Do you buy that there are different sorts of necessity, such as metaphysical necessity?

This is a Kit Fine paper I've linked to before:
https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/fine/Fine-Kit-necessity.pdf — Terrapin Station

thanks! Looks very much on point, will find time to read it.

//interestingly, I've encountered work by his daughter, Cordellia Fine.//

Have I made a logical error, and if so, where? — CurlyHairedCobbler

I'm sure there will be many other opinions expressed here, but mine is this. Your mistake is to apply logic and reason to a being whose existence is not accompanied by evidence. I.e. the sort of evidence that scientists would consider valid and useful. Lacking evidence, your use of reason and logic stops at the first hurdle: without evidence, you cannot proceed; The End.

One obvious question is whether there are any actual objects to which this this applies. Take your example of the Euclidean triangle - it can be demonstrated by a physical drawing, which is an object, but the principle itself can't be said to be 'an object' in any sense but the metaphorical, can it? — Wayfarer

(Thanks for the reply!)

Of course it can. While it is still an open dispute in the philosophy of mathematics, ontological realists argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects. This is not a metaphor at all. There are very good reasons to think that abstract objects do exist. Mathematical objects would exist necessarily.

Other logical principles and laws and 'arithmetical primitives' (foundational concepts in arithmetic which cannot be further defined) are likewise not objects in any sense other than the metaphorical. They can be applied to objects, insofar as the attributes of the objects in question can be made to conform to them, which is fundamental to modern scientific method. — Wayfarer

Treating mathematical objects as mere metaphor is not a very easy position to defend. One would have a difficult time reconstructing mathematics from this starting point. I am not saying things are obvious here at all, but you are too quick to settle on this position.

Moreover, mathematical objects and structures are typically not constructed/invented/discovered (I want this proposition to be philosophically neutral) for science. Quite the opposite is true: the application of mathematics is typically after the fact, and the vast abstract structures of mathematics are not necessary for science at all. Science requires a very small, strict subset of the mathematical structures and objects we already know about.

That's the sense in which an a priori truth is a necessary truth, is it not? And that also is assumed by modern scientific method, which seeks mathematical certainty in respect of those matters it investigates. — Wayfarer

I agree with the first sentence: if there are such things as a priori truths, then yes they would most certainly be necessary truths.

I disagree with the second sentence: science is successful precisely because it does not demand that scientific knowledge meet deductive standards (standards which are held in mathematics, philosophy/logic or the formal sciences more broadly). There is nothing deductively certain in the sciences. Scientific knowledge is falsifiable, and thus not certain. Only formalized theories that follow struct deductive reasoning like mathematics or logic can claim certainty.

This makes sense, as no scientific proposition is a logically necessary one. All scientific propositions, if true, are only contingently true. And even if contingently true, we cannot be certain of their truth. At best, we can only be highly confident that the proposition is true.

So the point of all the above is that 'necessity' in this sense, is a logical, not an empirical, matter. Bearing this in mind, caution is required when we talk of 'objects' and 'beings' in this context, as it is not altogether clear that what we are discussing is an objective matter. — Wayfarer

Of course necessity is a logical matter. But this does not preclude the possibility of necessarily existant objects and beings at all.

I also do not understand what you mean by "discussing an objective matter". Logic is entirely objective. In fact, logic and mathematics are not only objective, they are deductive. We can be certain of the truths of logic and mathematics in a way we cannot about empirical propositions.

There is nothing senseless about the proposition "God is a necessary being". It could very well be true, as it could very well be false (on the assumption that the word "God" has a sense, i.e. is meaningful -- but that is a separate matter).

In fact, I would say that I am fairly certain about the following proposition (on the commonly understood meaning of 'God'): "If God exists, then God necessarily exists". The proposition "God exists" is still not established, however.

Moreover, it seems to me that you want to have a very constrained interpretation of the word "objective". Objectivity has only to do with truth-values. That is, a proposition is objective if it is true or false, whether or now we know whether it is true or false. A proposition that isn't objective is one that does not have a determinate truth-value.

