknowledge this point) there is no functionality to an objective morality, even if it exists; We are free to ignore it, should we feel differently.

Some people would dictate that the bible objectively states that homosexuality is wrong. Even if they could (they can't) objectively demonstrate this, it doesn't benefit anyone; We can ignore it, save for the punishment of hellfire, should they be able to prove it (they can't). — Edward

It's a relief to see someone who gets it, amongst others who simply don't. These are very good points. I have made them myself a number of times, and in a number of different discussions.

Some people fail to see the logic of this, and are guilty of special pleading, e.g. "Yes, but with murder it's different!".

It is a characteristically religious mindset, actually. Not like the open-mindedness of Hinduism, which is more accepting of other religions, but like the mindset of "My religion is the One True Religion, and only My Religion has authority over what's right and wrong!".

"If you don't accept my religion, then you're a heathen!"

"If you don't accept my morality, then you're a psychopath!"

And what are your qualifications for making that diagnosis? And why don't I recall undergoing a professional assessment conducted by you?

I meant what is the basis of TS's and I think your core belief that all mental phenomena is by definition subjective. — Rank Amateur

Again, that isn't a belief. It's simply a stipulation about how I use a term. Different people use the same terms in different ways. I use that term to refer to mental phenomena.

Yeah, I could have, but I was more interested in what she said.

And as on many many many other things - lack of evidence, is just lack of evidence. And even that is in dispute. And at the core of point all along. Near universal moral judgments on some issues is evidence that the source of some moral judgments could have a source outside individual mental phenomena. — Rank Amateur

That's a pretty obvious double standard.

Mere possibility isn't sufficient to believe anything, because the contradictory is usually possible, too. — Terrapin Station

Indeed, and that's what his argument boils down to. It is easily refuted. It isn't able to rule out competing explanations. Maybe there's an outside source. Maybe there isn't. It isn't difficult to imagine a possible world with either scenario. You're right to press him on how near universal judgement is evidence of what he asserts (without supporting argument) that it is evidence of, but if you expect a proper response, you'll probably end up disappointed. He is intellectually dishonest and will refuse his burden of proof, yet he also won't concede. Instead, he'll respond with red herring after red herring, until you get distracted or grow sick and tired.

Except, wait a minute. Does an outside source even make any sense in the context of morality? Maybe it's not even possible, because it's a category error.

Morality is subjective. But morality isn't the entirety of the world. There are plenty of objective things. Morality just ain't one of them. — Terrapin Station

Yes, for Christ's sake, this really shouldn't have to be clarified, let alone over and over again. I am also a moral subjectivist, but would anyone here in their right mind accuse me of idealism? Just look at my recent discussions. Look at the sheer number of criticisms I have made of it.

It beggars belief that anyone could struggle so much with such an elementary distinction.

Yeah, it's frustrating to have to keep correcting such simple things against straw men.

Yeah, it's frustrating to have to keep correcting such simple things against straw men. — Terrapin Station

And why is it only people like us who are doing so? That is telling. The people on the other side of the debate either do not detect these problems or keep silent about them. With bad arguments like that, if I was on the other side of this debate, I would actively set out to dissociate myself with them. But instead, we see a lot of back patting. "Well said!", "Good point, Tim!", "Let's jerk off to Kant together, Tim!".

If, however, you're saying that it is a fact that this additional thing exists and I must prove it doesn't in order to sustain my position, then I'd take issue with that. — Isaac

This is a general problem with him which spills over into other discussions. He either doesn't get how the burden of proof works or he deliberately disregards it. He only cares about trying to deflect attention away from his weaknesses and trying to manipulate his interlocutor into presenting justification after justification after justification, hoping to catch him out on something.

Is that an honourable way to engage in philosophical discussion?

Yeah, I could have, but I was more interested in what she said. — Mww

If you were interested in what she said, then you wouldn't need to post it on a public forum. Just read the book.

If you thought other people in this discussion might be interested, then perhaps you could explain the relevance. I raised her argument as a position against the potential granularity of statements like "murder is wrong, one should not murder", which is exactly what her argument is against, so if you have any response to that line of argument perhaps you could post that instead of the playing childish games of one-upmanship with terminology.

As Tim said, this isn't a discussion its a street fight.

OK, I guess. I’m not happy with tautological truths myself, but ehhhh.....I’ll never be famous.

