Terrible analogy. — Merkwurdichliebe

Right?

It means that only photographs exist...

all phenomena is a product of the mind. — Merkwurdichliebe

This is false.

Terrible analogy. — Merkwurdichliebe

Because?

It means that only photographs exist... — praxis

Obviously not only photographs exist. But a camera is necessary to take photographs of things. Not everything is a photograph, obviously. A photograph is a specific thing that a camera does.

That's just not obviously not only minds exist. But minds are necessary to conceive things. Not everything is a concept, obviously. Concepts are specific things that minds do.

A photograph is a representation. A mind (or camera in your analogy) produces mental representations (analogous to photographs). The entire world of the camera in your analogy is comprised of photographs.

I'm not claiming that physical things don't exist. I'm claiming that a mind is necessary to make them exist for us.

The entire world of the camera in your analogy is comprised of photographs. — praxis

According to what?

My imagination?

My imagination? — praxis

lol

According to the physical world, and my imagination.

According to the physical world. — praxis

You'd have to explain how that's working in your view, because it just seems like a completely random thing to say.

Our senses recieve patterns of data which is mentally processed. The sense data is in accord with the received patterns.

If I'm off-base, what do you mean by 'according to what?'

This is false. — Terrapin Station

What is it that assigns phenomenological significance to my immediate sensory experience? The mind. Without thought/belief to mediate my raw unintelligible sensory data, there is nothing but the fleeting variegated mirage of direct existence.

If anything we are discussing can be accused of having a priori significance, it is the notion of thought/belief. 8n relation to the tabula rasa of thought/belief, any cosmological or neurobiological explanation are as much a matter of a posterior understanding as any explanation concerning the ethical or its source. — Merkwurdichliebe

I would not object to concluding/assuming that at the moment of a creatures' biological conception there is no such thing as thought/belief. However, Tabula Rasa is not a notion I would endorse. A blank slate overstates the case.

If we must speak in terms of a priori and a posteriori, then I suppose the above makes a fair point. However, I personally reject that framework as a result of it's inherent inadequacy. In fact, I reject all historical philosophical metaphysical frameworks for the very same reason. They are all based upon dichotomies such as subject/object, mental/physical, internal/external, subjective/objective, and others. None of these dichotomies can coherently arrive at a framework capable of taking proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus... neither. Thought/belief is one such thing.



Expanding upon the commonality between all explanations of thought/belief...

All explanations of thought/belief are themselves existentially dependent upon pre-existing thought/belief. That is to say that all explanations of thought/belief are metacognitive endeavors(they require thinking about thought/belief). Thought/belief cannot be pointed at. It does not have a spatiotemporal location. So, unlike thinking about physically perceptible things, thinking about thought/belief requires quite a bit more than just brains/nervous systems replete with physiological sensory perception and the innate ability to experience the effects/affects of basic emotion(contentment/discontentment/fear).

Here's my question...

Can anyone here offer an example of any philosopher from any time period throughout human history who has drawn and maintained the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief?

No. But why? I mean we all know that we do this. We're doing it now!

Because some humans - especially the Ivory Towered and religious ones - want to think of themselves as 'higher' than the 'dumb' animals. As a result, they've went to great extremes providing proof of this by arguing how animals do not think like us - cannot possibly think like us. It makes perfect sense to say such things. I mean, animals cannot think about their own pre-existing thought/belief. Animals cannot deliberately reason, suspend their judgment, conceive of novelty, etc. We can. That's just a small part of what language has helped facilitate.

But there's a big problem with this line of thinking. It does not draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. If it did, and it did it rightly, then we would still be able to hold superiority and do so without being dead wrong about whether or not animals form thought/belief and/or the extent of which they can be said to have/hold thought/belief.

So it is a more primitive morality, more closely related to the autonomic processes of the nervous system, whereas a more sophisticated mode of morality would render the autonomic process so insignificant as to bypass any potential effect it may have on subsequent behavior or disposition. — Merkwurdichliebe

I wouldn't call the common core of all thought/belief 'primitive morality'. Primitive thought/belief? Sure. Not all thought/belief is rightfully called "morality". Rather, morality is codified thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour(thought/belief that is moral in kind).

Morality is codified moral belief. Laws.

You and I both know that the position I'm arguing for rings true in a multitude of ways and has the broadest possible scope of rightful application(s). Don't we?

:wink:

Have you come up with a coherent account of shared meaning yet? That's where we left off long ago.

No.

