spurious problems due to philosophical inbreeding. — Izat So

That's actually pretty deep. :rofl:

Hegelian dialectics always in need of a job I suppose.

If it [metaphysics] is a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other sciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition ? If not, how can it maintain its pretensions, and keep the human mind in suspense with hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whether then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we must come once for all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called science, which cannot possibly remain on its present footing.

It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle every one inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, without gaining a single step. And so its followers having melted away, we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in other sciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody, however ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final verdict, as in this domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish sound knowledge from shallow talk. — Kant

http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil%20306/kant_materials/prolegomena2.htm

In short, this is an old theme. And Kant was already reacting against it, basically defending a place for philosophy as a kind of metaphysics squared, proof against metaphysicks of the first power. And later thinkers can generalize Kantian approaches and out-Kant them. And so on forever, to the limits of the number of books a human can plausibly pose as having mastered. But then people turned away from metaphysicks to some degree because they were busy and mortal in the first place.

If anyone has not read this bitchy response of Kant to one of his early reviewers, I recommend it. Kant comes off as lovably human.
http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil%20306/kant_materials/prolegomena9.htm#specimen

A taste:

My reviewer speaks like a man who is conscious of important and superior insight which he keeps hidden; for I am aware of nothing recent with respect to metaphysics that could justify his tone. But he should not withhold his discoveries from the world, for there are doubtless many who, like myself, have not been able to find in all the fine things that have for long past been written in this department, anything that has advanced the science by so much as a finger-breadth; we find indeed the giving a new point to definitions, the supplying of lame proofs with new crutches, the adding to the crazy-quilt of metaphysics fresh patches or changing its pattern; but all this is not what the world requires. The world is tired of metaphysical assertions; it wants the possibility of the science, the sources from which certainty therein can be derived, and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth. To this the critic seems to possess a key, otherwise he would never have spoken out in such a high tone. — bitchy Kant

Outside of our desires, reality has no problems, needs no solutions, etc. — Terrapin Station

:up:

If it [metaphysics] is a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other sciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition? — Kant

We would do well to remember the Aristotelian saying that metaphysics is useless. (I've searched for it a few times and can't find it again.) But what I take it to mean, is that metaphysics, for Aristotle, served no other purpose; that the ability of the mind to contemplate the eternal verities was an end in itself. (There's a blog post about Aristotelian contemplation here.) So, I'm sure Aristotle would say that metaphysics doesn't progress because it is contemplation of the eternal, and the idea of the eternal 'progressing' is an absurdity. Certainly science continuously progresses, but mainly nowadays in terms of utility and instrumental value/power. There is not the remotest sense of being nearer to a grand unifying truth, a vision of the Cosmos as a unified whole; in fact it's never seemed more remote than it does now.

Jacques Maritain, the neo-thomist, says that there is a vital 'intuition of being', which, he believes, escaped Kant, and was absent generally in modern philosophy, except, he says, for some of the existentialists (I can't imagine whom he was referring to - possibly Heidegger?) in any case, Maritain, whom I haven't studied enough, was I think probably one of the few real 'metaphysicians' in current culture.

I have immense respect for Kant's 'copernican revolution in philosophy', but then, I first encountered it reading T R V Murti's Central Philosophy of Buddhism, which has become one of my core texts. I feel as though Kant was right on the edge of a genuine epiphany, but didn't quite get there. Same for Schopenhauer. But between them, they're nearer to what I consider to be the great tradition of philosophy, than anyone since.

But what I take it to mean, is that metaphysics, for Aristotle, served no other purpose; that the ability of the mind to contemplate the eternal verities was an end in itself. — Wayfarer

I agree, but perhaps the essence of Kantian style philosophy is the separation of religion and science. The truths of religion can be endlessly contemplated and enjoyed, but some wanted this kind of truth in its own box, both for its own sake and for the sake of natural science. Or that's one perspective.

Certainly science continuously progresses, but mainly nowadays in terms of utility and instrumental value/power. — Wayfarer

But perhaps that's its essence, for better or worse. Slapping the word 'gravity' on a pattern in measurements that we expect to persist doesn't really explain anything. Some want to puff up these patterns into a metaphysicks...so that they can club other metaphysicians over the head with their kind of (lifeless) Platonism.

