A transcendental idealist says that some things are empirical experience and other things are mental constructs. Sense data are by their nature from outside reality. Space and time and frames of reference are mental constructs or inside projected outside. Did I get that right, @Mww?

Pretty much covers it, yep.

Minor distinction, perhaps. I consider projections of reality our expressions about it. Reality itself is that which is given to us. Reality comes in via perception, projections go out via understanding.

Do I get a ribbon? Just kidding.

I don’t do ribbons.

Gold star, now. That’s worth awarding.

Have a couple.

:starstruck:

Minor distinction, perhaps. I consider projections of reality our expressions about it. Reality itself is that which is given to us. Reality comes in via perception, projections go out via understanding. — Mww

To me a projection is first some aspect of reality existentially penetrating us -- projecting itself into us -- and second, our fixing on some part of that presentation and projecting it into our conceptual space. Each of these steps is represents a potential loss of content and so is a projection in the mathematical sense of a dimensionally diminished mapping.

It depends on how you define "theory." If you mean a hypothetical structure, then, no, it is not a theory. If you mean a way of organizing experience, then yes, noting that certain things (trees) are equally capable of evoking the concept <tree> does organize our experience. — Dfpolis

"Theoretical"--basically in the sense of reasoning about something, coming up with an account of "what's realy going on" contra the phenomena in question, etc.

The point is that phenomena that are present aren't actually always of one as a conscious being experiencing things. The only way to move away from realism with respect to experience is to introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on.

The only way to move away from realism with respect to experience is to introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on. — Terrapin Station

If you mean a way of organizing experience, then yes, noting that certain things (trees) are equally capable of evoking the concept <tree> does organize our experience. — Dfpolis

This requires a more in depth discussion to distinguish the differences.

Yes, trees are often just present — Dfpolis

Sure. So going from that to "this is something I'm perceiving" etc. is theoretical, isn't it? That is, it's literally invoking a theory about what's going on. — Terrapin Station

...

"Theoretical"--basically in the sense of reasoning about something, coming up with an account of "what's realy going on" contra the phenomena in question, etc. — Terrapin Station

I think it is naming, not theorizing. In what way does "this is something I'm perceiving" go beyond our experience? I think Maritain's analysis is on point. He sees us as mentally dividing in abstraction, and then joining what was divided in the act of judgement.

So, here we are aware of the integrated act of my tree perception; seeing in it mentally separable notes of intelligibility (<this> and <something I'm perceiving>); and finally seeing that these notes are not actually separate, but both evoked by the identical unity, judging <this is something I'm perceiving>. The copula "is" betokens this identity of source.

So, there is reasoning going on -- specifically mental separation and reunification, -- but there is no new, constructive element being added.

It is not an account of "what's really going on." For that you have to wait for something like Aristotle's analysis in De Anima iii. All the judgement is doing is explicating a unified experience.

The point is that phenomena that are present aren't actually always of one as a conscious being experiencing things. The only way to move away from realism with respect to experience is to introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on. — Terrapin Station

I have no desire to move away from realism. I think you're confusing realism with naivete.

This requires a more in depth discussion to distinguish the differences. — Noah Te Stroete

Feel free to ask for clarifications.

I don’t understand Terrapin, either.

I had a hard time parsing his statement.

Fair enough. Cheers.

"Reality" first means what we encounter in experience... — Dfpolis

I'm waiting for the other shoe to drop.
IOW, is there a second, third, fourth (etc) elaboration of the meaning of reality (what we encounter in experience)?

I think it is naming, not theorizing. In what way does "this is something I'm perceiving" go beyond our experience? — Dfpolis

So something wasn't understood about the question I'm asking.

First, just to clarify, I was referring to phenomena that are present in general. Whether those phenomena are "experience" qua experience or not needs to be left unanalyzed for the question I'm asking. (The point here is merely that the term "experience" can come with a lot of connotational baggage that I'm trying to avoid, because otherwise one won't understand the question I'm asking.)

And then the question was whether sometimes the phenomena that are present aren't simply things like trees, rivers, etc.

This is to say that the phenomenon present sometimes is not "I am perceiving this tree," but simply a tree. In other words, there's no conscious notion, awareness, etc. of perceiving something per se (or of conceiving, etc.) There's just a tree.

