...there can exist a morality in breaking, and presumably a greater morality in breaking than not breaking, does not make the immorality of breaking disappear. — tim wood

Ahh, so on your basis, either way, the law always involves morality.

Otherwise, your formulation of not immoral because illegal seems self-contradictory. — tim wood

Based on your intertwining of morality and legality, it seems it would be self-contradictory.

Ahh, so on your basis, either way, the law always involves morality. — THX1138

Yes. Always and absolutely. The Nazis have been thrown up here as a counter-example, but the fact is that they're an excellent example. Morality with respect of law is never not in question.

I should have worded the formulation differently.

A something not immoral (or moral, irrelevant of morality, in other words) when said something happens to be illegal.

But, seems that in your mindset, legal concerns are all founded on moral building blocks. No absence of morality in legality.

...And, to add, that morality is always "right" by nature, that there can be two moralities (two "rights") that seem to contradict but that impression would perhaps just be subjectively superficial? Or is that formulation also self-contradictory, maybe even nonsensical?

...And, to add, that morality is always "right" by nature, that there can be two moralities (two "rights") that seem to contradict but that impression would perhaps just be subjectively superficial? Or is that formulation also self-contradictory, maybe even nonsensical? — THX1138

Moreover on this, it can even be argued in your way of thinking that even if something considered moral that happens to result from an action not executed with moral intention (like infidelity from someone in an arranged marriage that produces genuine romantic love) should still be subject to penalty due to the nature in which it was done.

A something not immoral (or moral, irrelevant of morality, in other words) when said something happens to be illegal. — THX1138

In other words, illegal, but moral because it's illegal? I don't see how that can be. Maybe you mean moral if it were not illegal. And to that, probably. In the US it's illegal to drive on the left. Were it not illegal then I do not suppose it would be immoral to drive on the left.

No absence of morality in legality. — THX1138

Yes.

...And, to add, that morality is always "right" by nature, that there can be two moralities (two "rights") that seem to contradict but that impression would perhaps just be subjectively superficial? Or is that formulation also self-contradictory, maybe even nonsensical? — THX1138

Indeed sensible. Kant's solution was that if duties (i.e., possible actions) conflict, then you need to think some more until your'e satisfied you have a rule under which one governs. With that, the other (duty to act) falls away (in that context). Actually the Kant is not quite so simple, here, but then he never is.

It's nonsense to say that a foundational preference could be based on reason, as it would be an attempt to overcome the is/ought problem.

How do you propose you'd have a foundational preference that has something to do with reason? What would be an example?

Are you suggesting that categorically there are none? That's how I'm reading you - no duties at all. Question: assuming you drive, do you drive on the correct side of the road? Why, exactly (assuming you do)? — tim wood

It makes sense to say that there are duties a la things that are legally enforced, for example. But if that's what you're saying, then (a) obviously there are no duties to use particular grammar, which was his example, and (b) even if there were, obviously he was saying that he disagrees with the notion of that.

(a) obviously there are no duties to use particular grammar, which was his example, and (b) even if there were, obviously he was saying that he disagrees with the notion of that. — Terrapin Station

Aiee! You can't read! The quote about grammar is this:

I have no more "duty" to obey the law than I have a "duty" to use proper grammar. — ZhouBoTong

To be sure, I inferred that he means he has no "real" duty to use proper grammar, and thus no duty to obey the law. Could be he meant he does indeed have a duty to use proper grammar, and thus a duty to obey the law. I should have checked.

It's nonsense to say that a foundational preference could be based on reason, as it would be an attempt to overcome the is/ought problem.

How do you propose you'd have a foundational preference that has something to do with reason? What would be an example? — Terrapin Station

The "is-ought" problem was resolved long ago. For a current resolution, see Mortimer Adler. Language - broadly defined - through memory mediates experience, and reason underpins language. That is, reason is always there. Arguably there in the experience itself, but I am not prepared to argue that. But you might care to try a self-analysis of what you do when you accidentally touch something hot and burn yourself.

The "is-ought" problem was resolved long ago. For a current resolution, see Mortimer Adler. Language - broadly defined - through memory mediates experience, and reason underpins language. That is, reason is always there. Arguably there in the experience itself, but I am not prepared to argue that. But you might care to try a self-analysis of what you do when you accidentally touch something hot and burn yourself. — tim wood

Huh???

First, what was Adler's supposed resolution? If I read it in the past, I don't recall it.

Yes, as to illegality. As to harm, I'm agnostic on marijuana. . . etc — tim wood

It seems that we are introducing a new variable into the original question - namely that the immorality of drug taking depends on the level of self harm it might inflict on a person (along with any collateral damage to society).