IMV it's better to not worship our tools, or something like that. Worshiping human-like divinities (our own 'species essence') makes more sense, is more popular, and is probably the root of scientistic Platonism (the forms being those dead 'laws of nature').

Jacques Maritain, the neo-thomist, says that there is a vital 'intuition of being', which, he believes, escaped Kant, and was absent generally in modern philosophy, except, he says, for some of the existentialists (I can't imagine whom he was referring to - possibly Heidegger?) — Wayfarer

Could be Sartre or Heidegger. Look at Sartre on freedom. Old school theology! Stripped of all the baggage. It's apparently atheist, but it's arguably mystical. To say that man is free is to pluck him out of the causal nexus. And Heidegger was a heretical Christian, deeply influenced by Luther, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky. Both were fascinated by radical politics. But primitive Christianity was pretty radical too. The question is whether religion should be tangled up in politics. It's a deep question. If we separate religion from politics and leave it to individual preference, then in some sense we are no longer serious about it. Or at least our religion is framed in terms of private transcendence.

I think there's no problem with philosophy as an "intellectual game", just as there's no problem with "art for art's sake". So, there is an aesthetical vector, where perspectives and ideas are elaborated in order to consider things in new and interesting ways, and there's an ethical vector where the aim is to gain wisdom in order to actually practice and live a better life. There is also an epistemological vector (which I guess includes the various kinds of analytical approach) which takes scientific and common sense knowledge and understanding into account in order to explore questions about what we know and how we know it. Then of course there is the phenomenological vector, which ideally should include all of the others, to gain a comprehensive picture of the character of human life as lived.

Although I have sometimes reflected that it's impossible for the same person to at once admire Nietzsche and Plato. — Wayfarer

Codswallop!

I agree. I'd be quite the puritan to resent such relatively harmless pleasures. If my tone was a little harsh, it's about clarity rather than contempt. Of course we have our preferences. I'd guess that you also look around TPF and sometimes (not all the time!) see wheels spinning in old mud.

I'll just add (and perhaps you'll agree) that I find all of those vectors tangled up in single personalities.

Indeed, I know they're all "tangled up" in mine, so I agree! We can speak of those vectors as separate just as we can, and need to for the sake of intelligibility, speak of separate objects in the world, but there is no absolute separation. That's why I responded the way I did to what I see as the absurd notion that one could not admire both Plato and Nietzsche.

Indeed, I know they're all "tangled up" in mine, so I agree! We can speak of those vectors as separate just as we can, and need to for the sake of intelligibility, speak of separate objects in the world, but there is no absolute separation. — Janus

Exactly! And this theme runs through everything. Some would abolish all distinctions, however useful, in a useless, feel-good mist. Or maybe a genuine mystical high that probably shouldn't bother with argument but just write great music or poetry.

Others would shut their eyes to holism, which is what I think Hegel means by 'idealism.' Philosophy (for the holist-idealist) is a war against abstraction (in the sense of yanking out of context.) I say pass the stereoscopic vision. Each in its place...and as much precision as the matter allows or requires.

That's why I responded the way I did to what I see as the absurd notion that one could not admire both Plato and Nietzsche. — Janus

I also find that a questionable notion. Nietzsche is maybe no less mystical than Plato, and Plato is maybe no less of a 'monster.' Again, give me stereoscopic vision, to the limits of mortal personality. A case can be made that we can't fit all perspectives under our hat, but I think we can certainly synthesize from both Plato and Nietzsche. And both contain multitudes. Who is Plato? Who is Nietzsche?

This came to my mind with those last questions:

What are days for?
Days are where we live.
They come, they wake us
Time and time over.
They are to be happy in:
Where can we live but days?

Ah, solving that question
Brings the priest and the doctor
In their long coats
Running over the fields. — Larkin

No, I don't think Maritain had Sartre in mind. He was Thomist, after all. I first encountered him also through a Buddhist book also, called God, Zen and the Intuition of Being.

Why is that? The usual understanding of Nietzsche was that he was virulently hostile towards Plato. Plato was said to value the colorless, lifeless abstract over the immediacy and vitality of actual life - the 'thinnest promises of all', of something of that kind, was the expression. And also Platonism was a major plank of Christianity, which Nietzsche likewise despised.