You never will as long as you mistakenly believe that everything that exists has a quantifiable spatiotemporal location. Truth(correspondence to actual events) doesn't. Relationships don't. The attribution of meaning doesn't. Thought/belief doesn't.

An adequate account of shared meaning depends upon knowing that.

All meaning consists of correlations drawn between that which becomes sign and that which becomes significant, that which becomes symbol, and that which becomes symbolic. A creature drawing mental correlations, associations, and/or connections between different things. That is what meaning consists of... all of it. Multiply the creatures by any number. So long as they are drawing correlations between the same things, they're attributing meaning in the same way.

Both a dog and a human can learn that touching fire causes pain. That is how 'shared' meaning emerges, in the sense that it is the same thought/belief being formed by different creatures. Thought/belief that is commonly formed and/or held by more than one capable creature. Typically, talk of shared meaning denotes linguistic meaning and as such it involves people drawing the same or similar enough correlations between language use and something else.

We must take care and not confuse our reports with what they are reporting upon. The former is existentially dependent upon language. The latter is not always. Some thought/belief exists in it's entirety prior to it's being reported upon.

Everything ever spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered originates in/from pre-linguistic, non-linguistic thought/belief. Thought/belief autonomously emerges in simple 'form' and gains in it's complexity. Human knowledge, let us not forget, provides the strongest possible justificatory ground for our saying so, because it is an empirical manifestation of human thought/belief.

All thought/belief is meaningful to the thinking believing creature. Some thought/belief are prior to language. Some meaning is prior to language. Not all meaning is existentially dependent upon language. All thought/belief(all correlation) presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of subsequent further qualification). The presupposition of correspondence to actual events happens prior to language.

If the presupposition of truth(as correspondence to actual events) happens prior to language, then any and all philosophical positions arriving at and/or relying upon the contrary are wrong in a very specific sort of way.

If the attribution of meaning happens prior to language, then any and all positions arriving at and/or relying upon the contrary are wrong in a very specific sort of way.

You modest sunavabitch! :grin: — Merkwurdichliebe

Surely you jest.

What is it that assigns phenomenological significance to my immediate sensory experience? The mind. — Merkwurdichliebe

Assigning significance is something that minds do, sure.

That's just switching the topic.

Again, it's switching to "what is it that changes focal lengths?" so that we're suddenly talking about cameras qua cameras instead.

Have you come up with a coherent account of shared meaning yet? — creativesoul

I've had a coherent account of how meaning works for decades. I don't know if I explained it to you in any detail or not in the past.

We need to clarify, by the way, just how you're using "shared" there. We'd not be talking about different instances of the same (exact, logically identical) thing, because there are no such things in general (I'm a nominalist).

Have you come up with a coherent account of shared meaning yet?
— creativesoul

I've had a coherent account of how meaning works for decades. I don't know if I explained it to you in any detail or not in the past.

We need to clarify, by the way, just how you're using "shared" there. We'd not be talking about different instances of the same (exact, logically identical) thing, because there are no such things in general (I'm a nominalist). — Terrapin Station

Nevermind.

Look in the cupboard for a red cup. Inside it you will find coffee. You cannot dip your finger into that red cup of coffee.

Don't let me get off topic. Let's experiment.

If we establish (not really) an incontestable premise in thought/belief, then let's just pretend, how would we begin to flesh out a method?

Perhaps you can enlighten me here with a hypothetical test run. And then, perhaps, run the "source of morals" through it. — Merkwurdichliebe

A method for what?

Establishing a minimal criterion for what counts as being a case of thought/belief, such that all known examples of thought/belief also satisfy this criterion?

Look in the cupboard for a red cup. Inside it you will find coffee. You cannot dip your finger into that red cup of coffee. — creativesoul

No idea what that's supposed to be referring to.

In moral foundations theory (Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, Jesse Graham), it's proposed that moral judgment is primarily given rise to by intuition, with reasoning playing a smaller role in most of our moral decision-making. Conscious thought-processes serve as a kind of post hoc justification of our decisions.

The theory suggests that we have unconscious intuitive heuristics which generate our reactions to morally charged-situations, and underlie our moral behavior. When people explain their moral positions, they often miss, if not hide, the core premises and processes that actually led to those conclusions.

The main evidence for the theory comes from studies of "moral dumbfounding" where people have strong moral reactions but fail to establish any kind of rational principle to explain their reaction.

creativesoul

You are a writing machine.

A blank slate overstates the case. — creativesoul

I admit, it is a poor choice of words, but you get what I mean.

