• philosophy
    67
    Assume for the sake of argument that there are no ''things'', that instead everything is one. Does it follow from this that change is impossible and that any change we experience through the senses is an illusion? This is precisely Parmenides' argument in On Nature, which argues that change is impossible. By contrast, Heraclitus argues that change is reality. We seem to have two diametrically opposed views here. One claims that change is an illusion; the other claims that change is all that there is. However, despite this difference, both Parmenides and Heraclitus are monists; they both believe that all is one. For Parmenides, the one is ''Being'' (which Parmenides likens to a ''well-rounded sphere''), for Heraclitus it is one process. Note that both views seem compatible with modern science in their different ways: Parmenides' block universe is consistent with Einstein's four-dimensional space-time continuum; Heraclitus' becoming is consistent with the reduction of ''matter'' to energy.

    It seems to me that Parmenides' monism is more consistent than Heraclitus' monism. More generally, it seems impossible to be a monist and to assert that there is change, since change presupposes the existence of things. If there is only One, then how can it change? - there is nothing other than itself to change into, and changing into itself is clearly not a change.

    Monism entails Being; pluralism entails Becoming. Heraclitus is a monist who declares that all is one, therefore his position is self-defeating.

    So, my question is: is monism incompatible with change?

  • leo
    882
    It seems to me that Parmenides' monism is more consistent than Heraclitus' monism. More generally, it seems impossible to be a monist and to assert that there is change, since change presupposes the existence of things. If there is only One, then how can it change? - there is nothing other than itself to change into, and changing into itself is clearly not a change.philosophy

    The idea that there is only change is also the idea that there is no thing, because anything that we call a thing is not itself anymore by the time we call it. Change itself is not something that could be described in a constant, unchanging manner, so change itself would not be a thing, and so we can't treat change as a thing changing into itself. And so asserting that there is only change does not necessarily presuppose the existence of things, nor does it imply that there is no change.

    (That's just my point of view)
  • philosophy
    67
    But change seems to presuppose the existence of a thing. If something is changing then there must be a thing, i.e. an identity, that is undergoing change. It does not seem to make sense to speak of change independently of things, hence independently of pluralism.
  • frank
    15.7k
    But change seems to presuppose the existence of a thing. If something is changing then there must be a thing, i.e. an identity, that is undergoing change. It does not seem to make sense to speak of change independently of things, hence independently of pluralism.philosophy

    We seem to assume that past and future versions of things don't exist. Therefore, if time is continuous, then it's hard to specify a duration for the existence of anything. Saying that Becoming is fundamental does seem to be a mystical mind-bender, but how should we think about Being if it's fundamental? Do we change our conception of time?
  • leoAccepted Answer
    882


    You could say that there are many things always changing, but then what does it mean to call them things if they are always changing, if from one moment to the next they are not the same things anymore? Then it's not things that are changing, it's that there is change, and we temporarily call some part of that change a thing while it appears not to change, but then the things (the identities) are the illusion and the change is the reality. Even though you can identify temporarily an identity within that change, that doesn't make it an identity beyond the fact you temporarily didn't notice a change.

    And then in that view it is meaningless to talk about what is changing, because there is no such thing as is. It is even misleading to say that "there is only change", because the change that is referred to can't be described, the moment we try to describe it in terms of things we're missing its essence. Our language is based on the notion of things existing and being, often making use of the verb "to be" to describe, so it is misleading to attempt to describe change as the basis of reality using a language that assumes being as the basis of reality.
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