One problem is that I don't think the way that Platonism was understood and taught in modernity, really captured the vitality of the original Plato. The Platonic academy was intended to produce fully-formed humans and athletics, askesis, and other physical pursuits were an important part of it. I think it became vitiated over the centuries, by analysis on a purely discursive level, which seems to reduce the gist of the tradition to these 'ethereal forms'. But I'm sure, had we met Plato in the flesh, he would have been a figure of immense vitality, humour and physical presence.

And I don't agree the Nietzsche was mystical. Of course it's going to be almost impossible to make that case, as unless you have some sympathy for mysticism, then the word can mean almost anything. Actually, coming to think of it, the original definition for mysticism was 'initiated into the mystery schools' - those being such religions as Orphism, into which Plato might indeed have been initiated. So Plato was literally a text-book mystic. But I read Nietzsche as being hostile to the notion of 'the spiritual' except as refracted through literature and culture.

Nietzsche's attitude to Plato is far from unequivocal. But I could not, without the considerable effort involved in locating and presenting citations from his texts, cogently argue that, and most especially to someone who, avowedly, has not even read Nietzsche. So, I performed a quick search "Nietzsche's attitude to Plato" and this paper is the first one on the list:

http://krieger.jhu.edu/philosophy/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2013/02/Nietzsche-and-Plato.pdf


I haven't the time to read it, but a cursory glance confirms that it argues for a more nuanced view than that Nietzsche unequivocally despised and disvalued Plato.

In any case, all that aside, one can admire any thinker without necessarily agreeing with what she or he says.

But I'm sure, had we met Plato in the flesh, he would have been a figure of immense vitality, humour and physical presence. — Wayfarer

This is pure speculation and is, in any case, irrelevant to his philosophy. I wonder, have you read much of Plato's actual work?

And I don't agree the Nietzsche was mystical. — Wayfarer

I'm not saying he wasn't mystical, but unless I am mistaken, I haven't said he was, either. :confused:

I guess it doesn't matter much whether Nietzsche is called a mystic, but still...

With [Thus Spoke Zarathustra] I have given mankind the greatest present that has ever been made to it so far. This book, with a voice bridging centuries, is not only the highest book there is, the book that is truly characterized by the air of the heights—the whole fact of man lies beneath it at a tremendous distance—it is also the deepest, born out of the innermost wealth of truth, an inexhaustible well to which no pail descends without coming up again filled with gold and goodness. — Nietzsche

"Whoever thou mayest be, beloved stranger, whom I meet here for the first time, avail thyself of this happy hour and of the stillness around us, and above us, and let me tell thee something of the thought which has suddenly risen before me like a star which would fain shed down its rays upon thee and every one, as befits the nature of light. - Fellow man! Your whole life, like a sandglass, will always be reversed and will ever run out again, - a long minute of time will elapse until all those conditions out of which you were evolved return in the wheel of the cosmic process. And then you will find every pain and every pleasure, every friend and every enemy, every hope and every error, every blade of grass and every ray of sunshine once more, and the whole fabric of things which make up your life. This ring in which you are but a grain will glitter afresh forever. And in every one of these cycles of human life there will be one hour where, for the first time one man, and then many, will perceive the mighty thought of the eternal recurrence of all things:- and for mankind this is always the hour of Noon".[5] — Nietzsche's demon

Nietzsche was undoubtedly a great thinker, writer, and agent provocateur. But is there in Nietzsche's writing any recognition of the idea of there being a higher domain that the philosophical aspirant is required to ascend to?

I'd say that he was an 'art mystic.' As I'm sure you know, he was powerfully influenced by Schopenhauer.

His first book hurt his reputation. It was too flaky for his peers, I guess. But he was hanging out with Wagner.