We should not take disagreement as a sign of subjectivity. We can disagree about objective propositions (we all do!). We should also not think that empirical propositions are the only set of objective propositions. This is not true at all. Not only are logical and mathematical propositions clearly objective, I would extend the category of objective propositions to any set of propositions where reasons can be brought to bear. I would certainly include ethics in this account. Aesthetics most likely (though I know nothing about aesthetics). Propositions that would be excluded, for example, would be propositions of personal taste, for example. "I like this movie", "this hamburger tastes awful, yuck!", etc. I think (hope) this all makes sense? Let me know what you think.

That being said, I think that most of the disagreement and issues encountered in this thread turns on a mistake about what we think is actually being said in the OP. What is being said is not controversial at all. It is acceptable to all theists, atheists and agnostics.

While it is still an open dispute in the philosophy of mathematics, ontological realists argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects. This is not a metaphor at all. There are very good reasons to think that abstract objects do exist. Mathematical objects would exist necessarily. — Kornelius

I'm not saying numbers are metaphors, I'm saying the use of the word 'object' is a metaphor! I myself am a strong (and practically lone) advocate for mathematical realism on this forum. But there's a very important philosophical principle at stake.

Consider a number - say 7. In what sense is that 'an object'? 'Well, there it is', you might say, pointing to it - but what you're pointing at is a symbol. Furthermore that symbol could be encoded in any number of media, written in a variety of scripts, - 'seven', VII, 00000111, and so on. But the referent, what the symbol '7' signifies, is always the same. And that's what I'm saying is not 'an object'; it's more like a constituent, than an object, of thought.

As regards objectivity - I'm inclined to say that arithmetical proofs, and so on, are also likewise 'objectively true' only by way of metaphor. The point about an arithmetical proof is that it is logically compelling - again, the means by which we determine its veracity are purely internal to the nature of thought, they're not 'objective' in the strict sense of 'pertaining to an object or collection of objects'. In fact we often appeal to mathematics to determine what is objectively true; there's a sense in which mathematical reasoning is "prior" to empirical validation, in that the mathematics provide a reference to determine what is objectively happening.

So I'm bringing out the role that is accorded to 'objectivity' because I think that attitude is distinctively modern and part of our culture's implicitly naturalistic outlook.

There is nothing deductively certain in the sciences. Scientific knowledge is falsifiable, and thus not certain. Only formalized theories that follow struct deductive reasoning like mathematics or logic can claim certainty. — Kornelius

That's rather outside of scope for this thread (my fault!) but a very interesting question. Personally, I think the reason that physics is regarded as paradigmatic for science, is precisely because mathematical physics provides the clearest correlation between mathematical, a priori certainty and physical outcomes. Recall the many astounding predictions of modern physics, often not confirmed for decades afterwards, until the instrumentation catches up with the mathematically-derived prediction. How many times have we seen the headline "Einstein proved right again!"? There was another one recently. Einstein himself said that "the most incomprehensible thing about the Universe is that it is comprehensible". I agree that it's a deep question, but again it's a philosophical question, not a scientific one. And I think a clue to why it's "incomprehensible" is that it's something for which there isn't a naturalistic explanation (for which, see this paragraph.)

1) A necessary being is one whose existence depends upon nothing outside itself. 2a) Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being, because a necessary being cannot come into existence, 2b) since it necessarily always and forever exists. — Janus

How does 2b follow from 1? As to 1, it's non-contingency granted, still, how does that imply existence?

My take on "necessary being" is simply a question about the meaning, in this context, of "necessary."

It must seem that if the being is necessary, then the being exists. If the being does not exist, then for necessity to be in play, it must pre-exist the being.

If for anything to be, there must first be a necessary being, then absent that being there cannot be necessity (obviously). This is all an apparent paradox, or at least a tangle. But for some things that already exist, it seems reasonable that among them - as a set - are things, elements, that are necessary, as number for counting, for example. And 2a would seem to rule out life. Where did life come from if it did not "come into existence"?

A start to disentangling is to consider whether in the Universe there is any "must be, from necessity." And the mouth on that rabbit-hole is large enough for multitudes - indeed, has already consumed many.

How does 2b follow from 1? As to 1, it's non-contingency granted, still, how does that imply existence? — tim wood

If a being does not exist then it cannot be necessary, because since its being depends on nothing outside itself it must exist or fail the criteria.

This is just a matter of definition: of the logic of what is meant by "necessary". Think about it another way: a necessary being has necessary being, which just is to say that it necessarily exists. So it must always have existed and must always continue to exist, since nothing outside itself can affect it.

