If what I've described, is somewhat accurate, and Wittgenstein is accurate in his description of "the honourable thing" here, then he's faced with a sort of dilemma at this section of "Philosophical Investigations". — Metaphysician Undercover

He is not faced with a dilemma, he has solved a dilemma. His solution is an age old one. I took the quote from the online appendix to Arthur M. Melzer's excellent book "Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing". This should not be confused with occult or hermetic esoteric writings. It was a common and well documented practice of the philosophers. The appendix can be found here: https://www.press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/index.html

The question is, how would you keep a secret, allowing some people access to that secret, and at the same time completely hiding the existence of the secret from all others. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no secret, only things that only a few will understand. Rather than say: "you will not be able to understand this" he simply keeps these things from view, locked behind a closed door that only a few will even notice is locked and that it requires a key to open. In other words, he is saying that what any reader who opens the book will find on the page is not what those who have the key will find. The majority of readers will not understand him.

But if we look at the other metaphor, there are things we are prevented from seeing because we push rather than pull, as if it is just a matter of exerting sufficient mental force.

It can't be done, so perhaps allowing that some people have the key, and others do not, is itself a dishonourable thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a matter of allowing some people to have the key, but rather that only a few will find the key.

He's leading us right to the door of what he calls 'the ideal", "the preconceived idea of crystalline purity", what old called 'the kernel of meaning". But then he says let's turn things around (107), so that we won't see the need to look behind that door. I'm going to lead you away from the door now. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no door behind which we find hidden the preconceived idea of crystalline purity. The idea of crystalline purity refers to the Tractatus. He is not leading us there, he is saying that the idea is misleading, that he was misled.

How can the same thing be both good and bad? What same thing?

Your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" is bullshit, designed only to try and maintain your theoretical house of cards. You have claimed that "There's no such thing as 'what I am saying'." Honestly? Nobody really says anything - is that what you're saying? Also, this is hardly the main insight of "meaning is use". — Luke

Do you understand Wittgenstein's premise, "meaning is use"? The meaning of any particular instance of words is what the speaker is doing with those words (use). The speaker uses the words like a tool, doing something, so that the meaning (use) represents the speaker's purpose. This is why "meaning" is what is meant, what is intended. Saying is a form of doing. Language is a game. I don't see how you can say that this is bull shit, at this point in the book when it's the premise of the book

I see. If the speaker is being honest then you can understand the sentence, but if they are lying then you can't understand the (same) sentence. But how do you know when they're lying? Do you suddenly become unable to comprehend English? — Luke

The honest speaker gives an accurate indication of how the words are being used. The dishonest speaker does not. Meaning is use, therefore you cannot understand the meaning of the dishonest speaker. Simple isn't it? Often we do not know when the speaker is lying, and we think we understand how the speaker is using the words, when we really do not. This is not a case of the hearer not being able to "comprehend English", it is a case of misuse of English by the speaker.

There is no secret, only things that only a few will understand. Rather than say: "you will not be able to understand this" he simply keeps these things from view, locked behind a closed door that only a few will even notice is locked and that it requires a key to open. In other words, he is saying that what any reader who opens the book will find on the page is not what those who have the key will find. The majority of readers will not understand him. — Fooloso4

He doesn't keep these things from view though, he discusses them. And that, according to your quote, is not the honourable thing. That's why I said it's a dilemma. How can he show it only to those who will understand, without showing it to those who will not understand. As per your quote, the honourable thing is not to show the door to those who do not have the key. How can he show the door only to those who have the key, when he doesn't know who's going to have a key?

There is no door behind which we find hidden the preconceived idea of crystalline purity. The idea of crystalline purity refers to the Tractatus. He is not leading us there, he is saying that the idea is misleading, that he was misled. — Fooloso4

Yes, I already went through this with old. The problem is that when we attempt to get down to that crystalline purity, or what old called the kernel of meaning, in analysis, (look behind the door where it might be) it's not there, and all that is left is this attempt to find it. This process, the attempt to find it is nothing other than striving for an ideal. Then it appears like striving for an ideal might be the only thing which supports the idea of that crystalline purity. We can slam the door and retreat, saying that the crystalline purity is not real, non-existent, and the striving for the ideal is equally useless because that ideal is non-existent, but then there is a gaping whole in the structure of meaning, where that assumption of the fundamental elements stood . Wittgenstein seems to want to do this, retreat with a gaping hole in the structure of meaning. But we do not need to do that, we can stay and contemplate the relationship between the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal.

