Let's compromise: snooty joke.

Let's compromise: snooty joke. — bongo fury

Sure, why not.

Sure, why not. — Fooloso4

No reason at all. We're all gonna die. Etc.

... reposting... below

No reason at all. We're all gonna die. Etc. — bongo fury

Being smothered to death by a blanket though does not seem like a good way to go.

Being smothered to death by a blanket though does not seem like a good way to go. — Fooloso4

You're drunk, aren't you?

Bongo had said that we strive for agreement, — Metaphysician Undercover

... about, specifically, which words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed (already or eventually) at which things.

I was aware that as a description of human discourse this calls for plenty of clarification, and I was trying to begin it by alluding to the "inscrutability of reference": the (alleged) fact that any actual connection between symbol and object is in our imagination or diagram. (Straw man version: no bolt of energy passes between symbol and object.) MU thought this irrelevant, so I wasn't surprised to find it difficult to know how best to engage with their subsequent critique, or whether it really engaged with mine.

But I fancy that their evident fear and loathing of equivocation might be related to my own fascination with what I see as a kind of equivocation at the heart of the social game (of agreeing what is pointed at what). As when, for example, we equivocate between implying that a particular token is (or isn't) pointed at a thing and implying rather that every single token "of the word" is (or isn't) pointed at the thing. Not to mention the equivocation dual with this, between referring to a single thing and referring to each of a whole class of ("same") things.

Not that I would think that all of this equivocating is necessarily a problem, if properly understood. Nor that I'm assuming anyone else would think it necessarily a problem, or that they don't already understand it better than I do. Hard to know what people's assumptions are in a discussion of this sort. Well, obvs.

You said: "we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement." There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent." — Luke

Right, we can use language and play language games without any agreement, just like the girl in the op. Agreement may come afterwards, for those who strive for agreement as bongo says we do. Why impose "never" on your interpretation of what I said, when I never said never? Sometimes we agree, sometimes we do not. Where's the problem? When I speak of an instance when there is no agreement, why assume that I mean there is never agreement.

There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent." — Luke

Are you familiar with the term "context". I said that agreement [in that type of instance which was being discussed, ones like the op], is non-existent. How can you interpret this as "there is never any agreement"? Come on Luke, you're just arguing for the sake of arguing, when will you start striving for agreement?

about, specifically, which words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed (already or eventually) at which things. — bongo fury

Let me repeat what I already said, in a different way. I really don't think that agreement is relevant here, at this level of meaning which is demonstrated by the op. When I say something to someone, and the person understands what I have said (understanding is demonstrated by the person's actions), I do not think that it is the case that the person agrees with how I use the words to point at different things. I think it is simply the case that the person understands how I use the words to point at different things. Understanding how the words are used, and agreeing with how the words are used, are distinct. So for example, when a person speaks to me using a lot of jargon which I do not think is warranted in the situation, I might understand what that person is saying, but I wouldn't agree with that person's use of words.

In this type of situation, we understand without agreement. Nor do we really strive for agreement because understanding is what is important, and so long as we understand each other it's sort of irrelevant whether or not we agree with how the other is using words. It might be better to say that we strive for understanding rather than agreement. But when it comes to philosophy, and logical arguments, agreement might be expedient toward understanding. Then we might strive for agreement, but this would still be for the sake of understanding. So we ought to give "understanding" priority over "agreement", as what is striven for, or required for language to be useful.

Agreement (about just where it is we disagree) looming in sight? No, I don't kid myself, but anyway...

You say,

When I say something to someone, and the person understands what I have said (understanding is demonstrated by the person's actions), I do not think that it is the case that the person agrees with how I use the words to point at different things. I think it is simply the case that the person understands how I use the words to point at different things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly! As though there were some fact of the matter (to be understood) of how you use the words to point at different things.

Whereas, I see it as a game of 'pretend', on which we must collaborate.

You say,

So for example, when a person speaks to me using a lot of jargon which I do not think is warranted in the situation, I might understand what that person is saying, but I wouldn't agree with that person's use of words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whereas I reject the jargon for the reason that it is not conducive to the necessary collaboration. We won't be able to agree (enough) what things (we should pretend) the words are pointed at.

