The ethical authority has a specific role of exposing the pupil to moral thought/belief. Other than indoctrinating, and then judging the pupil, the work of ethical authority is done. Ethical authority represents absolute right - it has nothing else to prove. — Merkwurdichliebe

The above takes account of some ethical authorities. Not all. Some ethical authorities do not frame ethics in terms of absolute right/wrong.

If both pupil and teacher are moral agents, and it is impossible to be both ethical authority and ethical pupil at the same time, then moral agents can be both. The ethical pupil can be a moral agent. The ethical teacher can be a moral agent.

I'm hypothesizing that, in a given relation, it is impossible to be both ethical authority and ethical pupil at the same time. Or am I overlooking the possibility that we are both ethical pupil and ethical authority at all times?

A general rule of behavioural thumb. — creativesoul

We should probably parse out what role principle plays in determining ethical authority.

Some ethical authorities do not frame ethics in terms of absolute right/wrong. — creativesoul

Wouldn't the ethical authority, who believed in relative morality, talk to the ethical pupil about the relativism of morality as though it were absolute? Or, would they say that relative morality is relative, and just as viable as absolute morality?

I'm hypothesizing that, in a given relation, it is impossible to be both ethical authority and ethical pupil at the same time. Or am I overlooking the possibility that we are both ethical pupil and ethical authority at all times? — Merkwurdichliebe

I would think that it is not at all impossible to do both... teach another and learn from another over the right kinds of discourse(pun intended).

:halo:

Wouldn't the ethical authority, who believed in relative morality, talk to the ethical pupil about the relativism of morality as though it were absolute? Or, would they say that relative morality is relative too, and as viable as absolute morality? — Merkwurdichliebe

Perhaps.

What do the notions of relative morality and absolute morality add to the discussion?

They've yet to have been breached. Perhaps it is time. For robustness' sake.

We could say, that early on in the development process of ethical indoctrination the roles are distinct. But as the ethical pupil matures, the roles become equivocal.

The question becomes, when does the individual cease to respond to the judgement of the ethical authority, and come to rely on his own judgement of himself?

What do the notions of relative morality and absolute morality add to the discussion? — creativesoul

I was just positing the authority of the ethical authority to be absolute in relation to the pupil. That is due to the fact that he judges the ethical pupil, not the other way around. It's not a democracy :party: .

They've yet to have been breached. Perhaps it is time. For robustness' sake. — creativesoul

You lead. :grin:

I would say that the morality of the relativist is self defeating , and a bad omen for the ethical authority. That is not to say, I don't believe morals are relative, from a meta-ethical perspective.

The moral relativist cannot commit to principle, he has to view all principles as simultaneously right and wrong. The moment he commits to a principle, he becomes absolutist. The morality of the relativist is a phantasm.
(See what I did there? :grin: )

For the ethical authority to teach moral relativism to the ethical pupil is to hand over the keys to the car.

It is, however, possible that one can be absolutist regarding some principles, and relativist regarding others. This complicates things...

However, while internalization requires it sensory perception alone is not enough for internalization as I suspect it is being used here. — creativesoul

That's why I compared it to appropriation. The adoption of moral principle is founded on intellectual assessment. Appropriation implies that moral thought/belief is founded upon a pre-existing framework of thought/belief about the world. How one appropriates morality is uniquely affected by one's world view.

Internalizing a pre-existing morality results in one's moral 'feelings'.
These are involuntarily experienced during certain situations that are morally relevant to that particular person's worldview(morality). — creativesoul

Internalizing morality means appropriating it in thought/belief as one's personal morality. It results in moral thought/belief not feeling/intuition. I would say moral feeling/intuition only comes into play when one witnesses an ethically charged situation. And, feeling/intuition becomes most pertinent in certain ethically charged situations that directly involve me - when I become the decisive factor.
(speaking extemporaneously)

As a side, what does it mean when moral feeling/intuition results in behavior that contradicts one's moral thought/belief?

@creativesoul

Right now we are pursuing two threads: ethical authority and internalization. Judging by our overall framework, we are mostly on the right track, we just gotta keep the wheels spinning, and separate the wheat from the chaff. :grin:

Whatever happens next, we have at least discovered that societal conditioning is an immensely relevant source of morals. I'm still interested in exploring the historical aspect. But one thing at a time.

If both pupil and teacher are moral agents, and it is impossible to be both ethical authority and ethical pupil at the same time, then moral agents can be both. The ethical pupil can be a moral agent. The ethical teacher can be a moral agent. — creativesoul

Are you suggesting a hierarchy of ethical authority, or is it more complex?

If ethical existence is represented by a circle, individual morality would be represented by a dot in the center. — Merkwurdichliebe

I'm not even sure what "ethical existence" would refer to. If it's "where ethics exists" then the circle would be a small one inside a much larger "individual" circle, but you must have something else in mind. How would you define "ethical existence"?

How would you define "ethical existence"? — Terrapin Station

I was referring to the existing individual who is directly concerned with the ethical.

I'm still struggling to understand the difference between how the terms "ethical" and "moral" are being used here.

That's where I'm still at. Equivocation looms. I cannot accept equivocation.

