understand, my bad - my issues is source - mea culpa - typed too fast - apologies — Rank Amateur
The categorical imperative is a misrepresentation. Anscombe actually said “...his rule on universalized maxims is useless without stipulations....”.
“....A maxim is the subjective principle of volition...”
(Kant FPMM, 1785)
"...Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time will it to be a universal law"; this is the sole condition under which a will can never contradict itself; and such an imperative is categorical....”
(ibid)
It is clear the maxim, the subjective principle, being universalized is antecedent to an imperative behavior. It is the rule that’s claimed to be useless, and the categorical imperative is not a rule. It is a law. The difference is critical to deontological moral philosophy in general, and Kant’s mandate for pure practical reason, the concept of an autonomous, freely determinant will, in particular.
“....there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, (...) and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. (...) the categorical imperative, is not limited by any condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary, may be quite properly called a command....”
(ibid)
Hypothetical imperatives are rules, and if Anscombe’s thesis is to have power, she must only refer to these alone, in which case the they would be useless without a stipulation, which is not necessarily given:
“....When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition...”
(ibid)
The view to constructing a maxim, with respect to hypothetical imperatives, is nothing more than addressing whatever arbitrary want the description of the action provides. The view to constructing a maxim, with respect to a categorical imperative, involves a command of will, by which the description of the action must abide without exception.
Furthermore, there are as many hypothetical imperatives as there as circumstances that call for a moral determination and their respective maxims are just as many, as suits the mood of the will determining them. But there is one and only one categorical imperative, which demands the maxim one wills to become universal law, from which a certain act must follow necessarily by rule of law such that the act and the law do not contradict themselves, be chosen wisely. This proposition reduces to the proposition that the determinant will (the law) and the judgement of volition (the act) do not contradict themselves.
Is there remaining a question as to what form a relevant description of an action corresponding to a universalized maxim would have? While it is true Kant does not include a description per se, he makes it quite clear what the action is doesn’t matter. If one acts as if the maxim to which the imperative relates were a universal law, he is justified in calling himself morally worthy. — Mww
I do not know how you get this. The entire point is that's all that you-all will acknowledge, is a feeling. I argue that the monstrousness of these bad actors is bad in itself. You-all apparently need to personally suppose it bad, but do not acknowledge it as badness. More to the point, you-all have stated that inasmuch as (presumably) the bad actors did not think their actions were bad, then it's nonsense to say they were bad.
Question: do you suppose reason and its products to be universalizable? 2+2=4 is an expression of a certain kind of reason. Is it true, or is it true-for-you but not true, or maybe not true at all, but you just go with it? Which, please? — tim wood
Importantly, (and please acknowledge this point) there is no functionality to an objective morality, even if it exists; We are free to ignore it, should we feel differently.
Some people would dictate that the bible objectively states that homosexuality is wrong. Even if they could (they can't) objectively demonstrate this, it doesn't benefit anyone; We can ignore it, save for the punishment of hellfire, should they be able to prove it (they can't). — Edward
I meant what is the basis of TS's and I think your core belief that all mental phenomena is by definition subjective. — Rank Amateur
And as on many many many other things - lack of evidence, is just lack of evidence. And even that is in dispute. And at the core of point all along. Near universal moral judgments on some issues is evidence that the source of some moral judgments could have a source outside individual mental phenomena. — Rank Amateur
Mere possibility isn't sufficient to believe anything, because the contradictory is usually possible, too. — Terrapin Station
Morality is subjective. But morality isn't the entirety of the world. There are plenty of objective things. Morality just ain't one of them. — Terrapin Station
Yeah, it's frustrating to have to keep correcting such simple things against straw men. — Terrapin Station
If, however, you're saying that it is a fact that this additional thing exists and I must prove it doesn't in order to sustain my position, then I'd take issue with that. — Isaac
Yeah, I could have, but I was more interested in what she said. — Mww
OK, I guess. I’m not happy with tautological truths myself, but ehhhh.....I’ll never be famous.
Agreed on harmonious community, if one thinks of morality as an act, or a set of actions. — Mww
But, as I said before, I’ll never be famous, so....who cares. — Mww
So you have the well-worn thought experiments like what if you were in Warsaw — Janus
morality, if it is to have any communal significance, cannot but consist in acts. As principled intention it has significance for individuals to be sure; but where individuals do not transform intention into action I would say there can be no communal significance. — Janus
perhaps Kant would say that you are behaving morally. — Janus
Absolutely. But it still raises the question as to whether one can still be a worthy moral agent if he is the only human around. He might be, but what would it matter sans community to be moral in. Nobody ever stipulated empty environment for a location of morality, over a communal social environment. — Mww
You’re right, it’s not impossible, if something new is available.
— Mww
New thought/belief.
— creativesoul
Yes, but there is still the question about a possible instantiation for it. — Mww
If a society is of a certain moral persuasion, and a fully inculcated member is nonetheless subsequently in moral opposition to some part of it, the question is raised as to where the opposition came from.
Without experience, without some external influence, he is subject to his own a priori practical reason as the source of his opposition. But where did reason get the idea the societal norm should be opposed in the first place? What enables a subject to declare that whatever some norm might be, he is opposed to it? If it be supposed the opposition arose from mere feeling, for lacking experience reduces the means to nothing else, then it becomes manifest that feelings have the power over reason, which is impossible because feelings have no object until reason cognizes one as belonging to it necessarily.
Call it whatever you like, directly or indirectly, but you can bet your ass Tim wasn’t talking about me when he said it. — Mww
No criticism here; I'm just curious. — Janus
See, that's far too entrenched in the mistake of a brilliant man. If he did not deliberately misrepresent his own thought/belief, then I would be quite confident in saying that he was a good man. With that in mind, good men make mistakes just like bad men. In Kant's case, his categories of thought cannot take the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief into consideration. — creativesoul
1.)........Deliberate oppositional change to one's morality always happen through complex common language use.....
2.)........If the only way to question a certain kind of thinking is by virtue of using a specific well-defined set of linguistic terms in a conventionally accepted manner......
3.)........Questioning such an inculcated morality is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own pre-existing thought/belief. All thought/belief about the rules of conduct requires first isolating the rules as a means for subsequent consideration......
4.).......Some moral thought/belief is not existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul
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