Hence the gulf between our agendas, explaining why you answer this,

Do you associate meaning with use? (Or were you just interrogating T Clark on the point?) I certainly do associate the two. Equate them, even. But probably I see it/them quite differently to you. I see it as definitely not a matter of fact, but one we can reliably find agreement on in many cases (the clear ones). Like the case of a single grain of wheat not being a heap, snow not being black etc. I deny that you can (within the language) succeed in pointing the word heap at a single grain. Whereas, from what you say, I'm guessing you will accept any such attempt at use as inevitably counting as an instance of use of the word, however anomalous? — bongo fury

... with this,

I do associate "use" with meaning, but I would not equate the two. I believe that meaning extends beyond use. We could consider the metaphysical distinction between "good" and "beauty". "Good" is associated with use, but "beauty" is something desired for no purpose, just for the sake of itself. So "a good" is desired, and called "good" for some purpose, use, and it is meaningful because it is useful for that purpose. But things of beauty are desired and are apprehended as meaningful, though not because they are useful for a purpose. That brings meaning more toward the desire, rather than the act which is intended to fulfill the desire (use). This is why I believe that "use" accounts for some aspects of meaning, but it doesn't account for the entirety of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is fine, I'm not complaining. We have different agendas, different half-baked theories of discourse. I speak for mine when I say half-baked - yours can be done if you like.

As expected, very different views on "use", the difference resting, if I'm not mistaken, on whether we see reference as a matter of fact.

Agreement (about just where it is we disagree) looming in sight? — bongo fury

Lack of agreement does not necessarily mean that we disagree. If we do not understand each other then we can neither agree nor disagree. To be without an opinion on the matter allows one to neither agree nor disagree. And if the matter is seen as unimportant, or if there is no impending necessity of forming an opinion, one might intentionally continue in this state of neither agreeing nor disagreeing.

Whereas, I see it as a game of 'pretend', on which we must collaborate. — bongo fury

Yes, I understand this, but where does the "we must collaborate" come from? Let's assume that I want you to understand me, for my intents and purposes, and you want me to understand you for your intents and purposes, does that force the conclusion "we must collaborate"? If I am unwilling to help you, and you are unwilling to help me, then even though we want each other's help, we might just go on our separate ways, thinking that the other is unwilling to help. Where does the sense of fairness (you'll only help me if I help you), which is required for collaboration come from?

Which is fine, I'm not complaining. We have different agendas, different half-baked theories of discourse. I speak for mine when I say half-baked - yours can be done if you like.

As expected, very different views on "use", the difference resting, if I'm not mistaken, on whether we see reference as a matter of fact. — bongo fury

You haven't really described to me your view on "use", only repeating that it's very different from mine. Then when you allow me a little peek it appears to be very similar. You mention something about striving to agree, and the need to collaborate, but when I say something to you, you make a short reply and run away, saying we're very different in our views, making very little, if any attempt to agree. So it appears like you are proposing that we need to collaborate, and we ought to strive to agree, but you demonstrate the very opposite. This makes me very doubtful of your proposition. I don't see how you relate "use" to "we must collaborate". Do you recognize a difference between loving a person and using a person? How can you produce collaboration through "use" instead of through "love"?

Whereas, I see it as a game of 'pretend', on which we must collaborate.
— bongo fury

Yes, I understand this, but where does the "we must collaborate" come from? — Metaphysician Undercover

So... you do understand how I might see your example (of how you use the words to point at different things) as a game of 'pretend', but it surprises you that I might see this as likely to involve collaboration?

You wouldn't expect a game of 'pretend' to involve agreement about what is to be pretended? (If it is to amount to a game between or among players, and not just a set of one-person games?)

Do you recognize a difference between loving a person and using a person? — Metaphysician Undercover

Rather, you are saying you oppose dignifying a narrower, technical sense of "use" whereby it means, more specifically, "using a word to refer to something" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use–mention_distinction)? You want instead to emphasise and keep in play the very general sense of "using something in some way"? Resist reducing linguistic "use" to the mere pointing of words at things?