None of this is to suggest we must agree with the Ontological Argument. We are only thinking about what the notion of a necessary being logically entails, and this says nothing about whether there really is a necessary being.

Patronizing mode. Aren't you familiar with my background?

At any rate, so you're not using "necessary" in the general philosophical sense where we it's conceivable to say that the morning star and evening star might be metaphysically necessary?

And in the limited sense in which you're using the term, Jesus was not physical? — Terrapin Station

It has nothing to do with being "patronizing"; I have no idea about your "background". If you are familiar with Spinoza and Aquinas, then why are citing, as you seem to be, an argument about reference from philosophy of language, an argument, that is, from a totally different context?

Also, what relevance is the question about the physicality of Jesus? Nothing you say here has any bearing whatsoever on what I have been saying about the logic of necessity; but then that doesn't surprise me in the least.

It has nothing to do with being "patronizing" — Janus

It's patronizing to assume that someone isn't familiar with something.

I've mentioned my background here many times. But okay.

Re why I'm referencing the rigid designation stuff, I explained that already. I don't agree that God being "necessary" has anything to do with whether "Jesus is God" is a necessary proposition.

Also, what relevance is the question about the physicality of Jesus? — Janus

The relevance is that you gave nonphysicality as a criterion for metaphysical necessity. You wrote "Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being," So that means that if Jesus was a physical being, he can't be a necessary being.

The relevance is that you gave nonphysicality as a criterion for metaphysical necessity. You wrote "Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being," So that means that if Jesus was a physical being, he can't be a necessary being. — Terrapin Station

Obviously to say that Jesus is God is to say that Jesus is not merely a physical being. If you were familiar with Spinoza you would know that for him God is a necessary being and that the physical and mental are not substances (God is the sole substance) but attributes or modes.

For Spinoza nature just is God; which means that nature is necessary. Nature for Spinoza is not substantially physical but rather physicality is merely one of its modes. In Christian theology the person Jesus is a unique manifestation of the Christ, which is one "arm" of the trinity which God is.

Okay, so you meant, "Obviously no physical being that's only a physical being could be a necessary being"?

What you should be looking at instead is arguments about identity/identification a la rigid designators. Personally I think a lot of rigid designator analysis is a mess, but at least it has to do with what you're asking about. See, for example, section 1.1 here ("Names, Ordinary Descriptions, and Identity Statements"): https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/#NamOrdDesIdeSta — Terrapin Station

Thank you for that article, it definitely answered my question. It seems that if A and B are two names for the same thing, then A is necessarily identical with B. A and B need not be names for God for this to be the case. If my real name is Casey Gettier, then it's necessarily true that "Curly Haired Cobbler is Casey Gettier," because they are names for the same being. If it's not, then it's necessarily false. In this case, it is necessarily false, because I don't want to give my real name out, and also because Casey Gettier is an obvious pun.

This also seems to mean that just because something is necessarily true, that doesn't mean that all truths about it can be discovered a priori, with no empirical knowledge.

This is interesting. I think (1) and (2) are uncontroversial.

However, there seems to be an issue with the claim "Jesus is necessarily God". This says something different. Namely, the necessity operator, here, applied to an identity. When I say that God exists necessarily, what would follow is that if Jesus is God, then Jesus exists necessarily.

I think it is a further step in reasoning to speak of Jesus being necessarily identical to God. That is, if God is a necessary being, then God exists in every possible world. Should Jesus be God, then Jesus is identical with God in every possible world. So, yes, necessarily Jesus is God. Again, however, I am not sure that this is a controversial claim. It seems controversial, but claims of the sort would apply to any necessarily existing being. — Kornelius

Good point. Some philosophers have stipulated that numbers are necessary beings. If this is the case, then the number two is necessary, it is necessarily identical with some things (the square root of 4, 1+1, 3-1), and it is necessarily not identical with some other things (the number 100, 1-1, 3+1). But there are also things that the number two is identical with contingently, such as "the meaning of the Spanish word dos" or "the number represented by the symbol 2." One could imagine a possible world in which Arabic numerals had never been adopted, or Spanish had developed differently such that dos meant something else. If the meaning of the Spanish word dos is the number two, then the meaning of the Spanish word dos is a necessary being. That doesn't mean that the number two is necessarily the meaning of the Spanish word dos, because, again, Spanish could have developed differently.