If we must speak in terms of a priori and a posteriori, then I suppose the above makes a fair point. However, I personally reject that framework as a result of it's inherent inadequacy. In fact, I reject all historical philosophical metaphysical frameworks for the very same reason. They are all based upon dichotomies such as subject/object, mental/physical, internal/external, subjective/objective, and others. None of these dichotomies can coherently arrive at a framework capable of taking proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus... neither. Thought/belief is one such thing. — creativesoul

The a priori/a posterior distinction has its merits in explaining some things, but I certainly don't mean to restrict the conversation to that system, (only where relevant). And you are correct to reject any historical philosophical metaphysical frameworks.

I don't believe any philosophical framework aptly takes into account any of those metaphysical dichotomies which "consist of both, and are thus... neither". The only framework that comes close, is the dialectical one, which includes movement/transition into its logic, allowing it to essentially negate the law of contradiction.

However, I don't see how we can avoid beginning at an unverifiable metaphysical premise. The necessary abstraction of concepts inevitably places us on metaphysical ground. I don't know how it is possible to nullify this problem (in totality) through any methodology.

As I see it, we are left with two choices: to keep trying to metholologically locate a non-metaphysical premise from which we can proceed with absolute certaity; or to simply accept a metaphysical premise as self-evident, and proceed methodologically to investigate its consequence. The latter is obviously naive; but the former requires blind faith in a methodology that will only have proved itself, once it has indisputably proven itself. The only other way to validate a methodology is to test it by another method. What independent method could we use to determine the effectiveness of our methodology here (not that we actually have one)? It would seem to require another method to determine that methodology . . . ad infinitum.

All explanations of thought/belief are themselves existentially dependent upon pre-existing thought/belief. That is to say that all explanations of thought/belief are metacognitive endeavors(they require thinking about thought/belief). Thought/belief cannot be pointed at. It does not have a spatiotemporal location. So, unlike thinking about physically perceptible things, thinking about thought/belief requires quite a bit more than just brains/nervous systems replete with physiological sensory perception and the innate ability to experience the effects/affects of basic emotion(contentment/discontentment/fear). — creativesoul

Nice point, possibly something to build upon. I'll try not to get too excited and jump the gun.

Emotional affection, at the physiological level, corresponds directly to the behavioral disposition of desire/aversion. But, at this point, I can not say whether that the valuation of behavioral disposition marks a transition into the ethical, or, rather, stands as merely an aesthetic assessment of what seems most conducive to attaining the desirable.

Consider, that early in life, the infant begins to evaluate the desirable somewhere in the interplay of her nerve stimuli, and her emotional responses. As primitive as it is, this does constitute a valuation, despite the absence of any language skills. The primitive level in which value is imposed on emotional affection does not constitute a proper ethical judgement - it is more like an observation of what seems pleasing to me, rather than a moral choice about what I ought to do.

Then we can think about the toddler who has begun to acquire language. At this point, he is being linguistically conditioned (with some corporal conditioning) so that he can be assimilated into the culture to which he belongs. It is somewhere in this process that the evaluation of his primitive valuations commences; most importantly any evaluations of his primitive valuations are primarily acquired externally from culture, and not internally as a result of primitive valuation.

I hope this takes us one step closer to adequately understanding the source of morals. I could be mistaken, it's a terrible tragedy.


I would also add: thinking about thought/belief suffers from something analogous to the "observer effect" in physics.

It does not draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. I — creativesoul

You said it. If only thinking were not so indefinitely fluid - infinite, as it were. Perhaps, then, we could approach the topic of thinking about thought/belief in a direct manner. But, as it is, we cannot directly communicate actual thinking, and thusly, we can do nothing but approach it indirectly - as thought/belief about thought/belief.

I wouldn't call the common core of all thought/belief 'primitive morality'. Primitive thought/belief? Sure. Not all thought/belief is rightfully called "morality". Rather, morality is codified thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour(thought/belief that is moral in kind).

Morality is codified moral belief. Laws. — creativesoul

No dispute, here. I just meant to clarify your position. I would say, if there is a primitive morality, it comes well after primitive thought/belief. Hopefully we can discover approximately where that occurs.

You and I both know that the position I'm arguing for rings true in a multitude of ways and has the broadest possible scope of rightful application(s). Don't we? — creativesoul

Indeed! You arrogant sunuvabitch. :joke:

Don't mind that, I was just feeling out my present interlocutor - you.

Again, it's switching to "what is it that changes focal lengths?" so that we're suddenly talking about cameras qua cameras instead. — Terrapin Station

No, you are right...