Such a disagreement between us (where you resist what I embrace) is what I said I expected to be the case, yes. Do you agree this is the disagreement? — bongo fury

The word "use" is used in many different ways. If we restrict "use" to the sense of using words, then I think you need to realize that we use words for a lot of things more than just pointing at things. Do you agree that the most common use of words is to tell someone what to do? And do you agree that this is not a matter of pointing at something? Why do you want to restrict the meaning of "using words" to "using words for a particular purpose", when that particular purpose is to point at things?

Finally! We can get down to business. See if we can trade any ideas despite our (apparently) very different views on "use".

The word "use" is used in many different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed.

If we restrict "use" to the sense of using words, — Metaphysician Undercover

... or at least recognise use of words as an important kind of use...

then I think you need to realize that we use words for a lot of things more than just pointing at things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here we differ.

Do you agree that the most common use of words is to tell someone what to do? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, not really, but anyway...

And do you agree that this is not a matter of pointing at something? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not really. I think it's a matter, at least, of us striving to agree what some words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed at. One domain from which to choose objects pointed at might be a set (perhaps fuzzy) of slabs, another domain might be a set of places-to-lay, another might be a set of expected tasks, another might be a set of payments or punishments, and so on.

"Urggh! How restrictive... "

Not necessarily. Or, rather... If only!

Under what elaborations, or other scenarios, would you like to explore / test it?

"Can't function" is nice... A relatively entrenched, 'literal' usage sorting the domain of machines into, roughly, those in working order and those not. Then, a more novel, 'metaphorical' usage to sort the different domain of people, according to criteria some of which agree and some contrast with those for literal application. An important contrast, creating humour, would be the more stringent standard, denying the status of working order to perfectly healthy and normal humans recently roused from a sleep state. The story amuses because the child has learnt the secondary, metaphorical use before the original, probably not sensing the humorous implications of the change in domain and criteria. The metaphor itself (the change in domain and criteria) amuses by creating referential links, under the surface as it were, by which other machine-words and machine-pictures are readied to help sort the domain of persons.

And of course we sense the more general struggle of the novice to project, from limited examples, to suitable occasions for pointing a word. Which is always cute. Because we feel so much more expert. Even though we can barely cope, ourselves, with the constant dilemmas of projection, domain ambiguity and type-token equivocation, which are endemic to the game.

Why do you want to restrict the meaning of "using words" to "using words for a particular purpose", when that particular purpose is to point at things? — Metaphysician Undercover

For the same reason someone might want to restrict the meaning of "momentum" to "mass times velocity". The promise of theoretical simplicity and generality. What I thought you might be craving when you lamented:

So these people are trying to create a division between this type of meaning and that type of meaning, without any supportive principles to show that one supposed "type" is actually different from the other. In reality, the meaning which a defined word has is no different from the meaning which a piece of art has, which is no different from the meaning which a beautiful sunset has. — Metaphysician Undercover

Under what elaborations, or other scenarios, would you like to explore / test it? — bongo fury

I think that telling someone what to do, is not a matter of pointing at anything. How is an activity, which doesn't even exist yet, a thing?

"Can't function" is nice... A relatively entrenched, 'literal' usage sorting the domain of machines into, roughly, those in working order and those not. Then, a more novel, 'metaphorical' usage to sort the different domain of people, according to criteria some of which agree and some contrast with those for literal application. An important contrast, creating humour, would be the more stringent standard, denying the status of working order to perfectly healthy and normal humans recently roused from a sleep state. The story amuses because the child has learnt the secondary, metaphorical use before the original, probably not sensing the humorous implications of the change in domain and criteria. The metaphor itself (the change in domain and criteria) amuses by creating referential links, under the surface as it were, by which other machine-words and machine-pictures are readied to help sort the domain of persons. — bongo fury

So, how does "I can't function...", point to anything? You might say that the subject is "I" so it points to I, but the matter is "function", so the subject matter is "my functioning" and this is not a thing which is being pointed at. Subject matter in general, is not a thing.

Then there is what you call "metaphorical use". How do you think that metaphorical use is a matter of pointing at something?

I really think that most language use cannot be characterized as pointing at something.

And of course we sense the more general struggle of the novice to project, from limited examples, to suitable occasions for pointing a word. — bongo fury

What do you even mean by "pointing a word"? Is this metaphor? If not, I find it rather incoherent. What tool would you use to sharpen the tip of a word?

