It's usually defined as the idea that objects exist independently of us. We know, or at least have every reason to believe, that there is something independent of our perceptual experience itself,some existential set of conditions, that gives rise to our perception of a world of objects, selves, thoughts, emotions and so on.

The light bouncing off objects is within our perceptual experience. If we project that out as the transcendental conditions that give rise to perception then we have committed to some form of realism.

Not saying you’re wrong, just wondering how projection would work, as you see it.

Six of one, half dozen of the other, when it’s all said and done.

Not saying you’re wrong, just wondering how projection would work, as you see it.

Six of one, half dozen of the other, when it’s all said and done. — Mww

:grin: I think we philosophers just confuse ourselves with our different uses of language.

Six of one, half dozen of the other, when it’s all said and done. — Mww

Exactly, wtf does it really matter? Thinking one way or the other would not seem to change anything regarding what we experience.

It's usually defined as the idea that objects exist independently of us. We know, or at least have every reason to believe, that there is something independent of our perceptual experience itself,some existential set of conditions, that gives rise to our perception of a world of objects, selves, thoughts, emotions and so on.

The light bouncing off objects is within our perceptual experience. If we project that out as the transcendental conditions that give rise to perception then we have committed to some form of realism. — Janus

Yeah, I’m a transcendental idealist which includes realism, I think?

I don’t know what realism is. — Noah Te Stroete

What about idealism; do you know what that is? Be fucked if I do!

The idealism part is that time, space, and points or frames of reference are mental constructs. We do not directly apprehend these things. We create them in our minds.

I first said “directly perceive” but I think “directly apprehend” is more accurate.

My understanding is that transcendental idealism does function as the invisible partner of empirical realism; which I interpret as saying that we are all subject to the same noumenal conditions, whatever they are, which explains why we all perceive the same world, objects and so on.

But transcendental idealism may carry the connotation that the fundamental reality is mind (although Kant would never say that, because that would be tantamount to Berkeleyism, which he was at pains to distance himself from) and that is how it seems to be often interpreted by those on these forums I have encountered who identify themselves as transcendental idealists.

My understanding is that transcendental idealism does function as the invisible partner of empirical realism; which I interpret as saying that we are all subject to the same noumenal conditions, whatever they are, which explains why we all perceive the same world, objects and so on.

But transcendental idealism may carry the connotation that the fundamental reality is mind (although Kant would never say that, because that would be tantamount to Berkeleyism, which he was at pains to distance himself from) and that is how it seems to be often interpreted by those on these forums I have encountered who identify themselves as transcendental idealists. — Janus

I agree with all of this. The mind doesn’t just construct time, space, and frames of reference, but also draws borders and delineates objects, so that we don’t directly apprehend reality. We perceive an independent reality that is most likely at least somewhat different than than how we construct it in our minds. There is truth to materialism. There is truth to idealism, but not Berkeley’s conception of idealism.

that is how it seems to be often interpreted by those on these forums I have encountered who identify themselves as transcendental idealists. — Janus

They’re just plain wrong.

The idealism part is that time, space, and points or frames of reference are mental constructs. We do not directly perceive these things. We create them in our minds. — Noah Te Stroete

Yes, but to posit those as "mental constructs" seems to imply that mind is somehow fundamental, since it, on this view, constructs the world.

The other way of parsing this would be to say that reality is a quantum process, wherein time and space are irrelevant, nonexistent, and that all apparent objects along with the spacetime in which they appear are somehow emanated from the quantum vacuum. Then the question becomes as to whether we think of the quantum vacuum as some kind of mental reality (transcendental idealism) or some kind of physical reality (transcendental realism). For me the question seems to lose all meaning at this point, so I identify as neither an idealist or realist in this context.

Definitely an empirical realist, though!

Nice distinction; I agree!

The quantum vacuum is real. How we perceive it (if only through our instruments) is partly projected from reality (the four forces of nature) and partly constructed in the mind. Something is certainly lost in the act of perceiving (that’s why we misperceive all the time). The mind constructs what isn’t directly apprehended. Make sense?

I think Kant would call himself a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist. Is this your view @Mww?