Yes, I already went through this with old. The problem is that when we attempt to get down to that crystalline purity, or what old called the kernel of meaning, in analysis, (look behind the door where it might be) it's not there, and all that is left is this attempt to find it.
Wittgenstein seems to want to do this, retreat with a gaping hole in the structure of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

What if it's as simple as coming to see a certain style of argumentation as no longer cool? No longer the way to go? What if there's no gaping hole because for the most part we get along just fine? What if a certain habit is just made to look slightly ridiculous? Perhaps we not only don't miss that habit but are even slightly embarrassed that it was ever ours and that we were ever so pretentious.

I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell them: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy." — Wittgenstein

The temptation might be to say ' I know that that's a tree we are only doing philosophy' (that metaphysics is metaphysically impossible) in a way that makes Wittgenstein something more than the tone of this 'only.'

Something related in my mind is logical positivism. I think that logical positivism was right in spirit but erred in practice by insisting on an impossible foundation for their otherwise good sense.

Saying is a form of doing. Language is a game. I don't see how you can say that this is bull shit, at this point in the book when it's the premise of the book — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say this was bullshit. I said that your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" was bullshit. Yes, saying is a form of doing, but that doesn't imply that "there is no such thing as 'what I am saying'." You have apparently retreated to this absurd position only because you cannot answer my questions or respond to my specific examples. Repeating "meaning is use" does not address my criticisms or questions.

For example, you didn't answer: 'How can the same thing be both good and bad?' and 'What same thing?'

Meaning is use, therefore you cannot understand the meaning of the dishonest speaker. Simple isn't it? Often we do not know when the speaker is lying, and we think we understand how the speaker is using the words, when we really do not. This is not a case of the hearer not being able to "comprehend English", it is a case of misuse of English by the speaker. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are creating confusion via your attempted collapse of the distinction between "saying" and "doing". It is not about understanding the speaker; it is about understanding the language. Yes, speakers can use language differently and give different meanings to the same words across various occasions. But we all learn the same language for the most part and we learn that words can have different meanings in various contexts along with it. Wittgenstein is merely reminding philosophers of this fact.

You never answered my question of whether you understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means. But I'm certain that you do, whether it's told as a lie or not.

What if it's as simple as coming to see a certain style of argumentation as no longer cool? No longer the way to go? What if there's no gaping hole because for the most part we get along just fine? What if a certain habit is just made to look slightly ridiculous? Perhaps we not only don't miss that habit but are even slightly embarrassed that it was ever ours and that we were ever so pretentious. — old

Well, I guess we've come full circle, because I'm basically going to repeat what I first said about this issue. The problem is in how this all relates to striving for the ideal. Striving for the ideal is a beneficial way of proceeding, it's an attitude of recognition that we are less than perfect, thus allowing ourselves to be bettered. The histories and development of specialized languages like mathematics and logic demonstrate that the attitude of striving for the ideal is very useful. So this attitude is not something that we ought to relinquish. To avoid the situation of describing a foundation which is actually an impossibility, we need to assign to "the ideal" a type of existence which avoids this problem

I didn't say this was bullshit. I said that your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" was bullshit. Yes, saying is a form of doing, but that doesn't imply that "there is no such thing as 'what I am saying'." You have apparently retreated to this absurd position only because you cannot answer my questions or respond to my specific examples. Repeating "meaning is use" does not address my criticisms or questions.

For example, you didn't answer: 'How can the same thing be both good and bad?' and 'What same thing?' — Luke

I already explained about the same thing being both bad and good, at least twice. It is in relation to two distinct purposes. The same thing is good for one purpose but bad for another purpose. Anyway, you don't seem to have any grasp of what I'm talking about, probably because it is a difficult thing to explain. But this is way off topic so I suggest we give it up, and drop it.

Well, I guess we've come full circle, because I'm basically going to repeat what I first said about this issue. The problem is in how this all relates to striving for the ideal. Striving for the ideal is a beneficial way of proceeding, it's an attitude of recognition that we are less than perfect, thus allowing ourselves to be bettered. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I'd say that the ideal in this case (from my reading) is 'spiritual' or a matter of character. Who wants to be pretentious? Who wants to be bewitched by language? I see no escape from the ideal. All that varies seems to be its representation. Is it cooler to chase after a superscience or let go of what may come to look like a pseudo-scientific or pretentious pursuit and get real?

