Morals consist of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. They are the basis for morality. They vary according to cultural and/or familial particulars.

This is true of all morals. We agree here don't we? — creativesoul

Indeed.

I feel we have made progress in a way that is rarely seen on TPF (add. as insignificant as it might be).

Progress is good, especially considering the very nuanced side issues concerning the ontology of thought/belief and reason we've been also contemplating here.

I cannot see how morality comes prior to cultural indoctrination. — Merkwurdichliebe

We may be misunderstanding one another slightly. Although, I don't think it's that important. Just to make sure of that:Morality, on my view, follows from the conventional definition of morality as set out by the SEP... the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

So in that sense, morality is the tool used for cultural indoctrination. On second thought, that may be imparting intention/purpose where none exists. Initially I mean. Surely some do use morality as a tool to indoctrinate youth, for the purposes of such.

Some religions have holy books which nearly make this claim outright.

I cannot see the arrival to ethical existence prior to the ability of the individual to separate herself from the culture into which she has been indoctrinated (even if, at that point, she chose to abide with the cultural indoctrination. — Merkwurdichliebe

Is this akin to a rough criterion for moral agency?

Thinking about one's own adopted moral thought/belief?

You are correct in this point. Just consider me thorough. I just want to be sure we have firmly arrived into ethical existence before we finally determine that we have exhausted all the relevant potential sources of moraliy.

So in that sense, morality is the tool used for cultural indoctrination. — creativesoul

I would argue that the indoctrination of culture is value charged with a preexisting morality, but the problem is that it is entirely accidental. There is no possibility of decision here. I would say that the ethical doesn't actually exist until responsibility is assumed by a deciding agent (no matter how insignificant or illusory). But it is not the responsibility that places one into ethical existence, rather it is the acceptance of the role as the deciding agent that places one there. The ethical, as it were, circles back upon the individual through culture, and places him into an immediate relation to the decision - it is an existential tier above that of primitive thought/belief and basic reflective assessments of one's experience.

You are correct in this point. Just consider me thorough. I just want to be sure we have firmly arrived into ethical existence before we finally determine that we have exhausted all the relevant potential sources of moraliy. — Merkwurdichliebe

Oh.

:wink:

When you put it like that, you guide our thoughts about "ethical existence" through 'the realm' of logical possibility. Perhaps "domain" is more apt and/or understandable as it usually applies to the subject of discourse.

We could imagine all sorts of potential sources of morality, and as long as we are sensible in terminological use and consistent throughout we could arrive at all sorts of answers to the question. In this way, we could arrive at different 'possible' sources of morals. That would be exhaustive of potential sources if we're using the term "potential" as a synonym for logically possible.

However, I do not find logical possibility alone very convincing... not at all. So, I hope that that is not the case here.

However, if you mean to direct our attention to the importance that conscious deliberation of one's own (mostly)adopted worldview(including the inculcation aspect of morals) has upon one's character, then you'll receive nothing but complete and total agreement from me.

I was going to ask about "ethical existence" but you've answered while I was still formulating this reply. That's an interesting position to put forth. I'm going to carefully consider what I think it means prior to saying more.

:smile:

However, if you mean to direct our attention to the importance that conscious deliberation of one's own (mostly)adopted worldview(including the inculcation aspect of morals) has upon one's moral character, then you'll receive nothing but complete and total agreement from me.

I was going to ask about "ethical existence" but you've answered while I was still formulating this reply. That's an interesting position to put forth. I'm going to carefully consider what I think it means prior to saying more. — creativesoul

You have set forth a common goal. I will do the same. :up:

That's a nice piece of writing. It's a bit too flowery for my disciplinary taste/preference in philosophy(critical and analytic), but the sheer aesthetic value is very much appreciated. The affects of my reading it were visceral.

Two ways of arguing much the same thing.

I have no issue at all with that criterion for what counts as ethical existence. I only balk at the 'accidental' aspect, but would readily accept that too, if you're saying that the indoctrination of culture upon the individual - as a thing in and of itself - emerged independently of and/or without deliberative purpose. If we're arguing that it began prior to our awareness that it was happening, and is accidental in that specific sense...

That would place it squarely in the domain of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it.

Yes.

I would say that the ethical doesn't actually exist until responsibility is assumed by a deciding agent (no matter how insignificant or illusory). But it is not the responsibility that places one into ethical existence, rather it is the acceptance of the role as the deciding agent that places one there. — Merkwurdichliebe

On a critical reading, there's something a bit confusing here for me though.

