This relates to my post regarding conflicting duries "Do all moral dilemmas arise when two different duties are compared"

Useful here is to attend to Mww's point, the substance of which is that the categorical imperative (CI) itself is entirely general.

As a prior generality, it has no concept of the particular in question just as the rules of addition in themselves cannot add even 2+2. Rather, they must be applied.

If you don't like my metaphor, well, there's no accounting for taste. I myself think of it as a metaphor and a pretty good one, but as with any metaphor, not the thing itself but merely illustrative of some aspect of the thing itself. But you fault it for cause, viz, both that it is a metaphor and given the subject matter is already out-of-court, but also that

Well l don't think the analogy applies here, the act will be relevant to CI, if there is one but if there isn't any, the act can exist on its own. — Wittgenstein

Defending metaphors as metaphors seem a mug's game, but as to the "relevance" of the CI to the "act," can you make that clearer? You can start by distinguishing "acts" from maxims (I find "maxim" a strange word; if you prefer "rule" I'd agree to that change).

and trust me there is no way we will agree on what was Kant was saying if we regard him as right.
If we think Kant's position is weak, we can certainly share some common criticism of his theory. — Wittgenstein

With most things, and conspicuously with Kant, our regards, agreements and disagreements, opinions, thoughts and criticisms are worth exactly nothing absent understanding of our topic. Which is to say that much is proclaimed, conspicuously with respect to Kant, from ignorance. Part of the evidence of ignorance lies in the manner of presentation. If you're going to argue against Kant, then start with him.

What, exactly, do you disagree with Kant about, and, on what grounds with respect to his thought?

As a prior generality, it has no concept of the particular in question just as the rules of addition in themselves cannot add even 2+2.

Rules can be explained without applying to any problem, for example addition is opposite to subtraction.We can describe general concepts.

If you don't like my metaphor, well, there's no accounting for taste. I myself think of it as a metaphor and a pretty good one, but as with any metaphor, not the thing itself but merely illustrative of some aspect of the thing itself. But you fault it for cause, viz, both that it is a metaphor and given the subject matter is already out-of-court, but also that

It is not a matter of taste but clarity of thought.
If you want to treat ethics like a science ( i think so ), you have to abandon using metaphors.
In Science we use mathematical formulas to clarify doubts when physical phenomena confuse us.Ethics is confusing in philosophy and using metaphor is a tradition, perhaps that explains why things have gone messy in philosophy.

and, on what grounds with respect to his thought ?

HIS ? l don't think anyone can claim that he is speaking for Kant after he is dead.All we have is reading his work and commenting on what we think are his thoughts.This may seem a trivial or a stupid point but it is practical and realistic.
Can you explain what you think are the merits of his ideas and the cons.I can either acknowledge or refute them

A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms. — Wittgenstein

Could you elaborate on that?

We can throw away certain maxims or make them part of others but that will leaves us confused and destroy any ethical theory. — Wittgenstein

How so? There are maxims which can also be described by a more general, abstract maxim, but in less detail.

Again, the point is we do not know what maxim is correct, hierarchically. — schopenhauer1

If the CI works, there should not be a hierarchy of maxims, since a maxim that can be universalized cannot conflict with another maxim that can be universalized, or else they cannot be universalized.

So let's say that the clerk is rude because his wife died a couple weeks earlier and that puts him in a bad mood. So then in that case the maxim might be, "A clerk should not be rude, unless a tragedy befalls him close to the time of rudeness to a customer, as then no one would be allowed time to process their grief appropriately". This then trumps the maxim, "Clerks should never be rude to customers as this is violating civility and denying their humanity". Which rule wins out? — schopenhauer1

There wouldn't be emotional exception to a maxim, since that defeats the point. The idea behind the CI is to have reason guide your actions, not emotion. Kant would uphold the duty of civility (assuming it applies for the moment) even if an emotional reaction would be understandable.

It is not a matter of taste but clarity of thought.
If you want to treat ethics like a science ( i think so ), — Wittgenstein

Yes! to clarity. No, to a science of ethics.
And yes, it's messy in the trenches. It always is messy in the trenches. But in my opinion and piggy-backing on your thought, clarity of thinking clears up a lot of mess. And if a good ob of cleaning is done, then maybe you end up with real irreconcilable difference, which in itself calls out for more thinking.