Cameras freeze three dimensional fields of color onto two dimensional a surface.

...so, yes, you are wrong.

The presupposition of correspondence to actual events happens prior to language. — creativesoul

If the attribution of meaning happens prior to language, then any and all positions arriving at and/or relying upon the contrary are wrong in a very specific sort of way. — creativesoul

This is a very important point.

In basic terms, for the primitive human, the world has meaning in one particular or another. The introduction of language adds an entirely new dimension to the equation - a rational dimension. I, might argue, that ethical existence is not entered upon until (at least, but probably well after) the rational conscioussness is initiated through exposure to language.

We also find that the most relevant languages are not only historic, but contain historically embedded values that are determined by a completely separate dynamic, which lies far beyond the dynamic that determines primitive valuations; it is obviously more closely related to basic revaluations.

All thought/belief (all correlation) presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of subsequent further qualification). — creativesoul

Haha...nice!

The presupposition of correspondence to actual events happens prior to language. — creativesoul

Would you say such a presupposition is more a matter of immediate instinct/intuition, or rational reflection/deliberation?

In moral foundations theory (Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, Jesse Graham), it's proposed that moral judgment is primarily given rise to by intuition, with reasoning playing a smaller role in most of our moral decision-making. Conscious thought-processes serve as a kind of post hoc justification of our decisions. — praxis

This sounds about right, in general, for most people in most situations. However, I do find the notion of intuition to be without a common referent that existed in it's entirety prior to our accounts of it. It's use - without delineation - leaves me wondering what the speaker is talking about. Given that it is being claimed to give rise to moral judgment, I wonder if that is indicative of a claim regarding initial emergence/source/origen of all moral judgment or if it simply points out that some moral judgment happens automatically after one has a basis of moral thought/belief from which to judge. I'm probably being a bit too picky...

If by "moral judgment" we are talking about situations when one is voicing approval/disapproval in terms of whether or not something is acceptable/unacceptable, what morally right/wrong, or even what ought and/or ought not be done, then I would agree with the underlying sentiment.

Voicing approval/disapproval is almost always grounded upon pre-existing moral thought/belief(prior to the specific situation). In non reflective situations I might even be able to argue that it is always. However, we can - and we do - sometimes change our minds about which behaviours are acceptable/unacceptable. Those situations - where we are carefully considering our own pre-existing thought/belief - can yield moral judgments that are not so unreflective. They are arrived at via reasoning(thinking about our own pre-existing thought/belief). Of course, this takes another human - in some way, shape, or form, because it takes thinking about the same things in different terms. Roughly, one must admit being mistaken, and none of us are capable of recognizing our own mistakes when left entirely to our own devices. It takes another.

The theory suggests that we have unconscious intuitive heuristics which generate our reactions to morally charged-situations, and underlie our moral behavior. When people explain their moral positions, they often miss, if not hide, the core premises and processes that actually led to those conclusions.

I don't know about the 'heuristics' part, but aside from that I wouldn't disagree at all. I mean, that's very often the case regarding people's reactions in any emotionally charged situation regardless of the moral aspect(regardless whether or not it's about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour). I would even take that quite a bit farther and say that that's true in most everyday situations regarding almost all people's explanations regarding their own underlying 'operative' thought/belief.

The main evidence for the theory comes from studies of "moral dumbfounding" where people have strong moral reactions but fail to establish any kind of rational principle to explain their reaction.

Again I agree that these things happen, but I'm quite hesitant about the narrow scope of application. So, as far as evidence is concerned, it seems questionable for being used in such a specific way regarding only moral judgments as compared/contrasted to all sorts of judgments.

I think that most people in most situations can have strong reactions without knowing why and/or how they've come to have such unconscious emotional 'triggers'. All people have them at some point in time or another. I mean, that must take place prior to our taking account of it and/or ourselves.

Some people seem to be in a perpetual emotionally charged angry state; others a perpetual happy go lucky one; others are more even keeled. None of these general attitudes are always indicative of the amount of self-reflection and/or actual deliberate self-improvement work, and it is almost always difficult, that the individual has been involving in.

One has to want to do that. It does not always end well.

Not everyone is willing to or capable of doing what it takes to understand themselves. The remarkable thing, to me at least, is that the better you understand others the better you can understand yourself as well, and vice -versa. It's a self perpetuating process(pun intended).

Edited to be clear...

That's a hypothetical use of "you"... That nuance would have been much better understood had I used "one" instead of "you".