Thank you for that article, it definitely answered my question. — CurlyHairedCobbler

Glad it helped even if Janus is arguing that it has nothing to do with what you were asking.

According to the logic of necessary being there would be no such thing as a being which is "only physical" in any case. This is because contingent being (the physical) can only be a mode or attribute of necessary being; so the attribute of physicality could not exhaust its nature.

Glad it helped even if Janus is arguing that it has nothing to do with what you were asking. — Terrapin Station

You're dreaming: I haven't made any mention of the article.

According to the logic of necessary being there would be no such thing as a being which is "only physical" in any case. — Janus

So then why bring up whether Jesus is merely physical. Physical things are not merely physical in this context--that would be understood without needing to specify it. So was Jesus physical?

As to the more recent question, i.e., on the status of 'necessity'. A necessary being is a being that exists in every possible world. That is, a world in which such a being did not exist is not logically possible, i.e., it would be inconceivable.

Given that this is the nature of necessity, the person who wishes to argue for the necessary existence of a being has a daunting task ahead of them. — Kornelius

This way of thinking about necessary being really has little to do with the Scholastic or Spinozistic conceptions of necessary being. For one thing, for Spinoza, a necessary being must be infinite, because it must be independent of all contingent being. This means that it can be limited by nothing and nothing is "outside" it. Everything finite must ultimately be dependent upon it for its existence. It also follows form this logical that there cannot be more than one necessary being.

The idea that a necessary being is a being which must exist in all worlds is really not the same. It is rather the opposite from the Scholastic perspective; a necessary being is a being which all worlds must exist within.

What's the point of this question? Obviously Jesus is supposed to have been a person, and as such would be thought to be physical insofar as persons are thought to be physical.

Nothing you have said has anything to do with what I understand to be the scholastic logic of necessity as I outlined it. (I'm happy for the outline to be corrected by anyone who knows more about the subject than I do, by the way).

The logic is the logic; it's about how we can coherently and consistently think about it and it doesn't matter whether there actually is a necessary being; which seems to be what you want to, inappropriately, argue about.

It's patronizing to assume that someone isn't familiar with something. — Terrapin Station

What you have been saying seems to indicate that you are not familiar with Scholastic and Spinozistic thought. If you are familiar with those, then I can't understand why you would say the things you have been saying, and asking the questions you have been asking.

What's the point of this question? — Janus

The point is that you wrote "Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being," so if Jesus was a physical being (not merely physical of course, as that's categorically ruled out per your comments), he couldn't be a necessary being.

Otherwise we need to revise "Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being"

What you have been saying seems to indicate that you are not familiar with Scholastic and Spinozistic thought. If you are familiar with those, then I can't understand why you would say the things you have been saying, and asking the questions you have been asking. — Janus

Because (a) I have necessarily have to take the initial post in the thread to only be asking under the rubric of someone else's thought, (b) I have to believe that the texts in question (re scholasticism etc.) are coherent, not at all confused, etc., and (c) I have to read your comments so that no matter what you actually write, they have to be passable under (b)?

Yeah, well if you really were familiar with Spinoza in particular you would understand that that meant something like "insofar as being is thought of as physical it could not be thought of as necessary".

Your objection seems obtuse, in any case, because I said in my original outline "IF Jesus is God", and since it is obvious that Jesus as person is thought of as being finite and God is thought as being infinite, then the very idea of Jesus being God must entail thinking of Jesus as something more than a merely finite being.

Yeah, well if you really were familiar with Spinoza i particular you would understand that that meant something like "insofar as being is thought of as physical it could not be thought of as necessary". — Janus

What would be excluded as potentially being necessary in that case? (So that you'd point out that "Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being"?)

Because (a) I have necessarily have to take the initial post in the thread to only be asking under the rubric of someone else's thought, (b) I have to believe that the texts in question (re scholasticism etc.) are coherent, not at all confused, etc., and (c) I have to read your comments so that no matter what you actually write, they have to be passable under (b)? — Terrapin Station

I have no clear idea what you are asking.
You seem to be asking whether you need to respond to the OP "under the rubric of someone else's thought"? Well, no, obviously. But I responded to your talk about "identification" by pointing out that it is irrelevant to the logic and if you want to respond to that then obviously it should be under the rubric of that logic, at least, even if you want to show that it is inconsistent; which you haven't attempted to do.

