Seriously, though, if this is that difficult for you, we need to concentrate on tackling stuff like the Cat in the Hat first.

You don't seem to be reading what I'm writing. — Terrapin Station

Let's look again, shall we?

What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

So, it would follow that all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral in kind.
— creativesoul

Yes. Hence why I wrote that. — Terrapin Station

If all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral in kind then no opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are immoral in kind.

Hence, I asked what counts as immoral on your view. The answer contradicted what you've already argued.

You're using the two terms "moral" and "immoral" both as opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. Hence, I said you were moving the goalposts.

There's also this...

Being moral relative to S is about S's judgment.

Being moral as a result of being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette is not.

You're equivocating the term "moral".

Earlier I responded to your first statement above by saying that promises are not true or false in a propositional sense, but that they may be true promises or false promises depending on whether the one promising sincerely intends to keep the promise. I said further that so-called false promises are not truly promises at all, they just appear to be promises.

Thinking about it further it occurred to me that promises can be understood to be true or false propositions in two ways:

First, if we think of promises as statements of intention, then promises will be true or false depending on whether they correspond or fail to correspond to the intention they state. If I promise to pay you for the work you carried out on my behalf, and I have no intention of paying you for the work, then the so-called promise, as a statement of intention to pay you, is false.

Second, if we think of promises as statements about what will be, then promises will be true or false depending on whether the states of affairs they claim will obtain do or do not obtain. If I promise to pay you for the work, and I do not pay you for the work, then the promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, is false. — Janus

Again, well done.

This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around.

Why in the world do we have to keep posting the same thing over and over? — Terrapin Station

On the bright side, at least he has stopped going on about thought/belief, existential dependence, and that which is prior to language.

I can now take the shotgun out of my mouth.

Seriously, though, if this is that difficult for you, we need to concentrate on tackling stuff like the Cat in the Hat first. — Terrapin Station

:rofl:

Dr. Seuss utterly failed to distinguish between green eggs and the reporting of green eggs. Green eggs are distinct to and/or from that which is prior to green eggs. Green eggs are existentially dependent on ham.

The Cat/Feline in and/or around the Hat.

Eggs/ham is distinct from eating about eggs/ham.

Being moral relative to S is about S's judgment. — creativesoul

Would you two kindly stop talking about me?

Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.

What makes all these different things moral in kind?

What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator or set thereof also counts as being moral by virtue of having it? Is it just by virtue of having been called such?

I cannot agree with that.
— creativesoul

Hardly anybody does. — Mww

Do you?

Something here is troublesome to me...

A promise can be sincere and true at the time of utterance(the expressed intent corresponds to the speaker's intent).
A promise can be sincere and true at the time of utterance(the expressed intent corresponds to the speaker's intent), but the promise never be kept.

This would be to say that such a promise could be both true and false, no?

Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent).

The thing you’re not agreeing with, and now asking me if I agree with, is derived from an improper understanding of what I said.

What I categorically, and hardly anybody else by my supposition, and you by admission, wouldn’t agree with, is your statement, rather than my comment.

The thing you’re not agreeing with, and now asking me if I agree with, is derived from an improper understanding of what I said.

What I categorically, and hardly anybody else by my supposition, and you by admission, wouldn’t agree with, is your statement, rather than my comment. — Mww

Fair enough, I suppose.

I'm unclear still.

You did say "...promising is always morally good".

That's a duplicate post. Is your circuit board overheating? Do we need to send you away for repair?

I wouldn't agree with that.

Something here is troublesome to me... — creativesoul

Is it the relationship between green eggs and ham?

No. I said promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good.

The procedure is morally good, from a deontological point of view.

Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. — Mww

The second sentence above states "just because promising is always morally good"...

Are you saying that promising to cause injury aren't promises, or do not follow a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing?

Seems that you must admit/claim that all promises are morally good even when what's being promised is not. That seems to follow from what you've been arguing...

Yes?

How is stating that "Not all promises are good" an example of moral relativism?

I wasn’t asked that, so no, that wasn’t what I was saying.

An insincere promise is a deceit, so I would say it isn’t following the lawful procedure.

I said promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good.

The procedure is morally good, from a deontological point of view. — Mww

The last bit is not about what is morally good. It is about what is considered such from a deontological framework.

I was asking clearly, what makes something moral in kind. I took the answer to be about that. Now you're saying that that answer is from a particular point of view.

An insincere promise is a deceit, so I would say it isn’t following the lawful procedure. — Mww

And a promise to injure?

I said

Not all promise making is good. — creativesoul

is an instance of moral relativism. I should have said subjective moral relativism, because the good of a promise is always internal.

Your “not all promises are good” is a judgement made on a morality not belonging to it, and is merely a continuation of an objection to a promise-making procedure, and is moral relativism proper.

I don’t hold with the concept of “moral in kind”. One is moral or he is not, and either only with respect to himself.

Who’s the Philebus here, and who’s the Socrates?

Plato's dialogues were monologues. You are not me. I'm just trying to understand.

Your “not all promises are good” is a judgement made on a morality not belonging to it, and is merely a continuation of an objection to a promise-making procedure, and is moral relativism proper. — Mww

Given my view on truth and meaning, that's an interesting assertion. Judgment? Sure.

On my view, we can be mistaken. What we thought was good ends up being not. You? How does being mistaken fit into this deontological schema?

He still had to split-think.

Being right, or its complement, mistaken, is a rational judgement; being good, or its complement, not good, is a moral judgement. The former is legislated by reason with empirical predicates, the concepts of which are from experience; the latter is legislated by reason with pure practical predicates, the concepts of which are from understanding, better known to Everydayman as conscience.

Being mistaken doesn’t fit into the deontological schema. It is common to think that which is predicated on law is thereby susceptible to having those laws “broken”, hence arises the idea of mistake. While that is all true, such is not the true implication of law in moral philosophy, it being more the natural inclination of rational agents to respect the intrinsic properties of any law. Because humans generally respect law, it follows that if moral laws were shown to be possible, it is reasonable to suppose humans would respect them as well. Hence the ground of deontological moral philosophy.

Let's look again, shall we? — creativesoul

Re "you're not reading what I'm writing, what happened to reading this:

"Did you read 'The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility. . . ' For example. When I answered what 'moral in kind' is, I was saying what morality is."

You misunderstood my response to "moral in kind" as only being about moral permissibility per se, because it turned out that that's what you had in mind. It's curious that you read my response that way, though, because among other things, it implies that you didn't understand the phrase "relative permissibility." Relative permissibility includes "x is morally permissible* as well as "x is morally impermissible" (as it would include other points on the permissibility continuum, too). "Moral in kind" I read as "the nature of what we call morality," not just limited to moral permissibility contra moral impermissibility, etc. ("etc." for the similar metrics, which I also wasn't attempting to produce an exhaustive list of; it was just a quick list of examples of the relevant sorts of metrics).

I've identified and corrected this misunderstanding at least a handful of times now, but you don't seem to be reading, or at least you don't seem to be comprehending any of this. Maybe you are, maybe you don't really have so much difficulty with reading comprehension, and you're just having some "fun" instead, but I don't know about that. If the idea is to make this place seem that over the top learning-disabled it might be working.

I would think the ‘good’ of a promise is contingent upon integrity as always morally good, rather than adherence to correct promise-making procedure.

Just a thought...carry on...

the ‘good’ of a promise is contingent upon integrity as always morally good, — Possibility

Good thought, and would be justified, if it could be shown that integrity is itself irreducible. It’s the difference between what a man has as opposed to what a man is, and whether what a man has is sufficient to fully describe his moral disposition.

Me....carrying on.