I don't at all claim to have an authoritative answer. Personality is a risk. I'd say that some philosophers present their own personalities for possible emulation. The arguments may be secondary to their example as a creative revelation of possibility. If so-and-so is religious but ashamed to be unscientific, he may come up with a system of words that allows him to have his cake and eat it too. Or maybe an artistic/visionary personality finds scientism cramped and one-eyed. Same deal. If this system is slick, he may become an intellectual celebrity. Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche..Their value is not perhaps reducible to propositions and arguments.

I don't consider the ideal of the PI to be about anything 'spiritual'. It is about a (mis)conception long held by philosophers regarding the aims of their philosophy. Attempting to capture the true essence of things is one such ideal that philosophers have long sought. However, this is not a (super-) scientific endeavour, but a linguistic one. It can be resolved by looking at how language is actually used, rather than by pondering on the "true" nature of grand or seemingly mysterious concepts (outside of any context).

116. When philosophers use a word — “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, proposition/sentence”, “name” — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? —
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

Thanks for the reply. We probably agree more than we disagree. By 'spiritual' I meant something like a matter of character. For instance, I am an atheist for 'spiritual' reasons. I'll try to clarify what I mean by superscience and the profound reading.

This 'linguistic endeavor' (innocent sounding, right?) has been associated with philosophers calling the statements of other philosophers meaningless. But that's about as 'metaphysical' or 'superscientific' as it gets. Our linguistic metaphysicians claim a position so lofty that they don't even have to argue. Their system assures them that there is nothing there to argue with.

This is the 'profound' reading that I find questionable. It repeats the mistake of logical positivism (crystallizing good sense into the 'nonsense' it hopes to control). Instead of appealing to a theory of what's meaningful or not, I prefer to just respond on a case by case basis, with the same automatic knowhow that gets me through the rest of life. For me PI is one book among others that encourages this attitude, but Wittgenstein was a complex personality, and other interpretations will tempt others.

Because I prefer to read the book as a return to 'automatic knowhow,' I frame it more in terms of unlearning than learning, so that it's more anti-profound than profound. The difference is that a profound book makes you feel smarter than those who haven't read it, while an anti-profound book makes you feel like other people who maybe haven't read it are smarter than you wanted to give them credit for. This hurts at first but feels like progress later. This is the spiritual junk I had in mind.

Do you understand Wittgenstein's premise, "meaning is use"? The meaning of any particular instance of words is what the speaker is doing with those words (use). The speaker uses the words like a tool, doing something, so that the meaning (use) represents the speaker's purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The use of a screwdriver is to drive screws. If I use it to open a can of paint, it doesn't stop being a screwdriver and become a can opener. If you use words to deceive, you destroy meaning. The boy cries 'wolf' but eventually, it means nothing and has become useless. But you know this - why are you playing tricks?

This 'linguistic endeavor' (innocent sounding, right?) has been associated with philosophers calling the statements of other philosophers meaningless. But that's about as 'metaphysical' or 'superscientific' as it gets. Our linguistic metaphysicians claim a position so lofty that they don't even have to argue. Their system assures them that there is nothing there to argue with. — old

I wouldn't describe Wittgenstein as a 'linguistic metaphysician', so I'm not sure who you are describing. I don't think that he has a philosophical "system" to speak of in the PI, either. If anything, he gestures at the futility of engaging in metaphysics and philosophical systems, and demonstrates that many traditional philosophical problems can be dissolved by remembering how language is typically used in actual situations, that we are taught how to use language by other people and likewise enculturated into a community of speakers, etc. While a lot has seemingly been made of the younger Wittgenstein's use of 'meaningless' or 'senseless' in the Tractatus, his usage in the PI is a return to the rough ground.

Instead of appealing to a theory of what's meaningful or not, I prefer to just respond on a case by case basis, with the same automatic knowhow that gets me through the rest of life. For me PI is one book among others that encourages this attitude, but Wittgenstein was a complex personality, and other interpretations will tempt others.

Because I prefer to read the book as a return to 'automatic knowhow,' I frame it more in terms of unlearning than learning, so that it's more anti-profound than profound. The difference is that a profound book makes you feel smarter than those who haven't read it, while an anti-profound book makes you feel like other people who maybe haven't read it are smarter than you wanted to give them credit for. This hurts at first but feels like progress later. This is the spiritual junk I had in mind. — old

Yes, it looks like we agree more than we disagree. Thanks for clarifying.