If we are to take account of the societal influences upon morals, and we wish to remain coherent in our account, then that task must be commensurate with our groundwork. We need this new reporting to dovetail with the previously established groundwork.

Unfortunately, this is not the case... yet.

There are most certainly societal influences.

We need this new reporting to dovetail with the previously established groundwork. — creativesoul

Not yet... but we are examining internalization and ethical authority, which are variables of societal conditioning.

The adoption of moral principle is founded on intellectual assessment. Appropriation implies that moral thought/belief is founded upon a pre-existing framework of thought/belief about the world. How one appropriates morality is uniquely affected by one's world view. — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree with everything above aside from the first claim. The adoption of moral principle can happen during language acquisition. Intellectual assessment cannot.

There seems to be some preconceived notion at work in your reporting. What is a moral principle if not thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour?

The adoption of moral principle can happen during language acquisition. Intellectual assessment cannot. — creativesoul

I would go so far as to say the adoption of moral principle depends upon language acquisition, whereas assessment does not. All language that is acquired contains preexisting assessments of the world.

Internalizing morality means appropriating it in thought/belief as one's personal morality. It results in moral thought/belief not feeling/intuition. I would say moral feeling/intuition only comes into play when one witnesses an ethically charged situation. And, feeling/intuition becomes most pertinent in certain ethically charged situations that directly involve me - when I become the decisive factor.
(speaking extemporaneously) — Merkwurdichliebe

There's something interesting happening here. I'm unsure where our disagreement lies regarding the above. Yet, your reply leaves me with the impression that you do not see the agreement. Compare the above to excerpts from my initial report upon internalization found below...

All sorts of different thought/belief can become internalized. They become operative in the sense that they themselves have efficacy. — creativesoul

What is commonly called a conscience is the manifestation of past internalizations. Thought/belief is being internalized. It can be about one's self and/or about others. Internalizing a pre-existing morality results in one's moral 'feelings'. These are involuntarily experienced during certain situations that are morally relevant to that particular person's worldview(morality). — creativesoul

There's nothing new here though. Everyone internalizes all sorts of other people's thought/belief. — creativesoul

The collective conscience is the product of the collective group of people all internalizing the same moral(s) and/or sharing the same moral thought/belie — creativesoul

As a side, what does it mean when moral feeling/intuition results in behavior that contradicts one's moral thought/belief?

That doesn't make sense if moral intuition/feelings are products of internalized(unconscious but operative) moral thought/belief.

The adoption of moral principle can happen during language acquisition. Intellectual assessment cannot.
— creativesoul

I would go so far as to say the adoption of moral principle depends upon language acquisition, whereas assessment does not. All language that is acquired contains preexisting assessments of the world. — Merkwurdichliebe

So then you agree that not all adoption of moral principle is founded upon intellectual assessment?

There seems to be some preconceived notion at work in your reporting. What is a moral principle if not thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour? — creativesoul

I'm making a distinction between thought/belief that is moral in kind (moral judgement about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour and thought belief), and thought/belief that is not (nonmoral assessments about the world).

Not all moral thought/belief is judgment. And, that didn't answer the question...

What is a moral principle if not moral thought/belief?

I'm struggling to see what good it is doing us to invoke these recent notions of "moral principle", "ethical", "pupil", "authority", and "internalization".

So then you agree that not all adoption of moral principle is founded upon intellectual assessment? — creativesoul

If intellectual assessment is a primary function of linguistic thought/belief, I don't see how moral thought/belief cannot be founded upon it.

Not all moral thought/belief is judgment. And, that didn't answer the question... — creativesoul

If all moral thought/belief is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour, then it necessarily is about judgement, about ought. Assessment would refer to nonmoral thought/belief about what is, what might be, what is desirable, &c.

If intellectual assessment is a primary function of linguistic thought/belief, I don't see how moral thought/belief cannot be founded upon it. — Merkwurdichliebe

Some moral thought/belief is existentially dependent upon intellectual assessment. Not all. That is part of the groundwork we've already established.

All things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Moral thought/belief can be formed prior to language acquisition.

We're teetering on the edge of conflating what moral thought/belief takes with what our knowledge of moral thought/belief takes. Such was the fatal flaw underpinning Witt and many a linguistic since.

It is time to review our previous talk on morality and prelinguistic thought/belief. I thought we had come to enough agreement to move on to sociological factors, but apparently not.

If all moral thought/belief is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour, then it necessarily is about judgement. — Merkwurdichliebe

If all behaviour is judgment. It's not. It's quite a bit more nuanced than that.

One can know that they do not accept another's behaviour without judging their behaviour in any robust sense of moral judgment. Typically moral judgment is to condone/condemn, assent/dissent, etc.

So "individual morality" is only a dot in the center of "the existing individual who is directly concerned with the ethical"?

It is time to review our previous talk on morality and prelinguistic thought/belief. I thought we had come to enough agreement to move on to sociological factors, but apparently not. — Merkwurdichliebe

We are reviewing them now. I'm inserting them where they are applicable. The sociological factors cannot be properly accounted for by equivocating previously established key terms. All new terms must be commensurate with what we've already established.

There are also new criterion being employed that are not quite up to snuff. Our foundation for drawing conclusions is supposed to be based upon a universal criterion. New claims are being levied that are not based upon the same solid ground.