The thing about science is that it is not a thing but a process, and not a process that fits well with ethics.

There wouldn't be emotional exception to a maxim, since that defeats the point. The idea behind the CI is to have reason guide your actions, not emotion. Kant would uphold the duty of civility (assuming it applies for the moment) even if an emotional reaction would be understandable. — Echarmion

I don't see why there couldn't be something that shakes out in some universal violation.. "If everyone didn't allow for exceptions for emotional grieving, out of reasons of civility, that would itself endanger civility".. I don't know.. I'm sure I can think of a better one, but you get my gist.

I kind of find it funny that he is pitting "reason" with "emotion". That's kind of a false dichotomy. Property, life, civility, trustworthiness would be things we would have to value in the first place. Presumably value has some sort of emotional preference attached to it. Actual, now that I think about it, another criticism is that these contradictions might reduce down to preference theory or a hypothetical imperative.. because it presumes that we must value property, getting along, etc.

All we have is reading his work and commenting on what we think are his thoughts. — Wittgenstein

And it is just this that is worthless with respect to Kant, if his ideas - his texts, if you will - are not first understood. And - I noted above - he's difficult to condense or summarize. Themes I do extract are the primacy of reason and value of humanity in persons. That is, nothing because we want this or that to be so or think that it should be so, but because it is so. The rules against intentionally lying or breaking promises cases in point. The idea is that if we're to lie or break promises, then truth and promise-making are destroyed. And no one who knows has ever said that reason was always easy or convenient.

A good will is good under any circumstances and conditions but the categorical imperative can only be carried out by a good will. Changing the maxim based on circumstances undermines the role of will and makes it subservient to ends/goals.
Further more the maxim being based on a universal categorical imperative should not be extended into particulars as we cannot practically decide a universal when the conditions exceed the bare minimum but the bare minimum can always be reduced a condition less maxim such as "Do not Kill" a true maxim which can be reasoned and followed by all reasonable man.

If the CI works, there should not be a hierarchy of maxims, since a maxim that can be universalized cannot conflict with another maxim that can be universalized, or else they cannot be universalized.

I agree with this idea that all maxims should be on the same ethical plane in a sense like parallel lines, they should never conflict with each other.
We can avoid the hierarchy of maxims by clearly defining what we should consider as maxims.
What do you consider as maxims ?

In my opinion, and l can be wrong , the false maxims are those which are circumstantial like
1. Do A in 1 if a
2. Do B in 1 if b
3. Do ( ?) in 1 if a,b
The third one causes confusion, so we should rather say
1. Do A in 1.
2.Do B in 1.
A must be same as B.
3 does not even rise.

A good will is good under any circumstances and conditions but the categorical imperative can only be carried out by a good will. Changing the maxim based on circumstances undermines the role of will and makes it subservient to ends/goals. — Wittgenstein

So a couple of points:
First, this isn't a contradiction in terms, just a contradiction.
Secondly, not all maxims "pass" the CI. "I will lie when it suits my purposes" is a maxim, and it's clearly conditional. It just fails the CI "test".

Lastly, I think you are confusing the motivation for following a maxim with the content of the maxim itself. The reason for adopting a maxim in accordance with the CI should be unconditional duty. But that doesn't mean that the maxim must apply to all circumstances.

Further more the maxim being based on a universal categorical imperative should not be extended into particulars as we cannot practically decide a universal when the conditions exceed the bare minimum but the bare minimum can always be reduced a condition less maxim such as "Do not Kill" a true maxim which can be reasoned and followed by all reasonable man. — Wittgenstein

Isn't that just saying that the CI cannot be practically applied? After all real situations are always particular. Besides, "Do not kill" without any conditions cannot be universalised, since it rules out self defense.

Lastly, I think you are confusing the motivation for following a maxim with the content of the maxim itself. The reason for adopting a maxim in accordance with the CI should be unconditional duty. But that doesn't mean that the maxim must apply to all circumstances.

Once the maxim is made on the foundation Categorical imperative, it cannot give a maxim which we cannot rationally follow.Every moral act will be carried in some event which is logically related, but the circumstances need not to be mentioned.We will have a hierarchy of maxims that way, where we will end up selecting one maxim over another in a certain circumstance.