For the same reason someone might want to restrict the meaning of "momentum" to "mass times velocity". The promise of theoretical simplicity and generality. What I thought you might be craving when you lamented: — bongo fury

There's a problem with this type of restriction though. If you restrict your understanding of "using a word", to "using a word for the purpose of pointing at something", then all those instances in which people use words for something other than pointing at something will not be apprehended by your understanding. And if you say that "meaning is use", and restrict your understanding of "use" to the use of words, you will not apprehend all the meaning which is in those instances of using things other than words. Furthermore, if you restrict your understanding of "meaning" to "meaning is use", you will not apprehend all that meaning which is in things other than use.

Likewise, if you restrict your understanding of "inertia" to "momentum", thereby understanding inertia as mass times velocity, you will not apprehend the inertia of a body at rest. So "momentum" is useful for understanding the inertia of a body, just like "using a word to point at things" is useful for understanding the use of words, but it is an incomplete understanding. And to insist that it is complete would be a misunderstanding.

Likewise, if you restrict your understanding of "inertia" to "momentum", thereby understanding inertia as mass times velocity, you will not apprehend the inertia of a body at rest. So "momentum" is useful for understanding the inertia of a body, just like "using a word to point at things" is useful for understanding the use of words, but it is an incomplete understanding. And to insist that it is complete would be a misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

That should end with “QED,” the equivalent of philosopher smack talk.

Completion eludes us ... except maybe in death.

That should end with “QED,” — Noah Te Stroete

Haha, but "non sequitur".

Likewise, if you restrict your understanding of "inertia" to "momentum", thereby understanding inertia as mass times velocity, you will not apprehend the inertia of a body at rest. — Metaphysician Undercover

My analogy was: if you reduce your pre-systematic notions of momentum to mass times velocity, at the obvious cost of sidelining all sorts of helpful pre-systematic notions of momentum and wider aspects of motion, you gain a powerful theory which you may even find develops and generalises to apprehend all of those other pre-systematic notions, including notions of inertia. I don't claim this is the actual historical sequence with mechanics. Just that any theory is, typically, reductive (we certainly don't insist it is complete), but we hope that it produces thereby a more complete and systematic view, long term.

Sure, it may fail, and just be reductive. And a less obviously reductive theory may achieve a more systematic view. Let's judge by results.

I think that telling someone what to do, is not a matter of pointing at anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless, as apparently occurs to you right away, it is a matter of pointing at an activity, probably from a range of alternatives. But,

How is an activity, which doesn't even exist yet, a thing? — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense, at least if questioned during the discourse itself, but later on...

So, how does "I can't function...", point to anything? You might say that the subject is "I" so it points to I, but the matter is "function", so the subject matter is "my functioning" and this is not a thing which is being pointed at. Subject matter in general, is not a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

... I will prefer a parsing that imputes pointing of a word at a relatively concrete entity. Here it is quite plausible that the girl points the phrase "can't function" at her concrete self.

Then there is what you call "metaphorical use". How do you think that metaphorical use is a matter of pointing at something? — Metaphysician Undercover

By being a word-pointing that participates in a novel sorting of some domain that is not its original or usual domain. In "can't function" the transfer is from the domain of machines to the domain of people.

I really think that most language use cannot be characterized as pointing at something. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pointing of words (or phrases, or pictures or sunsets) at things, though? Participating in the vast cultural network of pointings we call usage. Helped along by what I was calling type-token equivocation, by which I meant the cultural pressure to infer (and the frequent utility in inferring) that a thing pointed at by one token of a word will tend to get pointed at by another token, and that two things alike in getting pointed at by one word will deserve to get jointly pointed at by other words too. Induction. Generalising. Learning through example and association. That kind of view of language use.

What do you even mean by "pointing a word"? Is this metaphor? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. If it doesn't work for you, try another? The author of the theory I'm hawking calls it "labelling". We don't literally attach words to objects by uttering them, but by a few months old we are able to play the game of inferring the semantics that later on we learn to describe in these and other metaphorical (though often dead-metaphorical) terms: "calling it a...", "describing it as...", etc.