Agreed on harmonious community, if one thinks of morality as an act, or a set of actions. — Mww

I don't see those formulations as "tautologous" so much as expressing the logical relation between actuality and truth. I agree that morality, if it is to have any communal significance, cannot but consist in acts. As principled intention it has significance for individuals to be sure; but where individuals do not transform intention into action I would say there can be no communal significance.

But, as I said before, I’ll never be famous, so....who cares. — Mww

I think your explication of Kant here is very good. It highlights the question as to whether Kant's CI is really categorical in relation to all acts of moral significance, or maybe rather whether it is instead the general maxim and not any specific prescriptions which is categorical in cases such as lying. As you no doubt know, one of the main objections to Kant's CI is that he is taken to claim that certain actions, for example lying, are always wrong in every situation and ought never be done under any circumstances. (What I say here would obviously not apply to acts such as murder, rape and torture).

So you have the well-worn thought experiments like what if you were in Warsaw and you had Jews hidden in your cellar, and Nazi soldiers knocked on your door and asked if you were harbouring any Jews? If the usual interpretation of Kant is assumed, then according to that you should tell the soldiers that there are Jews in your basement.

Now if you wanted to say that you should not tell them about the Jews, and were challenged to universalize that determination as a maxim it would be something like "Never lie unless Nazi soldiers are asking if you are harbouring Jews when you are harbouring Jews". That seems way too specific for a universal maxim, so perhaps we could make it less specific and say something like "Never lie except to protect the innocent from unjust harm". The problem is that it would seem to be impossible to construct an unambiguous maxim which does not consist in a treatment of morally relevant actions such as lying simpliciter which says they are just always wrong.

In one of his replies to me, @Isaac (I believe deliberately) conflates murder with killing. I think what he wrote there was a red herring, it was irrelevant to the points I had made and consisted in an attempt to undermine them by sophistry, and so I didn't think it was worth responding to. (Life is too short to waste!) The reason I bring that up is because Kant did condone capital punishment, but only as punishment for committing murder. He asserted that a convicted murderer should be killed and that it is actually our moral duty to kill him or her. (Not saying I do or don't agree with that, by the way). In any case the point is that for Kant murder is always wrong and killing is not always wrong.

Apart from Kant's requirement for an unambiguous maxim, we also have his notion of intention. If your intention is always to do what is right, according to a conscience unfettered by self-interest, and that is translated into the basis of your actions, then perhaps Kant would say that you are behaving morally.

By the way you have said "I'll never be famous" at least a couple of times now. I'm just wondering what the significance of that is. Do you want to be famous? Or do you think you ought to be famous? No criticism here; I'm just curious.

I’m aware, and I’ve already covered murder.

Call it whatever you like, directly or indirectly, but you can bet your ass Tim wasn’t talking about me when he said it. Nevertheless, I call it passing on an instruction. I’m not qualified to refute her, only to present him. Let the chips fall where they may.

Anything else?

So you have the well-worn thought experiments like what if you were in Warsaw — Janus

Yeah, The Good Professor took some serious flak for his conditions for maxims on lying. There are several references for the topic, and in typical Kantian fashion, one doesn’t say exactly the same as any other. But in an essay to the Frenchman Benjamin Constant,** he was pretty adamant in defending the subjective principle of absolute truthfulness. He justified it by changing the doing of harm to the doing of wrong, and it is always a violation of duty to do wrong. One must bring plenty of his own salt in cases like this.

Still, mass casualty events in Kant’s time were natural. I’d have to think he’d have done a little different job on this lying thing, if he’d witnessed WW1 or the Holocaust.....Hiroshima.......or some such man’s inhumanity to man thing. We are much less susceptible to perfection than his philosophy suggests for us.
—————-

morality, if it is to have any communal significance, cannot but consist in acts. As principled intention it has significance for individuals to be sure; but where individuals do not transform intention into action I would say there can be no communal significance. — Janus

Absolutely. But it still raises the question as to whether one can still be a worthy moral agent if he is the only human around. He might be, but what would it matter sans community to be moral in. Nobody ever stipulated empty environment for a location of morality, over a communal social environment.
—————-

perhaps Kant would say that you are behaving morally. — Janus

Agreed.

**http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/KANTsupposedRightToLie.pdf

Absolutely. But it still raises the question as to whether one can still be a worthy moral agent if he is the only human around. He might be, but what would it matter sans community to be moral in. Nobody ever stipulated empty environment for a location of morality, over a communal social environment. — Mww

Moral agency, intention or action would seem to be pretty meaningless without community. If one were alone in the natural world one might form worthy moral intentions and commit to worthy moral actions in relation to animals and plants; a form of community!