I think most people would like to have statements like
" Do not kill except in self defense " , the problem with such maxims is that it can't be universalized.
Consider the CI
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."
If we try to universalized the first statement, we will end up disputing what "self defense".The maxim " Do not kill" can be easily universalized, the right to live is well preserved.

Isn't that just saying that the CI cannot be practically applied? After all real situations are always particular. Besides, "Do not kill" without any conditions cannot be universalised, since it rules out self defense.

We can apply the CI in logically related situations without specifying the particulars.
For example " Do not kill a murderer" or "Do not kill a soilder that has surrendered" are essentially saying "Do not kill".They can be applied to all particular situations if we take their general form.In most of the countries, any lawyer would tell you, using " self defense" is arbitrary/difficult to apply in most of the cases.
Consider how killing someone who has trespassed into your property can be killed if you are also within the realm of your property but if you are outside of the property, you cannot kill the intruder.There is also a dispute about what qualifies as property.
If we try to universalize it, everyone will act differently even with the same maxim.
Let's suppose they act in the same way as you would, l think it will undermine the right to life and hence be unreasonable.

I don't see why there couldn't be something that shakes out in some universal violation.. "If everyone didn't allow for exceptions for emotional grieving, out of reasons of civility, that would itself endanger civility".. I don't know.. I'm sure I can think of a better one, but you get my gist. — schopenhauer1

Not everything that seems impractical is a contradiction in terms of the CI. It's not like being rude to customers, for example, is the only way to process grief. What Kant means by self-contradicting behavior is not maxims that "endanger" a positive value, but maxims that, if universalized, would defeat their own purpose. The thief aims to enrich himself, but if stealing were universalized, all the thief's wealth would be itself subject to stealing, and hence mostly worthless.

I kind of find it funny that he is pitting "reason" with "emotion". That's kind of a false dichotomy. Property, life, civility, trustworthiness would be things we would have to value in the first place. Presumably value has some sort of emotional preference attached to it. Actual, now that I think about it, another criticism is that these contradictions might reduce down to preference theory or a hypothetical imperative.. because it presumes that we must value property, getting along, etc. — schopenhauer1

That Kant unnecessarily pits reason against emotion is a common criticism, and one that later followers of his ideas have tried to rectify. But the CI does not rely on an emotional value attached to property, getting along etc. In fact that's the major reason why it has been so influential. Kant bases the CI purely on the form of a general law. It has no content. All content comes from examining maxims in a social setting and seeing which maxims, if universalized lead to outcomes that are both non-contradictory and can be willed regardless of your position in that society.

Once the maxim is made on the foundation Categorical imperative, it cannot give a maxim which we cannot rationally follow.Every moral act will be carried in some event which is logically related, but the circumstances need not to be mentioned.We will have a hierarchy of maxims that way, where we will end up selecting one maxim over another in a certain circumstance. — Wittgenstein

Why would this result in a hierarchy of maxims? If the maxims are conditional, they don't conflict in the first place. Kant considers the CI to be like your own personal law-giver. You should follow the law unconditionally, but the laws themselves, just like external laws, can have conditions.

I think most people would like to have statements like
" Do not kill except in self defense " , the problem with such maxims is that it can't be universalized.
Consider the CI
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."
If we try to universalized the first statement, we will end up disputing what "self defense".The maxim " Do not kill" can be easily universalized, the right to live is well preserved. — Wittgenstein

But I just pointed out that "Do not kill" cannot be universalized, since there are circumstances where one would will to be killed, such as in defense of innocents. That what "self defense" entails precisely requires further examination is not grounds for claiming that it cannot be universalized. Even simple maxims like "respect the porperty of others" require further details on what exactly constitutes property.

We can apply the CI in logically related situations without specifying the particulars.
For example " Do not kill a murderer" or "Do not kill a soilder that has surrendered" are essentially saying "Do not kill".They can be applied to all particular situations if we take their general form. — Wittgenstein

But you just specified the particulars. Are you claiming that by reformulating the abstract maxim into a couple of more specific maxims, the specific maxims now somehow violate the CI?

In most of the countries, any lawyer would tell you, using " self defense" is arbitrary/difficult to apply in most of the cases. — Wittgenstein

Yeah no. Self defense is one of the simpler legal concepts.