I'm not sure who you are describing. — Luke

Wasn't aimed at you, just to clarify.

I don't think that he has a philosophical "system" to speak of in the PI, either. If anything, he gestures at the futility of engaging in metaphysics and philosophical systems, and demonstrates that many traditional philosophical problems can be dissolved by remembering how language is typically used in actual situations, that we are taught how to use language by other people and likewise enculturated into a community of speakers, etc. While a lot has seemingly been made of the younger Wittgenstein's use of 'meaningless' or 'senseless' in the Tractatus, his usage in the PI is a return to the rough ground. — Luke

I tried, but I just can't find anything to disagree with here.

Yes, it looks like we agree more than we disagree. Thanks for clarifying. — Luke

Thanks, and we do indeed seem to be on the same page, which is nice.

But we do not need to do that, we can stay and contemplate the relationship between the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You really have made a mess of all of this. There are no elements of crystalline purity. Crystalline purity refers to the Tractarian assumption that there is a logical structure that underlies both the world and language that makes it possible to represent the world in language. Wittgenstein came to see that this picture is wrong and abandoned it.

In the Tractatus logic is form. The elements or substance or the world are simple objects. The elements of language are the names that correspond to those objects. There is no relationship between
the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal. They are not two different things. The crystalline purity is the ideal, an ideal which once again he came to reject.

In order to understand this we must look at the role of the logic of language in the PI. It is no longer some independent structure, but the rules of the language game. Those rules do not exist independently. They are determined by how the game is played. Different games different rules.

No. The use of a screwdriver is to drive screws. If I use it to open a can of paint, it doesn't stop being a screwdriver and become a can opener. If you use words to deceive, you destroy meaning. The boy cries 'wolf' but eventually, it means nothing and has become useless. But you know this - why are you playing tricks? — unenlightened

Using language to deceive does not completely destroy meaning, if meaning is use. It creates an inconsistency between the general and the particular, just like using the screw driver to open the paint can creates such an inconsistency. The language is still being used, so there is still meaning there. The problem is in the inconsistency between the general purpose "a screw driver is to drive screws", and the particular purpose, "the screw driver is used to open a paint can". We can say that the screw driver is "good" for the purpose of opening the can (serves the purpose), but when the particular purpose is inconsistent with the general purpose, an argument for "misuse" can be made. And misuse is bad despite the fact that it serves the purpose. Likewise, we can say that language is "good" for deceiving people in particular instances, because it is very useful toward that purpose. But if there is a general principle, "the purpose of language", then an argument might be made that deception is misuse.

Since these are human acts we're dealing with, there are moral implications. You wouldn't commonly argue that using the screw driver to open the paint can is a misuse, and therefore bad, but if the screw driver slipped off and stabbed your wrist, you might see that it really is misuse and therefore bad. A person engaged in misuse is culpable. And if someone misuses a screw driver to stab another person we want without doubt, the moral universal judgement that stabbing a person is bad, to overrule the particular judgement that the use of the screwdriver is "good" for this purpose.

So in using language we choose our words according to the needs of our particular purposes, in particular situations. We choose the words as they are deemed "good' for those particular purposes, and the words derive meaning unique to the situation, according to that particular use. But if the words are good for a particular purpose, and that purpose involves an immoral act (analogy of stabbing the person with the screw driver), then we need the principles whereby we can say that this is a misuse of language and therefore bad.

To say that the misuse of words (deception for example) just renders the words useless or meaningless is naivety in its prime. The misuse of the screw driver doesn't leave it as a useless tool, it renders it as a dangerous weapon.

You really have made a mess of all of this. There are no elements of crystalline purity. Crystalline purity refers to the Tractarian assumption that there is a logical structure that underlies both the world and language that makes it possible to represent the world in language. Wittgenstein came to see that this picture is wrong and abandoned it. — Fooloso4

Right, so you do not see the gaping hole now? Wittgenstein has dismissed what he had assumed made it possible to represent the world with language. Is it now impossible to represent the world with language. Is all language use just a big misunderstanding?

