I don't want to get into the issues re "explanations" again. — Terrapin Station

Ok. That’s the tough work. Has anyone explained that in this thread? If so, I missed it.

Personally, I don't think that Kant explains anything, by the way. — Terrapin Station

Kant doesn’t explain how theories are created. His is a metaphysical claim about what is inherent to mind and what is inherent to that which presents itself to the mind.

You had just written "A reference point is a location [in] space-time." And yes, that's correct. That's what I'm talking about. Spatio-temporal locations. (It's just that I'm stressing that properties are unique at each spatio-temporal location.) — Terrapin Station

Ok, then those properties are what we are talking about, which include the object's location in space and time. Objects have other properties than just spatial-temporal locations. There is more to the world than just reference points.

When looking at an apple and an orange sitting on a table next to each other there is a difference in location, not in time. They both exist in the same point of time but not in space. There's also difference in color texture and shape. All of which are not reference points if reference points are just spatial-temporal locations.

At no point did I suggest our experiences are presumed. Instead, what I said is that YOU are presuming our experiential mode of being is capable of grasping ultimate reality. — Arne

As I already said, I said nothing about ultimate reality. And the point of my experience remark is that what we mean by reality is what we experience.

Ok, then those properties are what we are talking about, which include the object's location in space and time. Objects have other properties than just spatial-temporal locations. — Harry Hindu

Right, so the point is that properties of objects vary at different spatio-temporal locations, including spatio-temporal locations on/in/etc. the objects themselves. That's because relations are an integral aspect of properties, and relations vary at different spatio-temporal locations. It's a spatio-temporal/relational situatedness, which isn't something that can be "escaped" in any sense. That has nothing to do with persons necessarily. But when persons are present, they experience this spatio-temporal/relational situatedness perceptually.

As I already said, I said nothing about ultimate reality. And the point of my experience remark is that what we mean by reality is what we experience. — Dfpolis

What exactly then is your position re Kant about what is inherent to the mind as laid out in Critique of Pure Reason? Is space and time at least partially constructed in the mind? Or are space and time inherent to the physical world ONLY?

What exactly then is your position re Kant about what is inherent to the mind as laid out in Critique of Pure Reason? Is space and time at least partially constructed in the mind? Or are space and time inherent to the physical world ONLY? — Noah Te Stroete

I'd say that space and time are inherent in the physical world, which is everything that exists, including your mind.

It's been so long since I read Kant that I can't remember his argument for this (which isn't aided by the fact that it probably didn't make a lot of sense to me when I did read it--Kant's not exactly my idea of a clear writer), but I can't see what the reason would be for one positing that we mentally create and basically "project" space and time onto things.

I'd agree that we'd not be able to make sense out of anything without thinking of things in terms of space/time, but that's because space is simply extension(al relations) and time is simply motion/change. It's incoherent to suppose that there could be existents without spatial extension/extensional relations to other existents, or to suppose that nothing is moving or changing. That's not a reason to suppose that there's no real extension/extensional relations or motion/change.

That's not a reason to suppose that there's no real extension/extensional relations or motion/change. — Terrapin Station

I guess. The way I interpret Kant is that the spatio-temporal reference points you were talking about as real things of nature only exist in minds.

In other words, a la Kant, if there were no minds it would be incoherent to have spatio-temporal reference points. Is that a good reading of Kant, @Mww?

Right, so the point is that properties of objects vary at different spatio-temporal locations, including spatio-temporal locations on/in/etc. the objects themselves — Terrapin Station

There are properties that vary at different spatial-temporal locations but not all of them. Color and texture of the orange doesn't change as I move around it or if I were to move it relative to me. The location changes, but not the color or texture.

I guess. The way I interpret Kant is that the spatio-temporal reference points you were talking about as real things of nature only exist in minds. — Noah Te Stroete

Right, it just seems like a very odd thing to think. I was reviewing his motivations for arriving at his view a bit, and they seem like really poor reasoning to me, but it would be a big thing to get into detailed critiques of all of the points.

There are properties that vary at different spatial-temporal locations but not all of them. Color and texture of the orange doesn't change as I move around it or if I were to move it relative to me. The location changes, but not the color or texture. — Harry Hindu

I'd agree that maybe not all properties change at different reference points, but I definitely wouldn't say that color and texture are among them. Color will change if the orange is moving at particular velocities, for example--it can be blue or red-shifted, and it will change as the environment changes, including, of course, as we change from day to night.

Texture will easily change with distance and scale. If the reference point is far enough away, the texture will be as smooth as a billiard ball, for example.

The common objection to this is to say something like, "Well, at the surface of the orange, the texture is such and such"--but that's a different reference point. (And this is just my point--the properties will be different at different reference points.)

The common objection to this is to say something like, "Well, at the surface of the orange, the texture is such and such"--but that's a different reference point. (And this is just my point--the properties will be different at different reference points.) — Terrapin Station

The properties of the orange do not change at different reference points. The perception of the orange changes at different reference points.

Color will change if the orange is moving at particular velocities, for example--it can be blue or red-shifted, and it will change as the environment — Terrapin Station

Oranges do not emit light like galaxies do. There would be no blue or red shift.

The properties of the orange do not change at different reference points. The perception of the orange changes at different reference points. — Noah Te Stroete

Exactly. If the properties of the orange change, then how can we keep calling it an orange? It seems to me that it would be a different object at different reference points if what TP says is accurate.

A relationship between two or more reference points can change if just one reference point changes and not the others. So it seems to me that there could still be constants in reality even though appearances change.

