The content of an experience is the intelligibility actualized in it. — Dfpolis

What in the world is that supposed to refer to? It seems extremely gobbledygooky to me, probably because it's resting on theoretical views that I don't at all buy. — Terrapin Station

To be grasped, something has to be able to be grasped, i.e intelligible.

To be grasped — Dfpolis

Grasped in what sense? "Intelligible" conventionally refers to understanding. How are you conflating understanding with experience or perception?

Understanding makes sense in semantic contexts, and it makes sense in the sense of, say, being curious about how something works and then discovering/being aware of that information. How would you apply it to experience or perception in general?

Grasped in what sense? — Terrapin Station

In the sense that we are aware of it. Knowledge is awareness of present intelligibility

Knowledge is awareness of present intelligibility. Intelligibility is grasping. Grasping is being aware. So Knowledge is awareness of present awareness basically. Or we could say grasping of presenting grasping.

That's gobbledygook.

I'd like to have a conversation with you, but if you're just going to keep falling back on word salad/gobbledygook it's pointless.

Also, why would you be conflating knowledge with experience or perception anyway? Are you using "knowledge" strictly in the "acquaintance" sense?

Personally, I don't buy any sort of phenomena/noumena distinction, no appearance/reality distinction. Appearances are what things are really like from some reference point, and there's always some reference point. — Terrapin Station

But if you say reality from some reference point is how things appear from some reference point, then I suppose you agree that when the reference point is a conscious being, what the being sees is always an experience of the being, so even though the being may encounter the phenomenon of "just a tree", it's still an experience of the being, and then doesn't that link back to what Dfpolis said in his first post, that all we have is our experiences?

what the being sees is always an experience of the being, so even though the being may encounter the phenomenon of "just a tree", — leo

I agree with that, because I believe that we're beings with bodies situated in a world, in relationships with things that are not us, where our perception works via our senses in particular ways, etc.

Again, this is different than the experience qua the experience, which can be of just a tree. The above is a theoretical account of what's going on.

Hence asking a question about experiences qua experiences versus theoretical accounts of what's going on with those experiences.

(And I already explained this to you above.)

Appearances are what things are really like from some reference point, and there's always some reference point. — Terrapin Station

Nothing new here.

An appearance is a reference point. Not everyone is talking about reference points (appearances). Some are talking about how objects are independent of reference points (a view from everywhere). Which one are you attempting to define as it really is - the reference point or the object? What is the nature of the tree independent of reference points?

Nothing new here. — Harry Hindu

As it shouldn't be. Now if everyone would just agree with it so I wouldn't have to point it out in contradistinction to other ideas.

Some are talking about how objects are independent of reference points (a view from everywhere). — Harry Hindu

There's no such thing, though. Hence the nothing new of "there's always some reference point." The reference point can be a combo of others, but it's still a reference point.

What is the nature of the tree independent of reference points? — Harry Hindu

I just wrote that there is no such thing, you just quoted it, and you just said "Nothing new here." So why would you even be asking?

Again, this is different than the experience qua the experience, which can be of just a tree. The above is a theoretical account of what's going on.

Hence asking a question about experiences qua experiences versus theoretical accounts of what's going on with those experiences. — Terrapin Station

Sure, but it seems to me you still arrive at the same result as Dfpolis, that both in your theoretical account and his theoretical account everything we experience are experiences of a conscious being, even if the conscious being doesn't always identify them as experiences of a conscious being. I think that's relevant, I'm still thinking about how.

Sounds like realism to me. For a realist there are objects and perception of objects. The qualia of experience are not objects themselves. Many people here seem to be confusing the two. If there isn't a difference between the two, then solipsism. If there is, then (indirect) realism. — Harry Hindu

You can argue that the objects of perception are identical to qualia but also argue that external world things exist and are causally responsible for the experience. It's not solipsism because it argues that things other than oneself exist and it's not indirect realism because it argues that qualia aren't representations of these external world things – they might be caused by them but that's where the relationship ends.