Thanks for the link.

Where do you see intention in Kantian moral philosophy? Or any brand, for that matter. I never gave it much thought, myself.

I am far more familiar with Kant's CPR than with his CPrR or his CPJ. So my understanding of duty may not be in strict accordance with Kant's (and it might take a lifetime of study to determine whether or not it is given the controversies which seem to be involved in Kant scholarship), but it seems to me that if we have an understanding of what is involved in moral duty, that it is nonetheless the case that we still need the unadulterated intention to carry it out.

Any understanding may be, by Kant's or any other lights, not up to it, but if our intention is pure, then we would still be acting morally, it seems to me. The question is whether any understanding of duty can be comprehensive enough to cover all situations, or whether we could know that our understanding of duty is the best possible understanding of it. Of course, there is also the question of whether pure intention is possible at all.

You’re right, it’s not impossible, if something new is available.
— Mww

New thought/belief.
— creativesoul

Yes, but there is still the question about a possible instantiation for it. — Mww

Indeed. We must know how deliberate change in one's deeply inculcated moral belief happens; what it takes in order to happen; what is required; etc. We need to know what the event itself needs to have already happened, in order for it to be able to. Otherwise, there is no way to know what it is that we're looking for and no way to know when we've found it.

We know it happens.

If a society is of a certain moral persuasion, and a fully inculcated member is nonetheless subsequently in moral opposition to some part of it, the question is raised as to where the opposition came from.

Indeed.

Without experience, without some external influence, he is subject to his own a priori practical reason as the source of his opposition. But where did reason get the idea the societal norm should be opposed in the first place? What enables a subject to declare that whatever some norm might be, he is opposed to it? If it be supposed the opposition arose from mere feeling, for lacking experience reduces the means to nothing else, then it becomes manifest that feelings have the power over reason, which is impossible because feelings have no object until reason cognizes one as belonging to it necessarily.

See, that's far too entrenched in the mistake of a brilliant man. If he did not deliberately misrepresent his own thought/belief, then I would be quite confident in saying that he was a good man. With that in mind, good men make mistakes just like bad men. In Kant's case, his categories of thought cannot take the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief into consideration.

What is the notion of a priori doing here?

I'm not entirely certain of Kant's actual stance. Seems to me though, that conventional understanding of a priori ought at least be capable of clearly and accurately setting out Kant's delineation. Correct me if I'm off here, but isn't a priori the name of a very particular kind of thought/belief; one of which Kant himself claims is existentially independent of all experience:That which we can deduce and/or induce while sitting in a chair? That which must be presupposed within all experience. I've also entertained that notion. That which is necessary for all experience. I've thought in those terms as well. I find none of them reliable for taking proper account of the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.


------------------------------------------------------------------------


Deliberate oppositional change to one's morality always happen through complex common language use. There are no exceptions and/or actual examples to the contrary. It is a series of connected events. Undoubtedly one's morality must already be an operative element within one's thought/belief system(world-view). Otherwise, one one cannot question it. One must already be following some set of behavioural rules in order to place them under suspicion.

These things are true of everyone who is placing their initial worldview under suspicion, regardless of the particulars.



If the only way to question a certain kind of thinking is by virtue of using a specific well-defined set of linguistic terms in a conventionally accepted manner, then it only follows that that particular kind of thinking is itself existentially dependent upon complex language acquisition replete with the terminology. Some accounts of morality pride themselves upon such complexity. Questioning such an inculcated morality is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own pre-existing thought/belief. All thought/belief about the rules of conduct requires first isolating the rules as a means for subsequent consideration.

Some thought/belief does not have such existential dependence. Some moral thought/belief is not existentially dependent upon language.

Prior to common language no one approves of another harming them. Everyone disapproves.

Call it whatever you like, directly or indirectly, but you can bet your ass Tim wasn’t talking about me when he said it. — Mww

Of course, because he's biased in your favour. When he said the street fight comment, he most likely excluded himself and people like you. Even though you lot are as guilty as the rest.

Anything else? — Mww

Well yes... The entire rest of the debate. Your response to the fact that we do not say that 'killing' is wrong. We'll start there. Why do you think, from a purely rational perspective that the maxim "one should not kill another" is not rational?