If A does not exist until B and B is insufficient for A then A is existentially dependent upon more than just B. If C results in A and C is not existentially dependent upon B then A is existentially dependent upon C and we've arrived at self contradiction with the first premiss. Either the first premiss is false, or there's an equivocation of "ethical" such that "the ethical doesn't actually exist" is not talking about ethical existence.

One can accept the role as a deciding agent without accepting responsibility. One can also accept responsibility without accepting they had a choice in what to do.

So, on second thought, despite the initial 'feeling' of agreement without issue regarding the criterion for ethical existence, I suppose there is a bit of an issue for me. All the rest concerning indoctrination existing in it's entirety prior to our awareness and/or accounts of it still stands strong for me though...

Carefully considering one's own adopted moral foundation requires thinking about one's own pre-existing thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. That would include considerations in light of not only the adopted moral basis of inculcation/indoctrination but also those moral thought/belief that everyone whose been harmed has. This includes those who had such thoughts long before language acquisition, and everyone after. The sadomasochist will still agree that they do not like being harmed by another despite being sexually aroused by some experiencing some forms of pain. They do not consider all pain as harmful, nor do I despite my distaste for painful sexual experiences.

No one likes being harmed by another.

The origen of morals must include all three, one's adopted morality via indoctrination, one's own reflective considerations of that, and one's own pre-linguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Morals, however aren't formed/held until the indoctrination begins.

That's a nice piece of writing. It's a bit too flowery for my disciplinary taste/preference in philosophy(critical and analytic), but the sheer aesthetic value is very much appreciated. The affects of my reading it were visceral. — creativesoul

"visceral" :lol: . Thank you. I know it's not the most popular philosophical form in this day and age. So, I appreciate that you have the philosophical versatility to look beyond my unfettered lexicon.

And, floweriness is a very apt description of my philosophy: for I intended to plant my ideas, cultivate and grow them, and finally watch them die.

I have no issue at all with that criterion for what counts as ethical existence. I only balk at the 'accidental' aspect, but would readily accept that too, if you're saying that the indoctrination of culture - as a thing in and of itself - emerged independently of any and all conscious deliberative purpose and prior to our awareness that it was happening.

That would place in squarely in the domain of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. — creativesoul

This is my meaning.

I would argue that this pre-existing entity, although only quasi-ethical (due to its inability for conscious deliberation) provides the necessary environment to cultivate proper ethical existence (qua. conscious deliberation of the moral agent).

I would say that the ethical doesn't actually exist until responsibility is assumed by a deciding agent (no matter how insignificant or illusory). But it is not the responsibility that places one into ethical existence, rather it is the acceptance of the role as the deciding agent that places one there. — Merkwurdichliebe

If A does not exist until B and B is insufficient for A then A is existentially dependent upon more than just B. If C results in A without B then A is existentially dependent upon C and we've arrived at self contradiction with the first premiss. — creativesoul

Permit me to put this logic into the terms of the discussion. Please correct me if I'm mistaken.

1) If the ethical (A) does not exist prior to cultural indoctrination (B), and cultural indoctrination is insufficient for the ethical, then the ethical is dependent upon more than just cultural indoctrination.
2) if moral agency results in the ethical without cultural indoctrination, then the ethical is existentially dependent on moral agency, and this contradicts the first premise.

You are correct. It definitely requires a closer look and some rethinking.

Either the first premiss is false, or there's an equivocation of "ethical" such that "the ethical doesn't actually exist" is not talking about ethical existence. — creativesoul

That was a very confusing use of language on my part. Let me restate it.

Perhaps it would have been better to say:
"the ethical only exists as a potentiality, until direct responsibility is assumed by a moral agent (no matter how insignificant or illusory the agent)."

Here, it is possible to conceive of the ethical as coming into being through cultural indoctrination. In becoming, the ethical is presupposed in cultural indoctrination, but until the ethical manifests itself in the live decision of moral agency, it is in a necessarily latent mode, which is quasi-ethical (or the ethical as concept), and not ethical existence proper (as moral being).

This includes those who had such thoughts long before language acquisition, and everyone after. The sadomasochist will still agree that they do not like being harmed by another despite being sexually aroused by some experiencing some forms of pain. They do not consider all pain as harmful, nor do I despite my distaste for painful sexual experiences. — creativesoul

It may be that physical harm and ethical harm differ qualitatively, and while it is possible for them to correlate in some way or another, it is not necessary. They each maintain their sense independent of the other.