You seem to be saying that occasional recreational marijuana use appears to be non-harmful and thus it is morally OK to consume marijuana - provided you do so in a place where it is legal.

However - and please correct me if I'm misrepresenting you - you appear to be saying that it is immoral to consume certain drugs even if they are legal.

E.g., in your viewpoint is it immoral to consume heroin in a country where it is legal - say Portugal?

The way - his, Adler's, modern expression of the way; I do not for a moment think he discovered it; he made no claim of discovery - from an is to an ought was through a hypothetical.

Most briefly, if you want X (if X is something to be that isn't), And Y is the way to get it, then you ought to do Y.

In, if memory serves, The Time of our Lives, the Ethics of Common Sense. Because he represents his book as a re-expression of Nichomachean Ethics, I presume the argument to be not original with Adler.

1) You seem to be saying that occasional recreational marijuana use appears to be non-harmful and thus it is morally OK to consume marijuana - provided you do so in a place where it is legal.

2) However - and please correct me if I'm misrepresenting you - you appear to be saying that it is immoral to consume certain drugs even if they are legal.

3) E.g., in your viewpoint is it immoral to consume heroin in a country where it is legal - say Portugal? — EricH

1) I won't argue against.

2) Yes. As someone else points out, morality and legality are different animals. Assuming certain drugs are harmful, then taking them must be immoral, else doing harm is not immoral.

3) Relying on 2), yes.

Most briefly, if you want X (if X is something to be that isn't), And Y is the way to get it, then you ought to do Y. — tim wood

Hence why I said foundational. "If you want x" would be the foundation. You can't get to that from an is.

So it's not even addressing the claim I made.

"If you want x" would be the foundation. You can't get to that from an is. — Terrapin Station

No? I've had grape juice. I like grape juice. I want grape juice. (Fermented, these many years.) This, per you, is foundational. This is the is-ness. Are you arguing I cannot get to an ought? If I want wine I should - ought to - go to the store and buy some.

Or in the case of vitamins. It is the case that vitamins are good for me, I should want them; I should get them, & etc.

But you wrote:

It's nonsense to say that a foundational preference could be based on reason, as it would be an attempt to overcome the is/ought problem.
How do you propose you'd have a foundational preference that has something to do with reason? What would be an example? — Terrapin Station

And I wrote:

Language - broadly defined - through memory mediates experience, and reason underpins language. That is, reason is always there. Arguably there in the experience itself, but I am not prepared to argue that. But you might care to try a self-analysis of what you do when you accidentally touch something hot and burn yourself. — tim wood

And this you have ignored.

No? I've had grape juice. I like grape juice. I want grape juice. (Fermented, these many years.) This, per you, is foundational. This is the is-ness. Are you arguing I cannot get to an ought? If I want wine I should - ought to - go to the store and buy some. — tim wood

From a fact to a value statement. "Ought" is a type of value statement. As is "I like grape juice" and "I want grape juice."

Saying that something is the "is/ought problem" is a way of mentioning that you can't derive any value statement from an objective fact.

Saying that something is the "is/ought problem" is a way of mentioning that you can't derive any value statement from an objective fact. — Terrapin Station

Did you not read about the vitamins? It's right there above. A vitamin is good for you. You ought to take one.

Vitamin A, and other vitamins have an effect on your body. It's up to each individual whether they value that effect or not. There's no objective fact that the effect it has is more valuable than the effects of not having vitamins, or that you should value the effects or anything like that.

Question: assuming you drive, do you drive on the correct side of the road? Why, exactly (assuming you do)? — tim wood

So I don't die. So I don't kill anyone. So I don't get hurt or hurt anyone. Because I don't want to get a ticket. Which of those defines my driving on the right side of the road as a duty? They all sound like "desire for intended consequence", which, although my philosophy knowledge sucks, I think Kant used as a counter/opposite for duty.

Oh, and what was the answer to this:

Your view destroys (in a Kantian sense) law.
— tim wood

And yet we (he) still go to jail if we break the law. So what was destroyed? — ZhouBoTong

In my mind, all that is destroyed is the sense of duty. The law is still 100% intact.

Vitamin A, and other vitamins have an effect on your body. It's up to each individual whether they value that effect or not. There's no objective fact that the effect it has is more valuable than the effects of not having vitamins, or that you should value the effects or anything like that. — Terrapin Station

I think you're just going to have to man up and admit that in your thinking there is no such thing as a fact. That at least would be consistent with your remark on vitamins Still nonsense, but consistent. Otherwise it's inconsistent nonsense, and I think that's worse.

So I don't... hurt anyone. — ZhouBoTong

Why do you care? Sounds like duty to me. You have a duty to others to act so that they are not hurt by your actions if you can help it.

