The physical processes involved in bringing about the seeing of colour are well understood. — Janus

No, again this would be like watching a movie, and concluding from correlations found within the movie that the physical processes involved in bringing about colors in the movie are well understood. That's the category error. What we experience with our usual senses is always the movie, we don't have access to the TV with these senses.

Why should we expect to have a physicalist explanation of something that cannot be objectified or measured? — Janus

Indeed, so then the problem is when physicalists claim that their models take into account the whole of reality, while their models cannot explain the very fact that we experience. They view the world as made of entities that behave according to laws, but they cannot explain how anything in that world can experience anything at all, why a human being has experiences but not a rock. This to me points to the idea that physicalism is a fundamentally flawed paradigm. But for some reason they usually don't seem to see this as an issue, in their view the motion of stars in a galaxy is something that requires an explanation, but not the fact that a human being has experiences.

What is the deeper 'why' that you mention? — g0d

It is just a how, how is it that physical entities that make up our body can give rise to experiences. It is not a why in the sense why is there something rather than nothing. If we claim that we are made of physical entities, then we ought to explain how these give rise to experiences, and if we can't then there is something missing in the idea that we are made of physical entities, as it isn't an idea that fits the very fact that we experience.

Otherwise we could just claim that the Sun is made of angels, and say that we can't explain it, but it's ok because it doesn't require an explanation!

What we experience with our usual senses is always the movie, we don't have access to the TV with these senses. — leo

What kind of "access" do you expect? How could we have any kind of access that wouldn't be dismissed by you as not being "real" access insofar as being "merely experiential"?

Indeed, so then the problem is when physicalists claim that their models take into account the whole of reality, while their models cannot explain the very fact that we experience. — leo

Some physicalists may believe that some day we will be able to explain in physical terms the fact that we experience. I can't see how it would ever be possible, since any such explanation would have to objectify the very aspect of experience which cannot be objectified. But I allow that this may (although I highly doubt it) be merely a limitation due to our current level of understanding the nature of the physical.

The problem doesn't exist only in relation to the human. Animal behavior and biological evolution, for example, cannot be explained in terms of physics; physics is simply a different level of explanation than anything beyond chemistry, and even there, the emergent properties of elements and compounds and how they interact with other elements and compounds is not exhaustively explainable in a purely physics context.

What kind of "access" do you expect? How could we have any kind of access that wouldn't be dismissed as being "merely experiential"? — Janus

If we stop assuming that our senses give us access to some reality "out there" independent of us then we don't have to deal with this conundrum. All would be experience, but we wouldn't claim that these experiences give us access to some objective reality, rather they would represent our subjective reality, and we could attempt to discuss it with others and find commonalities and differences between our subjective realities. Instead of forcing our different subjective realities to fit into one believed objective reality. And then maybe we would come to realizations that we couldn't hope to have in a physicalist paradigm.

In general terms, here’s how the scientific method works. First, we set aside aspects of human experience on which we can’t always agree, such as how things look or taste or feel. Second, using mathematics and logic, we construct abstract, formal models that we treat as stable objects of public consensus. Third, we intervene in the course of events by isolating and controlling things that we can perceive and manipulate. Fourth, we use these abstract models and concrete interventions to calculate future events. Fifth, we check these predicted events against our perceptions. An essential ingredient of this whole process is technology: machines – our equipment – that standardise these procedures, amplify our powers of perception, and allow us to control phenomena to our own ends.

The Blind Spot arises when we start to believe that this method gives us access to unvarnished reality. But experience is present at every step. Scientific models must be pulled out from observations, often mediated by our complex scientific equipment. They are idealisations, not actual things in the world. Galileo’s model of a frictionless plane, for example; the Bohr model of the atom with a small, dense nucleus with electrons circling around it in quantised orbits like planets around a sun; evolutionary models of isolated populations – all of these exist in the scientist’s mind, not in nature. They are abstract mental representations, not mind-independent entities. Their power comes from the fact that they’re useful for helping to make testable predictions. But these, too, never take us outside experience, for they require specific kinds of perceptions performed by highly trained observers. — From the essay

Exactly, and what kind of "depth" should we expect over and above our usual physical explanations? Do we have any actual intellectual justification for asking for such "explanations"? — Janus

I'm glad that you also see the issue. I must say, though, that for me it felt natural to come upon this question. It's like climbing the causal nexus for more general principles to (one hopes) some kind of first principle that truly satisfies and then realizing that there 'cannot' be such a first principle.