In the Tractatus logic is form. The elements or substance or the world are simple objects. The elements of language are the names that correspond to those objects. There is no relationship between
the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal. They are not two different things. The crystalline purity is the ideal, an ideal which once again he came to reject. — Fooloso4

They are two distinct things, because in the Tractatus, he posited the fundmental elements of crystalline purity as existing things which language is composed of. But in the Philosophical Investigations,"the ideal" is something we might strive after. One is already existent, inherent within the foundations of language, the other not, as a precision, exactness, or certainty, which we might strive after.

Notice at 107 where he describes a rotation around our real needs. The suggestion is to move away from this striving for an ideal (which in itself is an inversion from the position of the pure elements of the Tractatus), back toward what serves our purpose. So language ends up as inherently vague and ambiguous, whatever serves the purpose, because he dismisses both the existing elements and the striving for an ideal. There is no crystalline purity underlying it, nor do we strive for an ideal language, we are simply satisfied with what we have, imperfection in language, which at 98, he calls a "perfect order". Now he is left with nothing but inconsistency.

In order to understand this we must look at the role of the logic of language in the PI. It is no longer some independent structure, but the rules of the language game. Those rules do not exist independently. They are determined by how the game is played. Different games different rules. — Fooloso4

The rules are sign-posts. We cannot say that logic is the rules, because reason and logic is how the mind deals with the rules. We can say that different games have different rules, but we have no principle whereby we can say that the logic differs.

Using language to deceive does not completely destroy meaning, if meaning is use. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes it does. It is happening right now to the media. If you sometimes use language to deceive, you will not be trusted, if you do so as often as not, you won't be listened to at all and your talk will become meaningless because it is no use to anyone else, and thus no use to you either, even as a means to deceive.

Right, so you do not see the gaping hole now? Wittgenstein has dismissed what he had assumed made it possible to represent the world with language. Is it now impossible to represent the world with language. Is all language use just a big misunderstanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

The only gaping hole is the one in your understanding. If he concludes that this is not the way language works that does not mean language does not work or that there is some unsolved mystery of language.

They are two distinct things, because in the Tractatus, he posited the fundmental elements of crystalline purity as existing things which language is composed of. But in the Philosophical Investigations,"the ideal" is something we might strive after. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the PI he is referring to the Tractarian assumption not some other thing. It is this structure that would make possible precision, exactness, or certainty. Since that structure does not exist, precision, exactness, and certainty are never perfect, but typically sufficient.

Now he is left with nothing but inconsistency. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is inconsistency in language but that does not mean we are left with nothing but inconsistency. We do, after all, communicate and make ourselves understood.

The rules are sign-posts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Blame it on the inconsistency of language but you have completely misunderstood this. Sign-posts must be read according to rules. They do not contain the rules for reading them.

We cannot say that logic is the rules, because reason and logic is how the mind deals with the rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Logic is not some independently existing entity that is employed in order to deal with rules.

We can say that different games have different rules, but we have no principle whereby we can say that the logic differs. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a matter of determination by principle. The logic of the game is the rules by which the game is played. If you do not understand the logic of the game you could not know how to play.

Yes it does. It is happening right now to the media. If you sometimes use language to deceive, you will not be trusted, if you do so as often as not, you won't be listened to at all and your talk will become meaningless because it is no use to anyone else, and thus no use to you either, even as a means to deceive. — unenlightened

As your example, of the media shows, it does not become meaningless. Meaning is use. Serving one's own purpose is inherently meaningful. Using a screw driver to kill someone is still meaningful to the person who does that, despite the fact that others judge it as a senseless, or meaningless act.


Let me explain my opinion a bit more clearly. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein posited the fundamental elements of language, pictures of the world, as the foundations of language and conceptualization. He later came to see how naive this was, that these fundamental pictures do not even exist, and that what is at the foundation of language is vague unbounded concepts. This is what he describes in Philosophical Investigations, such vague concepts where we might create boundaries to produce clarity for specific purposes. But in this description he now comes across the notion of seeking an ideal, some sort of absolute precision, or clarity in defining terms, to give an unmistakable understanding.

As I described to old, "the ideal" here in PI is similar, if not the same as Plato's "the good" in the Republic. So Plato's cave allegory is applicable. Wittgenstein frees himself from the cave, to see the sun, the ideal. In Plato's allegory, the philosopher is supposed to go back into the cave, to lead the others to the same revelation, toward the ideal. Instead, Wittgenstein goes back in the cave and tells the others not to look out there at the ideal, that we ought to stay within the cave and settle for what serves our purpose, instead of seeking the ideal.

