Do you buy that there are different sorts of necessity, such as metaphysical necessity?
This is a Kit Fine paper I've linked to before:
https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/fine/Fine-Kit-necessity.pdf — Terrapin Station
Have I made a logical error, and if so, where? — CurlyHairedCobbler
One obvious question is whether there are any actual objects to which this this applies. Take your example of the Euclidean triangle - it can be demonstrated by a physical drawing, which is an object, but the principle itself can't be said to be 'an object' in any sense but the metaphorical, can it? — Wayfarer
Other logical principles and laws and 'arithmetical primitives' (foundational concepts in arithmetic which cannot be further defined) are likewise not objects in any sense other than the metaphorical. They can be applied to objects, insofar as the attributes of the objects in question can be made to conform to them, which is fundamental to modern scientific method. — Wayfarer
That's the sense in which an a priori truth is a necessary truth, is it not? And that also is assumed by modern scientific method, which seeks mathematical certainty in respect of those matters it investigates. — Wayfarer
So the point of all the above is that 'necessity' in this sense, is a logical, not an empirical, matter. Bearing this in mind, caution is required when we talk of 'objects' and 'beings' in this context, as it is not altogether clear that what we are discussing is an objective matter. — Wayfarer
While it is still an open dispute in the philosophy of mathematics, ontological realists argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects. This is not a metaphor at all. There are very good reasons to think that abstract objects do exist. Mathematical objects would exist necessarily. — Kornelius
There is nothing deductively certain in the sciences. Scientific knowledge is falsifiable, and thus not certain. Only formalized theories that follow struct deductive reasoning like mathematics or logic can claim certainty. — Kornelius
1) A necessary being is one whose existence depends upon nothing outside itself. 2a) Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being, because a necessary being cannot come into existence, 2b) since it necessarily always and forever exists. — Janus
How does 2b follow from 1? As to 1, it's non-contingency granted, still, how does that imply existence? — tim wood
Patronizing mode. Aren't you familiar with my background?
At any rate, so you're not using "necessary" in the general philosophical sense where we it's conceivable to say that the morning star and evening star might be metaphysically necessary?
And in the limited sense in which you're using the term, Jesus was not physical? — Terrapin Station
It has nothing to do with being "patronizing" — Janus
Also, what relevance is the question about the physicality of Jesus? — Janus
The relevance is that you gave nonphysicality as a criterion for metaphysical necessity. You wrote "Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being," So that means that if Jesus was a physical being, he can't be a necessary being. — Terrapin Station
What you should be looking at instead is arguments about identity/identification a la rigid designators. Personally I think a lot of rigid designator analysis is a mess, but at least it has to do with what you're asking about. See, for example, section 1.1 here ("Names, Ordinary Descriptions, and Identity Statements"): https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/#NamOrdDesIdeSta — Terrapin Station
This is interesting. I think (1) and (2) are uncontroversial.
However, there seems to be an issue with the claim "Jesus is necessarily God". This says something different. Namely, the necessity operator, here, applied to an identity. When I say that God exists necessarily, what would follow is that if Jesus is God, then Jesus exists necessarily.
I think it is a further step in reasoning to speak of Jesus being necessarily identical to God. That is, if God is a necessary being, then God exists in every possible world. Should Jesus be God, then Jesus is identical with God in every possible world. So, yes, necessarily Jesus is God. Again, however, I am not sure that this is a controversial claim. It seems controversial, but claims of the sort would apply to any necessarily existing being. — Kornelius
Thank you for that article, it definitely answered my question. — CurlyHairedCobbler
Glad it helped even if Janus is arguing that it has nothing to do with what you were asking. — Terrapin Station
According to the logic of necessary being there would be no such thing as a being which is "only physical" in any case. — Janus
As to the more recent question, i.e., on the status of 'necessity'. A necessary being is a being that exists in every possible world. That is, a world in which such a being did not exist is not logically possible, i.e., it would be inconceivable.
Given that this is the nature of necessity, the person who wishes to argue for the necessary existence of a being has a daunting task ahead of them. — Kornelius
It's patronizing to assume that someone isn't familiar with something. — Terrapin Station
What's the point of this question? — Janus
What you have been saying seems to indicate that you are not familiar with Scholastic and Spinozistic thought. If you are familiar with those, then I can't understand why you would say the things you have been saying, and asking the questions you have been asking. — Janus
Yeah, well if you really were familiar with Spinoza i particular you would understand that that meant something like "insofar as being is thought of as physical it could not be thought of as necessary". — Janus
Because (a) I have necessarily have to take the initial post in the thread to only be asking under the rubric of someone else's thought, (b) I have to believe that the texts in question (re scholasticism etc.) are coherent, not at all confused, etc., and (c) I have to read your comments so that no matter what you actually write, they have to be passable under (b)? — Terrapin Station
What would be excluded as potentially being necessary in that case? (So that you'd point out that "Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being"?) — Terrapin Station
if Jesus was a physical being (not merely physical of course, as that's categorically ruled out per your comments), he couldn't be a necessary being. — Terrapin Station
But I responded to your talk about "identification" by pointing out that it is irrelevant to the logic — Janus
Consider a number - say 7. In what sense is that 'an object'? 'Well, there it is', you might say, pointing to it - but what you're pointing at is a symbol. Furthermore that symbol could be encoded in any number of media, written in a variety of scripts, - 'seven', VII, 00000111, and so on. But the referent, what the symbol '7' signifies, is always the same. And that's what I'm saying is not 'an object'; it's more like a constituent, than an object, of thought. — Wayfarer
As regards objectivity - I'm inclined to say that arithmetical proofs, and so on, are also likewise 'objectively true' only by way of metaphor. The point about an arithmetical proof is that it is logically compelling - again, the means by which we determine its veracity are purely internal to the nature of thought, they're not 'objective' in the strict sense of 'pertaining to an object or collection of objects'. In fact we often appeal to mathematics to determine what is objectively true; there's a sense in which mathematical reasoning is "prior" to empirical validation, in that the mathematics provide a reference to determine what is objectively happening. — Wayfarer
This way of thinking about necessary being really has little to do with the Scholastic or Spinozistic conceptions of necessary being. For one thing, for Spinoza, a necessary being must be infinite, because it must be independent of all contingent being. This means that it can be limited by nothing and nothing is "outside" it. Everything finite must ultimately be dependent upon it for its existence. It also follows form this logical that there cannot be more than one necessary being.
The idea that a necessary being is a being which must exist in all worlds is really not the same. It is rather the opposite from the Scholastic perspective; a necessary being is a being which all worlds must exist — Janus
Let's grant the initial premise for the sake of conversation:If you take as a given that God is a necessary being, does it follow that the Christian belief that Jesus is identical with God is either necessarily true or necessarily false? My reasoning here is that it follows from "God is a necessary being" that:
1. If something is identical with God, then it is a necessary being
2. If something is not a necessary being, then it is impossible for it to be identical with God.
According to this reasoning, it seems like either Jesus is necessarily God, or it is impossible for Jesus to be God (given the premise that God is a necessary being). A third possibility is that my reasoning here is faulty. My questions are as follows:
1. Have I made a logical error, and if so, where?
2. If I have not made a logical error, how would I set about determining whether the necessary truth is "Jesus is God" or "Jesus is not God?" — CurlyHairedCobbler
My apologies if this other conception of necessity was being deployed. I know very little of it. I was using the contemporary idea of necessity (as it is understood in current metaphysics and logic).
Was this a historical discussion? — Kornelius
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.