So the 'why' is a 'cry,' a kind of birdsong. Is it our glory to unveil this pseudo-question? In some ways it allows us to see the whole as a whole from the inside, and yet we have to grasp the whole as a whole in order to see the futility of the 'question.'

Personally I prefer to entertain what is deeper in the way of feeling without making incoherent demands for rational explanations of it (given that documented attempts to do that never seem to stand up to scrutiny). — Janus

I can relate to this. The rose is without reason. Yet we depend on careful reasoning to maintain our garden. Depth of feeling is 'why' we bother, what we strive toward.

Anyway, I think we agree that the demand for a certain kind of explanation is incoherent. I do think it's a high altitude thought that only comes perhaps from trying to articulate it as a genuine question.

Thanks for clarifying
.

If we claim that we are made of physical entities, then we ought to explain how these give rise to experiences, and if we can't then there is something missing in the idea that we are made of physical entities, as it isn't an idea that fits the very fact that we experience. — leo

Just to clarify my position, I'm a skeptic when it comes to the metaphysical interpretation of 'physical entities.' I just posted some quotes from On Certainty in another thread that pretty much capture and indeed influenced my attitude.

It is just a how, how is it that physical entities that make up our body can give rise to experiences. It is not a why in the sense why is there something rather than nothing. — leo

Are the issues not related though? How does gravity work? If you name some particles, then how do they work? In some cases we have intuitive pictures. I see that. In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff suggests our embodiment as the source of the literal as opposed to the metaphorical. If 'control is up,' then what is up? It has a bodily meaning for us. We move our heads in a certain direction.

As far as how someone could explain how experience/mind is related to the physical, would it not be some vaguely intuitive analogy and a function relationship? Between words and readings on measuring devices? My current thinking on the matter largely evolved from trying to think what kind of an answer could possibly satisfy me. Beyond a kind of bodily intuitive understanding, we seem to have analogy and quantitative functional relationships.

A separate issue is whether an everyday distinction between mind and matter can ever be stretched into some stable, detailed theory.

I can relate to this. — g0d

gOd of many faces, right? ;-)

the demand for a certain kind of explanation is incoherent. — g0d

The demand to know what you are doing is not.

If we stop assuming that our senses give us access to some reality "out there" independent of us then we don't have to deal with this conundrum. — leo

But then we cannot explain how it is that we all experience the same world of things, given that our experience tells us that our minds are not directly connected at all.

and yet we have to grasp the whole as a whole in order to see the futility of the 'question.' — g0d

I'm not too sure about this; I mean firstly I'm not too sure we even can "grasp the whole". Certainly not if you mean rationally or discursively grasp it, and what other kind of grasping is there? We can 'get a feel' for the whole, but that is, per what I said before, a matter of feeling, not intellect. I guess it depends on what you mean by "the whole", though!

I think we become convinced that the question cannot be answered once we grasp the difference between the "space of reasons" and the "space of causes" to invoke Wilfrid Sellars. Explanations in terms of reasons, which are ultimately explications (not explanations, mind!) of motivations or volitions, and hence functions of feeling, are appropriate in one domain, and explanations in terms of causes are appropriate in the other. To ask for explanations of natural phenomena in terms of reasons is a category error, just as to ask for explanations of human (and even animal) volitions and behavior in terms of causes is also a category error. Perhaps grasping that is what you mean by "grasping the whole", and if so, then we would seem to be in agreement.

I mean firstly I'm not too sure we even can "grasp the whole". Certainly not if you mean rationally or discursively grasp it, and what other kind of grasping is there? — Janus

I understand your hesitation. All I meant was something mundane. I simply mean considering all of reality as one thing. Sometimes people use 'the world' this way. Of course we can never know everything about the world, but we can think of it 'as' a world.

From this point of view explanations are IMV relationships between intraworldly entities. The world itself is just there. Any god or principle that would explain the world is part of that same world as I intend it.

Grasping this (at least for me) only sharpens the world as a sort of closed system brute fact. But it's wildly open 'on the inside.' I realize this may just be my idiosyncratic perspective. I have found things in certain philosophers that were along these lines, but it's hard to be sure on such a slippery issue.

