So was Augustine puzzled by the meaning of the word, or what time was?

So, thanks for the link. Will watch more and say more anon. — Baden

I've watched it twice now, only 20 mins long, it informs and delights. It's a Wow for me :cool:

The summary where he talks to his son about the data recordings, who shows amazing understanding. And then shares his son taking his first steps. He echoes what his son whispers.

I look forward to hearing what you and others think...about the video and how much it explains the development of language in socio-cultural terms. Feedback loop * Is there some other, better ? explanatory factor or approach ?

Edited to add:
* another aspect:

They found that children elicit more responses from adults by making speech-like sounds and parents were less responsive to non-speech sounds. The research has implications for understanding how language and social skills develop and why children with autism develop speech more slowly than their peers. — LENA Research Foundation

The researchers observed increased sensitivity by adults with more education to the sounds the children produced. This likely encourages faster speech development for children in families with a higher socioeconomic status.

https://integratedlistening.com/blog/2014/03/26/language-development-parent-child-feedback-loop/

Augustine was puzzled by time. But as I explicitly said when I invoked the example, I'm using the example in a different way than Augustine intended.

Just watched the full video and it is fucking awesome. More so for its implications for broader language acquisition and sociocultural research than any specific conclusions drawn, which the researcher didn't really get into. There's a very dark side to this too but that's probably for another discussion. I'll have to look the guy up for more details on how his work plays re language acquisition theory (thanks for the links) but the method jives well with the sociocultural approach.

Agree. Fascinating to watch but I kept having thoughts re ethics, even though privacy issues were taken into consideration. I was a bit uncomfortable.
Also, a bit frustrating as to not making any specific conclusions.

I edited my last post to include another piece of research re feedback loop.

What's this --- we are happy to strive to agree? In some instances we co-operate and truly do strive to agree, happily. But in other instances, like in the philosophy forum, we happily disagree. — Metaphysician Undercover

Happily? Only, I would say, in those lucky cases where we can agree about what we are disagreeing about (in my book, agree about what each of us were pointing the words at). Only then can we say: either, ok, it's a matter of opinion, we'll agree to disagree; or else, oh dear, one version must be wrong, but we'll allow both accounts to co-exist for now. But, in that case, only for now. I'm surprised you can't see the strife as striving for agreement? No one need assume that any eventual settlement must be congenial for all parties.

Hope you and T Clark don't mind if I butt in here, because it's relevant to the above...

Do you see a difference between knowing how a word was used, and the act of using a word? If you associate meaning with use, then I would say that knowing the meaning of a word is knowing how the word was used. This accounts for the fact that the same word has different meaning in different instances of use. Meaning is specific to the instance of use, and knowing its meaning is knowing how it was used in that particular instance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you associate meaning with use? (Or were you just interrogating T Clark on the point?) I certainly do associate the two. Equate them, even. But probably I see it/them quite differently to you. I see it as definitely not a matter of fact, but one we can reliably find agreement on in many cases (the clear ones). Like the case of a single grain of wheat not being a heap, snow not being black etc. I deny that you can (within the language) succeed in pointing the word heap at a single grain. Whereas, from what you say, I'm guessing you will accept any such attempt at use as inevitably counting as an instance of use of the word, however anomalous?

He chronicled the development of his son's speech. Time accelerated motion analysis from bud to blossom, if you like. But really from 'gaga' to 'water'. Real world. And mostly jargon-free.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=RE4ce4mexrU — Amity

That was really cool. That kind of data visualization though is everywhere right now. When you hear 'big data', that's what it involves. That kind of stuff is now the bread and butter of Facebook, Google and so on.

That was really cool. That kind of data visualization though is everywhere right now. When you hear 'big data', that's what it involves. That kind of stuff is now the bread and butter of Facebook, Google and so on — StreetlightX

Well, like I said, I thank Fooloso4 for introducing me to it. That was a first for me.
I did wonder how it would have progressed...
What's new in language development ?

Well, like I said, I thank Fooloso4 for introducing me to it. — Amity

I will gladly take credit if anyone approves, but if you don't then blame Amity.

I will gladly take credit if anyone approves, but if you don't then blame Amity. — Fooloso4

I am sure you have plenty more sparklers to magically whisk out of your top hat or psychedelic pants.
At a moment's notice. Just like that :sparkle:
But perhaps you are shy :joke:

I am sure you have plenty more sparklers to magically whisk out of your top hat or psychedelic pants. — Amity

I was taught not to magically whisk out what is in my pants at a moment's notice. Such things are frowned upon and can get you in a lot of trouble.

I was taught not to magically whisk out what is in my pants at a moment's notice. Such things are frowned upon and can get you in a lot of trouble. — Fooloso4

And here was me thinking you a contermacious rebel who would rise to the occasion. And delight.
Am now in such a major huff :meh: and sad :cry: and disappointed :confused:
Don't leave me this way :groan:

And here was me thinking you a contermacious rebel who would rise to the occasion. And delight. — Amity

There is no doubt I would rise to the occasion and delight, but I simply cannot function without my double entendres.