I know that many people (under a certain famous influence) assume such a view of language to be hopelessly impoverished. To me, it looks rich enough. If it were simply a matter of establishing and following a correlation (a word-object mapping), then yes, too easy - easier than human language, and not likely to pass any Turing tests. But what the human baby does is a lot more: it understands the correlation as a large and fragile game of pretence, not reliably tied to the facts of the situation; it has to engage in the complexest kind of collaboration and negotiation.

Unless, as apparently occurs to you right away, it is a matter of pointing at an activity, probably from a range of alternatives. But, — bongo fury

Telling someone what to do is not a matter of pointing to an activity, because the particular activity which is referred to does not even exist at the time of speaking. So even if we say that speaking is pointing, there is really nothing which is actually being pointed at. This problem is very evident with "meaning". Meaning is related to intention, and intention is related to what is wanted, and the "thing", or state, which is wanted is nonexistent. So your thesis is lacking, because it requires that we can point at non-existent things.

I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense, at least if questioned during the discourse itself, but later on... — bongo fury

It's more than just a matter of using "thing" in a loose sense, because there is an issue of the relationship between the general and the particular. We ask for something in general, and the response is to give us something particular. So for example, "can you get me a cup please", refers to "a cup" in the general sense, but the hearer might get a particular cup. Now, the speaker was not referring to that particular thing which the hearer brought, nor is "a cup" a thing unless you're Platonic realist. And, if you're such a realist, then there is a huge gap between the "thing" referred to, the Idea of "a cup", and the thing which the person brings to you, a particular cup.

There is clearly a problem with this thesis, that speaking is pointing at things. It's obviously not "things" in any reasonable sense of the word, which are being pointed at in the act of speaking. And even if we use "things" in a very loose way, so as to include activities, the activity referred to is always (without exception) something general, while any "thing" referred to is something particular. Say a person describes an activity which has already occurred, such that we might think that it is an existent activity, the words used to refer to any activity always allow that one might be speaking about something else carrying out that (very similar, or "same") activity, rather than the particular thing which is being referred to as carrying out that activity. So referring to an activity is always a reference to something general, but if one points to a particular thing which has carried out this activity, is carrying out, or will carry out this activity, we attempt to particularize this reference. But such a thing, to particularize the general, is impossible because there is an incompatibility between the two.

When you say "speaking is pointing at things", and "I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense", you simply veil this incompatibility behind smoke and mirrors, as if you actually believed that you could use "thing" in a way which would make sense here. The problem of course, is that the general allows for the possibility of many different things, while "thing" indicates that a particular has been specified. So if we are pointing when we speak, we are pointing in many different directions according to the many possibilities allowed for by the use of the general, and the hearer might choose one direction, and act as if that is the "thing" referred to. But as you can see, the thesis that speaking is pointing is really inadequate, because pointing at all these different possibilities would require that one is pointing in many different directions at the same time.

Thanks for your continued indulgence in this matter. I will be keen, I assure you, to know of the theoretical possibilities from your perspective as well.

Telling someone what to do is not a matter of pointing to an activity, because the particular activity which is referred to does not even exist at the time of speaking. So even if we say that speaking is pointing, there is really nothing which is actually being pointed at. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not that, typically, we discourage children from pointing out hypothetical or potential circumstances? Fictional ones, even. Not in my home, anyway.

This problem is very evident with "meaning". Meaning is related to intention, and intention is related to what is wanted, and the "thing", or state, which is wanted is nonexistent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know if you come to bury "meaning" here or to praise it, but I would point out that I offer a considerable simplification: in equating use, meaning, reference, denotation, labelling, and pointing; and from largely (initially at least) setting aside such related notions as intention, desire, connotation, depiction, metaphor, expression and sensitivity. This is in the spirit of enlightened reductionism outlined above, with an expectation of dividends from the theoretical effort, not least by way of insights into the related notions.

So your thesis is lacking, because it requires that we can point at non-existent things. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I was saying before, the aspiration is entirely in the direction you urge: towards an analysis that traces reference to concrete, existent things. More so, perhaps, since the reference is assumed to be by uttered or inscribed linguistic (or pictorial) tokens, rather than mental items? And you seem to me to exaggerate the difficulty of interpreting most word-pointings as being directed towards physical items. As a non-metaphysician I don't quite see the problem with tracing (albeit provisionally) reference to future objects and events. But perhaps you will provide me with a rude awakening in that regard?