I think we become convinced that the question cannot be answered once we grasp the difference between the "space of reasons" and the "space of causes" to invoke Wilfrid Sellars. Explanations in terms of reasons, which are ultimately explications (not explanations, mind!) of motivations or volitions, and hence functions of feeling, are appropriate in one domain, and explanations in terms of causes are appropriate in the other. — Janus

OK, that's helpful. I'd say that theme is a big part of my view but (just to clarify) maybe not the center. For me the question was revealed as I wrestled with religious issues long, long ago and discovered or came to believe that theology was a kind of mechanics.

God has a face. God speaks. God gives reasons. For this reason people are often satisfied with the idea of a human-like creator. But I wanted to know then (when I still believed enough to care) why God made the world as he did (and condemned most people to eternal torment.) I wanted to understand the nature of God. If this was obscure to me, then I was left with brute fact. If I could understand the nature of god, then I'd 'be' god, except trapped in this little dog without the omnipotence. But even God can't explain why there is a world, if he is imagined to be human-like. (I'm not a believer. This is just how the situation was first framed for me back then.)

Attaching a face to a first principle puts questioning to sleep. Our familiarity with human reason-giving obscures that the personality of the first principle is now the brute fact. It wins us over in an animal way. But the question isn't answered. Nor is it revealed as a pseudo-question, since it is paired with a pseudo-answer. It's when a person imagines the structure of any possible answer ...and sees that that structure is incapable of scratching the itch...that the question is finally revealed as a lyrical cry.

Attaching a face to a first principle puts questioning to sleep. It's familiar. It wins us over in an animal way. But the question isn't answered. Nor is it revealed as a pseudo-question, since it is paired with a pseudo-answer. It's when a person imagines the stucture of any possible answer and sees that that structure is incapable of scratching the itch. — g0d

This is a great description of philosophy. To me it sounds like a lot of fun. I don't get why some people get so hostile and uptight about it, speaking extemporaneously of course.

You two are bound to hit it off. :wink:

But then we cannot explain how it is that we all experience the same world of things, given that our experience tells us that our minds are not directly connected at all. — Janus

We don't experience the same world, there are a lot of similarities and a lot of differences. There are obvious differences in the way we feel, in what we think, what we imagine, what we dream, what we want, what we believe, but there are also differences in the way we perceive the so-called objective things (there are blind people, deaf people, people who perceive things that others don't), there are so-called optical illusions that appear differently to different people, we might say we're looking at the same 'thing' and yet what we see is different (such as what we see when we look at a cloud). We tend to assume that we're all experiencing the same world, but when we don't assume that and instead share and discuss what we experience we find a lot of differences.

Depending on what we want what we perceive appears differently too, a tree may be seen as a source of life, you may focus on its shape and colors and see it as a living being, feel its leaves, see the life that lives on it, or you may see it as a tool, as wood to cut to build a house or sell to someone. We experience such a different world that I find it hard to stick to the idea that we can somehow describe an objective world from which stems all that. What we call the objective world is a very limited description of some of the perceptions that people seem to share.

And then we don't really allow others to express what they experience. We teach kids in school that the world is objective, we tell them how the world is, we force them to interpret their experiences in terms of that objective reality. If some of what they experience doesn't fit that objective reality that they are forced to accept, they dismiss these experiences, or they make them fit clunkily, or if they refuse to accept the reality they are taught then they are labeled as delusional, what they experience is not valid if it doesn't fit a widespread belief of what the world really is. We force one another to believe that there is one objective reality, we are involved in constructing that objective reality.

There is the fact that we can shape the realities of others, through speech, through what we do, we can shape the beliefs of one another, and beliefs shape the world we experience, so our minds are connected in some way.

This is a great description of philosophy. To me it sounds like a lot of fun. I don't get why some people get so hostile and uptight about it, speaking extemporaneously of course. — Merkwurdichliebe

Hi. Yes it is fun. For me it was at first the result of some anguished, serious thinking about God and the justice (or injustice) of human existence. But eventually it became a beautiful kind of thinking that went for the depths.

In the other thread I was dismissive of a certain kind of philosophy, but I do that 'in the name of' moving on to this kind of issue. I think we already know how to speak and listen. The 'problem' is usually one of 'will' or character. We fail to understand X because we are emotionally closed off and/or haven't had a similar experience and not because we lack a theory of language.