A relationship between two or more reference points can change if just one reference point changes and not the other. So it seems to me that there could still be constants in reality even though appearances change. — Harry Hindu

Consider this. Everything is in constant motion. I suppose that my wife sitting on the couch and me sitting in the recliner are both at rest relative to each other, but we are flying through space on this planet. If I get up and go into the kitchen, then my reference point relative to everything else in the house is constantly changing as long as I’m moving. When I stop in the kitchen, I’m at a different reference point to my wife. One always has to pick a particular reference point on an or in an object (such as in the house) in order to perceive or conceptualize what is moving and what isn’t. Conceptualization requires a mind, as does perception. Hence, speaking about reference points as things in nature is tricky. Are they inherent in nature, or are they inherent in minds?

Exactly. If the properties of the orange change, then how can we keep calling it an orange? It seems to me that it would be a different object at different reference points of what TP says is accurate. — Harry Hindu

Yup.

Even if your experience isn't about an external world it doesn't then follow that there isn't an external world, which is why there is a middle ground. There is an external world that is causally responsible for your experience but these external world things are not the objects of perception and are not represented by the objects of perception — Michael

This is incoherent. If there is an external world that our experience isnt about, then what does it mean for our experiences to be caused by the external world?

Consider this. Everything is in constant motion. I suppose that my wife sitting on the couch and me sitting in the recliner are both at rest relative to each other, but we are flying through space on this planet. If I get up and go into the kitchen, then my reference point relative to everything else in the house is constantly changing as long as I’m moving. When I stop in the kitchen, I’m at a different reference point to my wife. One always has to pick a particular reference point on an or in an object (such as in the house) in order to perceive or conceptualize what is moving and what isn’t — Noah Te Stroete

The only property that is changing between you and your wife and everything else is location. That's it. Your wife is still a human being. None of that changes when you change your spatial location. Your wife does not cease existing as a human, or an organism, when you change your location.

This is incoherent. If there is an external world that our experience isnt about, then what does it mean for our experiences to be caused by the external world? — Harry Hindu

Perception is about the things causing the perception. One doesn’t directly apprehend the thing in itself. One perceives things. A lot is lost in perception (for example, do you perceive atoms when looking at a chair?), and the mind constructs a “story” about the object that is perceived but not directly apprehended.

The only property that is changing between you and your wife and everything else is location. That's it. Your wife is still a human being. None of that changes when you change your spatial location. — Harry Hindu

Of course. I was talking about whether reference points are inherent in the world absent minds or not.

“Reference” implies a referring to something. Can something refer to something else without conceptualization or perception? That is what I can’t figure out. I’m leaning towards no.

a la Kant, if there were no minds it would be incoherent to have spatio-temporal reference points. — Noah Te Stroete

Kantian speculative philosophy, and Enlightenment philosophy in general, tacitly presupposes the human mind. There is mounds of theoretical expositions on how the mind works, but not a shred on what the origin of mind is, the reasoning being, if one is engaged in rational thought he must have a mind, which makes its ontology, and theories concerning it, quite irrelevant.

So Kant....nor anyone else of any repute....is not going to say anything about coherency in the absence of the human mind. Because all meaning of anything whatsoever, is always relative to a human mind, the very idea of coherency absent the mind, is unintelligible.

But if you mean to say the human mind creates spatio-temporal reference points, then Kant would agree, for the excruciatingly simple reason Nature doesn’t incorporate them in her catalog of physical objects. If she did, you can bet yer arse there’d be a preferred one, which from our perspective of course, there isn’t.

But if you mean to say the human mind creates spatio-temporal reference points, then Kant would agree, for the excruciatingly simple reason Nature doesn’t incorporate them in her catalog of physical objects. If she did, you can bet yer arse there’d be a preferred one, which from our perspective of course, there isn’t. — Mww

Yes, I was trying to say something like this. “Unintelligible” is a better word than “incoherent.”

This is incoherent. If there is an external world that our experience isnt about, then what does it mean for our experiences to be caused by the external world? — Harry Hindu

Do you not understand the difference between causation and subject matter/representation? When I talk to you my speech is caused by my body (lungs, vocal chords, mouth, etc.) but those words aren’t (always) about my body. When I flip a switch on a wall it turns on a light but that light isn’t a representation of me flipping the switch.

There can be an external world that stimulates whatever it is that I am in such a way that it elicits in me a certain kind of experience without it then following that such an experience is representative of or about that external world cause.

The tree we experience isn’t the atoms and photons that cause the experience. It’s a coherent, non-solipsistic, anti-realist account of trees.

anti-realist account of trees. — Michael

But is it anti-realist?

It's not that the orange is emitting light. It's reflecting it. Reflected light is doppler-shifted just as well as emitted light. You could say that it's emitting reflected light if you like. At any rate, just how the light is produced is irrelevant to the doppler effect. The relative motion is what matters.

It's not that the orange is emitting light. It's reflecting it. Reflected light is doppler-shifted just as well as emitted light. — Terrapin Station

Exactly how fast does an orange have to travel in order for there to be blue or red shift detected? I’m ignorant on this subject.

Not very fast. Radar guns work via doppler effect measurement, for example. Radar guns use microwaves, but it's all just part of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Not very fast. Radar guns work via doppler effect measurement, for example. Radar guns use microwaves, but it's all just part of the electromagnetic spectrum. — Terrapin Station

Okay. Now I know! Thank you.

Not very fast. Radar guns work via doppler effect measurement, for example. Radar guns use microwaves, but it's all just part of the electromagnetic spectrum. — Terrapin Station

Except that has nothing to do with color which is visible light.

Exactly. If the properties of the orange change, then how can we keep calling it an orange? — Harry Hindu

How would you think that the properties of an orange (or anything else) don't change? You wouldn't be able to have orange trees flowering, some of the flowers turning into fruit, the fruit developing, eventually ripening, falling, decomposing, etc.