Now, the speaker was not referring to that particular thing which the hearer brought, nor is "a cup" a thing unless you're Platonic realist. And, if you're such a realist, then there is a huge gap between the "thing" referred to, the Idea of "a cup", and the thing which the person brings to you, a particular cup. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're preaching to the converted, here. I'm surprised you don't see that.

So referring to an activity is always a reference to something general, but if one points to a particular thing which has carried out this activity, is carrying out, or will carry out this activity, we attempt to particularize this reference. But such a thing, to particularize the general, is impossible because there is an incompatibility between the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the difference between us is that you see an impossibility where I see a normal human skill of constructive ambiguity, could that be because you haven't grasped the relevance of the inscrutability involved: there being no fact of the matter?

But as you can see, the thesis that speaking is pointing is really inadequate, because pointing at all these different possibilities would require that one is pointing in many different directions at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, why is this a problem, that we should be ever unsure whether a token is pointed at some one or several or all of the things that every token "of the word" ever points at? This would be how we generalise and particularize.

I don't know if you come to bury "meaning" here or to praise it, but I would point out that I offer a considerable simplification: in equating use, meaning, reference, denotation, labelling, and pointing; and from largely (initially at least) setting aside such related notions as intention, desire, connotation, depiction, metaphor, expression and sensitivity. — bongo fury

What I believe, is that the attempt to simplify a complex thing is a mistake, because it leads to misunderstanding, in the sense of a person who believes oneself to understand the thing because it has been simplified, but really does not understand the thing because it is complex.

The point I'm trying to make, is that I think we can understand some aspects of meaning in terms of pointing, but many other aspects of meaning we cannot understand in terms of pointing. So for instance, part of one's use of language might consist of pointing at a thing, and this is an important part of language and meaning, but what someone says about that thing, what it is doing, or describing its properties, cannot be understood within the context of pointing. This again is an important part of language use and meaning, but it is a part that cannot be understood as pointing.

This is in the spirit of enlightened reductionism outlined above, with an expectation of dividends from the theoretical effort, not least by way of insights into the related notions. — bongo fury

As I explained, this form of reductionism doesn't work. It creates the illusion of a complete understanding through explicitly equating one thing with another, "meaning is pointing", or "momentum is mass time velocity", when in reality there is much more to each of these concepts than that which it is equated with. Understanding "meaning" also requires understanding types of activities (and these cannot be pointed to), and understanding "momentum" also requires understanding inertia (which is not covered by "mass times velocity"), because "velocity" requires a frame of reference.. By saying one is equal to the other, an illusion of completion is created, which is really a deception.

As a non-metaphysician I don't quite see the problem with tracing (albeit provisionally) reference to future objects and events. But perhaps you will provide me with a rude awakening in that regard? — bongo fury

You see no problem with taking it for granted that one can point to something which is not there? I don't understand how you can believe that you can point to something which is not there, and then just assume that you are actually pointing at something. And to simply point, without pointing at anything specific, is not really pointing at all. That's the point I'm making, you ought not characterize this as pointing. If someone uses language to refer to something, then we can say that the person is pointing at that thing. But when a person uses language to refer to something non-existent, how can we assume that this is a matter of pointing at something?

If the difference between us is that you see an impossibility where I see a normal human skill of constructive ambiguity, could that be because you haven't grasped the relevance of the inscrutability involved: there being no fact of the matter? — bongo fury

I really do not see this inscrutability which you claim to be pointing at. What I see is that you are describing something as "pointing" when the thing being described really cannot be described in that way. So you might say "I am pointing to an inscrutability", but in reality there is no inscrutability there, only a vague inaccuracy in your description. What you are really doing is pointing at language use, and insisting that all language use is a matter of pointing, but when it is shown that this is impossible because sometimes there is nothing there being pointed at, instead of seeing that this is not a matter of pointing, you try to dismiss the argument by saying that this is an inscrutable type of pointing. If "pointing" doesn't suit as an appropriate descriptive term, and there is something inscrutable going on, then why not just say that it is something inscrutable rather than a pointing.

