That's a how answer masquerading as a why answer. — Unseen

It is presumptuous to assume there's a reason for consciousness BESIDES the how. Why think that? Are you looking for an excuse to believe it "had to be" a product of design?

I'm not going to insist it CAN'T be design, but you need to make a case for it and not merely ask a leading question.

I know it [that some creatures are not conscious] with about the same certainty as I know that I'm not writing from the surface of the moon. — Unseen

You use the term 'certainty' differently to me. I'd say you have a working hypothesis based purely on assumptions.

Are you suggesting you don't know you're communicating with a conscious being and wonder if I might be a rock? — Hanover

No

Since you can decipher my behavior from a rock, why not use the distinctions you recognize to answer your own question.

I can't. The differences in your behaviour from that of a rock do not allow me to make any general conclusions about consciousness, as far as I can tell. But you may have noticed something I have missed. That's why I am asking you (and Unseen if s/he cares to answer).

What is the relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks, such that you attribute consciousness to the former but not the latter?

How do you elevate a chemical reaction (in an amoeba, for example) to a chemical condition outside its cellular border to having an experience? You're painfully close to personifying a single-celled creature's reaction to an environmental condition. A Roomba's navigation system may be more sophisticated than an amoeba's but we don't imagine that the Roomba is experiencing cleaning your floor. — Unseen

It only seems close to personifying from your perspective, in which only persons have experiences. But try to keep an open mind.

A Roomba has a central processing unit that does all the work: ‘receiving’ the information from sensors and then transmitting that information as instructions to the mechanical systems according to sophisticated programming. I’m not entirely sure how it works, but I can safely say that none of the Roomba parts are changed by the information they receive (except perhaps in temperature). There is no change occurring in the Roomba - only in those parts of its program that are open to new information. I imagine you could swap out the CPU in a Roomba without any problems.

Bacteria doesn’t work like that, though. It experiences the environmental condition precisely because its reaction is chemical. A change occurs to the cell itself - not simply to the information that cell receives or transmits. Not only that, but it occurs based not on a single bit of information, but on the relationship between two bits of information: enabling it to respond in time according to the direction in which the desired chemical condition is stronger.

Do you believe that a rock molecule has the capacity to receive an isolated bit of information from its environment (eg temperature change, directional force) that it embodies, and in doing so transmits information to its environment - whether or not it is aware of that information AS temperature change or directional force as such? — Possibility

The behavior of a rock differs not so slightly from the behavior of a person. I understand that every object is subject to physical laws, but surely you see a difference between a ball bouncing off a wall and a person throwing a ball.

I can't. The differences in your behaviour from that of a rock do not allow me to make any general conclusions about consciousness, as far as I can tell. But you may have noticed something I have missed. That's why I am asking you (and Unseen if s/he cares to answer).

What is the relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks, such that you attribute consciousness to the former but not the latter? — bert1

So this conversation isn't interesting. It is based upon the false premise that you cannot decipher a meaningful difference between rock behavior and my conversation with you here and that has somehow caused you to wonder whether rocks are thinking, conscious things. I suppose the task you're assigning me is that I offer up some distinction and we go round and round with some nonsense Socratic attempt for you to show me that people and rocks aren't too terribly different in terms of consciousness. It's no more interesting for me to do that than it might be for me to assert that actually rabbits are planets and then we can go round and round where I point out that all the distinctions you provide are vague and subject to ad hoc corrections, so maybe rabbits and planets are just the same. Definitional imprecision is a universal objection, but it hardly means we really can't distinguish cats from dogs.

It is based upon the false premise that you cannot decipher a meaningful difference between rock behavior and my conversation with you here and that has somehow caused you to wonder whether rocks are thinking, conscious things. — Hanover

Is it? You could always try asking me rather than assuming what I think. I can, of course, decipher many important differences between you and a rock. And I certainly don't think a rock can think and experience the kind of things that you can. But that's not what is at stake. We're not talking about differences of content of experience, we're talking about the difference between some experience and no experience at all. And that, it seems to me, is a harder line to reasonably draw. And it seems you have no appetite to attempt to draw it, even though you seem to take this view on a philosophy forum and engaged me in conversation about it. I'm not sure what you are doing here or why you answered my question to Unseen if you find this stuff uninteresting.

Alright then, let’s go back a step or two...

Why do you think a nervous system is necessary for consciousness?
— bert1

Because alteration of an organism's nervous system predictably affects its consciousness. — Hanover

I can see how this makes sense for you. It’s hard to believe an organism can be conscious if it can’t feel pain. But I get the feeling it’s because we keep drawing lines like this against what we assume cannot be conscious that we have so much trouble understanding what consciousness actually is.

My argument is NOT that there is no difference - it’s that we need to better understand and explore the many, many, MANY incremental differences in how information is processed and embodied between a rock molecule and human being as an evolution rather than as a single line in the sand.