And this thinking that idealism entails that qualia are identical to objects of perception is a false one. Think of the relationship between printed words and the story they tell. There is a logical distinction even if in terms of ontology there's just ink on paper. So there can be a logical distinction between qualia and objects of perception even if in terms of ontology there's just subjective experience (and whatever otherwise unknowable external world thing is responsible for causing it).

There's no such thing, though. Hence the nothing new of "there's always some reference point." The reference point can be a combo of others, but it's still a reference point. — Terrapin Station

A reference point is a location is space-time. If there are a combination of reference points, where are they located relative to each other? I can see you looking at the tree, and you are located relative to the tree and myself. Why am I suppose to assume you exist independent of my reference point, but the tree doesn't?

I just wrote that there is no such thing, you just quoted it, and you just said "Nothing new here." So why would you even be asking? — Terrapin Station

You wrote it in the post above - AFTER my post, so how could I have quoted it in my post before you wrote it?

that both in your theoretical account and his theoretical account everything we experience are experiences of a conscious being, — leo

Sure, but I'm not at all endorsing representationalism, idealism, etc. Those require theoretical moves just like any other stance does. That was the point.

If there are a combination of reference points, where are they located relative to each other? — Harry Hindu

It depends on the points, obviously. You can't give a single answer that applies to all cases.

For example, Mars and the Eiffel Tower would have very different answers as to where all the possible reference points for each are located relative to each other, because of the different spatial arrangements, etc.

Why am I suppose to assume you exist independent of my reference point, but the tree doesn't? — Harry Hindu

I honestly have no idea what you're asking here. It doesn't sound as if it's stemming from anything I'd say. Let me ask why you're thinking that anyone is saying that you're "supposed to" assume that some things exist independent(ly) from you but other things do not?

You wrote it in the post above - AFTER my post, so how could I have quoted it in my post before yours? — Harry Hindu

You quoted me saying "there's always some reference point," after which you wrote the phrase "Nothing new here."

You can argue that the objects of perception are identical to qualia but also argue that external world things exist and are causally responsible for the experience. It's not solipsism because it argues that things other than oneself exist and it's not indirect realism because it argues that qualia aren't representations of these external world things – they might be caused by them but that's where the relationship ends. — Michael

If there is nothing but objects of perception, then solipsism is the case. If there is more, then realism is the case. It's really that simple.

And this thinking that idealism entails that qualia are identical to objects of perception is a false one. Think of the relationship between printed words and the story they tell. There is a logical distinction even if in terms of ontology there's just ink on paper. — Michael

I never said that is what idealism entails. I have said that there is no coherent middle ground between solipsism and realism (ie idealism). My experience is about an external world, or it isn't.

For example, Mars and the Eiffel Tower would have very different answers as to where all the possible reference points for each are located relative to each other, because of the different spatial arrangements, etc. — Terrapin Station

Mars and the Eiffel Tower don't have eyes and a brain. They don't have subjective experiences. How would they have reference points?

Are you saying that when I look at objects, I'm merely looking at other reference points? How is a reference point different than an object as it is, or are they the same thing? If a tree is a reference point, then why do I perceive it as an object that is part of my reference point rather than experiencing the reference point of the tree? The tree is only part of my reference point. So what is the reference point like for the tree and how is it different than the tree in my reference point? In other words, when I perceive a tree, I'm not experiencing another reference point (which would probably be like reading someone's mind), I experience the tree as an object.

When talking about the tree, are you talking about your reference point, or the tree's?

Intelligibility is grasping. — Terrapin Station

No. Intelligibility is what we grasp in knowing.

Grasping is being aware. So Knowledge is awareness of present awareness basically. — Terrapin Station

That is not what I said. Objects can be understood. That means they are intelligible. When that intelligibility is actualized by awareness in experience they are known.