The origen of morals must include both, one's adopted morality via indoctrination and one's own pre-linguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. — creativesoul

Indeed, the indoctrination and ethical assimilation into culture, combined with one's enduring pre-linguistic assessments of the desirable, adequately set the stage for the moral agent to appear. Somewhere in this dynamic comes, what I like to call "the original sin": the knowledge of good and evil. The role of the moral agent is most decisive in the transition from ethical becoming to ethical being. Is it, then, possible to say that the "source of morals" can be included under the category of becoming, and "existing morals" under the category of being.

Prior to ethical existence, there are many accidental factors that come into play. But once I have assumed the ethically deliberative consciousness, all meaning comes through my decisiveness. I no longer am concerned about my level of conformity to cultural norms, nor about my relation to the desirable. In ethical existence, I am no longer focused outward on the world: as it seems to be, and as it should be; rather, I turn inwardly towards myself: as I seem to be, and as I should be. For instance there is a sharp distinction between: the world is a scary place, it should be a peaceful place and I am afraid, I should be brave.

I have no issue at all with that criterion for what counts as ethical existence. I only balk at the 'accidental' aspect, but would readily accept that too, if you're saying that the indoctrination of culture - as a thing in and of itself - emerged independently of any and all conscious deliberative purpose and prior to our awareness that it was happening.

That would place in squarely in the domain of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it.
— creativesoul

This is my meaning.

I would argue that this pre-existing entity, although only quasi-ethical (due to its inability for conscious deliberation) provides the necessary environment to cultivate proper ethical existence (qua. conscious deliberation of the moral agent). — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree with the sentiment but would simplify our account. Perhaps it would be better to say that the inculcation/indoctrination does not 'provide' anything for it is not the sort of thing that is capable of providing. Rather, indoctrination/inculcation is the affect/effect that the cultural environment has upon it's individual members, and moral agency requires indoctrination/inculcation in order to have something to think about.

So, regardless of our different parsings... I think we both agree that moral agency depends upon(amongst other things) thinking about one's own mostly adopted moral belief(of which morals in the common sense are a kind). Moral agency is existentially dependent upon carefully evaluating one's own pre-existing moral foundations/morality/moral belief, and that foundation is almost entirely cultural.

It seems that simplification requires more words on my view???

:razz:

Perhaps it would have been better to say:
"the ethical only exists as a potentiality, until direct responsibility is assumed by a moral agent (no matter how insignificant or illusory the agent)."

Here, it is possible to conceive of the ethical as coming into being through cultural indoctrination. In becoming, the ethical is presupposed in cultural indoctrination, but until the ethical manifests itself in the live decision of moral agency, it is in a necessarily latent mode, which is quasi-ethical (or the ethical as concept), and not ethical existence proper (as moral being). — Merkwurdichliebe

Ouch.

:wink:

You know I'm going to want to reframe this, right?

What are we referring to, as precisely as possible, by 'the ethical'?

Aren't we just talking about specific kinds of thought/belief; those that give rise to moral agency?

I think I avoid the notion of potentiality and replace it with use of existential dependency and actual existence. So, instead of saying that the ethical is presupposed within cultural indoctrination, I would say that ethical thought/belief and the moral agency that emerges from it are both existentially dependent upon first having something to think about(indoctrination/inculcation of moral belief/morality).

This includes those who had such thoughts long before language acquisition, and everyone after. The sadomasochist will still agree that they do not like being harmed by another despite being sexually aroused by some experiencing some forms of pain. They do not consider all pain as harmful, nor do I despite my distaste for painful sexual experiences.
— creativesoul

It may be that physical harm and ethical harm differ qualitatively, and while it is possible for them to correlate in some way or another, it is not necessary. They each maintain their sense independent of the other. — Merkwurdichliebe

I would readily concur. However, ethical harm would surely be a harder thing to pin down and/or find widespread agreement upon.

The origen of morals must include both, one's adopted morality via indoctrination and one's own pre-linguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
— creativesoul

Indeed, the indoctrination and ethical assimilation into culture, combined with one's enduring pre-linguistic assessments of the desirable, adequately set the stage for the moral agent to appear. Somewhere in this dynamic comes, what I like to call "the original sin": the knowledge of good and evil. The role of the moral agent is most decisive in the transition from ethical becoming to ethical being. Is it, then, possible to say that the "source of morals" can be included under the category of becoming, and "existing morals" under the category of being. — Merkwurdichliebe

It's possible to say whatever we want. Is it helpful? Good/evil are a couple of days too old, ya know? There are way too many religious connotations and/or theistic baggage for my tastes. Surely we can do ethics in better ways without depending upon such unwarranted belief systems setting the stage for us, can't we?