Why do you think a nervous system is necessary for consciousness?
— bert1

Because alteration of an organism's nervous system predictably affects its consciousness.
— Hanover

If we tweak a car's engine it will affect its motion. This does not mean that things in motion are dependent on combustion engines. The consciousness in humans may be created by, be a side effect of, nervous systems. Or it may be that the nervous system affects or is a vehicle for human consciousness (and other animals). Right now we don't know. We can't measure consciousness. So we measure behavior and functions. And we have had a long bias to assume consciousness to be present only in things like us. In fact up into the early 70s it was taboo in science to talk about animal consciousness (or emotions, intention, etc.). But we don't know.

I'm asking why we are conscious in the sense of "is it necessary to be conscious" not "how did our consciousness come about."

I know it [that some creatures are not conscious] with about the same certainty as I know that I'm not writing from the surface of the moon.
— Unseen

You use the term 'certainty' differently to me. I'd say you have a working hypothesis based purely on assumptions. — ChrisH

The OP is a question; WHY are we conscious and the only assumption embodied in it is that we ARE conscious. Of course, maybe we're not.

An amoeba has no "senses" in the sense we generally use the term. Just responses.

To offer an answer to the OP (apologies for not doing so before), from my panspychist perspective, we are conscious beings because consciousness is a fundamental property. Everything is conscious, so we are as well. Not a terribly interesting answer. There is the follow-up question, 'Why is everything conscious?'. I don't know the answer to that. It just is, like any other fundamental property or force, there comes a point where there are no further layers of reality to appeal to for an explanation.

If we tweak a car's engine it will affect its motion. This does not mean that things in motion are dependent on combustion engines. — Coben

Yes, that's not a bad analogy to show some of the fallacious reasoning, I think. Need to think about it a bit more.

Of course, maybe we're not. — Unseen

You're not certain that you are conscious? You've lost me.

My argument is NOT that there is no difference - it’s that we need to better understand and explore the many, many, MANY incremental differences in how information is processed and embodied between a rock molecule and human being as an evolution rather than as a single line in the sand. — Possibility

The scientific record doesn't support a theory of higher and lower order rocks where marble, for example, can be shown to have ancient granite ancestors. Much of this has to do with rocks not being able to reproduce, much less actually having DNA.

Rocks don't process information in any literal way. This conversation remains ridiculous regardless of how much you wish to stubbornly maintain it.

I'm not sure what you are doing here or why you answered my question to Unseen if you find this stuff uninteresting. — bert1

It's not interesting because it's ridiculous. It's ridiculous to assert that maybe rocks have experiences, even if you wish to admit their experiences are of a different degree than humans. I'm not sure why you want to admit that though, considering you have no way of knowing that rocks don't have rich mental states and are laughing at the simplicity of humans.

How is it that you know that rocks don't know all sorts of things and aren't silent omniscient gods?

The better question, and the one I assert, is why would I think that? The onus seems to be the one on making the claim.

If we tweak a car's engine it will affect its motion. This does not mean that things in motion are dependent on combustion engines. The consciousness in humans may be created by, be a side effect of, nervous systems. Or it may be that the nervous system affects or is a vehicle for human consciousness (and other animals). Right now we don't know. We can't measure consciousness. So we measure behavior and functions. And we have had a long bias to assume consciousness to be present only in things like us. In fact up into the early 70s it was taboo in science to talk about animal consciousness (or emotions, intention, etc.). But we don't know. — Coben

This is the dualist's quandary: How does the conscious affect the body and vice versa. I don't think this should lead us to wonder whether rocks have a conscious. This is the flip side of the solipsist who wonders whether he's the only conscious being in the universe, where one wonders if everything has a conscious, including rocks. Both positions seems to involve a waste of thought.

What is the relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks, such that you attribute consciousness to the former but not the latter? — bert1

The relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks is the expressive ego; something that is presumed as the base of sentience. It's not.

Consciousness doesn't denote expression.
Just like how the body is constantly conscious, even during deep sleep, but isn't expressive without commands from the ego.

The consciousness of rocks is no different from the consciousness of the dreaming man; aware but non-controlling.

The better question, and the one I assert, is why would I think that? The onus seems to be the one on making the claim. — Hanover

That's a perfectly good question, and one we could discuss if you want. I've gone over it many times on this forum and the old one, and I can do it again if you like, but I suggest starting another thread so we don't derail Unseen's too much.

However, that's not how this conversation got started. If you remember, I asked a question of Unseen, specifically, "Why do you think a nervous system is necessary for consciousness?" to which you gave an answer that raised further questions, which you find uninteresting and are disinclined to answer.

It's ridiculous to assert that maybe rocks have experiences, — Hanover

Why? Is it just the burden of proof point? Is it that you perceive that you have no odd claim to defend, and there is no case to answer until I make the case for panpsychism? Is that all?

The relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks is the expressive ego; something that is presumed as the base of sentience. It's not. — Shamshir

I don't understand 'expressive ego'.

Consciousness doesn't denote expression.
Just like how the body is constantly conscious, even during deep sleep, but isn't expressive without commands from the ego. — Shamshir

OK, I think I might know what you mean. Consciousness is necessary for expression or behaviour, but expression/behaviour is not necessary for consciousness. Is that the idea?

The consciousness of rocks is no different from the consciousness of the dreaming man; aware but non-controlling. — Shamshir

Maybe. I favour a version of panpsychism in which all behaviour is caused by will, although much behaviour is a mechanical emergent of many wills interacting. Indeed the behaviour of a rock would be such a mechanical emergent I think, so the whole-rock-consciousness may indeed be as you say, I'm not sure.

Assumptions can be quite logical and rational. I assume there's no hippopotamus in my coat closet for rational and logical reasons. I just looked in my closet and showed that it IS possible to prove a negative.

I don't believe free will is possible, so what sort of will are you talking about and how does it work?

Assumptions can be quite logical and rational. — Unseen

Of course, but you don't seem to be consistent.

You say that your belief that you are conscious is an assumption but you believe with certainty that some creatures are not conscious.

It seems to me that the first is self-evident whilst the second is, and can only ever be, a pure assumption.

I don't understand 'expressive ego'. — bert1

Let's compare the ego to water.
Water by itself is formless, so it is without context, lacking an expression.
It expresses itself in the forms it takes: oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, etc.

• An integral part of the human modus operandi is the ego.
• The ego expresses itself through desires.
• Desire makes it jitter, and form expressions; this is the base of the arts.
• Rocks don't really crave anything, so they don't jitter and aren't expressive.

OK, I think I might know what you mean. Consciousness is necessary for expression or behaviour, but expression/behaviour is not necessary for consciousness. Is that the idea? — bert1

That's the idea.
Thinking something doesn't mean you'll speak it.
Speaking it, means you think it.

Maybe. I favour a version of panpsychism in which all behaviour is caused by will, although much behaviour is a mechanical emergent of many wills interacting. Indeed the behaviour of a rock would be such a mechanical emergent I think, so the whole-rock-consciousness may indeed be as you say, I'm not sure. — bert1

Everything wills, but not everything is willed.

It may sound confusing, but it is as simple as going with the flow.
In part, some things are strongly willed and steered.
But on the whole, things go with the flow - willingly, but not willed.

Think of many wills interacting as creating a swirling current, which simply drags those wills around.
This motion is inertial and doesn't need to be willed or maintained; that's the essence of a dream.
So when I say that the conscious rock and the dreaming man are the same, you may think of it as 'experiencing' the world, rather than 'molding' the world, which is what the ego attempts.

I don't believe free will is possible, so what sort of will are you talking about and how does it work? — Unseen

I am fairly certain you have direct experience of free will. It's what you experience when you act.

Assumptions can be quite logical and rational. I assume there's no hippopotamus in my coat closet for rational and logical reasons. I just looked in my closet and showed that it IS possible to prove a negative. — Unseen

But only for empirical questions and only because the proof is itself based on assumptions.

What is the relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks, such that you attribute consciousness to the former but not the latter? — bert1

The behavior of a rock differs not so slightly from the behavior of a person. I understand that every object is subject to physical laws, but surely you see a difference between a ball bouncing off a wall and a person throwing a ball. — Hanover

You and others aren't getting anywhere because "consciousness" hasn't been clearly defined. Do rocks and balls have memories that they can recall? Can rocks and balls form categories (concepts) of "humans", "rocks" and "balls" in their consciousness? Are rocks and balls self-aware? If we were to design a humanoid robot that behaves and responds like another human, would that robot be conscious?

Everything wills, but not everything is willed.

It may sound confusing, but it is as simple as going with the flow.
In part, some things are strongly willed and steered.
But on the whole, things go with the flow - willingly, but not willed. — Shamshir

Are you saying all behaviors are instinctual, and that free will is an illusion and really just another instinctual response to our perceptions?

Are you saying all behaviors are instinctual, and that free will is an illusion and really just another instinctual response to our perceptions? — Harry Hindu

Free will is not an illusion, but its freedom is limited.
A chess piece can only move within the confines of the chessboard, and free will whilst free, is confined by the absolute possible.

Does free will govern behaviour? In part.
Free will is pushing the ball off the top of the hill, then it gets lost for a bit in the inertia of being.
At some point the ball stops, and then free will is in control again.

An amoeba has no "senses" in the sense we generally use the term. Just responses. — Unseen

A ‘sense’ is the faculty by which a body receives an external stimulus.

A ‘response’ is the reaction to that stimulus.

Just because it isn’t processed by a nervous system as such, doesn’t mean it cannot ‘sense’ the environment to some extent.