Consider how killing someone who has trespassed into your property can be killed if you are also within the realm of your property but if you are outside of the property, you cannot kill the intruder. — Wittgenstein

Because when you are outside the property, it's not exactly defense, is it?

If we try to universalize it, everyone will act differently even with the same maxim. — Wittgenstein

But the basis of Kant's system is that everyone has access to the same rationality. So, if everyone rationaly thinks through what should and should not consider self-defense, they would not come up with different behaviors. If what you were saying here was true, then the CI itself could not work, since it presumes that every actor applies the CI internally and comes up with the same maxims.

Let's suppose they act in the same way as you would, l think it will undermine the right to life and hence be unreasonable. — Wittgenstein

Well you're going to have to supply an argument why you think self defense is incompatible with the CI. Kant himself did not think so.

a positive value, but maxims that, if universalized, would defeat their own purpose. The thief aims to enrich himself, but if stealing were universalized, all the thief's wealth would be itself subject to stealing, and hence mostly worthless. — Echarmion

Right, so the theory itself rests on the value/emotional weight put on property itself. There is something beyond the contradiction that is added. The thief has to actually value property in the first place. Thus, it does turn hypothetical: "If you value property, then you would not steal, as property itself would be useless for you". Hence why I claimed that the supposed "categorical" imperative becomes "hypothetical".

Right, so the theory itself rests on the value/emotional weight put on property itself. There is something beyond the contradiction that is added. The thief has to actually value property in the first place. Thus, it does turn hypothetical: "If you value property, then you would not steal, as property itself would be usefuless for you". Hence why I claimed that the supposed "categorical" imperative becomes "hypothetical". — schopenhauer1

Well but the thief does value "property", in the sense that he values having secure access to material goods, or else what would the point of stealing be? It's important to look at the act from the perspective of the maxim. A thief's maxim might involve profiting from selling the stolen goods. In that case, it's obvious that the thief relies on the notion of property to benefit from the act (as without the notion, noone would buy). There are maxims where this kind of contradiction doesn't exist. For example, one might simply steal because one has no other way to acquire food, or simply to deprive the owner of the item in order to spite them. In those cases, no self-contradiction occurs, and it's then a matter of asking whether or not one can will the maxim to be universal.This second step is similar to the well known "golden rule", or perhaps in a more modern form Rawl's veil of ignorance.

For example, one might simply steal because one has no other way to acquire food, or simply to deprive the owner of the item in order to spite them. In those cases, no self-contradiction occurs, and it's then a matter of asking whether or not one can will the maxim to be universal.This second step is similar to the well known "golden rule", or perhaps in a more modern form Rawl's veil of ignorance. — Echarmion

There's several problems here. First, again is that it reduces to a hypothetical: "If you want to live in a world where property is honored for daily living, then you would not steal". There is an element of common interest there. We can choose to not value property and be okay living in a society that property doesn't matter. Perhaps it is a treacherous "all man for yourself" society that we desire. Then stealing would be fine. Sure, this is probably not something most people would value or desire, but in some possible world, person can indeed value this type of society. Thus, the contradiction itself like "property being useless as a concept", or some such, is really based on social norms, emotional feelings about the value that may or may not be contradicted, and more generally things that are more qualitative, probabilistic (being socially constructed and contingent), and not universal in application.

I'd gone away for a bit because I wanted to consult the primary and secondary literature carefully and see if I still thought what I thought when I OP-ed. Only now, coming back, I can see I have even more to catch up with! :razz:

On a matter of - dare I say - practical reason, there are posts I can write in pretty much the time it takes to type them, and there are posts that require actual research. I probably can't afford too many of the latter because there are actually other things I need to get done besides participate in this forum!

Nevertheless, you should hear more from me shortly...

Yes, yes. I know...

There's several problems here. First, again is that it reduces to a hypothetical: "If you want to live in a world where property is honored for daily living, then you would not steal". There is an element of common interest there. We can choose to not value property and be okay living in a society that property doesn't matter. Perhaps it is a treacherous "all man for yourself" society that we desire. Then stealing would be fine. Sure, this is probably not something most people would value or desire, but in some possible world, person can indeed value this type of society. — schopenhauer1

There's a lot to unpack here. The "categorical" in the CI refers to the way you form your maxims, not to their content. You're supposed to be "motivated" by duty alone, and reason determines what that duty is. This ties back into Kant's conception of freedom.