Again, why is this a problem, that we should be ever unsure whether a token is pointed at some one or several or all of the things that every token "of the word" ever points at? This would be how we generalise and particularize. — bongo fury

I will ask you then, how is this a pointing? Suppose there are a thousand equally probable possibilities indicated by a single use of a single word, for example, "get me a cup please", when there are a thousand cups in the room. How can you describe this use of that word as a pointing?

Let's assume to point is to direct one's attention. What exactly is the person who says "get me a cup please" directing the other's attention toward? Would this be an imaginary future state, in which the person speaking has a cup? Not really, because the person making the request is requesting that the other perform a particular action, and the reason for this is unknown. So, the person says it because the person wants the other to act. Where is the "directing one's attention"? We often act without directing our attention, as reflex indicates. I think that the principal use of language is to get a response, a reflex action, out of another, without actually directing the other's attention. Any attempt to direct the other's attention would be far too imposing on the other's sense of freedom, and the individual's own will to direct one's own attention toward one's own interests. Therefore attempting to direct another's attention would not be effective, because the person whom you were trying to direct (show the way by pointing), would dismiss this as interference against one's own free will to choose one's own way. So when someone says something, I think that person is simply trying to get a reaction out of the other, without trying to interfere with, or direct, the other's attention. Such actions as trying to direct another's attention (like pointing) would be received as rude and interfering, negative, and therefore not conducive to cooperation. Remember the distinction I made between using another, and cooperating with another? Directing another's attention, pointing, is an instance of using the other.

My analogy was: if you reduce your pre-systematic notions of momentum to mass times velocity, at the obvious cost of sidelining all sorts of helpful pre-systematic notions of momentum and wider aspects of motion, you gain a powerful theory which you may even find develops and generalises to apprehend all of those other pre-systematic notions, including notions of inertia. I don't claim this is the actual historical sequence with mechanics. Just that any theory is, typically, reductive (we certainly don't insist it is complete), but we hope that it produces thereby a more complete and systematic view, long term. — bongo fury

Just to clarify, I’m not picking on you. I haven’t read the whole thread as I stopped after the OP and the first few responses. Then I picked it up again later on. If one were a psychiatrist or psychologist reading these discussions on this philosophy forum, one might conclude that ALL philosophy enthusiasts or philosophers have loose associations and thought disorders. Just how did we get here from where it all started? One might also conclude that such people ALL have mood disorders given the general moodiness on this forum. Then again, I may just be projecting.

Anyway, carry on.

Haha, no worries.

What I believe, is that the attempt to simplify a complex thing is a mistake, because it leads to misunderstanding, in the sense of a person who believes oneself to understand the thing because it has been simplified, but really does not understand the thing because it is complex. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly, I'm barking up the wrong tree trying to sell my favourite theory to you as a paragon of scientific systemization and simplification. Never mind.

As a non-metaphysician I don't quite see the problem with tracing (albeit provisionally) reference to future objects and events. But perhaps you will provide me with a rude awakening in that regard?
— bongo fury

You see no problem with taking it for granted that one can point to something which is not there? I don't understand how you can believe that you can point to something which is not there, and then just assume that you are actually pointing at something. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, if it turns out that there was (in the end) nothing there, I and probably the speaker will look for an alternative interpretation. I did say "albeit provisionally".

What you are really doing is pointing at language use, and insisting that all language use is a matter of pointing, but when it is shown that this is impossible because sometimes there is nothing there being pointed at, instead of seeing that this is not a matter of pointing, — Metaphysician Undercover

I notice you keep saying "pointing at something" and ignoring my reminders that it is generally a matter (or rather a mutually agreed pretence) of "pointing a word at something". This (stated properly as a semantic relation between word and object and not usually finger-pointer and object) strikes me as perfectly intuitive, something a child will recognise as being essentially what we are playing at, with language. I sense that you sense this, and are forced into mis-stating the principle in order to deflate the intuition, or to divert us into a certain famous ready-made critique of finger-pointing, which I think is an unnecessary diversion.

Obviously, we can easily cause the child to question the intuition, and quite possibly to soon disavow it. I, though, think the intuition is a good enough basis for a thoroughgoing theory, such as the one I have alluded to, recommended, and tried (however inadequately) to apply to the OP. And I thought you might be interested. And thank you very much for your highly interesting interrogations about it!

