Oh. Well, you did a better job of explaining your position there than you had in some previous posts.

Although most geniuses are shit at teaching. — Noah Te Stroete

Yeah, and some stuff of genius can’t be taught.

If you stopped at the stop sign, the rigidity of the designator is validated. If you didn’t, the designator is no less rigid, but you disregarded it for whatever reason. All the designator needs, is for what it represents to be understood, not necessarily agreed with. — Mww

There's zero rigidity to "what it represents" though.

What is this from? — Noah Te Stroete

It's from his Bible. He likes to quote from his Bible.

There's zero rigidity to "what it represents" though. — Terrapin Station

So there is a possible world where “stop” means “go” or “smoke a cigarette”?

There's zero rigidity to "what it represents" though. — Terrapin Station

Because the designator is not universal and necessary with respect to its representation, it isn’t rigid? The world ends if you don’t stop at the stop sign? We both know that’s not true, so those can’t be the criteria for rigid.

Because the designator is not universal and necessary with respect to its representation, it isn’t rigid? — Mww

Right. What the heck would "rigid" amount to if a designator is variable?

The world ends if you don’t stop at the stop sign? We both know that’s not true, so those can’t be the criteria for rigid. — Mww

That part doesn't make sense to me. Supposedly one of the criteria is that a term always refers to the same thing, in all possible worlds, but a term that doesn't always refer to the same thing isn't going to meet that criterion.

All you gotta do is ask yourself.....how many other worlds have I been to? None....probably....so universality is irrelevant. That leaves necessity.

In this particular case, no other sign, of this given color, shape and location, ever has any other purpose than to signal an action with respect to what the sign represents. Therefore, necessity is satisfied, and the designation is rigid. Sorta like....if this is all it can be, it must be necessary for it to be that. If sufficient compliance is attained, universality is possible.

Possible worlds are stipulated. One cannot logically conceive of “what that sign represents” to be other than what it represents given the meaning of the word “stop”, its color, location, etc. I would agree that it is a rigid designator.

On this thread, the original rendering of a rigid designator representing morality, forwarded by creativesoul.

I don’t know about rigid designator as a term in general. Is that where other worlds are stipulated?

And why would anybody do that? Use a mere possibility to cast suspicion on an otherwise perfectly valid Earthly conception.

It’s from Kripke’s Naming and Necessity. It helps one distinguish necessary from contingent truths.

Oh. One of those New Age types, huh. Too modern for me.

What do you think makes distinguishing necessary from contingent truths important? Like....why are there two of them anyway?

What do you think makes distinguishing necessary from contingent truths important? Like....why are there two of them anyway? — Mww

I don’t really know the import of it besides having different epistemic value. Also, I don’t know how creativesoul was using it.

I don’t know how creativesoul was using it. — Noah Te Stroete

Page 51, towards the bottom, part of his string of posts. Seemed quite apropos.

So “morality” must always refer to acceptable/unacceptable behavior is a necessary truth. Moral beliefs can change so instances of moral beliefs are contingent truths. I think that is what creativesoul was saying.

In this particular case, no other sign, of this given color, shape and location, ever has any other purpose than to signal an action with respect to what the sign represents. Therefore, necessity is satisfied, and the designation is rigid. Sorta like....if this is all it can be, it must be necessary for it to be that. If sufficient compliance is attained, universality is possible. — Mww

There's no purpose period except for an individual thinking about something in terms of purposes. Same with representation. Since different individuals can and do think about things differently, as well as potentially the same individual on different occasions, there is no rigidity.

So “morality” must always refer to acceptable/unacceptable behavior is a necessary truth. — Noah Te Stroete

I think that’s how he uses the word, yes. But it works just as well for me, when I say it is a rigid designator which must refer to, or represents, one of the two fundamental conditions of being human, which just happens to use the same word.....morality. I think his is use much more general than mine.

I agree with both of you.

Yes, without a doubt. There is no source other than ourselves for anything whatsoever. That we’re conscious of, anyway.

Yes, without a doubt. There is no source other than ourselves for anything whatsoever. That we’re conscious of, anyway. — Mww

I don’t think Terrapin is going to agree to that, but we’ll see what he says.

I agree with both of you. — Noah Te Stroete

Cool. Fuel for Terrapin’s fire.

Yes, without a doubt. There is no source other than ourselves for anything whatsoever. That we’re conscious of, anyway. — Mww

That's like saying "There's no source for anything whatsoever other than suspended pigments applied to canvases. That we can paint, anyway."

JINX!!!!!

That's like saying "There's no source for anything whatsoever other than suspended pigments applied to canvases. That we can paint, anyway." — Terrapin Station

I don’t understand this. It seems like a category error or something.

Out of bounds.

What I said must relate to what you said. You spoke of sources relevant to human thinking which means my response has to be relevant to human thinking. Not paint or canvass.

DOUBLE JINX!!!!!

So, you start out by saying that there is no x aside from F, where the scope seems to be universal, and the claim thus controversial . . . But then you suddenly clarify that you're restricting the scope to y, which is definitionally F.

You spoke of sources relevant to human thinking — Mww

In the case at hand, the phenomena only occur as thought.

That only applies to all phenomena if we restrict our context to thinking about things.

I don’t know what you are saying. Meta-ethics, normative ethics, and descriptive ethics are all different things.

Hmm . . . I wasn't even talking (or thinking about) ethics there.