The physical processes involved in bringing about the seeing of colour are well understood. — Janus
Why should we expect to have a physicalist explanation of something that cannot be objectified or measured? — Janus
What is the deeper 'why' that you mention? — g0d
What we experience with our usual senses is always the movie, we don't have access to the TV with these senses. — leo
Indeed, so then the problem is when physicalists claim that their models take into account the whole of reality, while their models cannot explain the very fact that we experience. — leo
What kind of "access" do you expect? How could we have any kind of access that wouldn't be dismissed as being "merely experiential"? — Janus
In general terms, here’s how the scientific method works. First, we set aside aspects of human experience on which we can’t always agree, such as how things look or taste or feel. Second, using mathematics and logic, we construct abstract, formal models that we treat as stable objects of public consensus. Third, we intervene in the course of events by isolating and controlling things that we can perceive and manipulate. Fourth, we use these abstract models and concrete interventions to calculate future events. Fifth, we check these predicted events against our perceptions. An essential ingredient of this whole process is technology: machines – our equipment – that standardise these procedures, amplify our powers of perception, and allow us to control phenomena to our own ends.
The Blind Spot arises when we start to believe that this method gives us access to unvarnished reality. But experience is present at every step. Scientific models must be pulled out from observations, often mediated by our complex scientific equipment. They are idealisations, not actual things in the world. Galileo’s model of a frictionless plane, for example; the Bohr model of the atom with a small, dense nucleus with electrons circling around it in quantised orbits like planets around a sun; evolutionary models of isolated populations – all of these exist in the scientist’s mind, not in nature. They are abstract mental representations, not mind-independent entities. Their power comes from the fact that they’re useful for helping to make testable predictions. But these, too, never take us outside experience, for they require specific kinds of perceptions performed by highly trained observers. — From the essay
Exactly, and what kind of "depth" should we expect over and above our usual physical explanations? Do we have any actual intellectual justification for asking for such "explanations"? — Janus
Personally I prefer to entertain what is deeper in the way of feeling without making incoherent demands for rational explanations of it (given that documented attempts to do that never seem to stand up to scrutiny). — Janus
If we claim that we are made of physical entities, then we ought to explain how these give rise to experiences, and if we can't then there is something missing in the idea that we are made of physical entities, as it isn't an idea that fits the very fact that we experience. — leo
It is just a how, how is it that physical entities that make up our body can give rise to experiences. It is not a why in the sense why is there something rather than nothing. — leo
If we stop assuming that our senses give us access to some reality "out there" independent of us then we don't have to deal with this conundrum. — leo
and yet we have to grasp the whole as a whole in order to see the futility of the 'question.' — g0d
I mean firstly I'm not too sure we even can "grasp the whole". Certainly not if you mean rationally or discursively grasp it, and what other kind of grasping is there? — Janus
I think we become convinced that the question cannot be answered once we grasp the difference between the "space of reasons" and the "space of causes" to invoke Wilfrid Sellars. Explanations in terms of reasons, which are ultimately explications (not explanations, mind!) of motivations or volitions, and hence functions of feeling, are appropriate in one domain, and explanations in terms of causes are appropriate in the other. — Janus
Attaching a face to a first principle puts questioning to sleep. It's familiar. It wins us over in an animal way. But the question isn't answered. Nor is it revealed as a pseudo-question, since it is paired with a pseudo-answer. It's when a person imagines the stucture of any possible answer and sees that that structure is incapable of scratching the itch. — g0d
But then we cannot explain how it is that we all experience the same world of things, given that our experience tells us that our minds are not directly connected at all. — Janus
This is a great description of philosophy. To me it sounds like a lot of fun. I don't get why some people get so hostile and uptight about it, speaking extemporaneously of course. — Merkwurdichliebe
The demand to know what you are doing is not. — Wayfarer
I guess others might hate on philosophy because it's just difficult or insufficiently directly practical? — g0d
'Life is about creating yourself' (Bob Dylan). That's one nice frame. Existence is a character building exercise. That's another. Existence is a roller coster ride. As I see it, these are explanations of the world or existence but cognitive approaches. Why is life about creating yourself? Or transcending your small self? Or collecting gold coins? Or becoming famous? — g0d
My point is particular. I've tried to sketch why I think it is impossible on principle to explain the world as a whole. This is not at all to say that particular metaphors or myths aren't extremely valuable. It matters very much how we frame the world or existence. — g0d
as in the naturalist landscape, there is no 'up', there's nothing corresponding to the vertical axis along which something can be judged 'higher' in that sense. That seems to me to be what has dropped out of the modern discourse. — Wayfarer
Hi, I've always wanted to talk to g0d. — Merkwurdichliebe
The fact that philosophy is very difficult, in a very peculiar way, might give the impression that it yields some very sufficient and directly practical results. — Merkwurdichliebe
criticisms by philosophers like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: that the "famous wise ones" were constructing these towering edifices, which however astoundingly breathtaking, had no application to life. — Merkwurdichliebe
There is a great contrast between systems philosophy, and philosophy of life. The former depends much more on scientific understanding, a coupling of hard evidence with hard logic. Ehile the latter is quasi-religious, refocusing all importance directly upon the individual's existence. — Merkwurdichliebe
Word on the street was that my return was still expected by a few here and there. — g0d
Naturalism is very much focussed on finding natural explanations for causal relationships - causes, effects, and causal patterns or laws. So, any form of transcendentalism, be that Christian, Platonist, or another variety, will always insist that such explanations must be limited or incomplete, by their very nature. — Wayfarer
You have always been in my heart, even when I sinned. :pray: — Merkwurdichliebe
Where do you put Popper in this scheme?
I'm not sure what you have in mind, but my initial prejudice is that your 'systems philosophy' sounds more like science than philosophy. I can imagine, however, that making sense of QM would be a good example of what I'm understanding by 'systems philosophy.' — g0d
Naturalism is very much focussed on finding natural explanations for causal relationships - causes, effects, and causal patterns or laws. — Wayfarer
I like Popper. He seems like an honest philosopher. From my general acquaintance to him, I would call him a systems philosopher. — Merkwurdichliebe
By "systems philosophy", I mean anything that tries to make sense of the world independent of my existence. The world is the focus, and I am only incidental. What I have to say has little importance, what matters is what can be said that can pass through an immense amount of scrutiny unharmed, and again, it does not matter one lick whether I can actually say it or not. — Merkwurdichliebe
So, yeah, things should pass through intense scrutiny.
But this scrutiny takes different forms. Monkey see, monkey sometimes do. The system in question is not necessarily proved or refuted within language (logically). I suggest that we sometimes adopt what we see as a option, give it a try, and then keep, abandon, or transform it. Agreeing with Popper, I'd say that creativity is at the heart of science and philosophy. So the result is a fire-tested poetry, and that fire can be life as much as logic. — g0d
So 'the world sucks' or 'the world is golden' may be informative about the speaker but that's about it. — g0d
I am serious about my mind/personality and body (actually a unity of course.) — g0d
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