If you think, that is, that "texts in question" (I haven't cited any specific texts but I take you to be referring to Scholastic texts in general and Spinoza's texts) are "incoherent" or "confused" then you should provide some citations and show just how you think they are confused or incoherent. I doubt you will attempt to do that, since you have not even attempted to show how the outline I presented is confused or incoherent.

What would be excluded as potentially being necessary in that case? (So that you'd point out that "Obviously no physical being could be a necessary being"?) — Terrapin Station

Under the scholastic conception of necessary being, anything that depends for its existence on anything else, which obviously all physical beings do, could not be a necessary being.

If a being does not exist then it cannot be necessary, because since its being depends on nothing outside itself it must exist or fail the criteria. — Janus

This confuses the necessary being with the necessity of the being. Two different animals. Which? (Or both?)

if Jesus was a physical being (not merely physical of course, as that's categorically ruled out per your comments), he couldn't be a necessary being. — Terrapin Station

I think as a point of mainstream Christian doctrine, Jesus Christ is said to be both fully human and fully divine. That is called the 'hypostatic union'. To say that he is a partially divine, and partially human, is a dualist heresy (of which Nestorianism is an example.)

Here's mine.
Everything is a God, Including us, anything, etc.
What i'm trying to say is God is indeed Exist, so exist that it safe to say it can be us and can be everything. God is not a being since being itself is 'exist/presence' and God is more like a 'Something' thats not present but also present and it sticks to everything. So how matter you point everything in this universe you always point at a God.

But I responded to your talk about "identification" by pointing out that it is irrelevant to the logic — Janus

That's wrong, though. Even when we're talking about necessity in the context of Spinoza, say.

Consider a number - say 7. In what sense is that 'an object'? 'Well, there it is', you might say, pointing to it - but what you're pointing at is a symbol. Furthermore that symbol could be encoded in any number of media, written in a variety of scripts, - 'seven', VII, 00000111, and so on. But the referent, what the symbol '7' signifies, is always the same. And that's what I'm saying is not 'an object'; it's more like a constituent, than an object, of thought. — Wayfarer

Thanks Wayfarer for your response!

Indeed, I would say that the symbol "7" refers to the object 7. I do not use the term "object" metaphorically at all. The semantics of arithmetical language certainly attributes to semantic value (an object) to these terms. How else would they figure into identity claims?

If they are not objects, we must explain arithmetical propositions in some other way. For example, $2+2=4$ is true, but what makes it true? What are the referents of each expression? The standard replay is that the semantic value of "+", "=" are relations/functions, and "2", "4" refer to objects. However, we could give a different semantics: one which takes more seriously the adjectival use of number expressions. Consider the sentence: "There are four chairs in the room" v.s. "The number of chairs in the room is four". In the first, "four" is an adjective, and maybe we treat "four" as a second-level concept (this has been tried, but the view has problems). The second sentence is a straight-forward objective use, so the term "four" is an object.

If we want to say that our number talk, whether in everyday language or in arithmetical language, is misleading, and that the true nature of our numerical expressions is that they refer to second level concepts, or perhaps to constituents of thought as you suggested, then we need to realize how difficult such views actually are to sustain.

Take your position: a numerical expression actually refers to a constituent of thought. This is problematic, since it cannot mean the constituent of my thought or your thought. This would violate the universality of mathematical propositions. Then you might mean it is the constituent of some Thought, with a capital T, but what would that mean exactly? I am not sure this view doesn't also have pretty thought metaphysical and epistemological assumptions we're being asked to swallow.

As regards objectivity - I'm inclined to say that arithmetical proofs, and so on, are also likewise 'objectively true' only by way of metaphor. The point about an arithmetical proof is that it is logically compelling - again, the means by which we determine its veracity are purely internal to the nature of thought, they're not 'objective' in the strict sense of 'pertaining to an object or collection of objects'. In fact we often appeal to mathematics to determine what is objectively true; there's a sense in which mathematical reasoning is "prior" to empirical validation, in that the mathematics provide a reference to determine what is objectively happening. — Wayfarer

Even if we determine the veracity of logical and mathematical propositions by reason alone, this doesn't make these propositions any less objectively true. I think you are trying to redefine objectivity to suit a particular position, i.e., it must "pertain to objects" and you are refusing to admit that mathematical propositions involve objects. Even if they don't involve objects, there is no way mathematical propositions are not objective. They are paramount objectively true propositions.