So that is my opinion, at this point in the text. I see this as a deficiency in Wittgenstein's philosophy, but I may be inclined to change my opinion as things develop further in the text.

The only gaping hole is the one in your understanding. If he concludes that this is not the way language works that does not mean language does not work or that there is some unsolved mystery of language. — Fooloso4

The gaping hole is that he replaces the fundamental pictures at the foundation of language with vague, boundless concepts, families of meaning. Now there is nothing to account for any precision or clarity within language, except for a striving for clarity with regard to some purpose. So language only "works" in relation to a striving to achieve some purpose. The premise of the Tractatus, that it works because it consists of fundamental pictures of the world has been dismissed.

In the PI he is referring to the Tractarian assumption not some other thing. It is this structure that would make possible precision, exactness, or certainty. Since that structure does not exist, precision, exactness, and certainty are never perfect, but typically sufficient. — Fooloso4

The striving to achieve a purpose is absent from the Tractatus, but it is central now in PI. Without the premise of the Tractatus, the existence of any precision or exactness within language cannot be accounted for, unless it is produced from the desire to fulfil a purpose. The problem I see is that simply serving the purpose does not suffice for us, we always seek better, or more efficient ways of doing things. Therefore we cannot dismiss "striving for the ideal" as unreal, because it is very real, and highly evident.

Blame it on the inconsistency of language but you have completely misunderstood this. Sign-posts must be read according to rules. They do not contain the rules for reading them. — Fooloso4

It is you who has misunderstood, please reread the 80's. The rule is a sign-post, that's why there may be ambiguity as to what the rule tells us. And this is how he avoids the infinite regress of requiring rules to read rules, which you and I discussed earlier. You seemed to not be concerned with that infinite regress. Wittgenstein was, and rightly so. "85. A rule stands there like a sign-post--"

In case anyone hasn't read Quine's Word and Object, I'd recommend reading it simultaneously with PI, especially for the clarity of Quine's behaviourist arguments regarding the indeterminacy of translation. The challenge is then to reconcile the two philosophers. (I think any conflict is mostly a style issue, for Quine's definition of "science" was a very broad and immanent church)

what is at the foundation of language is vague unbounded concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is at the foundation of language is, as he makes clear in On Certainty, quoting Goethe, is our acting in the world.

But in this description he now comes across the notion of seeking an ideal, some sort of absolute precision, or clarity in defining terms, to give an unmistakable understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The ideal of absolute precision and clarity is based on the assumption of a logical structure underlying both language and the world. It is a holdover from the Tractatus, not something new and different. It is this structure that was presumed to allow for precision and clarity. The rejection of such a structure is not a rejection of precision and clarity. Unmistakable understanding does not require such precision and clarity, but that does not mean that we always understand things unmistakably. Whether we have understood can only be determined by the specifics of the case.

This is what he describes in Philosophical Investigations, such vague concepts where we might create boundaries to produce clarity for specific purposes. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I say "wait here" this does not mean that if you move an inch in one direction or another you are no longer standing here. If I am teaching you to play the violin, on the other hand, and I say "put your finger here" this requires a great deal more precision. If you do not put your finger in the right place you are not playing the right note, but on the other hand, microtonality might or might not be important. What is considered to be within the tolerable range of frequencies is not set. In fact, many musical instruments are designed and tuned to a compromise, that is, they use a tempered scale. One can, nevertheless, play music on a piano or guitar. To use another analogy, one does not use a micrometer to measure a piece of wood used to frame a house.

As I described to old, "the ideal" here in PI is similar, if not the same as Plato's "the good" in the Republic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not going to pursue that tangent, but this simply wrong.

In Plato's allegory, the philosopher is supposed to go back into the cave, to lead the others to the same revelation, toward the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

A basic premise of the allegory is that the majority will never leave the cave. It is not that the philosopher will make philosophers of the unphilosophical but that he or she (Plato allowed for female philosophers) will rule the city based on his or her knowledge. The noble lie is essential to the city.

Instead, Wittgenstein goes back in the cave and tells the others not to look out there at the ideal, that we ought to stay within the cave and settle for what serves our purpose, instead of seeking the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

To continue the cave analogy, the ideal is an image on the cave wall. An image the philosopher would recognize as such if he were able to break the chains.

