You may be right. I'm still not sure. Camus could have just said that Sisyphus remained brave, that he didn't complain, that he learned to cope with his fate. But he goes beyond that, saying we must imagine Sisyphus happy (heureux - also interpreted as 'fortunate').Certainly in some readings of Zen - ‘Chop wood, draw water’ - there’s a sense of finding the transcendent in the round of everyday life. But there’s still a transcendent dimension. That is what is explicitly rejected in Camus. — Wayfarer
Well, the problem is posited with a solution. Otherwise, it would be pessimistic. — Wayfarer
even the "solution" is itself pesimissitc — Inyenzi
As I said, if the Buddhist path was simply that life is suffering, then indeed it would be pessimistic philosophy, but it says there is an end to suffering. You're assuming that the goal of the path is non-existence, which it isn't; it is said to be a state of utmost bliss. — Wayfarer
“Suppose, bhikkhus, a man would remove a hot clay pot from a potter’s kiln and set it on smooth ground: its heat would be dissipated right there and potsherds would be left. So too, when he feels a feeling terminating with the body … terminating with life…. He understands: ‘With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here; mere bodily remains will be left.’ “What do you think, bhikkhus, can a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed generate a meritorious volitional formation, or a demeritorious volitional formation, or an imperturbable volitional formation?”
“No, venerable sir.”
“When there are utterly no volitional formations, with the cessation of volitional formations, would consciousness be discerned?” “No, venerable sir.”
“When there is utterly no consciousness, with the cessation of consciousness, would name-and-form be discerned?”
“No, venerable sir.”
“When there is utterly no name-and-form … no six sense bases … … no contact … no feeling … no craving … no clinging … no existence … no birth, with the cessation of birth, would aging-and-death be discerned?”
“No, venerable sir.”
“Good, good, bhikkhus! It is exactly so and not otherwise! Place faith in me about this, bhikkhus, resolve on this. Be free from perplexity and doubt about this. Just this is the end of suffering.” — SN 12.51
At least the antinatalist has only the suffering of this earth to uproot, rather than the endless lifetimes through hell, ghost, animal, deva, etc, realms. — Inyenzi
The problem is that Nietzsche tries to "abundance the hell" out of life.. by embracing the tragedy and having unbridled enthusiasm for life, we can somehow overcome it, and become some sort of ubermensch. This all rings hollow- — schopenhauer1
"I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy." — Albert Camus
The quietude of antinatalism, the rebellion against furthering the objectives of foisting more challenges on yet more people, is the rebellious stance against existence itself. — schopenhauer1
Just as a tiny bit of faeces has a bad smell, so I do not recommend even a tiny bit of existence, not even for so long as a fingersnap. — AN 1, 18
Yeah, you also find the same hollowness and conformity in this sort of drivel:
"I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy."
— Albert Camus — Inyenzi
But perhaps here you are giving only two choices. Either there is an embracing of the conditions of this life and world (and therefore a continuance of it), or there is a total rebellion against and rejection of it (and therefore, it's cessation). But is there not a third, in-between option - that of changing the conditions of our existence (or future existences)? Where one does not embrace the conditions of this life, and yet doesn't totally rebel against all possible conditions. The antinatalist is saying, "the conditions of my existence, and the existence of all beings are such that no lives are worth starting. Life is not good enough for my standards, and therefore shouldn't exist at all." But instead of dissolving the entire human project into quietude because of this, why not instead bring the world (and the lives that begin in it) up to your standards? Is the task really so utterly hopeless?
I think there are worthwhile, meaningful, and positively good experiences in this life - I'm sure you've had them. Perhaps humour, romantic partnership, music, just the sheer awe (or is that, horror?) over existing at all. Although rare, and containing downsides, is there not a sense in which the antinatalist is throwing these babies (among others) out with the bathwater (or rather, out with the ocean of suffering they drown in)? I don't ask these questions rhetorically by the way. It could very well be that the Buddhists are right in that, — Inyenzi
Just my two cents. — Inyenzi
Śāriputra, foolish ordinary beings do not have the wisdom that comes from hearing the Dharma. When they hear about a Tathāgata’s entering nirvāṇa, they take the wrong view of cessation or extinction. Because of their perception of cessation or extinction, they claim that the realm of sentient beings decreases. Their claim constitutes an enormously wrong view and an extremely grave, evil karma. 1
On my reading of the suttas, I fail to see how there is any functional difference between Buddhist parinibbana and the atheist materialist conception of death? — Inyenzi
The Eternal Recurrence/Return idea of life simply repeating over and over, similar to the Buddhist/Hindu reincarnation story, seems pretty hellish. The problem is that Nietzsche tries to "abundance the hell" out of life.. — schopenhauer1
Nietzsche's implication is that we can't do anything about it, so fully embrace it. — schopenhauer1
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.