That makes sense, but if you posit mind as something independent of "the four forces of nature" or whatever then you are moving towards dualism. Or if you posit the four forces of nature as being fundamentally mental then you move towards transcendental idealism. And if you posit the four fundamental forces of nature as being fundamentally physical, then you are moving towards materialism, physicalism and realism.

The other issue is that we might think that the four forces of nature, along with mind, matter, energy, time, space and everything else as having their provenance only within human cognition.

I think Kant would call himself a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist. — Noah Te Stroete

To my knowledge he very explicitly does identify his position as being that. Since Kant, though more sophisticated, plausible models (informed by QM and Information theory) of transcendental realism have evolved. See, for example, Indirect Realism, Ontic Structural Realism and other forms of "relational" realism.

Anyway, I've enjoyed conversing with you, someone who seems to actually have an open mind, but I've got to go do some work now. :yikes:

It's a hard life! :cry: :groan:

Anyway, I've enjoyed conversing with you, someone who seems to actually have an open mind — Janus

Likewise.

That makes sense, but if you posit mind as something independent of "the four forces of nature" or whatever then you are moving towards dualism. Or if you posit the four forces of nature as being fundamentally mental then you move towards transcendental idealism. And if you posit the four fundamental forces of nature as being fundamentally physical, then you are moving towards materialism, physicalism and realism. — Janus

I haven’t made up my mind on the hard problem. I don’t think there is an easy solution. It’s unknown.

I haven’t made up my mind on the hard problem. I don’t think there is an easy solution. It’s unknown. — Noah Te Stroete

It may be hard to solve right now, it being so private, but a great penultimate step would be to surround it by localizing it to the brain.

It may be hard to solve right now, it being so private, but a great penultimate step would be to surround it by localizing it to the brain. — PoeticUniverse

That seems like common sense, but I’m not sure that that would necessarily be metaphysically coherent with the rest of human knowledge. It remains to be seen. It’s not just up to science, in my view, it’s also up to philosophers to come up with a coherent TOE.

That seems like common sense, but I’m not sure that that would necessarily be metaphysically coherent with the rest of human knowledge. — Noah Te Stroete

What shows through from the brain to consciousness? What can block consciousness? What can alter consciousness?

It remains to be seen. It’s not just up to science, in my view, it’s also up to philosophers to come up with a coherent TOE. — Noah Te Stroete

So far, philosophers have it narrowed done to two: from 'Nothing' versus Eternal/Timeless as being that was never made. Note that they might converge, for, 'never made' as not from anything resembles from 'Nothing'; however, seeming paradoxically, 'Nothing' can never have being, suggesting that existence has no opposite, no alternative, and thus must be. So, the TOE has thus been limited, too.

It’s strange, no?

Stranger than fiction. And lately I'm led to vote for something having to be eternal, over 'Nothing' doing anything, either way, almost, such as with a capability (for a near-Nothing like the quantum-foam) being the eternal source or as having everything already existent, eternally, due to the eternal having no point for anything specific or particular to be designed into it.

Realists don't believe that we can't have false beliefs, that we can't experience hallucinations, etc. — Terrapin Station

And how does the realist get to conclude that what he experienced was a hallucination or that he had a false belief? For instance if the realist sees water in the distance and moves towards it and the water progressively disappears as he gets closer, how does he conclude that this water was an illusion and not that it was real water that progressively disappeared?

You were saying that moving away from realism requires theoretical explanations, but so does sticking to realism as soon as you invoke false beliefs or hallucinations.

Saying there is no object that is perceived as it is independently of the perceiver is not saying that there is nothing beyond perception, of course if you assume there is nothing beyond perception you end up with solipsism, idealism doesn't make that assumption. — leo

Then idealism is no different than realism.

And how does the realist get to conclude that what he experienced was a hallucination or that he had a false belief? For instance if the realist sees water in the distance and moves towards it and the water progressively disappears as he gets closer, how does he conclude that this water was an illusion and not that it was real water that progressively disappeared? — leo

Illusions are simply misinterpretations of what is real. It only seems like water when you don't move towards it. When you move towards it, it doesn't behave like a pool of water. This is how you know it's not a pool of water.