The reason you apply though, is practical reason. As such, it does not operate in "some possible world" but always in the context of human society. And humans, by and large, have common interests. Sociopaths and mental illnesses exist, but those are exceptions. Kant assumes that humans have a common ability to reason, and I think it's difficult to disagree with that.

Thus, the contradiction itself like "property being useless as a concept", or some such, is really based on social norms, emotional feelings about the value that may or may not be contradicted, and more generally things that are more qualitative, probabilistic (being socially constructed and contingent), and not universal in application. — schopenhauer1

I think this is taking things a bit too far. There are no "emotional feelings" involved in determining whether or not a maxim is self-contradictory. You just look at what concepts the maxim presupposes. Those concepts may be themselves the result of social processes, but that doesn't turn the operation into a "qualitative, probabilistic" process. The process is subjective, yes, because morality isn't written down as some object somewhere. The universal application only ever happens in a mind.

So, Kant would argue that in a truly moral world, there is absolutely no room for lying. And even the smallest lie destroys his precious categorical imperative. So, Kant would say, if a killer came to your house, looking to kill the man hiding upstairs and asked where he was, you'd be obliged to tell him. In his perfect world, you know, you couldn't lie.

Yeah, I can see the logic that if you open the door, even just a crack, you accept a world where lying is permitted.

Okay, then, then you'd say if the Nazis came to your house, hiding Anne Frank and her family, and asked if anyone was in the attic, you'd say, "Ja, the Franks are upstairs." I doubt it. Because there's a difference between a theoretical world of philosophy bullshit, and real life, you know? Real, nasty, ugly life that includes greed, and hate, and genocide. Remember, if you learn nothing else from me, you should learn that much of philosophy is verbal masturbation. — irrational man

Maybe, just maybe, using a bit of sophistry, or other techniques, the categorical imperative can be salvaged. But in any case, what difference does it make, what does it matter, if people suffer and die as a result? I mean, philosophically speaking, Kant could be right, and his CI alive and kicking, like they say, but the people dead and buried, what is it that we really want here?

@Wittgenstein

A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms. — Wittgenstein


Could you elaborate on that? — Echarmion

I can't speak for Wittgenstein, but I would suggest that it means that a rule can't be contingently universal. There's a contradiction in terms there.

@Wittgenstein@Mww
Anyone who’s ever tried to “do” philosophy, to examine, take apart, or, dare I suggest, contribute to philosophical arguments, inevitably notices that the exact formulation of a position matters. It matters a lot. A subtle re-wording of a premise can open up or rule out entire lines of reasoning. A minor tweak to a conclusion can make the difference between a valid and an invalid argument. Anyone who attempts to do philosophy, even for just five minutes, quickly notices this.

To give an example from relatively philosophical recent history, logical positivism holds that all metaphysical statements are meaningless. But, it has been countered, “metaphysical statements are meaningless” is itself a metaphysical statement.

Whatever you may think of that argument, the logical positivists do not get to say “Oh, but you know perfectly well that we didn’t intend to imply that, so you’re just being willfully ignorant of the details of our philosophy.” That’s not how implication works. It’s not how philosophy works either. If the position of logical positivism, as formulated and advanced by logical positivists, turns out to have self-contradictory implications, that is a problem – for the logical positivists. It is not evidence that the person who points out this self-contradiction is just being willfully ignorant because they failed to focus exclusively on what the logical positivists intended to imply.

My own argument form, as @Kippo correctly identified right from the outset, was reductio ad absurdum. It is a valid argument form. And it pretty well always works by identifying some implication that everyone knows perfectly well your opponent never intended to imply.

So. Does, as I suggested, Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative imply that literally everything is forbidden?

To me, it all comes down to whether or not we take Kant at his word when he says “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” I think “only” is the crucial word here, because if there is even one maxim you are acting in accordance with that you cannot at the same time will that it become a universal law, you are no longer “acting only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”

QED.

Furthermore, a great deal that Kant says only makes sense if we interpret the first formulation of the categorical imperative in this way. In every instance I have found where Kant argues that some specific act is wrong, all he does (or even tries to do) is show that it forms an instance of acting in accordance with a maxim we could not at the same time will to be universal.