In so far as the subject is the artist, however, he has already been released from his individual will, and has become as it were the medium, through which the one verily existent Subject celebrates his redemption in appearance. For this one thing must above all be clear to us, to our humiliation and exaltation, that the entire comedy of art is not at all performed,[Pg 50] say, for our betterment and culture, and that we are just as little the true authors of this art-world: rather we may assume with regard to ourselves, that its true author uses us as pictures and artistic projections, and that we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of art—for only as an æsthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified:—while of course our consciousness of this our specific significance hardly differs from the kind of consciousness which the soldiers painted on canvas have of the battle represented thereon. Hence all our knowledge of art is at bottom quite illusory, because, as knowing persons we are not one and identical with the Being who, as the sole author and spectator of this comedy of art, prepares a perpetual entertainment for himself. Only in so far as the genius in the act of artistic production coalesces with this primordial artist of the world, does he get a glimpse of the eternal essence of art, for in this state he is, in a marvellous manner, like the weird picture of the fairy-tale which can at will turn its eyes and behold itself; he is now at once subject and object, at once poet, actor, and spectator.
....
Here it is necessary to raise ourselves with a daring bound into a metaphysics of Art. I repeat, therefore, my former proposition, that it is only as an æsthetic phenomenon that existence and the world, appear justified: and in this sense it is precisely the function of tragic myth to convince us that even the Ugly and Discordant is an artistic game which the will, in the eternal fulness of its joy, plays with itself. — Nietzsche

I can relate this to eternal return of the same. If we can affirm this existence (forgive the ugly and discordant through a perception of the beautiful and good), then we can welcome the news of the demon, that we'll live it again and again, after a dip in the river of Lethe.

Yes, of course? In BG&E. He is quite explicit in his opinion of the faults of ‘philosophers’

With this chorus the deep-minded Hellene, who is so singularly qualified for the most delicate and severe suffering, consoles himself:—he who has glanced with piercing eye into the very heart of the terrible destructive processes of so-called universal history, as also into the cruelty of nature, and is in danger of longing for a Buddhistic negation of the will. Art saves him, and through art life saves him—for herself.

For we must know that in the rapture of the Dionysian state, with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence, there is a lethargic element, wherein all personal experiences of the past are submerged. It is by this gulf of oblivion that the everyday world and the world of Dionysian reality are separated from each other. But as soon as this everyday reality rises again in consciousness, it is felt as such, and nauseates us; an ascetic will-paralysing mood is the fruit of these states. In this sense the Dionysian man may be said to resemble Hamlet: both have for once seen into the true nature of things, —they have perceived, but they are loath to act; for their action cannot change the eternal nature of things; they regard it as shameful or ridiculous that one should require of them to set aright the[Pg 62] time which is out of joint. Knowledge kills action, action requires the veil of illusion—it is this lesson which Hamlet teaches, and not the cheap wisdom of John-a-Dreams who from too much reflection, as it were from a surplus of possibilities, does not arrive at action at all. Not reflection, no!—true knowledge, insight into appalling truth, preponderates over all motives inciting to action, in Hamlet as well as in the Dionysian man. No comfort avails any longer; his longing goes beyond a world after death, beyond the gods themselves; existence with its glittering reflection in the gods, or in an immortal other world is abjured. In the consciousness of the truth he has perceived, man now sees everywhere only the awfulness or the absurdity of existence, he now understands the symbolism in the fate of Ophelia, he now discerns the wisdom of the sylvan god Silenus: and loathing seizes him.

Here, in this extremest danger of the will, art approaches, as a saving and healing enchantress; she alone is able to transform these nauseating reflections on the awfulness or absurdity of existence into representations wherewith it is possible to live: these are the representations of the sublime as the artistic subjugation of the awful, and the comic as the artistic delivery from the nausea of the absurd. — Nietzsche

Note phrases like 'the true nature of things' and the 'eternal nature of things.' Nietzsche and others (all of us at times?) transcend what's terrible by a mystic experience through art.

The problem with philosophy lately (at least on this forum) is philosophy's abandonment of its most fundamental field - logic - and embracing religious notions of truth like tradition (refering to dead philosophers as if they were founders of a religion) and revelation.

These "philosophers" use poorly defined terms and often find that they are either talking past each other or just using different terms to refer to the same thing.

Note phrases like 'the true nature of things' and the 'eternal nature of things.' Nietzsche and others (all of us at times?) transcend what's terrible by a mystic experience through art. — ghost

The eternal return from Dionysian to Apollonian, is found in creative willpower (will to power), which transforms the absurdity and awfulness of existence into something tolerable. This is what philosophy attempts to do.

the Dionysian man may be said to resemble Hamlet: both have for once seen into the true nature of things, —they have perceived, but they are loath to act; for their action cannot change the eternal nature of things; [...] Not reflection, no!—true knowledge, insight into appalling truth, preponderates over all motives inciting to action, in Hamlet as well as in the Dionysian man. — Nietzsche

For Nietzsche the true nature of things is embodied in the Dionysian - that existence is an intoxicating dream state and there is no true nature of things. This is, indeed, an appaling truth to behold - a truth that negates all truth, the paradoxical knowledge that existence is entirely irrational, and all reason is illusory. In present day philosophy, the postmodernists take these ideas to the absolute extreme (complete nonsense), while the rest of the cutting edge of philosophy completely disregards it - preferring to exacerbate the problems of philosophy.