When it is understood that it is light we see, not objects, then mirages and "bent" sticks in water is what you would EXPECT to see.

Experience is the data we have to work with — Dfpolis

One wonders how to make sense of this. One works with hammers, data sets, roadways, and other people. Does one work with 'experience'? It's hard to know what this means. Is there a contrast here that is not just sheer negation (not-experience)? Is there some other thing that we could instead, in principle, might 'work with' besides 'experience'? The OP says 'experience' is 'how one relates to the world'. Is it? I 'relate' to the road by walking on it. I 'relate' to the hammer by hitting the nail and building the hut. I 'relate' to the other by sharing in our laughter and work. 'Experience' tends to be a shadow word, a word that looks to do conceptual work but does not. It conjures phantoms. It usually does. The OP doesn't seem to alter this situation.

Then idealism is no different than realism. — Harry Hindu

If we say that what we call the physical world stems from minds, that objects do not exist independently from minds, that's not realism no. And "The physical world stems from minds" does not imply at all that "there is nothing beyond your perception" so that's not solipsism either.

Illusions are simply misinterpretations of what is real. It only seems like water when you don't move towards it. When you move towards it, it doesn't behave like a pool of water. This is how you know it's not a pool of water. — Harry Hindu

It behaves like a pool of water that progressively disappears, so you don't have to conclude that it's not water.

When it is understood that it is light we see, not objects, then mirages and "bent" sticks in water is what you would EXPECT to see. — Harry Hindu

I guess Terrapin would disagree with that, he says he encounters mostly phenomena of direct things, for instance the phenomenon of "just a tree", not the phenomenon of "light traveling from a tree towards our eyes", so how does a realist conclude that everything he sees is light reaching his eyes?

Terrapin said "The only way to move away from realism with respect to experience is to introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on", I'm arguing that to stick with realism we have to "introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on" all the same, unless we say that everything we experience is real.

Saying there is no object that is perceived as it is independently of the perceiver is not saying that there is nothing beyond perception, of course if you assume there is nothing beyond perception you end up with solipsism, idealism doesn't make that assumption. — leo

Then idealism is no different than realism. — Harry Hindu

Realism isn't simply the view that there are things that exist independent of perception and idealism isn't simply the view that only one's own subjective experiences exist.

If we look at Kant's transcendental idealism as an example, it is accepted that there are things that exist independent of perception but argued that these "noumena" are unknowable and not the objects of perception. The objects of perception – known as "phenomena" – are not independent of perception and so Kant's transcendental idealism is a kind of idealism.

So it might be clearer to say that one is a realist about some X rather than just to say that one is a realist. For example one might be a realist about the kind of fundamental entities described by our best scientific models but believe that the objects of perception – chairs, trees, people, etc. – are not reducible to these fundamental entities.

An example of a theory that suggests something like this is enactivism: "organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, ... [they] participate in the generation of meaning ... engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world." Objects of perception are products of our interaction with an external world and as such are as much dependent on us as they are dependent on this external world.

Experience is the data we have to work with. One can either work with experience, or one can simply cease thinking. — Dfpolis

Experience doesn’t amount to data unless it is interpreted. Besides, ‘experience’ is too broad a word in the context to really mean anything. You could say that if you’re not conscious, then you are unconscious, although it’s a pretty trivial tautology. But different people can share experiences, and draw completely different conclusions from them, so there’s clearly more than ‘experience’ in play.

Yes. Although as Janus pointed out to me a while ago, while he fully admits to it in the 1781 edition, as quoted below, he does not go so far in the 1787 edition. Makes one wonder who or what caused him to back off from declaring for the metaphysical doctrine he himself developed. Probably figured it was so obvious everybody should declare for it.

“...From the start we have declared ourselves in favor of this transcendental idealism, and our doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the existence of matter on the unaided testimony of our consciousness, or of declaring it to be proved in the same manner as to the existence of myself as a thinking being is proved...”

Bear in mind the proof spoken here is merely a logical proof, based on the concept of law, which is itself based on the principles of universality and absolute necessity. Very Aristotelian on the one hand and very Cartesian on the other.