For example, following the reference Mww gave

My reference can be found here: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5682/5682-h/5682-h.htm#link2H_4_0005 . Scroll to SECOND SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, then scroll some more to the 7th indented footnote on what a maxim is — Mww

and scrolling down a bit lower, we find:

***

1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: "From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: "Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?" Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: "When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so." Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, "Is it right?" I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: "How would it be if my maxim were a universal law?" Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.
3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.
4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: "What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!" Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.

***

Notice how in all of the above, Kant never once, not once, considers that there may be some alternative maxim that could also apply, and which you could at the same time will to be universal, and that this may, perhaps, make the act permissible. Of course, he doesn’t need to consider this possibility if we take his use of the word “only” in the first formulation of the categorical imperative seriously. He has shown that an act is in accordance with a maxim that you cannot at the same time will to be universal. Therefore, by his own standards, he has made his case and he can stop there.

By contrast, if we don’t take him at his word, and assume that somehow he is not serious when he uses the word “only,” literally all the arguments that he advances above now have a hole in them that you could drive a truck through. Or perhaps an infinite series of trucks, since one can always dream up new maxims to test.

Everything I said applies equally well to Kant's argument that stealing is wrong. If we all stole all the time, private property could no longer exist, so there could be no such thing as stealing. Therefore we cannot steal and at the same time will that stealing be universal. Therefore stealing is wrong. And that, once again, is that.

Are you noticing a pattern here?

If you read the secondary literature on Kant, it seems generally accepted among ethicists that one of the great weaknesses in Kantian ethics is that Kant rarely provides much in the way of guidance for choosing between competing moral imperatives. I refer interested parties to a reference I gave before in a previous post:

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30317932.pdf

The only well known example of Kant considering any kind of moral quandary [and the only example at all that I'm aware of in which can actually provides the solution to the quandary] is the famous “killer at the door” example that has already been discussed. But even that seems to exist only to demonstrate that all other rational beings are independent moral agents, and so that you are not responsible for the maxims that they act on. If you lie, you yourself are acting in accordance with a maxim that you cannot at the same will to be universal. Therefore it's wrong, and all discussion ends.

Again, are you noticing that same pattern in his argument form? One broken maxim, QED.

Other than that... if you follow the link I gave immediately above (and scroll down to the first paragraph beginning on page 3), you'll see that Kant's theoretical response to the possibility of moral quandaries was that it was conceptually impossible for them to even exist, but that there could, perhaps, be conflicts between "the so-called 'grounds' of the obligations," and that in such cases the strongest grounds prevail. For myself I am far from convinced that this is even coherent, and that even if it is, that it does not wind up flatly contradict the first formulation of the categorical imperative. Nevertheless, I believe that this is the only even possible ground for refuting the claim I made in my OP, so I present it to you. It's possible that only someone completely committed to a really excruciating exegesis of Kant would be able to nut all this out. Or perhaps even that gives Kant too much credit. Maybe he's just fudging it at this point. He realizes he's in trouble, and so has resorted to such vague wording that no strong conclusions either way are possible. Or maybe I'm being too harsh. Maybe he, like the rest of us, just gets stuck and unsure sometimes.

"What if Kant were one of us?"

He is, you know. I think we forget that sometimes. And now I'll have that playing in my head all day...

Finally, currently there is a debate going on on this thread as to whether you can add as many conditions as you like to a “maxim.” Frankly, I don’t think that expanding out your maxims in this way is consistent with the term as used in Kant’s writings. But for the purposes of my own underlying thesis, even if you can, so what? The only real issue here is whether I'm right about the "only" part. If I am, then expanding on the range of possible maxims that could potentially apply only has to effect of expanding on the range of possible maxims that could potentially forbid the action.

The more freedom you give me to design maxims as I see fit, the easier it becomes for me to come up with at least one maxim that seems to apply that no-one could at the same time will to be universal. The freedom to add additional clauses and contingencies as I see fit makes it easier, not harder, for me to dream up some perverse maxim that an act is in accordance which, yet which you could not, at the same time, will to be universal. You’re strengthening, not weakening my hand.

Great... I just spent the last three hours putting the finishing touches on a 1,300 word attack on Kantian deontology. To say nothing of the time spent on it over the last few days.