Why is it a duty? Because by accepting it as a duty you can expect others to accept some reasonable version of that duty to you. One aspect of law is to mediate that expectation and clarify its applications and limitations. if you deny that obligation of duty, then you cannot with reason expect anyone else to act in accordance with a duty you reject. This isn't Kantian or Christian or anything else other then plain common sense and understanding of what passes these days for a social contract.

Your view destroys (in a Kantian sense) law.
— tim wood
And yet we (he) still go to jail if we break the law. So what was destroyed?
— ZhouBoTong — ZhouBoTong

Going to jail is a possible consequence of breaking some laws, not the law itself. You do not seem to grasp that as a member of the communities you belong to (whether you choose to belong or want to belong irrelevant), you are those each of those communities writ small; and those are your laws, also writ small. If you choose to break a law and imagine you're making some statement by breaking it against someone or something, then unless you have your moral ducks in row, your FU is against yourself. And even if your ducks are all nice and orderly, even so your act is against yourself. That's the heart of immorality. In this latter case you claim a greater moral reward - justification - than the one you pay.

@tim wood
I'd like to go back to our earlier conversation about exceeding the speed limit. If I followed you correctly you said (or at least implied) that speeding was not immoral because people typically do not deliberately speed, it's more of an unconscious decision - likely you are going along with the flow of traffic.

To be moral is to accept being a member of a community, many communities. It is to accept the obligation to the other, as they accept a similar obligation to you. — tim wood

Ahh, so on your basis, either way, the law always involves morality. — THX1138
Yes. Always and absolutely. — tim wood

But given that the laws are collectively decided upon by the community, when you speed you are violating the collective decision that exceeding the speed limit is dangerous not only to yourself but to other fellow citizens on the road. Is it as dangerous as taking heroin? I don't have an answer to that - and in any case it's irrelevant. The community has made the decision that speeding is illegal, and you must accept that obligation. And there is clearly no moral obligation requiring you to speed under normal circumstances.

So it seems to me that if you want to be consistent in your approach, then you must conclude that exceeding the speed limit is immoral.

I think you're just going to have to man up and admit that in your thinking there is no such thing as a fact. — tim wood

I said, "Vitamin A, and other vitamins have an effect on your body." That's a(n objective) fact. What's not a(n objective) fact is whether the effect is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, something we ought to pursue or not, etc.

What's not a(n objective) fact is whether the effect is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, something we ought to pursue or not, etc. — Terrapin Station

I used to suffer occasional vertigo, the kind where you hold on to the floor and don't move because you're afraid you'll fall off. Or as an actress noted, when you feel like you'll die and are afraid you won't - forty year's worth. And in addition to the vertigo itself there is a feeling you get that maybe it's coming on. By accident I took a daily iron supplement. Guess what: all symptoms gone. I had been suffering the effects of an iron deficiency, then and now cured by taking a daily vitamin with iron. Now there's no question as to the fact. If you question whether vertigo is good or bad there is a very simple and harmless experiment doctors do that you can do: make yourself comfortable lying on your back on your bed and inject a little bit of warm water into one ear and a bit of cold, or cool, water in the other, and hold the water in for half a minute or so - then you can let it drain. If done correctly, you should be able to recognize some effects - all harmless and transitory - if none try it again. I would appreciate your reporting back the results of the experiment.

As to good or bad effects, what do you think medical research is all about? Is there a question in your mind as to whether polio and a life in an iron long is a good or a bad thing, worth trying to cure or not? Stop being stupid! Go perform the experiment.

The idea isn't at all that people do not judge things to be good or bad, preferable or not, recommendable or not, etc. Obviously we do.

Rather, the world outside of people does not judge things to be good or bad, preferable or not, recommendable or not. Those judgments are something that brains do. They're not something that rocks, the atmosphere, a music CD, a vitamin A pill, etc. do.

Those judgments are something that brains do. They're not something that rocks, the atmosphere, a music CD, a vitamin A pill, etc. do. — Terrapin Station

Please indicate where this subject arose. I do not believe it's a part of this thread.

Why do you care? Sounds like duty to me. — tim wood

sounds like semantics to me.

Because by accepting it as a duty you can expect others to accept some reasonable version of that duty to you. — tim wood

I don't accept it as duty, nor expect others to. Hence the need for laws.

Please indicate where this subject arose. I do not believe it's a part of this thread. — tim wood

It's what's at dispute if we're disputing whether value judgments can be objective.

If the law is immoral, — Terrapin Station

Who decides? — tim wood

We do, individually and collectively.

It's what's at dispute if we're disputing whether value judgments can be objective. — Terrapin Station

Value judgements are not objective, by definition. A value judgement is a subjective judgement.