Here is a view, let me know what you think. Objective propositions are propositions that are truth-evaluable. They do not have to refer to objects at all. This is has to be a mistake. If I say "the use of the copula in English is to ...." or "the word "English" starts with the letter "E"", then I I am using objective propositions. They can be determinately true or determinately false, but they do not seem to "involve objects" in the way that you are describing. The same would be true of many propositions that do not involve objects.

This way of thinking about necessary being really has little to do with the Scholastic or Spinozistic conceptions of necessary being. For one thing, for Spinoza, a necessary being must be infinite, because it must be independent of all contingent being. This means that it can be limited by nothing and nothing is "outside" it. Everything finite must ultimately be dependent upon it for its existence. It also follows form this logical that there cannot be more than one necessary being.

The idea that a necessary being is a being which must exist in all worlds is really not the same. It is rather the opposite from the Scholastic perspective; a necessary being is a being which all worlds must exist — Janus

My apologies if this other conception of necessity was being deployed. I know very little of it. I was using the contemporary idea of necessity (as it is understood in current metaphysics and logic).

Was this a historical discussion?

If you take as a given that God is a necessary being, does it follow that the Christian belief that Jesus is identical with God is either necessarily true or necessarily false? My reasoning here is that it follows from "God is a necessary being" that:

1. If something is identical with God, then it is a necessary being
2. If something is not a necessary being, then it is impossible for it to be identical with God.

According to this reasoning, it seems like either Jesus is necessarily God, or it is impossible for Jesus to be God (given the premise that God is a necessary being). A third possibility is that my reasoning here is faulty. My questions are as follows:

1. Have I made a logical error, and if so, where?
2. If I have not made a logical error, how would I set about determining whether the necessary truth is "Jesus is God" or "Jesus is not God?" — CurlyHairedCobbler

Let's grant the initial premise for the sake of conversation:

Assume that "God is a necessary being" is a true statement. What does it tell us? What do we mean by the terms "God" and "being" in this sentence? What do we mean by the modifier "necessary" in such sentences?

What is a necessary being? What other kinds of being are there, that are not necessary beings? What other kinds of thing, apart from beings, may be necessary or not-necessary? How can we tell whether a being is necessary or not-necessary? How can we tell what counts as "a being"? How shall we resolve disputes that arise with respect to such matters?

You seem to suggest that, if there is such a thing as a necessary being, then there can only be one such thing, as any such thing must be identical to God. On what grounds do you make this claim?


Granting that "God is a necessary being" is a true statement, composed of terms as yet unaccounted for, you ask, does it follow that "the Christian belief that Jesus is identical with God" is either necessarily true or necessarily false?

What is "the Christian belief that Jesus is identical with God"? Is there only one such belief, or are there a wide range of such beliefs, perhaps not all compatible with each other, held by a wide range of believers who call themselves "Christian"? What are the various conceptions of "Jesus" according to the various sorts of Christian believer?

I expect some such believers are inclined to think of Jesus as a historical person, and to think of the relation between God and Christ as at least analogous to the relation between Brahman and Atman. I expect many of these believers would agree, further, that each of us, each sentient being, is an Offspring of God, though some individuals more than others "realize" or "awaken" to the harmony of all things, traditionally exemplified and idealized in legends of prophets and sages, like Jesus.

I might count myself sympathetic to that sort of theological discourse, without supposing the picture must conflict with principles of atheism or agnosticism.

It all depends on how we unpack the terms we've bundled together so far in this conversation.

My apologies if this other conception of necessity was being deployed. I know very little of it. I was using the contemporary idea of necessity (as it is understood in current metaphysics and logic).

Was this a historical discussion? — Kornelius

No, not a historical discussion. I took it that intended the question in the context of the traditional (Aristotelian, Scholastic, Spinozistic) understanding of 'necessary being' is all. If I was mistaken about this then @CurlyHairedCobbler will hopefully correct me.