The analogy doesn't quite take out endeavor into proper account. I like watching people play games even sometimes when I do not want to play.
— creativesoul

But even then, the best way to watch is by entering the stadium. Watching a summarization on TV never matches being there, live at the bocce ball match.

The stadium is the universal criterion in my analogy, to be clear. — Merkwurdichliebe

Understood.

It's also quite useful to tame down rhetorical drivel regarding claims and/or implications/entailment that any and/or all 'definitions' and/or conceptions are on equal footing. The groundwork has already been put down to conclude that we can get some definitions wrong in a vey specific sense of being "wrong".
— creativesoul

Can you present an example where this has occurred in our discourse? Not disagreeing, only looking for a live example of such error so it can be properly understood. — Merkwurdichliebe

That has not taken place here. Earlier you - quite astutely - put such potential things to rest in another way, with other words.

I've seen it happen too many times to count here on this forum and others as well.

From here, we can transition with confidence into the introduction of linguistic thought/belief by authority . . . With linguistic thought/belief comes conceptual abstraction, and it would seem at this point, all necessary conditions are met for the inculcation of thought/belief that is moral in kind. — Merkwurdichliebe

I'd like to address this ellipsis.

The question is, what is the difference between linguistic thought/belief that is non-moral in kind, and linguistic thought/belief that is moral in kind? I would say that the former makes ethically neutral assessments of the world (analytical and speculative), while the latter makes ethically charged judgements (normative and prescriptive), that are likely to be someway associated with one assessment or another.

That has not taken place here. Earlier you - quite astutely - put such potential things to rest in another way, with other words. — creativesoul

I know exactly what you are referring to. :cheer:

Not much activity during your absence. Just my blabbing. You should be able to catch up quickly.

I would say that the former makes ethically neutral assessments of the world (analytical and speculative) — Merkwurdichliebe

This is the category of thought our criterion is restricted to. All talk of the "ought" is neither here nor there, but only an assessment. (This point is for others, not @creativesoul).

...other than the guillotine, I completely reject Hume's ethics (and all derivations therefrom). So, as far as 'expectation' is concerned, I cannot associate it with anything ethical. — Merkwurdichliebe

I reject Hume's framework for a couple of different reasons, including the guillotine. Hume's entire edifice is based upon an arbitrarily drawn distinction between emotion and reason that is itself based upon an ill-conceived notion of thought/belief. Hume wants to characterize reason as though it does not contain/include emotion. That could only be the case if reason was not existentially dependent upon emotion. Reason(Hume's conception) is a metacognitive endeavor. It consists entirely of thinking about pre-existing thought/belief. Disinterest is not completely devoid of all emotional content. It is itself an emotional attitude of sorts, one of 'self-control'. This could be further explicated, but I think we all agree on that much.

Thought/belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity according to the content of the correlations themselves. At conception there is no thought/belief. All thought/belief consist entirely of correlations between different things. Prior to language, correlations are drawn between the creature's own autonomous mental ongoings such as hunger, fear, and/or the lack thereof. Those are what's necessary for meeting the two basic needs for survival, gathering resources and avoiding danger. This sometimes results in contentment/discontentment amongst other things. Fear and hunger are at the foundation of all subsequent emotion and thought/belief.

Regarding expectation...

Expectation is a hallmark - the most reliable one - from which we can confidently say that the candidate under our observation/consideration has formed thought/belief, and/or is a thinking/believing creature. Humeans may wish to invoke the problem of induction, but it's moot here. A creature is more than capable of holding expectations without having the capability to presuppose a consistent world. Hume's inability to arrive at this is a result of not ever having drawn and maintained the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.

Rather, successful prediction/expectation is itself existentially dependent upon a consistent world. It does not follow from the fact that unexpected/unforeseen events can take place due to previously unknown causes, that we are unjustified/unwarranted regarding all expectation/prediction based upon consistent past events and/or their recollection. To quite the contrary, one who refrains from holding any expectation intentionally, would be arguing along the lines of refusing to believe that anything will happen because we've been wrong about what would happen before. We need not be omniscient in order to form, have, and/or hold well-grounded inferences/expectations/predictions.

The point of all of this is simply to situate expectation where it belongs...

