I've been trying to avoid responding here beyond offering brief comments because time is precious for me at the moment. So I'll keep it as short as possible. — Janus
There are two senses of 'fact': facts as verbal statements and facts as ostensive ontological propositions or conceptions of states of affairs. States of affairs are propositional in the sense that they are always given, even prior to their expressions, in the form that 'such and such is the case'. The verbal propositional equivalent is just the expression of what is already recognized to be the case. The fact need not be expressed, but it is always already in propositional form by virtue of its recognition as fact nonetheless. — Janus
The sense of "fact" that I use (which isn't a novel sense, but that's not important), is simply that facts are states of affairs. A billion years ago, there were countless facts. There was no language, there were no propositions, etc.
The sense of "proposition" that I use (which again isn't novel), is that propositions are the meanings of statements.
So again, a billion years ago, there were no propositions, as there was no meaning, because there were no creatures of the sort that create meaning, yet there were plenty of facts. — Terrapin Station
If these are all to be called "facts", then what do we call the false ones? — creativesoul
You have a belief that the cat is on the mat, say. You have a belief that such and such is the state of affairs that obtains.
Truth, on the other hand, is a judgment about the relationship of the proposition "the cat is on the mat" to the fact (as you believe) that the cat is on the mat. — Terrapin Station
Facts are not propositional, they're not conceptions, they're not verbal statements. Facts are not in the form that "such and such is the case." — Terrapin Station
If these are all to be called "facts", then what do we call the false ones?
— creativesoul
Non-facts? — Janus
A more exact formulation for truth with respect to judgement might be: judgement is the necessary means to truth, and by association, the more exact formulation for truth with respect to cognition would be: cognition which conforms to its object is the necessary condition for truth. — Mww
...the more exact formulation for truth with respect to cognition would be: cognition which conforms to its object is the necessary condition for truth. — Mww
Trouble is, it's the fact that the cat is on the mat that makes "the cat is on the mat" true. — Banno
So, I would say that there were no facts, just as there were no truths or any determinate actuality, prior to the advent of humans. — Janus
A proposition will be true or false regardless of your or my judgement. — Banno
The very idea of a "state of affairs' is propositional; that affairs are in such and such a determinate state. Actuality, considered as the (human) mind-independent "in-itself" is indeterminate. It takes a sapient percipient to, in terms of some perspective or other, determine the indeterminate actuality as a factuality. — Janus
If judgment were necessary for truth — creativesoul
Sure. We can work with that. — Banno
Any analytic proposition is true in itself, without judgement related to it. “All bodies are extended”, “A = A” require no judgement whatsoever; — Mww
So the first problem is that there's no meaning aside from someone actively thinking in a meaning-oriented manner. — Terrapin Station
You're saying that meaning is thinking, propositions are the meaning of statements, so the meaning of a statement is a thought, not a state of affairs? — Banno
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