If it's the case that the phenomenon present can sometimes just be the tree, then the phenomenon present on that occasion will not be "I am perceiving a tree." So, for those occasions, "I am perceiving a tree" is doing something theoretical (as I'm using that term) that isn't present in the phenomenon it's about.

I would say that we try to model reality, — Dfpolis

Granted, but what is a model but a construct? Whether model or construct presupposes that which is its cause, which in its turn presupposes a necessary displaced orientation of it. That is, because it is reason modeling, the cause absolutely must be oriented exclusive to reason, otherwise reason is merely modeling itself, from which knowledge of the model cannot be distinguished from knowledge of the cause of the model. Hence, empirical realism, and the inescapable aspect of epistemological dualism associated with it.

Everydayman is seldom surprised by reality, but he is exposed to precious little of it, and that of which he is exposed is rather tedious. This can be explained by theorizing that data, re: information, generating experience, once so generated, is no longer considered information, for it provides no new knowledge. But give to his sensibility something for which he has no ready conception, he should be all the more surprised by what little he really knows.

"Reality" first means what we encounter in experience... — Dfpolis

I'm waiting for the other shoe to drop.
IOW, is there a second, third, fourth (etc) elaboration of the meaning of reality (what we encounter in experience)? — Galuchat

Of course there is. We call these shoes philosophy and natural science. In my view, the goal of philosophy is to provide us with a framework for understanding the full range of human experience. Natural science seeks to discover general principles for understanding objective reality in abstraction from the knowing subject.

whether sometimes the phenomena that are present aren't simply things like trees, rivers, etc. — Terrapin Station

Of course. Sometimes they are experiences of reflective thought, meditation, dreams, pains and joys, etc. Over time we learn to divide the content of experience into "self" and "other" categories. How this is possible is a profound open question in my view.

This is to say that the phenomenon present sometimes is not but simply a tree. — Terrapin Station

I would not call "I am perceiving this tree," a phenomenon, but a refection on a phenomenon. The tree presents itself, is apprehended (or not). Then, we can stop to reflect on the experience, or not. Quine's analysis of introspection in the Concept of Mind is deeply flawed. We don't have separate awarenesses of the tree and of ourselves perceiving the tree, but a single awareness that can be reflected upon and articulated in various ways. Aquinas understood that we come to know our intellectual powers not in se, but in actu, i.e. by reflecting on what we do.

In other words, there's no conscious notion, awareness, etc. of perceiving something per se (or of conceiving, etc.) There's just a tree. — Terrapin Station

I agree that often the intelligibility of the knowing subject is not actualized. Still, the knowing subject is always intelligible in acts of awareness. Awareness makes no sense absent a subject being aware.

If it's the case that the phenomenon present can sometimes just be the tree, then the phenomenon present on that occasion will not be "I am perceiving a tree." So, for those occasions, "I am perceiving a tree" is doing something theoretical (as I'm using that term) that isn't present in the phenomenon it's about. — Terrapin Station

This misunderstands "I am perceiving a tree." It is not a phenomenon, but the result of actualizing/articulating intelligibility already present in the perception of a tree. So, if you see theories as adding content, that isn't happening here. Theory theory is wrong.

That was a lot to type that shows nothing at all as to whether you now understand what I was asking you.

All I'm interested in is whether my post made it any clearer to you what I'm asking you. Because I want to ask you what I did (ask you), I want you to answer it, and I want to move on with that as a starting point. Otherwise I can't get at what I'm trying to get at with you.

Again, what showed that you didn't understand what I was asking you was this comment: "I think it is naming, not theorizing. In what way does 'this is something I'm perceiving' go beyond our experience?" That question doesn't make sense in the context of the question I asked and your initial response to it.

Just to make it clear, I asked, "The first thing I'd wonder is if that's really the way all phenomena are to you. For example, it's never for you just that there's a tree, say. It's always that you have something like 'I'm a conscious entity, aware of a tree' present? For me, there's often just a tree (or whatever)."

And you said, "Yes, trees are often just present."

So "In what way does 'this is something I'm perceiving' go beyond our experience?" doesn't make sense in the context of the question I asked and your initial answer to it. "Just a tree" is not the same thing as "This is something I'm perceiving."