This, apparently, is what I do for fun...

I gotta get a better forum-life balance! :gasp:

You know, having poured out all the above, I can now see another problem. And it's a problem both for me and for Kant.

What I said above is fine just so long as all our maxims are "Thou shalt nots." But what if we also have a maxim that's a "thou shalt," and the two conflict?

Whatever you do then, you'll have broken a maxim!

Kant, of course, takes the coward's way out, claiming (as I previously observed) that such a conflict is inconceivable.

Of course, even if he's wrong, it's only a problem if we assume all situations have a moral way out. Perhaps the universe, by its very nature, just compels us to be sinful? I'm back to the teachings of Saint Bartholomew: "You're damned if we do and you're damned if you don't." There's nothing incoherent about that. It's just a nasty universe.

But the idea of an inherently moral universe does bring me to what I've long thought of as the real fundamental problem with Kantian ethics.

All (or at least most) ethical theorists have sought to establish an objective basis to their favored theory. Kant’s is that morals are implied a priori by reason. To be immoral is to be irrational, and to be perfectly rational is to be perfectly moral. That is what Kant actually said. And his basis for that claim is that if you act according to a maxim that you could not at the same time will to be universal, you are being irrational. Kant’s claim is that if you don’t want to live in a world where everyone welshes on their debits all the time; or you can see that a world where everyone welshes on their debts all the time is simply not logically possible, because no-one would ever lend in the first place, then it is irrational for you to welsh on your debts. You are, in effect, saying that you disapprove of this action, while at the same time engaging in it yourself. Which is, so he claims, irrational, and we can know this a priori.

My own “naïve” response to this is that when you act according to a maxim, you are not making it universal. That is simply not the decision you are making. So superficially at least, it seems profoundly irrational to insist on acting as if it was.

Kant’s claim – that it is irrational to act according to a maxim that you would not will to be universal – only makes sense if you introduce an additional assumption: that there are in fact maxims that prescribe moral and immoral actions. Either that, or that there are moral and immoral actions, and that these can be prescribed by maxims.

So what masquerades as Kant’s conclusion – that there is an objective basis to morality – is in fact his unstated premise: That there is an objective basis to morality. So reduced to its naïve form, with its real fundamental premise laid bare, Kant’s true argument form devolves to A therefore A.

Impressive, ain’t it?

While I'm going off on tangents, I think there's another serious problem with Kant's solution to the murderer at the door scenario that hasn't been pointed out thus far.

Kant's solution only works if we absolve ourselves of all responsibility for the actions of others - or at least, of all others we recognize as rational beings. But suppose the maxim "absolve yourself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings" became universal.

There could certainly be no police, no judiciary, no penal system. Civilized society would collapse overnight.

Okay, that's enough from me for now. Over to the rest of you.

The reason you apply though, is practical reason. As such, it does not operate in "some possible world" but always in the context of human society. And humans, by and large, have common interests. Sociopaths and mental illnesses exist, but those are exceptions. Kant assumes that humans have a common ability to reason, and I think it's difficult to disagree with that. — Echarmion

This really is very murky.. "human society".. "common ability to reason".. Not everyone has, does, or will come up with a same common reasoning about society and its interests. All I have to prove is that there is an ethics above and beyond the categorical imperative and being bound by duty for which morality lies, otherwise the categorical imperative is just a clever line of reasoning that explains little of morality. There is already an assumption of what is good behind the "practical reasoning" for which the categorical imperative is supposed to focus on. Thus, "property is a concept that is good for society" is really more what Kant is saying morally, and not the categorical imperative. Rather, it reduces to a list of goods that people think are worth living for. But this already means that the CI itself is just a heuristic and not morality itself- there is something beyond it whether that be a good, a value, or an emotional weight or moral sense of something, depending on your theory.

Thus, "property is a concept that is good for society" is really more what Kant is saying morally, and not the categorical imperative. — schopenhauer1

Kinda makes me want to merge this with the socialism thread. Kant is so bourgeois.

I can't speak for Wittgenstein, but I would suggest that it means that a rule can't be contingently universal. There's a contradiction in terms there. — Theologian

That would be a contradiction in terms, but it's not what I said. Maxims aren't rules (though their structure is very similar) and they aren't universal (or else there'd be nothing to universalise).