Nietzsche made some important points, unfortunately the modern trend is not creative enough to shift through his insanity for his essential meaning.

Nietzsche was undoubtedly a great thinker, writer, and agent provocateur. But is there in Nietzsche's writing any recognition of the idea of there being a higher domain that the philosophical aspirant is required to ascend to? — Wayfarer

I definitely think he is calling out his reader, to become Dionysian - 'amor fati'. In my opinion, he is quite religious and evangelistic in his regard for the Dionysian. And, he proceeds forth with the erraticism of a crazed prophet.

But I don't think Nietzsche showed a mature, reflective awareness of these matters. Which is not to say he wasn't brilliant and insightful. But, was he wise?

I feel the hallmark of traditional philosophy is the idea that the getting of wisdom is an endeavour or something difficult to achieve which can only be undertaken by arduous discipline and deep contemplation. That is why Hadot could write of 'philosophy as a way of life'. As he points out, it's different from religion because not reliant on dogmatic belief; but also different from science, because not concerned with instrumental mastery over nature, but rather the introspective mastery of self-knowledge and disciplined understanding.

'It is a perennial philosophical reflection', says the SEP's entry on Schopenhauer, 'that if one looks deeply enough into oneself, one will discover not only one’s own essence, but also the essence of the universe. For as one is a part of the universe as is everything else, the basic energies of the universe flow through oneself, as they flow through everything else. For that reason it is thought that one can come into contact with the nature of the universe if one comes into substantial contact with one’s ultimate inner being.'

I agree with this, but would qualify it by saying that 'energies' is a poor choice of word; that it's something much nearer to the Stoic sense of 'logos', i.e. the organising principle of both the mind and the Universe. So my intuition is that in the rational intellect, nous, in the Greek sense, the universe is coming to a new level of self-awareness, that it's able to realise ways of being that were never available in non-organic form; that we are in some sense, 'the universe becoming aware of itself'. ('A physicist', said Bohr, 'is just an atom's way of examining itself').

I think these kinds of ideas were implicit in the neo-platonic tradition, albeit never expressed in bald terms, as man has only become aware of himself as something other than the Universe since the advent of modernity. Indeed it is precisely that sense of 'otherness' which is the hallmark of modernity proper (although harbingers of it can be seen in gnosticism.)

As Hadot says, much of Platonism and neo-platonism was absorbed into, and you could almost say, appropriated by theology, which then converted ts terminology into the lexicon of popular religion (for example, the conversion of the ancient sense of 'logos' into 'the word of God' and thereafter, simply, The Bible), which has, regrettably, concealed a lot of what was distinctively original in the philosophical tradition. As a consequence, in the turn from dogmatic religion, the distinctive understanding of the Greek philosophical tradition was rejected along with dogma - for all but a few scholars and specialists in the subject, anyway.

There is a deep tension in Christianity between the Platonic philosophy that it absorbed through the Greek theologians, and the Hebrew religion which was amalgamated with it. I sometimes feel that the real mainstream of philosophy proper became lost as a consequence. That's why it has now become mainly concerned with language and analysis; the sense of philosophy as a discipline through which to 'plumb the depths of being' seems mainly lost (although perhaps not so much in the Continental tradition).

This is the theme of the essay I often refer to, Thomas Nagel's Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament. It's particularly valuable, because Nagel himself doesn't have a religious bone in his body. Yet he recognises, on purely philosophic grounds, the basic absurdity and meaninglessness of much that goes under the banner of philosophy nowadays, and gives a good account of what he thinks has become lost in translation.

Of course, whenever I say this, I am suspected of being an evangelist of some stripe. Perhaps that's true, but I feel I've become somewhat religious by accident, or at any rate unintentionally. And I am also attempting to resist the temptation to simply believe; I want to feel that sense of integration and relatedness that I think is suggested by a philosophy proper. Whether that is possible, is still open.