That's the whole point of setting out the universal common denominators.

Prior to ethical existence, there are many accidental factors that come into play. But once I have assumed the ethically deliberative consciousness, all meaning comes through my decisiveness. I no longer am concerned about my level of conformity to cultural norms, nor about my relation to the desirable. In ethical existence, I am no longer focused outward on the world: as it seems to be, and as it should be; rather, I turn inwardly towards myself: as I seem to be, and as I should be. — Merkwurdichliebe

Regardless of one's moral thought/belief at this time of maturity?

It may be that physical harm and ethical harm differ qualitatively, and while it is possible for them to correlate in some way or another, it is not necessary. They each maintain their sense independent of the other. — Merkwurdichliebe


I would readily concur. However, ethical harm would surely be a harder thing to pin down and/or find widespread agreement upon. — creativesoul

All this unnecessary thrashing around is muddying the waters. Physical harm causes physical pain and suffering. Emotional harm causes emotional pain and suffering. they are both of them unethical. What's the problem?

No thrashing.

:wink:

Just waiting for a distinction between the two kinds of harm. Ethical harm seems to be a notion which follows from one's own pre-existing moral thought/belief. That's problematic, to me at least.

Not all pain is unethical. Nor is all pain harmful.

Sure, not all harm is necessarily unethical, or at least entirely unethical (the benefit of the action that causes the harm might be thought to outweigh the harm). But the question about whether we should cause harm (to anyone or anything) is always an ethical question.

Certainly. I argue for universally shared(common to everyone) thought/belief about exactly that. No one likes being harmed by another. That is thought/belief that is moral - in kind - on my view.

Earlier you mentioned the relevance of moral feelings to the source of morals.

I'd like to broach that aspect. Could you begin?

I think some social animals are very cognizant (sometimes in quite subtle ways) of the difference between conflict with intent to harm and playful competition. I see this as a kind of proto-moral feeling at work.

I would not disagree with that. If we are to take account of moral thought/belief in a manner that is amenable to evolution, it must be that way.

Our moral feelings are much more complicated. I'm sure you agree.

Our moral feelings are much more complicated. I'm sure you agree. — creativesoul

Yes I agree. Our moral feelings are not "raw" or merely instinctive affects, but culturally mediated, conceptually, linguistically and narrationally elaborated affective responses.

Certainly. Our moral feelings are informed by language use.

A proper account would need to be able to parse these out, wouldn't you agree?

I'm not sure what you mean by "parse these out".

It's possible to say whatever we want. Is it helpful? Good/evil are a couple of days too old, ya know? There are way too many religious connotations and/or theistic baggage for my tastes. Surely we can do ethics in better ways without depending upon such unwarranted belief systems setting the stage for us, can't we?

That's the whole point of setting out the universal common denominators. Ethics begins when we start considering others. — creativesoul

I was only speaking poetically. Oops

@Janus

Certainly. Our moral feelings are informed by language use. — creativesoul

Moral beliefs are certainly informed by language. But, it would seem that moral feelings are a deeper matter. A moral feeling is not simply some capricious attitude formulated by reason, rather, it is a deeply personal conviction that is not always receptive to the notion of opposing moral beliefs.

I was only speaking poetically. Oops — Merkwurdichliebe

Poetic philosophy tends towards equivocation and/or multiplying unnecessary entities.

Certainly. Our moral feelings are informed by language use.
— creativesoul

Moral beliefs are certainly informed by language. — Merkwurdichliebe

Some.

Janus
Certainly. Our moral feelings are informed by language use.
— creativesoul

Moral beliefs are certainly informed by language. — Merkwurdichliebe

Some.

Our moral feelings are not "raw" or merely instinctive affects, but culturally mediated, conceptually, linguistically and narrationally elaborated affective responses. — Janus

Some

I'm not sure what you mean by "parse these out". — Janus

Some moral feelings are informed by language. Some moral beliefs are informed by language.

Our moral feelings are not "raw" or merely instinctive affects, but culturally mediated, conceptually, linguistically and narrationally elaborated affective responses. — Janus

Moral feelings and moral beliefs need further parsing. Not all are informed by language use.