Notice how in all of the above, Kant never once, not once, considers that there may be some alternative maxim that could also apply, and which you could at the same time will to be universal, and that this may, perhaps, make the act permissible. — Theologian

Of course he doesn't. Because, if you read the examples, you notice that they all just deal with the one maxim that actually describes the persons actual intentions. Other hypothetical maxims are not relevant.

Finally, currently there is a debate going on on this thread as to whether you can add as many conditions as you like to a “maxim.” Frankly, I don’t think that expanding out your maxims in this way is consistent with the term as used in Kant’s writings. — Theologian

If you look at the portion of Kant's writings you quoted, the maxims listed all have conditions. They have "when X is the case" segments.

The more freedom you give me to design maxims as I see fit, the easier it becomes for me to come up with at least one maxim that seems to apply that no-one could at the same time will to be universal. The freedom to add additional clauses and contingencies as I see fit makes it easier, not harder, for me to dream up some perverse maxim that an act is in accordance which, yet which you could not, at the same time, will to be universal. You’re strengthening, not weakening my hand. — Theologian

The problem is that you still misunderstand how the CI applies. I have pointed this out twice already. The CI evaluates a particular maxim. One which you either actually want to adopt or merely want to consider for the future. The maxim comes first, the act second. Of you take an act and then "dream up" arbitrary maxims it might fit you're simply doing it wrong. That exercise is entirely unrelated to Kant's system.

What I said above is fine just so long as all our maxims are "Thou shalt nots." But what if we also have a maxim that's a "thou shalt," and the two conflict? — Theologian

Maxims are neither "thou shalt" nor "thou shalt not". They're always "I will". The CI is not a canon of rules like the ten commandments. It's a self-test to run on your own behaviour. Expressing the results of a CI test as a law is a second step that you can use to determine behaviour in advance.

All (or at least most) ethical theorists have sought to establish an objective basis to their favored theory. Kant’s is that morals are implied a priori by reason. To be immoral is to be irrational, and to be perfectly rational is to be perfectly moral. That is what Kant actually said. — Theologian

Yes, but "rational" is not the same as "objective".

My own “naïve” response to this is that when you act according to a maxim, you are not making it universal. That is simply not the decision you are making. So superficially at least, it seems profoundly irrational to insist on acting as if it was. — Theologian

It's a good thing, then, that Kant does not insists that this is the case. When you apply the CI, you imagine your maxim as if it were a universal law. It stays a maxim in your head, however.

So what masquerades as Kant’s conclusion – that there is an objective basis to morality – is in fact his unstated premise: That there is an objective basis to morality. So reduced to its naïve form, with its real fundamental premise laid bare, Kant’s true argument form devolves to A therefore A. — Theologian

Now this is turning into pure nonsense. Kant doesn't claim his morals are based on an object somewhere, he claims they are based on reason. The CI doesn't come out of thin air. There is an actual derivation you can read.

Kant's solution only works if we absolve ourselves of all responsibility for the actions of others - or at least, of all others we recognize as rational beings. But suppose the maxim "absolve yourself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings" became universal. — Theologian

That's not a maxim though.

This really is very murky.. "human society".. "common ability to reason".. Not everyone has, does, or will come up with a same common reasoning about society and its interests. — schopenhauer1

Murky? What's murky about it? Is it unclear what I mean by "common ability to reason" or "human society"?

But sure, not everyone agrees on the details. But how much of that is due to personal interests or pre-existing beliefs? I don't think anyone can truly say.

There is already an assumption of what is good behind the "practical reasoning" for which the categorical imperative is supposed to focus on. — schopenhauer1

What is assumed about good and bad by starting from the fact that we are human beings that live together in a society?

Thus, "property is a concept that is good for society" is really more what Kant is saying morally, and not the categorical imperative. — schopenhauer1

Kant doesn't say this when he talks about the CI, though he did write about property and I don't think he ever questioned the idea of property. Whether or not Kant was correct in assuming that individual property is moral is a different question from the question of whether the CI is the correct standard to assess morality.

But this already means that the CI itself is just a heuristic and not morality itself- there is something beyond it whether that be a good, a value, or an emotional weight or moral sense of something, depending on your theory. — schopenhauer1

So, what is behind it? How does it get in?