I guess others might hate on philosophy because it's just difficult or insufficiently directly practical?

The demand to know what you are doing is not. — Wayfarer

Just for context, I'm pro-philosophy and anti-scientism.

My point is particular. I've tried to sketch why I think it is impossible on principle to explain the world as a whole. This is not at all to say that particular metaphors or myths aren't extremely valuable. It matters very much how we frame the world or existence.

'Life is about creating yourself' (Bob Dylan). That's one nice frame. Existence is a character building exercise. That's another. Existence is a roller coster ride. As I see it, these are explanations of the world or existence but cognitive approaches. Why is life about creating yourself? Or transcending your small self? Or collecting gold coins? Or becoming famous?

Hi, I've always wanted to talk to g0d. :cheer:

I guess others might hate on philosophy because it's just difficult or insufficiently directly practical? — g0d

I think that hit the nail on the head. It seems, any difficult task we humans perform tends to be for the purpose of obtaining some sufficient result, the more direct and practical the better.

The fact that philosophy is very difficult, in a very peculiar way, might give the impression that it yields some very sufficient and directly practical results. Yet, this isn't necessarily the case with most philosophy, as was one of the main criticisms by philosophers like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: that the "famous wise ones" were constructing these towering edifices, which however astoundingly breathtaking, had no application to life. One analogy: it's like building an enormous skyscraper for all to marvel at, yet which cannot be entered, all the while, living in a shack next door.

Nevertheless for me, it is like you say, it is a beautiful type of thinking that goes for depths. In other words, I like to look at the skyscrapers from my shack, and talk about them with philosophically talented individuals.

'Life is about creating yourself' (Bob Dylan). That's one nice frame. Existence is a character building exercise. That's another. Existence is a roller coster ride. As I see it, these are explanations of the world or existence but cognitive approaches. Why is life about creating yourself? Or transcending your small self? Or collecting gold coins? Or becoming famous? — g0d

There is a great contrast between systems philosophy, and philosophy of life. The former depends much more upon scientific understanding, a coupling of hard evidence with hard logic. While the latter is quasi-religious, refocusing all importance directly upon the individual's existence.

My point is particular. I've tried to sketch why I think it is impossible on principle to explain the world as a whole. This is not at all to say that particular metaphors or myths aren't extremely valuable. It matters very much how we frame the world or existence. — g0d

Naturalism is very much focussed on finding natural explanations for causal relationships - causes, effects, and causal patterns or laws. So, any form of transcendentalism, be that Christian, Platonist, or another variety, will always insist that such explanations must be limited or incomplete, by their very nature. (A way of glossing it, is that naturalism presumes the Universe contains its own ground or explanation, whereas transcendentalism does not.) Of course, the response to that is generally along the lines, 'oh well, you mean "God did it" ' - which means that theism, as an explanatory framework, terminates all search for explanations in acceptance of dogma, 'I believe'.

My view is that this dichotomy or dilemma between 'science and religion' is very much a construct of modern European history; that it's possible to arrive at an understanding of the transcendent that is not simply a matter of reciting a creedal statement. That's what my reading of philosophy is aimed at.

So naturalism, and natural sciences, are concerned with what can be explained. (Notice the reflexive hostility of such an attitude to what can't be explained. In other words, anything that seems outside the bounds of the scientifically-informed worldview, it's like, 'well that's just woo'. 'Woo' is a modern descriptor for practically all of what used to be considered the subject matter of metaphysics. You can use it like one of those handy kitchen fire-blankets.) But anyway, the polemical point I am working towards is that while naturalism is concerned with what can be explained, metaphysics is concerned with what explains us. It is 'upstream', prior, anterior, or something like that. Which of course is just the kind of thing it seems to me that the Lakoff and Johnston account of if wishes to deflate, as in the naturalist landscape, there is no 'up', there's nothing corresponding to the vertical axis along which something can be judged 'higher' in that sense. That seems to me to be what has dropped out of the modern discourse. Actually I have been tracing a pretty exact and compelling historical narrative for how, when, and why this occurred.

(Next three days, I am delivering a training course out of town, participation here will be sporadic.)

“We never encounter physical reality outside of our observations of it.” AF, MG and ET

I have experience reality and I have made observations of this reality. When we engage in discussions about this reality we can point to objects and understand such concepts. However, in the quote above, have we not used the word “outside” and stretched its meaning beyond recognition?