Evolutionarily... I would think that amoebas are incapable of either.
— creativesoul

They certainly lack a neocortex. — Merkwurdichliebe

Our notion of thought/belief must also include some physiological aspects, or at least be falsifiable/verifiable. It seems that the complexity of thought/belief is proportional to the physiological/biological complexity of our candidate.

A venus flytrap, for example, can detect stimulus. It would be a stretch to say that it is capable of having/holding expectation about what's to come, and/or what's about to happen/take place...

So, that's another aspect that will definitely need to be addressed.

Of what use are those notions [intuitive, non-linguistic, subconscious] in this context?
— creativesoul

Yes, me wants to know too.
— Merkwurdichliebe

In the context of moral dumbfounding? Plenty, in my opinion.

Dumbfounding is indicative of an implicit evaluation or conditioned response that is beneath conscious awareness. — praxis

What it could mean for us to say that something/anything can even be 'beneath conscious awareness'. What would be above it? A spatial relationship between two things requires that both have a spatiotemporal location.

I also have a hard time making sense of this notion of 'implicit evaluation'...

Evaluations are deliberative measures with clearly established criteria. Evaluations are not the sort of things that exist implicitly within all moral thought/belief. Nor are they of much use here. Ignorance of one's own worldview predates evaluations thereof. Moral dumbfounding always results from the former but not always the latter.

Furthermore, implication is existentially dependent upon language use. It belongs in the domain of discourse about a single language expression having more than one accepted use(shared meaning).

So - knowing all of that - the only sense I can make of an "implicit evaluation" is when we're talking about a deliberate evaluation that has been previously made but has been long since forgotten, but the results left an impression of sorts that is still identifiable by virtue of it's ongoing affects/effects. In that sense, an implicit moral evaluation would be better understood as one element, one piece, one part, one ingredient... of a case of moral dumbfounding.

Not all cases of dumbfounding include much deliberate evaluation to begin with. Seems to me that correcting the dissonance is itself existentially dependent upon such an evaluation.

One who has a good grasp upon his/her own worldview also has implicit evaluations, so the notion of moral dumbfounding is not helpful here as far as I can tell...

Am I missing something?

I'm simply saying that if one makes true statements about the source of their own moral convictions then s/he cannot be sensibly said to be morally dumbfounded...
— creativesoul

I'm trying to reconcile this point. My concern is, what is the criterion for morality, who is making the moral judgment? If it is a true statement about the source of one's own moral convictions, then you are right, but if it is, say, culture, then it is entirely possible for Socrates to give a coherent but deluded reason for why he is ethically obligated to drink the hemlock. — Merkwurdichliebe

The above - by my lights - looks like the result of a prior misunderstanding. However, I do not think further hyper focus will sort it out. Sorting is sometimes better done indirectly.

Are you suggesting that you don’t believe in moral intuition?

Are you suggesting that you don’t believe in moral intuition? — praxis

Not at all. I'm suggesting that moral dumbfounding has been rendered useless here.

I'd be happy to intentionally analyze moral intuition. What is it?

Does my earlier assessment lack explanatory power regarding intuition of any sort?

I'm fond of Jung's unconscious. More particularly, what he asserts as the contents thereof.

That is the extent of my agreement with Jung however.

Moral dumbfounding is believed by some to be evidence for moral intuition.

I'd be happy to intentionally analyze moral intuition. What is it? — creativesoul

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_intuitionism

I'd rather not do all the work here and now. Suffice it to say that any and all things called "intuition" consist entirely of and/or are existentially dependent upon thought/belief.

They are a kind of thought/belief. The kind is determined by their content. Unconscious operative thought/belief. Those about acceptable/unacceptable thought/belief and/or behaviour are moral in kind.

That is the basis that exhausts all notions of moral intuition.

Moral intuition is the product of a pre-existing worldview replete with thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Habits of thought/belief are habits of mind. Habits of mind yield consequences. Intuition is a consequence of previously formed and re-formed thought/belief.

I would agree to the following(which seems amenable to some of the positions mentioned in the wiki article or it's link).

Not all well-grounded true belief is existentially dependent upon language acquisition and/or use.

Am I missing anything relevant?

Not much activity during your absence. Just my blabbing. You should be able to catch up quickly. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yeah, perhaps setting out and/or enumerating our agreements is a good thing to do...

