So intuitive, non-linguistic, subconscious — whichever you want to call it then? — praxis

I would go so far as to call it a second nature. Correct me if I'm wrong.

That’s another term for it, yes.

Was that the case with Plato's own personal superhero? — creativesoul

He's mine too. But I'm more aligned with Antisthenes account (via Diogenes), than Plato's.

I agree with Nietzsche, Plato fucked everything up - that pussylicking pedophile.

I'm under the impression that "one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief", I would have to add: only when the question posed is done so rationally (by a relatively normal person), and is meant to elicit a rational answer. For the one who is morally dumbfounded, his reasons are perfectly rational and completely justify his position.(bolding mine) — Merkwurdichliebe

Rational?

How about true?

Plato has his own notion of the unknown. Unfortunately he claimed to know too much about it.

:halo:

...moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief.
— Merkwurdichliebe

Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance.
— creativesoul

So intuitive, non-linguistic, subconscious, whichever you want to call it then? — praxis

Those are not different names for the same referent on my view. Unnecessarily multiplying entities is against my religion.

:wink:

Of what use are those notions in this context?

I'm suddenly reminded of Russell's Why I am not a Christian.

Those are not different names for the same referent on my view. Unnecessarily multiplying entities is against my religion. — creativesoul

That's why you are so valuable to this discussion. When we all push ahead, you keep your hands on the reins.

@Praxis

Of what use are those notions in this context? — creativesoul

Yes, me wants to know too.

Rational?

How about true? — creativesoul

I think it would be wise, in the context of this discussion, to honor the great guillotine of Mister Hume, and leave out the notion of "true" thought/belief. Otherwise, we are going to end up in a different universe, a new thread. I think rational thought/belief is fair enough here.

I'm suddenly reminded of Russell's Why I am not a Christian. — creativesoul

I don't think he read much Kierkegaard.

I'm suddenly reminded of Russell's Why I am not a Christian.
— creativesoul

I don't think he read much Kierkegaard — Merkwurdichliebe

Maybe not. Probably not. Fear and Loathing?

Maybe not. Probably not. Fear and Loathing? — creativesoul

You had to bring it up. A book that constantly reminds us of the highest ethical idea - qua. the tragic hero.

I think it would be wise, in the context of this discussion, to honor the great guillotine of Mister Hume, and leave out the notion of "true" thought/belief. Otherwise, we are going to end up in a different universe, a new thread. I think rational thought/belief is fair enough here. — Merkwurdichliebe

Not sure how Hume's guillotine is applicable. When talking about moral dumbfounding, we're talking about what we've named some particular state of mind. When we're offering answers to what grounds our moral convictions those answers can most certainly be true, and must be if one is not morally dumbfounded. Seems that Hume's guillotine is irrelevant at this time.

Fear and Loathing?
— creativesoul

You had to bring it up. A book that constantly reminds us of the highest morality - qua. the tragic hero. — Merkwurdichliebe

I cannot remember. I do remember some very odd language use.

I cannot remember. I do remember some very odd language use. — creativesoul

I love philosophers who are courageous enough to speak oddly on occasion.

When talking about moral dumbfounding, we're talking about what we've named, some particular state of mind. — creativesoul

In this scenario, this particular state of mind (the morally dumbfouned) is in relation to the particular state of mind of the other(s). We cannot call the true, what is, without tossing this discussion out with the bathwater, and beginning again from the beginning with epistemology.

Ethical conversation is always prescriptive, the ought. "True" doesn't matter, only reason.

@creativesoul
Consider that the other tells you murder is wrong, but condones just war, and everybody else is same. Suppose you believe that murder is not immoral, but sometimes necessary. Where is the truth here? Who is morally dumbfounded?

We cannot call the true, or what is, without tossing this discussion out with the bathwater, and beginning with epistemology. — Merkwurdichliebe

On my view we cannot draw an equivalence between what's true and what is without equating truth with what's happened. Doing so renders us incapable of accounting for what sorts of things are true and what makes them so.

I agree though. Perhaps it's best to not invoke any specific notion of "truth" as of yet. We're using one already, but it is not the one that draws an equivalence between truth and reality(or what's happened - on my view).

That said, I thought we had already effectively situated the presupposition of correspondence to what's happened and the attribution of meaning within thought/belief formation itself.

All thought/belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line. All thought/belief is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.

That is the rough general - very common sense - criterion and/or outline for what pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic thought/belief must be able to satisfy. We arrive at that criterion(although this arrival has not yet been argued for) by virtue of looking towards statements of thought/belief as a means for assessing the common denominators of them all, regardless of the particulars.

Would you like to see a simple argument that allows us to venture between statements of thought/belief and non-linguistic thought/belief?

There's a bridge that still needs building it seems?

This is a fundamental assumption for what we are discussing here... — Merkwurdichliebe

Oh, but it's not just an assumption. It is a premiss that I've argued for may times over in past. Common sense actually. We can stay on course. Call it an assumption here, but just realize that it is well grounded by the same method used for arriving at a universal criterion for what all things called "moral" have in common.

That said, I thought we had already effectively situated the presupposition of correspondence to what's happened and the attribution of meaning within thought/belief formation itself.

All thought/belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line. All thought/belief is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.

That is the rough general - very common sense - criterion and/or outline for what pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic thought/belief must be able to satisfy. We arrive at that criterion(although this arrival has not yet been argued for) by virtue of looking towards statements of thought/belief as a means for assessing the common denominators of them all, regardless of the particulars. — creativesoul

That would make a great thread. But you said it "All thought/belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line. All thought/belief is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature." This is a fundamental assumption for what we are discussing here. And it has allowed us to discuss it quite efficiently in comparison to what was happening the first 15 pages. As far as the truth of meaning is concerned, that is beyond the scope of the present conversation, no?

Where is the correspondence to what happened?

Correspondence is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location. Thus asking where it is is misguided. — creativesoul

Then may I invoke the gravely overlooked guillotine of Nietzsche, that the only correspondence between what happened and what it means, is accidental or conditioned.
There is no necessary causal or logical relation between what we experience, and what we think of that experience.

Prefixing "truth" with the term "the" doesn't make sense on my view. — creativesoul

We went over this before, if I could get away with prefixing every word with " the ", I would.

Then may I invoke the gravely overlooked guillotine of Nietzsche, that the only correspondence between what happened, is accidental or conditioned, there is no necessary causal or logical relation between what we experience, and what that experience means. — Merkwurdichliebe

Unsure how this applies to a framework that says nothing of the sort. Looks like a conflation between truth and meaning. I've not talked in terms of truth as "a relation between experience and what that experience means"... nor would I

We went over this before, if I could get away with prefixing every word with " the ", I would. — Merkwurdichliebe

I didn't understand then, and I still do not understand such thinking...

I'm simply saying that if one makes true statements about the source of their own moral convictions then s/he cannot be sensibly said to be morally dumbfounded...

:smile:

Its a satire on the the assumption that what we say has actual existential meaning. :grin:

Is that different than having meaning and/or being meaningful?

I'm simply saying that if one makes true statements about the source of their own moral convictions then s/he cannot be sensibly said to be morally dumbfounded... — creativesoul

Ok good. I see how you mean to use true. :up:

I believe Socrates was morally dumbfounded in his moral conviction to eat the hemlock, and he gave plenty of sincere reason - "true statements about the source of [his] own moral convictions". But they were quite inconsistent in regard to what we know scientifically about death and social justice, as well as in regard to the general sentiment of common folk.

Is that different than having meaning? — creativesoul

Well, just ask an athiest if God has meaning, then ask if God exists.