I'd like to have a conversation with you, but if you're just going to keep falling back on word salad/gobbledygook it's pointless. — Terrapin Station

Then you have to pay attention to what I actually say.

Are you using "knowledge" strictly in the "acquaintance" sense? — Terrapin Station

In the context of experience, I am. In other contexts, not necessarily.

Mars and the Eiffel Tower don't have eyes and a brain. — Harry Hindu

Why would spatio-temporal locations imply eyes and a brain to you? It's frustrating that so much interaction here is people not even understanding what the other person is saying.

They don't have subjective experiences. How would they have reference points? — Harry Hindu

You had just written "A reference point is a location [in] space-time." And yes, that's correct. That's what I'm talking about. Spatio-temporal locations. (It's just that I'm stressing that properties are unique at each spatio-temporal location.)

Are you saying that when I look at objects, I'm merely looking at other reference points? — Harry Hindu

When you look at an object, you're seeing the object as it is from that reference point. (That is, from your spatio-temporal and relational situatedness)

Objects are always some set of ways from any arbitrary reference point. Your presence isn't required. No one's presence is. But when you're present, you experience things from a particular reference point.

There's no way for anything to be any way from "no reference point." There's always some reference point, including reference points on, inside, etc. the "object itself." Again, this is talking about saptio-temporal locations, or spatio-temporal (and relational) situatedness.

If a tree is a reference point, then why do I perceive it as an object and not a reference point? — Harry Hindu

So, this is asking "If the tree has a spatio-temporal location, then why do I perceive it as an object and not a spatio-temporal location?" Is that a question you'd be inclined to ask?

The tree is only part of my reference point. — Harry Hindu

The tree isn't part of your spatio-temporal location unless either you've climbed the tree, or you're inside it, or we're considering a reference point as broad as whatever city you're in, or we're simply talking about Earth or the solar system or something.

Experience is the data we have to work with. One can either work with experience, or one can simply cease thinking. — Dfpolis

This is a false dichotomy. Ceasing to think is not a choice for a sentient being. Think about it even if you lack the experience (you cannot do otherwise)! And no, I am not an idealist. the ultimate false dichotomy is ideal/real. :-)

No. Intelligibility is what we grasp in knowing. — Dfpolis

I hope you're not thinking that "Knowledge is awareness of present what-we-grasp-in-knowing" is any less gobbledygooky.

Objects can be understood. — Dfpolis

Objects can be "understood" in what sense? Not a semantic sense, obviously. But?

Then you have to pay attention to what I actually say. — Dfpolis

You have to say things in a manner that's intelligible. (Ironically enough.)

This is a false dichotomy. Ceasing to think is not a choice for a sentient being. Think about it even if you lack the experience (you cannot do otherwise)! — Arne

The dichotomy was rhetorical. Of course, we cannot stop thinking, but all the content we think about is rooted in experience. So, the alternative was an impossible counter factual.

I never said that is what idealism entails. I have said that there is no coherent middle ground between solipsism and realism (ie idealism). My experience is about an external world, or it isn't. — Harry Hindu

Even if your experience isn't about an external world it doesn't then follow that there isn't an external world, which is why there is a middle ground. There is an external world that is causally responsible for your experience but these external world things are not the objects of perception and are not represented by the objects of perception. It's not solipsism because things other than oneself exist but it's also not realism because the everyday things we talk about and are familiar with – trees, chairs, etc. – aren't mind-independent entities.

Your underlying presumption is that our experiential mode of being is capable of grasping ultimate reality and therefore our experiential mode of being grasps ultimate reality. Once you let go of that presumption, the false dichotomy of ideal/real is obvious.

I hope you're not thinking that "Knowledge is awareness of present what-we-grasp-in-knowing" is any less gobbledygooky — Terrapin Station

It is not. Before we encounter a duck, it is a duck and capable of evoking the concept <duck>. That capability is its intelligibility as a duck. When we sense the duck, that intelligibility becomes present in us. When we attend to its sensory representation (become aware of it), we actualize that intelligibility and know the duck as a duck.