There is no doubt I would rise to the occasion and delight, but I simply cannot function without my double entendres. — Fooloso4

I Simply Can't Function Without My Sexy Emoticons !
:cool: :kiss: :love: :yum:

I'm surprised you can't see the strife as striving for agreement? No one need assume that any eventual settlement must be congenial for all parties. — bongo fury

I see no reason to conclude that this strife is a "striving for agreement". In some cases it may be, but in other cases not, so we cannot characterize it as such, with a general principle. I think it is often the case that one person is trying to get something from another, but what that person is trying to get is not necessarily agreement.

Do you associate meaning with use? (Or were you just interrogating T Clark on the point?) I certainly do associate the two. Equate them, even. — bongo fury

I do associate "use" with meaning, but I would not equate the two. I believe that meaning extends beyond use. We could consider the metaphysical distinction between "good" and "beauty". "Good" is associated with use, but "beauty" is something desired for no purpose, just for the sake of itself. So "a good" is desired, and called "good" for some purpose, use, and it is meaningful because it is useful for that purpose. But things of beauty are desired and are apprehended as meaningful, though not because they are useful for a purpose. That brings meaning more toward the desire, rather than the act which is intended to fulfill the desire (use). This is why I believe that "use" accounts for some aspects of meaning, but it doesn't account for the entirety of meaning.

As expected, very different views on "use". Thanks for the clarification.

There is no such thing as "use" in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular.

Thanks for the further clarification.

I'm guessing you can't mean "there is no such thing as 'using something' in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular"?

Rather, you are saying you oppose dignifying a narrower, technical sense of "use" whereby it means, more specifically, "using a word to refer to something" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use–mention_distinction)? You want instead to emphasise and keep in play the very general sense of "using something in some way"? Resist reducing linguistic "use" to the mere pointing of words at things?

Such a disagreement between us (where you resist what I embrace) is what I said I expected to be the case, yes. Do you agree this is the disagreement?

I'm guessing you can't mean "there is no such thing as 'using something' in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular"? — bongo fury

Actually this is exactly what I said, and what I meant.

Rather, you are saying you oppose dignifying a narrower, technical sense of "use" whereby it means, more specifically, "using a word to refer to something" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use–mention_distinction)? You want instead to emphasise and keep in play the very general sense of "using something in some way"? Resist reducing linguistic "use" to the mere pointing of words at things? — bongo fury

This is proceeding in the opposite direction of what I suggested. Each instance of use would be a particular act of referring to something, whether that something is a physical object, or a mental object like a type, a class, or category. Therefore "using something in some way" is excluded, as itself a mental object, a classification, which is not an act of use, it's a category.

Such a disagreement between us (where you resist what I embrace) is what I said I expected to be the case, yes. Do you agree this is the disagreement? — bongo fury

Do we have agreement then? The issue though, between us, was the relationship between meaning and use. You said you equate the two. I make "meaning" into a wider category than "use", such that all particular instances of "use" may be classified as meaningful, or having meaning, but not all instance of meaningful things are instances of use.

To explicate this, I brought in the distinction between "good" and "beauty". Instances of "use" necessarily relate to some "good". We use something for a purpose, and that purpose is the good which is expected to come from that use. But when we see beauty in something, such as a piece of art, there is meaning without use. The beautiful thing is meaningful, but not because it is useful. Therefore, meaning extends beyond "use" (good), into the category of beauty.

From this distinction we can produce two categories of "meaning", corresponding to two types of expression. We have expressions which are based in purpose, good, and use, as well as expressions which are based in art, creativity, and beauty. I would say that the two forms of meaning mix and intermingle. So in language for example, we find a mixture of purposeful use, and artful expression. Referring back to the op, we might ask what degree of artful expression is there in the child's statement, and what degree of use. I've noticed that children often enjoy saying unusual and creative things.

As expected, very different views on "use". Thanks for going over yours once more.

Anyway, I remain a fan of your previous diatribe against (other people's) unnecessary multiplication of types or categories of meaning.

How does the term 'function' function for our precocious three year old girl? Perhaps "function" means "I want it" and she is not going to give it up.
5 days ago — Fooloso4

That's the first thing that pooped into my mind, too. The young child probably meant "shit" by "function". Sub "pooh pooh" for "function" and it all makes sense all of a sudden.

OP makes sense to me. It feels right, looking back on my own memories growing up and also watching kids grow up into the world.

It seems like a certain emotional attunement comes first, and language is a means of entering as a 'player' (but there must be a better word) into a space crisscrossed by confusing emotional/social dynamics. Does this work? Am I doing it right? You test things out. It's not super unlike posting here, or elsewhere about philosophy. You bring something to 'canon' philosophy, you have all these feelings and ideas, and then you observe for a while, and then you test out certain things, to see if you get it. There's that old trope about the 'western canon' and how it's all one big conversation, which is exactly what it's like to be a child growing into a household, but the difference between learning a first language and trying consciously to learn a second.

