To me, it doesn't make sense to say, "There is really no such thing as 'what Wittgenstein is saying.' I think it's plainly contradictory, at least in terms of how we normally use the word say. — Sam26
In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. — StreetlightX
A lot of ink has been spilt on Witty's understanding of the 'survayability of grammar' (@Fooloso4 linked to a nice article on it here), but I want to try my hand at reading it on my own terms. — StreetlightX
In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. Importantly, it is also to recognise that that grammar does not extend beyond that purpose: there is no grammar that would encompass all instances of use: there is only ever this or that use, in this or that language-game. This is what is means to say that "our grammar is deficient in surveyability": there is no Archimedean point from which one could survey (all?) grammar from without (no ideal) - one must only ever work with actual (local) grammars. — StreetlightX
One of the reasons I'm employing these cartographic terms (map making terms) like 'local' and 'global' is that it helps account for §123, which talks about how philosophical problems consist in 'not knowing one's way about'. — StreetlightX
I am showing my pupils details of an immense landscape which they cannot possibly know their way around.
— Culture and Value 7
Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses. — PI 18
It was Luke who provided the link. — Fooloso4
For, despite the heavy critique of the Tractatus here (re: idealisation and so on), Witty’s understanding of philosophy remains strikingly similar. — StreetlightX
and that philosophy only ought to describe language — StreetlightX
is also not empirical: that is, math also does not deal with facts, or at least, facts in the empirical mode. — StreetlightX
I see a move of inconsistency in this section. Prior to 127, he describes philosophy as just laying things out, "to make it possible to get clear view" -125. That would be the goal of philosophy, to lay things out for viewing, analysis, whatever. — Metaphysician Undercover
309. What is your aim in philosophy? — To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.
This seems to be the basis for your claim of inconsistency, but where does he describe philosophy as "just laying things out"? — Luke
Then, at 127 he shifts, — Metaphysician Undercover
255. The philosopher treats a question; like an illness.
Rather than being the goal of philosophy [your unsupported assertion], getting a "clear view" is a means to an end; — Luke
No, it is succinctly stated at 133 that clarity is the end of philosophy. "For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear." — Metaphysician Undercover
When someone says we are aiming at something, as is the case in 133, "the clarity we are aiming at", then that thing is a goal. — Metaphysician Undercover
The inconsistency is that prior to 127 Wittgenstein is describing philosophy as simply putting things in front of us, not explaining anything, but after 127 he switches to say that the philosopher will arrange things into a particular order, for a particular purpose. He then proceeds to identify that particular purpose as clarity at 133. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point being that there is a radical difference between laying everything out in front of us for the sake of observation, and arranging things in an order for the sake of clarity. The latter being a form of explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Complete clarity is the goal, for that is when the philosophical problems completely disappear. You originally said that the goal of philosophy for Wittgenstein was "just laying things out...to get a clear view". — Luke
However, the process of getting a clear view is not the goal, for it is not the end of that process. The goal is the final achievement of that clear view: complete clarity. — Luke
There is no "switching" or inconsistency. Arranging things into a particular order for a particular purpose is the process of getting a clear view. — Luke
Regardless, I have no interest in arguing over the word "explanation". — Luke
Prior to 127 the goal of philosophy is just laying things out. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the complete clarity is for the purpose of something other than philosophy, then this further goal is irrelevant to this discussion of philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover
To arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view is completely opposed to what is stated prior to !27. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you must, go right back to 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.". By what principle is one order better than another order? If a philosopher is creating an order for the purpose of clarity, then that philosopher is explaining. But Wittgenstein has introduced no principle whereby explaining is what a philosopher ought to do. In fact, he has explicitly denied that there is any need for a philosopher to explain. Any order is a perfect order, even the vaguest of sentences, and there is no reason why any philosopher ought to arrange things in any specific order, for any specific purpose, because all orders are equally "perfect". — Metaphysician Undercover
Does that imply quietism? — Wallows
This is your unsupported assertion. He never states this is the goal of philosophy. But maybe if you say it enough times it will become true. — Luke
These are different uses/meanings of the word "order". — Luke
I quoted 126 at least twice and 125 at least once. I'm not here, to teach you how to read. — Metaphysician Undercover
At 98 he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence. — Metaphysician Undercover
You could at least quote the parts of §125 and §126 which support your claim that "just laying things out" is the goal of philosophy. — Luke
When he speaks of "order" at §98, he is talking about the sense of a sentence. This is quite obvious from the context of §98 and §99. — Luke
I just came across this article which argues that Wittgenstein was not a quietist, so perhaps I was a little hasty to label him as one. I consider the distinction made in the article for why he is not a quietist to be somewhat subtle, although I do agree with it. The article also contains pertinent remarks on the current passages under discussion and on my recent discussion with Metaphysician Undercover. It is a little lengthy, but worth the read. — Luke
I did. If you cannot understand, then so be it. — Metaphysician Undercover
He says "On the other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect order". This does not say that the sense is the order. It says that order is necessary (as determined by some sort of logic) for there to be sense. The order, which produces sense, is what I described above. At this point in the book (130-133), we have moved from "sense", to what underpins sense (as has been determined to be required for sense at 98), and that is "order". — Metaphysician Undercover
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