The gaping hole is that he replaces the fundamental pictures at the foundation of language with vague, boundless concepts, families of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

He replaces it with observations about the actual practices of language. There is no foundation of language, just as there is no foundation of action.

The striving to achieve a purpose is absent from the Tractatus — Metaphysician Undercover

This is fundamentally wrong. The purpose is to see the limits of language and how they leave unsaid what lies beyond those limits, the ethical/aesthetic.

It is you who has misunderstood, please reread the 80's. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not going to rehash that. My intent is to move forward, to get passed the stall that threatens to be terminal.

And this is how he avoids the infinite regress of requiring rules to read rules, which you and I discussed earlier. — Metaphysician Undercover

An infinite regress is avoided by the correction of one's actions. If you have not followed the rule then corrective measures are necessary - the knight in chess moves like this and like this but not life that or that. Once the rule is followed correctly then nothing more is required. One could, as you seem to be doing, always find some possible exception, some perverse way of reading the rule that leaves it unclear what one is supposed to do, but this is not a deficiency of language.

The rule is a sign-post ... "85. A rule stands there like a sign-post--" — Metaphysician Undercover

Standing there like a sign-post does not mean that it is a sign-post, but that it functions as a sign-post does. A pointed finger does not tell us in what direction to look. We learn how to read the sign. We learn the rule - look in the direction the finger is pointing. Those who have raised children and/or dogs knows that there is nothing inherent in the pointed finger, the sign-post, that tells us how to read it. They may look at the finger or back at the person pointing. One does not then look to other rules to explain how this rule is to be followed, but rather you may direct their attention by turning their head in the right direction or walking over to the thing you are pointing to. It is possible, however, that some may never get it. This does not mean that pointing is ineffectual even though it may be in this case.

Using language to deceive does not completely destroy meaning, if meaning is use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I tend to agree with you here. Deception is a successful communication of meaning. In my view, it's better to read 'meaning is use' not as a theory (which is tempting) but rather as one of many pointers toward our automatic knowhow. Meaning as use, if taken too seriously, is one more metaphysical theory of meaning.

My intent is to move forward, to get passed the stall that threatens to be terminal. — Fooloso4

Thank you, and great post!

The ideal of absolute precision and clarity is based on the assumption of a logical structure underlying both language and the world. It is a holdover from the Tractatus, not something new and different. — Fooloso4

I'm starting to get the impression that you haven't read the Philosophical Investigations. He describes a striving for the ideal, check 98-110. The assumption that the ideal is there, made him strive to find it. So the assumption of the Tractatus then turns into a striving for the ideal expressed in PI. This becomes even more evident in On Certainty where he strives for the ideal of overcoming doubt, an objective certainty.
"105. When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called "propositions", "words", "signs"."

A basic premise of the allegory is that the majority will never leave the cave. It is not that the philosopher will make philosophers of the unphilosophical but that he or she (Plato allowed for female philosophers) will rule the city based on his or her knowledge. The noble lie is essential to the city. — Fooloso4

In Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher very definitely goes back into the cave to teach the others. The noble lie is irrelevant to this part of The Republic, and is related to Plato's proposed eugenics.

Standing there like a sign-post does not mean that it is a sign-post, but that it functions as a sign-post does. A pointed finger does not tell us in what direction to look. We learn how to read the sign. We learn the rule - look in the direction the finger is pointing. — Fooloso4

You are placing the rule within the mind, a principle learned. But Wittgenstein places the rule outside the mind, like the sign-post. So the words we hear and read are themselves the rules, just like the sign-post itself. The rule is the finger pointing, it is not "look in the direction the finger is pointing". Looking in the direction the finger is pointing is the person's response to the rule, which is simply the finger pointing.

...we are not striving after an ideal... [§98]

...we misunderstand the role played by the ideal in our language. That is to say: we too would call it a game, only we are dazzled by the ideal, and therefore fail to see the actual
application of the word “game” clearly. [§100]

We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there. [§101]

103. The ideal, as we conceive of it, is unshakable. You can’t step outside it. You must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. - How come? The idea is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.

We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk:
so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! [§107]

The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. [§108]

I'm starting to get the impression that you haven't read the Philosophical Investigations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Please do not insult me. I do not generally discuss my background, but let it suffice to say my credentials say otherwise. I went against my better judgment by getting into this and so now I am getting out.

Please do not insult me. . — Fooloso4

My apologies Fooloso4, insult was not intended. I was just stating an observation, and you did not supply your credentials as evidence of your credibility.