Moral dumbfounding is believed by some to be evidence for moral intuition. — praxis

I'd have to see that argument. :wink:

It’s not clear to me how you distinguish between moral judgments that, on examination, ‘thought/belief’ can be clearly articulated and judgments where they cannot (as when dumbfounded).

It’s not clear to me how you distinguish between moral judgments that, on examination, ‘thought/belief’ can be clearly articulated and judgments where they cannot. — praxis

Can you re-phrase this?

Never mind.

I want to find a way to help us all better understand thought/belief and it's different complexity levels.

I've seen several different notions of 'moral judgment'. On my view, all moral judgments are about what's counts as either acceptable or unacceptable behaviour. It is to think, believe, and/or say that some specific thought, belief, and/or behaviour is one or the other(acceptable/unacceptable).

This begins prior to language(as heretofore argued without subsequent refutation/objection), and first manifests in language via mimicry and/or in situations where one witnessed the terms in question being used by others.

Does that help?

All else being equal...

Cases of moral judgment by a language user who is capable of clearly explicating their own moral thought/belief are cases of one who is not ignorant of their worldview. Such capability does not require careful scrutiny at the level of origens. I mean only to say that not all explanations are on equal footing.

Cases of moral judgment by a language user who is not capable of clearly explicating their own thought/belief are cases of one who is ignorant of the origins/sources of her/his/their own worldview. Such incapability does not equate to having/holding ungrounded thought/belief.

Just because one may not be aware of the ground, does not mean that there is none. Just because one may not be capable of arguing for their belief, it does not follow that it is not well-grounded. Just because one may be able to argue for their own belief, it does not follow that it is well-grounded. Coherency alone is insufficient for both, solid ground upon which to base subsequent inference and truth.

Does that address your concerns?

The term 'prelinguistic' has been used a lot in the topic and I thought it might be helpful to clarify what is being meant in its usage. — praxis

It means - quite simply - thought/belief that is formed and/or held prior to language acquisition, and/or by a language-less creature.

It can mean developments prior to language acquisition for our species or for children. The former might be considered instinctive or innate, but not the latter. — praxis

Our children are individuals of our species. Thus, I do not understand how something could be called "instinctive" or "innate" for a species but not for an individual thereof.

Regarding the source of morals, a distinction might be made between our innate condition, early pre-linguistic childhood conditioning, cultural conditioning (part of childhood conditioning), and whatever conditioning we might intentionally impose on ourselves. — praxis

Oh, indeed! There are all sorts of distinctions that have yet to have been drawn and maintained between different complexity levels of linguistically informed thought/belief.

Merk and I were amidst drawing a distinction between moral and ethical along those lines(lines of complexity and/or existential dependency). Much was left unpacked. The aim was what ethical agency was existentially dependent upon; the preconditions necessary for ethical agency to arise/emerge as compared/contrasted to simple moral thought/belief(I presume).

The question is, what is the difference between linguistic thought/belief that is non-moral in kind, and linguistic thought/belief that is non-moral in kind? I would say that the former makes ethically neutral assessments of the world (analytical and speculative), while the latter makes ethically charged judgements (normative and prescriptive), that are likely to be someway associated with one assessment or anothe — Merkwurdichliebe

The question needs attention, my friend.

:wink:

The question needs attention, my friend. — creativesoul

That was a typo, thanks for helping me. :scream: Now it's fixed. Just seeing if you were paying attention.. :grin:

This might be the central question. I think I gave very unresolved answers, I will be sure to elaborate...

Hume skirted around an important aspect of thought/belief. Expectation. — creativesoul

Have you ever read Hume? Or any secondary literature about his philosophy?

Yes. Our philosophies are actually quite similar in several aspects. He did not get thought/belief right. Humean causation attests to that as well as his notion of belief.

Just because one may not be aware of the ground, does not mean that there is none. Just because one may not be capable of arguing for their belief, it does not follow that it is not well-grounded. Just because one may be able to argue for their own belief, it does not follow that it is well-grounded. Coherency alone is insufficient for both, solid ground upon which to base subsequent inference and truth. — creativesoul

Right. The point is that individuals may have roughly the same intuitions but they can be developed differently depending on cultural influences. If true, that’s relevant to the project of investigating the source of morals.