Is a tree dependent upon it's relations?

Is a tree's existence dependent upon it's relations?

How are we to make sense of this?
— creativesoul

Is a tree dependent on water for its existence? Does a tree provide it's own water? — Merkwurdichliebe

Water is not a relation.

Water is not a relation. — creativesoul

Then you agree that a tree provides it's own water. Peculiar. I wonder how that happens.

Ah. we ought not doubt the word...

So there are no conditions that a(re) required for the existence of a tree? Explain yourself — Merkwurdichliebe

What is a condition for existence, that I might answer your question? But I don't think you can tell us. Either there are conditions for the existence of a tree, or there are not... Just as existence is either blue, or it is not blue; and if I say it is not blue, you will insist i tell you what other colour existence is...

That which is prior to something else cannot be intrinsically bound up in that something else. The presupposition of existence is prior to language. Thus, on that level, it is not bound up in language. — creativesoul

But we are talking about existence. So how is it not "bound up" in language?

AH, well, that's that thread, then. I enjoyed the Life of Brian quotes.

Water is not a relation.
— creativesoul

Then you agree that a tree provides it's own water. Peculiar. I wonder how that happens. — Merkwurdichliebe

I'll hold off for a while...

You can do better than this.

Either there are conditions for the existence of a tree, or there are not... Just as existence is either blue, or it is not blue; and if I say it is not blue, you will insist i tell you what other colour existence is... — Banno

But the conditions for a tree can be easily enumerated. It is sensical. The conditions for "existence is blue" are ridiculous, nonsensical.

There is a big difference here.

Where does water come from? The tree?

AH, well, that's that thread, then. I enjoyed the Life of Brian quotes. — Banno

Another one bites the dust. :cool:

But the conditions for a tree can be easily enumerated. It is sensical. — Merkwurdichliebe

you wanted "Necessary conditions not inherent to the tree itself... which are nonetheless required for its existence".

Are you now saying that the need of a tree for water is not inherent in the tree itself...

Honestly, I am having difficulty thinking in such a confused fashion.

That which is prior to something else cannot be intrinsically bound up in that something else. The presupposition of existence is prior to language. Thus, on that level, it is not bound up in language.
— creativesoul

But we are talking about existence. So how is it not "bound up" in language. — Merkwurdichliebe

Nah. You're confused. I was talking about that which exists prior to language. I was using language to take account of it.

That which happens prior to language cannot be bound up in language.

Anyway, are there any threads around at the moment that are not full of such stuff?

I've a little time on my hands over the next few days.

Or do I start my own?

Are you now saying that the need of a tree for water is not inherent in the tree itself... — Banno

Actually, simpler. I'm saying the tree is dependent upon water which it does not provide for itself.

But that's not what you said.

Anyway, are there any threads around at the moment that are not full of such stuff?

I've a little time on my hands over the next few days.

Or do I start my own? — Banno

Go for it. You typically draw a better/larger crowd than others.

I also invoked the consideration of whether or not a thing's existence is dependent upon its relations. — Merkwurdichliebe

What are we counting as a tree's relations?
— creativesoul

One example would be all necessary conditions that are not inherent to the tree itself, which are nonetheless required for its existence. — Merkwurdichliebe

So...

Verbatim...

A tree's relations are described as...

..all necessary conditions that are not inherent to the tree itself, which are nonetheless required for it's existence. — Merkwurdichliebe

I've no need to mutilate something already so butchered. I'm trying to help.

...

Once again, I will attempt to emphasize that the word 'existence' matters only in particular contexts like disputes about 'existence of God' . It is my contention that an absolutist stance is not valid because there is no consensus as to 'the nature of God' . But if a relative view is taken, we can validly say 'God exists for believers' because the concept has utility for their interactions..And 'God does not exist for atheists' because the reverse is true. The consequences (i.e.what matters) of this relativity view are that atheists' seeking to argue against 'God's existence' on the basis of 'evidence' are barking up the wrong tree.

I will attempt to emphasize that the word 'existence' matters only in particular contexts like disputes about 'existence of God — fresco

And yet... I've shown how it matters and I've not once invoked God. Thus, the above is not true.

No...I said disputes like 'existence of God'. But certainly unless you refer to existential disputes, Iwould say you have missed my point.

Nothing I've said is a dispute like 'existence of God'.

Have you mentioned any other dispute...electrons...global warming.. etc ?
If not we are talking past each other.

Perhaps I should specify normal situational dispute.

I'm simply pointing out that there is nothing - NOTHING AT ALL - added to our understanding by using the term "existence" as a predicate.

Well...

Aside from unnecessary confusion.

Perhaps I should specify normal situational dispute. — fresco

Banno foresaw/predicted the no true scotsman earlier.

Once again, I will attempt to emphasize that the word 'existence' matters only articular contexts like disputes about 'existence of God' — fresco

Sure. The only issue I would take is that there is an existential statement implicit in many other statements; in particular, those that feature "is". Think this was mentioned earlier, too.

Its not a question of 'belief'. Its a fundamental later phenomenological pov which follows Kant's non accessibility of noumena and therefore discards 'noumena' as vacuous, and which accepts Nietsche's rejection of any difference between 'description' and 'reality'. It is also supported by Maturana's argument that all we call 'observation' essentially involves 'languaging'. — fresco

Any news yet on why you'd endorse or stress that point of view?

Is a tree dependent upon it's relations? — creativesoul

Everything, except for maybe elementary particles, supposing there really are any, and imagining that any could obtain in isolation, is, and is thus dependent on matter in dynamic relations. That obviously includes trees. You can't have a tree without particular kinds of matter in particular sorts of dynamic relations, both internally (internal to what we're considering "the tree itself") and with respect to external matter in dynamic relations, such as the sun, water, carbon dioxide, etc.

I'm simply pointing out that there is nothing - NOTHING AT ALL - added to our understanding by using the term "existence" as a predicate.

...then explain why the word 'existence' was coined in the first place. Surely it can only function in the context of disputes, which is where I claim that relativity refers to consensus, whereas absolutism does not.

First look at the etymology:

late 14c., "reality," from Old French existence, from Medieval Latin existentia/exsistentia, from existentem/exsistentem (nominative existens/exsistens) "existent," present participle of Latin existere/exsistere "stand forth, come out, emerge; appear, be visible, come to light; arise, be produced; turn into," and, as a secondary meaning, "exist, be;" from ex "forth" (see ex-) + sistere "cause to stand," from PIE *si-st-, reduplicated form of root *sta- "to stand, make or be firm."

One thing it's handy for, especially in the context of the scholastic philosophy from which the term emerged, is talking about the difference between possibles/potentials and actuals. Something closely related is instantiation of (platonic) forms, or instantiations of properties.