whether man discovers or creates his knowledge of the world (perhaps the hard question). — Merkwurdichliebe
exactly on the point of whether subjectivity is real or an illusion. — Marchesk
What does not noticing that have to do with qualia? — Terrapin Station
It fits more into a behavioral, functionalist epistemology. — Forgottenticket
How are your imaginings, dreams and inner dialog subjective if I can refer to them with language and use them as explanations for your behavior that I percieve? — Harry Hindu
How is that any different than talking about atoms as an explanation for the behavior of matter that I perceive? — Harry Hindu
What makes us think that there is a what it is like for a bat, but not ask the same question of a computer robot with sensory systems? — Harry Hindu
The thing is we know that we experience. — Janus
You said mental things are done by the brain. What if the atoms we were referring to make up the neurons in your brain? Isnt electricity a necessary component for the brain to do mental things?The difference is that those atoms aren't part of a material system that amounts to mental phenomena. — Terrapin Station
Does Nagel believe that what it is like to be a bat exhausts everything it is to be a bat including the non- nerological parts of the body that include the stomach, intestines, blood and feces? If not, then he's really not asking what it's like to be a bat. He's asking what it's like to be a specific part of the bat, no? — Harry Hindu
Right, computers don't have neurological structures, and that's why we have little reason to seriously consider the possibility that they might experience anything in the kind of way that we think we and other animals do. — Janus
Would those things that we don't experience thanks to the limitations of our sensory organs be considered subjective, too? In other words, are you saying that the information that is missing from our experience of the world is subjective and everything else is objective? — Harry Hindu
I'm not sure you have drawn a relevant "logical conclusion": I expect that being an "illusionist" about the putative phenomenon of conscious experience does not entail being an "illusionist" about apples, sensorimotor systems, and perception.The goal is to dissolve the hard problem without just handwaving it away or giving into some form of dualism. But taken illusionism to its logical conclusion has serious ramifications for knowledge. When I perceive an apple, I'm not just aware of the apple's color or its taste, I'm also aware of it's shape and weight. Some qualities of human experience are the basis for science. But if color and taste are illusions, what reason would we have for supposing that shape and weight are not? After-all, we know about apples by experiencing them via our sensations of color, taste, etc. — Marchesk
I expect most eliminativists or illusionists about the phenomenal character of consciousness will insist the path from perception to perceptual object remains open. They won't deny the existence of intermediate perceptual objects like light, sound, and odor, but only aim to characterize such phenomena in maximally objective terms -- terms that typically embrace the perceptual object construed as a physical system, and the perceiving object, construed as a physical or information-processing system in touch with the perceptual object by way of sensory contacts, while denying that there is a genuine "phenomenal character" or "subjective character" to perception.Of course not, but that's what I think the logical conclusion is if you say colors, sounds, etc. are illusions, since that's how we know about apples and everything else. — Marchesk
I take it by the phrase "philosophical zombie", you mean a creature exactly like a human being in every physical detail, that behaves exactly like a conscious human being, but that somehow lacks sentience, or the phenomenal character of conscious experience, or something along these lines. Is that about right?Maybe you can formulate the p-zombie argument for epistemology? — Marchesk
You said mental things are done by the brain. What if the atoms we were referring to make up the neurons in your brain? — Harry Hindu
No, not unless panpsychism is true. The things we can't perceive that we learn about through science are described in objective terms. — Marchesk
Then the question Nagel is asking is more concerened about whether or not different senses produce different qualia, not whether or not there is a 1st person perspective of qualia?He's asking what the experience of using sonar is. Is it accompanied with something like color or sound? The reason for choosing a bat is because it has a sensory modality we lack. It's akin to being born blind and then learning that other people see color, whatever that means for a person blind from birth. — Marchesk
These are representations in us that contribute to our cognitive talents without being for us.(In this regard they are no different from the representations of blood sugar level or vitamin deficiency that modulate our digestive systems with-out engaging cerebral cortex at all.)
-Dennett
But that approach isn't going to do anything but preach to the choir. — Terrapin Station
There isn't really any other way he can present empirical evidence for his theory that the brain is just a big parallel processing machine with the right kind of information being copied from place to place. — Forgottenticket
Right, but then he uses this to argue like Keith Frankish that subjectivity is an illusion. — Marchesk
Dennett's definition of consciousness is purely objective: functional, behavioral or neurophysiological with no additional experiential properties or stuff to go along with it. The colors, sounds, feels, are a trick of the brain. — Marchesk
Does Nagel believe that what it is like to be a bat exhausts everything it is to be a bat including the non-neurological parts of the body that include the stomach, intestines, blood and feces? If not, then he's really not asking what it's like to be a bat. He's asking what it's like to be a specific part of the bat, no? — Harry Hindu
I take it by the phrase "philosophical zombie", you mean a creature exactly like a human being in every physical detail, that behaves exactly like a conscious human being, but that somehow lacks sentience, or the phenomenal character of conscious experience, or something along these lines. Is that about right?
I'm not convinced this is a coherent notion. — Cabbage Farmer
I take it by the phrase "philosophical zombie", you mean a creature exactly like a human being in every physical detail, that behaves exactly like a conscious human being, but that somehow lacks sentience, or the phenomenal character of conscious experience, or something along these lines. Is that about right? — Cabbage Farmer
Even if consciousness were an illusion, we act in many of the ways we do, and say many of the things we do, because we think of ourselves as being conscious, and the p-zombie could not have such a self-reflexive self-understanding. — Janus
Then it is already implied that the bat has first person experiences so that you can then go about wondering what it is like to have sonar.Qualia is first person, but I prefer to talk in terms of color, sound, etc. — Marchesk
How would it be useful to have a description for sonar experiences? What purpose would the description serve?We don’t have a description for sonar experiences, nor do we have a way of gaining them from science. That’s Nagels point. — Marchesk
How would it be useful to have a description for sonar experiences? What purpose would the description serve? — Harry Hindu
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