Again, why is this a problem, that we should be ever unsure whether a token is pointed at some one or several or all of the things that every token "of the word" ever points at? This would be how we generalise and particularize.
— bongo fury

I will ask you then, how is this a pointing? Suppose there are a thousand equally probable possibilities indicated by a single use of a single word, for example, "get me a cup please", when there are a thousand cups in the room. How can you describe this use of that word as a pointing? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm admitting it's far worse than that! Your token of "cup" could be pointing at (referring to) any or all of past, present and future cups. Obviously your interlocutor will look for suitable examples that are ready to hand. You might even produce a token (or, indeed, a finger) that points out a more particular target. But you both want to allow the pointing at any or all cups as well, as this is how (according to the theory I recommend) we create what other philosophers were (and on occasion still are) inclined to call a "concept" or "idea" or "form" of a cup, but which we can better see as a classification, through language, of objects.

I'll let you have the last word. Thanks for looking!

No, if it turns out that there was (in the end) nothing there, I and probably the speaker will look for an alternative interpretation. I did say "albeit provisionally". — bongo fury

It's not a question of how it turns out, it's a question of whether or not there is something there being pointed to, and the answer to that question is no. The argument, that something may come about, and this particular thing would be the thing which is pointed at, doesn't make sense because that thing might not come about. And when it doesn't, this is clear evidence that the speaking was not a case of pointing to something, in the first place. That's the point, we have clear evidence here that speaking is not reducible to pointing at something.

I notice you keep saying "pointing at something" and ignoring my reminders that it is generally a matter (or rather a mutually agreed pretence) of "pointing a word at something". This (stated properly as a semantic relation between word and object and not usually finger-pointer and object) strikes me as perfectly intuitive, something a child will recognise as being essentially what we are playing at, with language. I sense that you sense this, and are forced into mis-stating the principle in order to deflate the intuition, or to divert us into a certain famous ready-made critique of finger-pointing, which I think is an unnecessary diversion. — bongo fury

No, this is not intuitive to me at all. As I've said, I find that the majority of language use cannot be described as establishing a semantic relation between a word and an object. That's why I've taken the time to explain to you that very often there is no object which is referred to. "Get me a cup please", when there is a thousand cups in the room does not establish a semantic relation between a word and an object, nor is it spoken with the intent of establishing such a relation.

Furthermore, I really cannot understand what you could possibly mean by "pointing a word at something". As I said before, this is incoherent to me, and I asked you for an explanation. So you called it "labelling", but I don't see how labelling is pointing words. And speaking about things is not simply labelling things, it consists of describing things, saying where they are, etc.. These are not instances of labelling. This is what I've been trying to explain to you. It is one thing to name something, label it, and maybe you might like to call this pointing a word at it, but it is something completely different to say something about that thing. Let's assume we've labelled an object, "my phone", so that you would assume that when I mention "my phone" this is a matter of pointing to it. When I say something about my phone, like "I do not know where my phone is", how can you construe this as a pointing at my phone?

And thank you very much for your highly interesting interrogations about it! — bongo fury

You're very welcome, that's what I like to do, interrogate so that I might better understand your thesis, so it's really my pleasure.

Your token of "cup" could be pointing at (referring to) any or all of past, present and future cups. — bongo fury

Then it appears like you agree that it's not really a pointing. You might interpret "get me a cup please" as pointing to a cup, but you readily admit that this is a misinterpretation, because I'm really not fussy and I don't care which cup you bring me. Really, I'm not pointing at any cup whatsoever, or anything in particular, I'm just trying to get you to do something.

But you both want to allow the pointing at any or all cups as well, as this is how (according to the theory I recommend) we create what other philosophers were (and on occasion still are) inclined to call a "concept" or "idea" or "form" of a cup, but which we can better see as a classification, through language, of objects. — bongo fury

Of course I would say that this theory is evidently wrong. We do not create the concept, idea, or form of "cup" by pointing at cups. We create such concepts through descriptions, just like geometrical concepts. This is not to say that a child cannot learn how to identify a cup by having people point to cups, but knowing how to pick out a cup from a bunch of objects does not require that the child has a concept, idea, or form of "cup". This is the difference between knowing how to identify a cup, and knowing what a cup is.