Objects can be "understood" in what sense? — Terrapin Station

We can become aware of specific properties. "Known" in the sense of "acquainted with" might be a better word.

You have to say things in a manner that's intelligible. (Ironically enough.) — Terrapin Station

I try very hard to do precisely that.

Your underlying presumption is that our mode of being is capable of grasping ultimate reality and therefore our mode of being grasps ultimate reality. — Arne

First, I said nothing about "ultimate reality," whatever that may mean to you. Second, what we experience is known a posteriori, not presumed.

Second, what we experience is known a posteriori, not presumed. — Dfpolis

Seriously? Flailing in the wind are we? At no point did I suggest our experiences are presumed. Instead, what I said is that YOU are presuming our experiential mode of being is capable of grasping ultimate reality. Perhaps you should give the idea some more thought. I am done now.

It is not. Before we encounter a duck, it is a duck and capable of evoking the concept <duck>. That capability is its intelligibility as a duck. When we sense the duck, that intelligibility becomes present in us. When we attend to its sensory representation (become aware of it), we actualize that intelligibility and know the duck as a duck. — Dfpolis

Okay, so first, you're applying a concept that you've constructed. Do you agree with that? It's not as if you're perceiving concepts or anything like that. A concept is something you do, personally, in response to things.

Secondly, you can perceive a duck and not think anything like the name "duck," or think of the concept of a duck, or any sort of mental content per se period, right?

We can become aware of specific properties. "Known" in the sense of "acquainted with" might be a better word. — Dfpolis

I don't see what that would have to do with the word "understand(ing)" or "intelligibility." Those seem like misleading words to use there. (At least relative to their conventional senses.)

@Dfpolis@Mww@Harry Hindu@Michael@leo

Does anyone here really understand one another? Are we using words differently or are there really differences in metaphysics and epistemic and ontological matters? I think we all know how perception works. At least most of us do.

I think @Terrapin Station is saying that there is a real way something IS from a particular spatial temporal reference point, and how that thing is from that particular point is knowable by thinking about a theoretical model of that reference point in relation to the object. That doesn’t require a perceiver but a thought grounded in theory. Theory comes about from experience from perceiving and about thinking about the objects of perception, which have an actual way they are from a spatial temporal reference point. Is that right?

That doesn’t however explain how the brain and mind construct these theories. It doesn’t say what is inherent to the mind and what is inherent to the objects themselves, which is what Kant explains.

Does this clear up some confusion or am I confused?

I think Terrapin Station is saying that there is a real way something IS from a particular spatial temporal reference point, and how that thing is from that particular point is knowable — Noah Te Stroete

That's all correct. To finish the above, it's knowable, for one, from perception, which isn't theoretical. But in cases where perception isn't possible, sure, then we have to do something theoretical.

The point I was bringing up re having to introduce theoretical material was contra a notion that seems popular around here: namely, that idealism or at least realism skepticism due to representationalist notions of perception are somehow a default experiential view. Those views aren't default experiential views. You have to invoke theory and make theoretical commitments in addition to your experiences, your perceptions, to arrive at idealism or representationalism.

You have to invoke theory and make theoretical commitments in addition to your experiences, your perceptions, to arrive at idealism or representationalism. — Terrapin Station

But you understand that transcendental idealism a la Kant is more than just idealism a la Berkeley or @leo? And how do you personally explain how theoretical knowledge is created?

That's all correct. To finish the above, it's knowable, for one, from perception, which isn't theoretical. But in cases where perception isn't possible, sure, then we have to do something theoretical. — Terrapin Station

Good. Glad that’s cleared up.

But you understand that transcendental idealism a la Kant is more than just idealism a la Berkeley or leo? And how do you personally explain how theoretical knowledge is created? — Noah Te Stroete

I don't want to get into the issues re "explanations" again.

Personally, I don't think that Kant explains anything, by the way.