No criticism here; I'm just curious. — Janus

LOL. Oh hell no, I don’t want to be famous. I use authority to make some points, but I grant that what I say of my own accord has no kind of authority. Opinion, no matter the pretty prose and precise grammar, is nonetheless mere opinion.

I mean it as sort of an anticipatory, “well who the hell are you? What makes you any better than me?” kinda thing.

See, that's far too entrenched in the mistake of a brilliant man. If he did not deliberately misrepresent his own thought/belief, then I would be quite confident in saying that he was a good man. With that in mind, good men make mistakes just like bad men. In Kant's case, his categories of thought cannot take the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief into consideration. — creativesoul

Yikes!! That’s a tough one, right there. Lemme see if I understand this the way you intended:
......too entrenched.....that’s me, in the writing of the scenario;
......if he did not deliberately, his own thought/belief, he was a good man.....he being the subject of the scenario, the guy In moral opposition to the norm....

Good men make mistakes just like bad men, sure, but there’s no sense of good/bad anywhere here. The scenario has to do with racist norm vs. non-racist exception to the norm. Adding in good/bad doesn’t address the origin of the moral divide. Is the good man and/or the bad man in the scenario, or is that a general provision for all scenarios? You say if he had not misrepresented his own thought/belief, he would be a good man, but where in the scenario was it ever presented that he was a bad man? If all he’s doing is morally opposing the extant racist norm of his society, why isn’t he automatically a good man? Not from your or my point of view because *WE* think racism ugly from a distance, but from *HIS* point of view, because he’s in the midst of it experientially?

I shall take your word that Kant’s categories of thought cannot take the actual distinction... into account. I’m sure such failure has something to do with all that said beforehand.
————————

1.)........Deliberate oppositional change to one's morality always happen through complex common language use.....

2.)........If the only way to question a certain kind of thinking is by virtue of using a specific well-defined set of linguistic terms in a conventionally accepted manner......

3.)........Questioning such an inculcated morality is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own pre-existing thought/belief. All thought/belief about the rules of conduct requires first isolating the rules as a means for subsequent consideration......

4.).......Some moral thought/belief is not existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

1.) OK, granting that complex language use does not necessarily include actual speech.
2.) OK, but the problem remains, in the given scenario of a completely racially entrenched society, there shouldn’t be any set of linguistic terms contrary to the terms of the inculcation. Sorta like a minor Mary’s Room, insofar as all this guy has ever heard are racist terms and conditions, so supposing he will understand non-racist terms and conditions when there aren’t any.....well, how would that even happen?
3.) Absolutely. Herein lies the employment of a priori practical reason.
4.) Yes, agreed. Morality itself, or some ground for it, or the means for its possibility, reside in humans as a intrinsic condition. If not language, then what? Feeling or reason are the only choices.

Nice street fighting with you, mon amie. May the Gods of Proper Dialectic smile upon your countenance and bring you a vast array of Plato/Platypus jokes and Andy Warhol reprints.

Why do you think, from a purely rational perspective that the maxim "one should not kill another" is not rational? — Isaac

I doubt I ever presented my thought “one should not kill” is not rational. Don’t know why I would, especially when it seems perfectly rational to me.

How do you propose an army work? You think opposing Hitler with military force was not rational, because a lot of people got killed?

One ideology in conflict with another doesn’t negate the rationality of the given maxim. It may be irrational to even have a conflict, but that is not under consideration. One can hold the maxim “one should not kill”, and still go about his business as a soldier in the combat field with his morality intact.

“thou shall not kill”, an absolute declarative statement per the Ten Commandments, e.g., is irrational, because it is impossible in all cases to avoid it and simultaneously hold with a more valuable maxim “the wonton violation of ownership of life is wrong”. Wherein lies the distinction between the should not of killing and the shall not of murder, insofar as the former may be forgivable but the latter is may never.

Technically speaking, in deontological moral philosophy, “one should not kill” is not a maxim, it is a directive. The maxim proper would be, in the correct form of a subjective principle which prescribes a possible volition, “no life has preference over another”, and the hypothetical imperative standing for what the possible volition actually becomes, “ therefore one has no right to kill”. Because killing is not always avoidable, this hypothetical, while not tacit permission to kill, maintains an agent’s sense of personal moral worthiness if he should be put in a position where he must exercise his prerogatives.

I'd say that any moral stance, n, is rational only in relation to some other, effectively foundational stance or desire, goal, etc., m, where n is either a consequence of or prerequisite for m.