I feel the hallmark of traditional philosophy is the idea that the getting of wisdom is an endeavour or something difficult to achieve which can only be undertaken by arduous discipline and deep contemplation. That is why Hadot could write of 'philosophy as a way of life'. As he points out, it's different from religion because not reliant on dogmatic belief; but also different from science, because not concerned with instrumental mastery over nature, but rather the introspective mastery of self-knowledge and disciplined understanding. — Wayfarer

Nice! :up:

In regards to Nietzsche, you are correct about the "crazed prophet" part.
But he did have this other register: We know stuff because of this huge apparatus of words that we use while understanding only a portion of it.
He was a philologist.

But he did have this other register: We know stuff because of this huge apparatus of words that we use while understanding only a portion of it.

He was a philologist. — Valentinus

Perhaps. Nietzsche's work is wide open to interpretation. There is no claim that can be made, that is not contradicted somewhere within his writing.

Nietzsche said he is a complete skeptic when it comes to Plato. He actually means something quite different than may appear at first glance. Both Nietzsche and Plato have been widely misunderstood and this comment helps shed light on Nietzsche’s perspicacious reading of Plato and at the same time on how we are to read Nietzsche. Nietzsche the skeptic teaches us to read skeptically, esoterically, to read between the lines, to make connections, and not take things at face value.

Nietzsche says he is a complete skeptic when it comes to Plato because both he and Plato are skeptics. We are accustomed to thinking of Socrates as a skeptic (“I know that I do not know”) but do not think of Plato as a skeptic because of his talk of Forms. We assume that Plato knows the Forms or at least defends a “theory of Forms”. Nietzsche is skeptical of this. He thinks that Plato was a skeptic, that he too knew he did not know. Laurence Lampert’s “Nietzsche and Modern Times” discusses how Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche all read Plato as a skeptic. There is a growing number of prominent scholars of Plato who now read him in this way as well.

Nietzsche is skeptical of this. He thinks that Plato was a skeptic, that he too knew he did not know. Laurence Lampert’s “Nietzsche and Modern Times” discusses how Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche all read Plato as a skeptic. There is a growing number of prominent scholars of Plato who now read him in this way as well. — Fooloso4

Plato hardly claims the power to grasp absolute truth for himself. Very often, when approaching the territory of final metaphysical ideas, he abandons the style of logical exposition for that of myth or poetry. There is something characteristically unfinished about his thought; he eschews neat systems and his intuitions often jostle one another. ... The dialogues are, each one, a drama of ideas; in their totality, they depict the voyage of a mind in which any number of ports are visited before the anchor is finally east. And at the end, it is as though the ship of thought were unable to stay in the harbor but had to cast anchor outside; for according to Plato the mind must be satisfied with a distant vision of the truth, though it may grasp reality intimately at fleeting intervals. — Raphael Demos

Introduction to Plato: Selections.

I think this makes the important point that Plato was not, and didn't claim to be, a systematic philosopher, especially when it comes to first philosophy. In many of the dialogues there are aporia, resolutions considered and rejected, sketches of ideas, possibilities explored. But it is animated throughout by a kind of faith in the Form of the Good (which later was appropriated into Christian theology), and by the hint of glimpses of some 'distant vision of truth', which in my judgement is often omitted from later readings. Not the faith in religious dogma that came to replace it - let's not forget the Academy was closed by Christians - but a striving towards a rational demonstration of the ultimacy of the good.

Lloyd Gerson identifies five doctrines of the Sophists which Plato and later Platonists particularly sought to challenge:

* Materialism, all there is is just material bodies and their physical properties
* Mechanism, all events happen because of physical cause-and-effect
* Nominalism, only individual objects exist, and any properties which they share have no reality beyond the names we may give them
* Relativism, what is "true" or "good" is simply what is true or good as it appears to me
* Skepticism, gaining knowledge of truth, or of what truly is, is impossible

(From Plato to Platonism, 10-14)

All of these themes are of course current in today's philosophy, and are arguably ascendant in Anglo-American philosophy, in particular.

What you say is accurate. But, Nietzsche essentially accused Plato of being a system builder, particularly in "Birth of Tragedy", where he relates Platonic rationalism to the Apollonian, and contrasts it with the irrationality of pre-Platonic Greece, what he associates with the Dionysian.