Son, “Daddy I went into the woods and this animal that had big claws....”

Dad, “Son, you had encountered a wolf”

Son “Dad, like me clarify what you said, I observed a wolf like object, but I never encountered the actual wolf”

Language goes on a Holiday.

I encountered things in this world, I learned the word “encounter” by interacting with things in this world. I learned how to use this word “outside” in this world, by observing things in this world.

Try to leave out the language learned from the “observable” world and see if “un-observable” world can be articulated. This language game may have a very different feel.

as in the naturalist landscape, there is no 'up', there's nothing corresponding to the vertical axis along which something can be judged 'higher' in that sense. That seems to me to be what has dropped out of the modern discourse. — Wayfarer

This can also be framed in the context of the qualitative-quantitative dichotomy. The modern approach has married itself to quantitative understanding, only operating along the horizontal line. One might say such an approach is very one dimensional. But I'm sure everything I've said here will be refuted by calling it "woo".

Hi, I've always wanted to talk to g0d. — Merkwurdichliebe

Word on the street was that my return was still expected by a few here and there.

The fact that philosophy is very difficult, in a very peculiar way, might give the impression that it yields some very sufficient and directly practical results. — Merkwurdichliebe

Right. And in a way it has, through its 'child' science anyway. And with science there was a shift from anthropomorphic explanation toward quantitative description ---from 'why' an object fell (it 'wants' the ground, etc.) to how it fell (its position as a function of time.)

criticisms by philosophers like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: that the "famous wise ones" were constructing these towering edifices, which however astoundingly breathtaking, had no application to life. — Merkwurdichliebe

From my point of view the towers were given false foundations. Their actual foundations were in the blood of the culture. Proofs of god are like 'mechanical' supports of a metaphorical framing that don't bear the weight of the structure. Kierkegaard liked to pick on Hegel, and some of Hegel is indeed exhausting. Yet the spirit of Hegel's system is pretty clear (a grandiose humanism and/or 'religion' of progress). Perhaps he offered a certain kind of personality the illusion of a proof that their gut-level attitudes. So while I relate to what you say, I think the central metaphors are applied (in the great wise ones who still had a vision of the world) and it's just that some of their justifications for their attitudes/metaphors were bogus.

There is a great contrast between systems philosophy, and philosophy of life. The former depends much more on scientific understanding, a coupling of hard evidence with hard logic. Ehile the latter is quasi-religious, refocusing all importance directly upon the individual's existence. — Merkwurdichliebe

That makes sense to me. I guess I've mostly looked into the classic 'vision of existence' philosophers. Where do you put Popper in this scheme?

I'm not sure what you have in mind, but my initial prejudice is that your 'systems philosophy' sounds more like science than philosophy. I can imagine, however, that making sense of QM would be a good example of what I'm understanding by 'systems philosophy.'

Word on the street was that my return was still expected by a few here and there. — g0d

You have always been in my heart, even when I sinned. :pray:

The point was not that our experiences are exactly the same, but that we perceive the same objects and that it can easily be shown that we can all agree about precise qualities and features of those objects. I can only imagine two possible explanations; one is that the objects are mind-independent and the other is that our minds are all connected together in some unknown way. If you can think of another explanation then have at it.

Naturalism is very much focussed on finding natural explanations for causal relationships - causes, effects, and causal patterns or laws. So, any form of transcendentalism, be that Christian, Platonist, or another variety, will always insist that such explanations must be limited or incomplete, by their very nature. — Wayfarer

I hear you, but I'm not sure that you are addressing my particular concern. Can the world as whole (which would include any god or principle) be explained? How do we avoid either infinite regress or brute fact at the apex ?

I'm not anti-religious. It is true that I understand religion in terms of myth and metaphor, but I also understand myth and metaphor to be central to human cognition and feeling. I did believe in God in the traditional way in my youth, and I vague remember the world and the secretes of my mind being watched by their creator. Now I'm grimmer and freer. I can forgive mortality largely by identifying with those who will replace me and those that I replaced. The same secrets (myths, metaphors, concepts, images, music) are revealed again and again. We are born in confusion and (if we're lucky) learn to stand free and tall. For a little while. And this 'for a little while' chases us away from our pettiness and vanity.

I understand that some will not be satisfied with this, because it means that the whole drama happens 'within' humanity --that our deities are forged in our own imaginations to fulfill our hearts' desires. Maybe our experiences as individuals are just that different.