Thanks Luke, the issue with the self-proclaimed accredited Fooloso4 (insult intended) is the difference between "striving after an ideal" (expressed in PI), and the assumption of fundamental elements (Tractatus). Clearly there is a description of "striving after an ideal" in the PI which is absent in the Tractatus. It is absent in the Tractatus because the fundamental elements required for clarity in understanding are assumed to be right there, existing within our concepts. Now Wittgenstein has realized that they are not there, and the only thing which can take their place, to account for any existence of clarity in understanding, is a striving for such. That Wittgenstein directs us away from this notion of striving after an ideal, by "turning our whole inquiry around", instead of guiding us toward the ideal (as the philosopher in Plato's cave analogy does), is what I conclude as a deficiency in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

A surveyable representation, an übersichtlichen Darstellung, a representative overview is said to be of fundamental importance. For it is from this vantage point that we see connections between things, how they relate to each other.

125. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey.
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases, things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is
just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: “That’s not the way I meant it.”
The civic status of a contradiction, or its status in civic life - that is the philosophical problem.

An examination of grammar does not show these connections. The rules do not yield a representative overview. A representative overview, rather, makes clear how we have become entangled in the rules. The last remark regarding civil life may seem puzzling until we make the connection between language and life. The overview encompasses not just language but its place and function within our forms of life. Meaning is not determined by an analysis of grammar. Meaning is not in the rules.

The fundamental importance of an übersichtlichen Darstellung is something that Wittgenstein will continue to develop. He is no longer concerned with the Tractarian question of the conditions for the possibility of representation, but rather with the ways in which representation, how we picture things, is how we look at them, and can both stand in the way of and lead to new ways of seeing connections.

Meaning is not in the rules. — Fooloso4

Perhaps I'm taking this out of context, or perhaps I'm just misunderstanding Wittgenstein, but this strikes me as not completely true.

What I have in mind is something like the following:

Or we may say: “These people are so trained that they all take the same step at the same point when they receive the order ‘+3’. [§189]

Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule — say a signpost — got to do with
my actions? What sort of connection obtains here? — Well, this one, for example: I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it. [§198]

206. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. One is trained to do so, and one reacts to an order in a particular way.

The order '+3', for example, has the meaning of taking the same step at the same point in one's caluclations. A Stop sign or a red light means you move or react accordingly - "green means go". Although I'm not trying to say that this sort of behavioural reaction to language/signs is always the case.

I know I haven't explained it very well. Maybe I'm just unclear on why you move from discussing the representative overview to discussing meaning.

Maybe I'm just unclear on why you move from discussing the representative overview to discussing meaning. — Luke

He says at 125:

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey.
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases, things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen.

If one is entangled in the rules and the rules prevent one from saying what he means, then the meaning is not the rules. The survey, that is, the representative overview, throws light on this.

If one is able to follow the rule then he knows what he is to do, but we know that there are some who have a great capacity of misunderstanding. The rule says +3 but they interpret this perversely. They don't follow the rule because they do not understand what is meant by +3. Repeating the rule does not make its meaning clear to them.

I think I understand. Thanks.

The order '+3', for example, has the meaning of taking the same step at the same point in one's caluclations. A Stop sign or a red light means you move or react accordingly - "green means go". Although I'm not trying to say that this sort of behavioural reaction to language/signs is always the case. — Luke

What I think, is that the rule is "+3", as you indicate, the sign-post itself. According to the premise, "meaning is use", the meaning of the rule is what is intended (meant) by the speaker, in the particular instance of use, as per 117. We have no premise yet to assign universality, or generality to use, such as "green means go".

"117. You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't
you? Well then—I am using it in the sense you are familiar with."—
As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it
carried with it into every kind of application.
If, for example, someone says that the sentence "This is here"
(saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to
him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this
sentence is actually used. There it does make sense."

The question now might be why am I inclined to do what the speaker intends of me, when the speaker uses the words, and I hear the words. Or, why am I inclined to use specific words in particular situations. At 139 this is expressed as "understanding" the word. Understanding the word might be like associating a picture with it. And at 140 there is a "force", or "compulsion" described, which may incline one to associate a particular picture with a particular word, rather than associating some other picture with that word, which would still be a possibility. Further, 141, we might remove the picture and replace it with a process, a "projection" or "application".