That sticks like shit to a blanket!

There is no such thing as "use" in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are we willing going to go down the road that we can't use language to speak in the general sense? All word meanings are unique and particular?

Maybe I misunderstand, but if so, I can't help but think something has gone badly wrong. It's language's ability to generalize which is so very useful.

That sticks like shit to a blanket! — Janus

Metaphysical Undercover would probably dismiss yours as a "blanket statement". Remember, s/he is into undercover, not blankets.

bongo fury
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↪Metaphysician Undercover
As expected, very different views on "use". Thanks for the clarification. — bongo fury

If one of you is called Hugh, then the assertion "The difference is huge, of Hugh's views on use of "use"." would make perfect sense.

There is no such thing as "use" in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

I.e., there is no such thing as anything.

Are we willing going to go down the road that we can't use language to speak in the general sense? All word meanings are unique and particular? — Marchesk

No I wasn't really going down that road. Notice I spoke in a general sense, and I even used "use" in a general sense. Even so, don't you agree that each instance of use is unique and particular, having its own peculiarities, and no two instances are the same? If you agree, then don't you think that this itself is a meaningful fact? Or would you argue that this is a difference which doesn't make a difference? I would say the latter is contradiction.

Maybe I misunderstand, but if so, I can't help but think something has gone badly wrong. It's language's ability to generalize which is so very useful. — Marchesk

There is a very evident problem with the idea of generalizing, as bongo brought up, and that is the question of what is being referred to in the generalization. If we say that there is a category, a mental object, which is referred to, then we get lost in Platonism trying to validate such a reference. If we say that there is a "way of using" a word, then the generalization is intrinsic to this concept, "way of using". What would validate a "way of using", if not some faulty assumption that X (a particular instance of use) is the same as Y (a particular instance of use)? That there is a difference between X and Y, which doesn't make a difference, is contradiction because the very fact that it may be identified as a difference is an instance of making a difference. Therefore, contradiction is intrinsic to generalization. I believe it was C.S. Peirce who expounded on this incompatibility within the relationship between the fundamental laws of logic and generalization. For him, it manifests as vagueness.

I.e., there is no such thing as anything. — god must be atheist

Right, where can we start? To have any meaning, a symbol must be associated with a thing, correspondence. If there is no association there is no meaning, therefore the symbol is not a symbol and ought not be called a symbol. If the symbol may be associated with anything, then we have a very similar problem, the symbol might be called a symbol, but it may be associated with absolutely anything. What kind of symbol is that? Can we say that there is any meaning there? If we restrict the use of the symbol, then meaning is created, but it is not created by the use of the symbol, which is inherently free, it is created by the restrictions. Now we can dismiss the idea that there is necessarily a thing which is referred to by the symbol, because it is intrinsic to the nature of the symbol, that it could theoretically (potentially) refer to anything (and there is no such thing as anything), but its application has been restricted, and so it has meaning. The idea dismissed is Platonism, it assumes the restrictions as a thing, an idea. If the restrictions are not ideal, then we are left with the task of characterizing them. How could they exist?

I’m wondering how we can use language at all if every instance of using a word is unique. As you pointed out, even the word use is a generalization. Language is full of general terms used across instances.

As I said, I'm not denying the existence of generalizations, I'm just pointing out that the existence of such things is very hard to understand. A generalization, as a thing to be understood seems to defy logic. As indicated, they are based in contradiction.

To understand the situation, I suggest you start with what I would call the pure form of "meaning is use". In this case we begin with the assumption that every instance of use is unique, particular. We might say that the true and precise meaning of each word is given by the context of the situation. So in one instance "cup" would refer to a specific object in my kitchen, and in another, it would refer to an object in your kitchen. Do you see that the meaning of the word "cup" is different each time it is used to refer to a different object? When I sit in my kitchen and say "could you please get me my cup", it has a completely different meaning from when you sit in your kitchen and say that, because I am asking for a different object from you Here we have what I would call the pure form of meaning in which the word relates directly to an object without the use of generalization. Each instance of use is distinct from every other.

Contrast this with what others seem to say about "meaning is use". They would say that "use" refers to a "way of using" a word. In this case, there would be a way of using the word "cup", to refer to a certain type of object, such that the word has "a meaning" which corresponds not with the actual use of the word, but with the "way" of using the word. Notice the two generalizations inherent within "way of using", and within "type of object". So in this way of using "meaning is use", one generalization (way of using the word) is related to another generalization (type of object).

In the latter case, we have utilized generalizations to understand meaning. Now we must make a move to understand the nature of a generalization, or else we are not really understanding meaning at all. we would simply be describing meaning in terms of generalizations, without having a clue as to what a generalization is. What is the point of that? What do you think constitutes a "way of using"?