That suggests that maybe you didn't really understand the question.

I would say that we try to model reality, — Dfpolis

Granted, but what is a model but a construct? — Mww

Models mix abstracted and constructed elements. They are not pure constructs or they would have no relation to the reality modeled. When we combine divers abstracted projections of the same reality, there are invariable gaps because no human understanding is exhaustive, so we fill these gaps with constructs that may not even be consciously added.

Whether model or construct presupposes that which is its cause, which in its turn presupposes a necessary displaced orientation of it. — Mww

I do not understand this sentence. What does "a necessary displaced orientation of it" mean?

That is, because it is reason modeling, the cause absolutely must be oriented exclusive to reason — Mww

Our reason is intentional (manifesting "aboutness" per Brentano). Thus, it points beyond itself.

knowledge of the model cannot be distinguished from knowledge of the cause of the model — Mww

As I explained above, models combine abstracted and constructed elements. Since we can distinguish them, we can differentiate what we add (what occurs in the model, but not necessarily in what is modeled) from the portions of the model abstracted from reality. So, there is no need for epistemological dualism.

But give to his sensibility something for which he has no ready conception, he should be all the more surprised by what little he really knows. — Mww

I agree we know precious little and should always be open to surprise.

Natural science seeks to discover general principles for understanding objective reality in abstraction from the knowing subject. — Dfpolis

If reality is "what we encounter in experience" and experience is "the data we have to work with", then reality is: what we encounter in the data we have to work with.

What is objective reality, and does it require subjective reality?

My apologies. I am trying to understand you.

No problem.

Does it make sense to you that "(Just a) tree" is different than "I am perceiving a tree"?

So the experience (again, I was trying to avoid that word--we could just say the phenomena) of:

<<(just a) tree>>

would be different than the experience (phenomena of):

<<I am perceiving a tree>>

Does that make sense to you?

What is objective reality, and does it require subjective reality? — Galuchat

Reality is "objective" to the extent that it can enter into the subject-object relation of knowledge, which is to say insofar as it is intelligible. It can be intelligible without being actually known by a subject. So, we know that there is objective reality when we actualize its intelligibility, but our knowing is not a condition of its existence.

Are hallucinations real?

It's really simple. If there is no object independent of perception, then it would simply be wrong to say that we perceive anything. There would be no such thing as perception. Perception is about acquiring information about state-of-affairs. There is an aboutness to perception. If those state-of-affairs don't exist independent of perception, then "perception" becomes incoherent. So, if there are no objects independent of perception, then you are misusing the terms, "perception" and "perceiving".

Trees exist in the same way that other people do - as perceived objects independent of my perception of them. If we are going to question the existence of trees as "just trees", then what about "just people"? How do biological organisms with brains exist independent of my perception of them? This forum is full of idealists questioning the existence of objects independent of us, yet contradict themselves when they talk about other minds, or talk about people, as if they are sure there are more than one. If we are going to question the existence trees independent of perception, then why are we not applying the same skepticism to the existence of other minds? Once you question realism, you slide down the rabbit hole of solipsism, and there is no such thing as a middle ground (ie. idealism) because that would be a contradiction.

Does it make sense to you that "(Just a) tree" is different than "I am perceiving a tree"? — Terrapin Station

Yes.

So the experience (again, I was trying to avoid that word--we could just say the phenomena) of:

<<(just a) tree>>

would be different than the experience (phenomena of):

<<I am perceiving a tree>> — Terrapin Station

Yes. The first is an experience of a tree, the second the experience of making a judgement about experiencing a tree. My point was that while the form of these is different, their matter is the same. The judgement adds no content. It only actualizes content already present.

Are hallucinations real? — Galuchat

Yes. They are real experiences potentially informing us of the reality of some neurological disorder.

My point was that while the form of these is different, their matter is the same. — Dfpolis

This makes no sense to me. The first is just a tree. That's all it is phenomenally. The second is phenomenally the tree plus phenomenally the notion of a self, an I, the notion of a perception (or if you want to say a judgment).

Just a tree doesn't have a notion of self, of perception, etc.

So how are they the same?

Once you question realism, you slide down the rabbit hole of solipsism, and there is no such thing as a middle ground (ie. idealism). — Harry Hindu

I think this is right.