You have always been in my heart, even when I sinned. :pray: — Merkwurdichliebe

Thank you, son of Adam. I only invented sin to urge my mini-me creations to think as I do (to feel less lonely up here.) I can't remember why I created this world, but I don't regret it.

Where do you put Popper in this scheme?

I'm not sure what you have in mind, but my initial prejudice is that your 'systems philosophy' sounds more like science than philosophy. I can imagine, however, that making sense of QM would be a good example of what I'm understanding by 'systems philosophy.' — g0d

I like Popper. He seems like an honest philosopher. From my general acquaintance to him, I would call him a systems philosopher.

By "systems philosophy", I mean anything that tries to make sense of the world independent of my existence. The world is the focus, and I am only incidental. What I have to say has little importance, what matters is what can be said that can pass through an immense amount of scrutiny unharmed, and again, it does not matter one lick whether I can actually say it or not.

Naturalism is very much focussed on finding natural explanations for causal relationships - causes, effects, and causal patterns or laws. — Wayfarer

Naturalism is focused on finding natural explanations for natural phenomena, Can you provide even one example of a supernatural explanation for any natural phenomenon that stand up to reasonable scrutiny, that we would have any reason at all to accept as true? Can anyone else on here think of any?

I like Popper. He seems like an honest philosopher. From my general acquaintance to him, I would call him a systems philosopher. — Merkwurdichliebe

Thanks. I like Popper too. I like his character and style.

By "systems philosophy", I mean anything that tries to make sense of the world independent of my existence. The world is the focus, and I am only incidental. What I have to say has little importance, what matters is what can be said that can pass through an immense amount of scrutiny unharmed, and again, it does not matter one lick whether I can actually say it or not. — Merkwurdichliebe

OK. I can totally relate to this. Yes! My mere opinion is...who cares? Serious thinking is aimed at what is good for us. Or what is true. So 'the world sucks' or 'the world is golden' may be informative about the speaker but that's about it. Any child can say how things should be. I'm interested in how things are. [To be real, we also like to project our choices as the right choice. 'One ought to be like me' is sewed into our lining it seems.]

I'm very much in agreement with 'what I have to say is of little importance.' That's my gripe about sloppy relativism. People who aren't just goofing around are trying to reveal reality, what is the case. It's the deep structure of communication, this revelation of what is the case. Philosophers are to truth candidates as health nuts like me are to their diet. I don't want to believe everything I hear or eat whatever is put in front of me. I am serious about my mental/physical health. So, yeah, things should pass through intense scrutiny.

But this scrutiny takes different forms. Monkey see, monkey sometimes do. The system in question is not necessarily proved or refuted within language (logically). I suggest that we sometimes adopt what we see as a option, give it a try, and then keep, abandon, or transform it. Agreeing with Popper, I'd say that creativity is at the heart of science and philosophy. So the result is a fire-tested poetry, and that fire can be life as much as logic.

So, yeah, things should pass through intense scrutiny.

But this scrutiny takes different forms. Monkey see, monkey sometimes do. The system in question is not necessarily proved or refuted within language (logically). I suggest that we sometimes adopt what we see as a option, give it a try, and then keep, abandon, or transform it. Agreeing with Popper, I'd say that creativity is at the heart of science and philosophy. So the result is a fire-tested poetry, and that fire can be life as much as logic. — g0d

This is a nice prescription for how philosophy should be practiced. One reason I also like Popper is that his system doesn't seem to elbow out the individual as incidental.

So 'the world sucks' or 'the world is golden' may be informative about the speaker but that's about it. — g0d

Systems philosophy loses the individual in its vast speculation.

This is where we can see the contrast with the philosophy of life. Life philosophy doesn't care about whether or not the speaker's opinions have any relevance to the world. It cares about the speaker himself, and what importance such opinions as: 'the world sucks' or 'the world is golden', have for the speaker himself.

For example you write:

I am serious about my mind/personality and body (actually a unity of course.) — g0d

This has very little relevance to the physical or logical structure of the world, or any philosophical explanation. But for you, in your life, it has great importance.

Life philosophy essentially turns you back upon yourself, and forces you to examine and reflect upon your own life/existence. I might argue that the more exposure one has to the traditions of philosophy, the better the self examination.