Where you're going wrong is in having trouble with the longer, less simple, sentence construction.

There's no phenomenon of self.

Try Categories i, 2: "By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject [italics mine]." It is clear from the context that he is speaking of accidents as present in a subject. — Dfpolis

I have to look up the parts before and after that as soon as I can get to it, but how is that about substances and whether they're separable from properties?

how is that about substances and whether they're separable from properties? — Terrapin Station

Because in this translation "subject" and "substance" mean the same thing. A substance is what other things (including accidents) are predicated of.

Also, try this from i, 5: "To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself." In other words, accidental changes are changes to the substance itself, not to something separate.

Because in this translation "subject" and "substance" mean the same thing. A substance is what other things (including accidents) are predicated of. — Dfpolis

Accidents are properties. If properties are "other things" then substances are not necessarily properties.

There's no phenomenon of self. — Terrapin Station

It depends on how one defines "phenomenon." What is your definition?

See the post just a few above that explains this to him.

By the way, not that there are any real accidental versus essential properties. That's confusing how someone thinks about things --specifically, with respect to the concepts they've constructed --with the world independent of us.

Accidents are properties. If properties are "other things" then substances are not necessarily properties. — Terrapin Station

I used "thing" in an analogous sense -- not to refer to wholes (substances), but to refer to whatever can be predicated. Still substances are not properties. Aristotle also states that clearly. Properties are aspects of substances, which cannot exist apart from them.

Still substances are not properties. — Dfpolis

Which means they're separable=they're not identical, but this is wrong.

OK, so there's the phenomenon of a tree without there being a phenomenon of self. That is, there is awareness of a tree, but no awareness of self. So far so good, I agree that is totally possible.

However the self is still there, or the phenomenon of the tree could not be possible, it's just that the self is not paying attention to itself, and is therefore not apparent, or not present as a phenomenon. To my mind, a phenomenon entails a subject that the appearance appears to. Is that where we disagree?

By the way, not that there are any real accidental versus essential properties. That's confusing how someone thinks about things --specifically, with respect to the concepts they've constructed --with the world independent of us. — Terrapin Station

This depends on how you define "essential." Aristotle is clear that by "essential" in this regard, he is speaking of species-defining properties.

Still substances are not properties. — Dfpolis

Which means they're separable=they're not identical, but this is wrong. — Terrapin Station

No, 'Separable' means that they could have an independent being, which Aristotle explicitly denies. They are distinguishable -- mentally, not ontologically separable.

No, 'Separable' means that they could have an independent being, — Dfpolis

Now you're telling me what I'm referring to. I'm referring to being logically separable. The idea of substances sans properties is incoherent. That's the whole point (that I already made).

This depends on how you define "essential." Aristotle is clear that by "essential" in this regard, he is speaking of species-defining properties. — Dfpolis

There's no sense in which essential versus accidental properties are objective/extramental. The "essential/accidental" distinction is subjective; it's solely one of how an individual formulates their concepts.

However the self is still there — bert1

But not phenomenally or experientially. That was the point. In order to get to "the self is still there" we need to do something theoretical, to think about this and posit "what's really going on" where that's different than what phenomenally or experientially was the case.

Now you're telling me what I'm referring to. I'm referring to being logically separable. The idea of substances sans properties is incoherent. That's the whole point (that I already made). — Terrapin Station

That is not Aristotle's idea, but yours. Aristotle sees substances as wholes.

That is not Aristotle's idea, but yours. — Dfpolis

I was referring to "mentally, not ontologically separable." Is that not Aristotle's idea? You just said it was.

There's no sense in which essential versus accidental properties are objective/extramental. — Terrapin Station

The point made by Aristotle is that some properties can change, and the whole remains the same kind of thing (fits the same definition). That relates to extramental reality, but not not exclusively, because it is humans who define things.

and the whole remains the same kind of thing (fits the same definition). — Dfpolis

Definitions are something we do with language. So you're saying that Aristotle is doing ontology "The whole remains..." by analyzing language. Which is something I said above that you disagreed with.

That is not Aristotle's idea, but yours. — Dfpolis

I was referring to "mentally, not ontologically separable — Terrapin Station

And I was referring to the notion of substance sans properties. Aristotle never speaks of it. That is why it is your idea. The reason substances are not accidents is that accidents do not exhaust substances, not because substances can exist (even mentally) without accidents.

we see open possibilities being closed by experience. — Dfpolis

Experience is knowledge, knowledge is the reception and processing of intelligible information. The total of possibilities in reality are inversely proportional to our knowledge of the information that specifies it. Exactly what I’ve been saying all along.
———————-

Logical possibility: always derived from pure reason, and is the form of physical possibility....
All there is, is what reality is, which means all the information that would or could specific reality already is, as well. All there is must be possible, or it wouldn’t be, regardless of our knowledge of it. The absolute totality of reality is expressible by the totality of information contained it in. Logically, reality and its information are quantitatively equal; there cannot be more reality than information specifying it, and there cannot be more information than reality to which it applies.

Physical possibility: always derived from experience, and is the matter of logical possibility.....
Each part of the matter of reality is existentially independent, even if not necessarily ontologically independent. While it is certainly the case that some part of the matter of reality is identical in substance to another part of the matter, it is never the case that all parts of the matter of reality be identical in substance to each other. That the diverse and discreet arrangements of the substance of the matter of reality can be given to human perception merely by their impression on it, is sufficient to define and establish the physical possibility of them. It follows necessarily that the establishment of the physical possibility of any arrangement of any substance of any matter of reality not present to human perception, is not sufficiently given. That is not to say such physical arrangement not so impressed is thereby impossible, but only that the possibility of it is not established.

Logical possibility is thought, physical possibility is experience. The two can be interconnected, can influence each other, but cannot be confused by a rational mind. And while it is not absurd that the form of matter lies within it, it is patently obvious, with respect to the human cognitive system, that whatever its label or whatever the doctrine is that describes the matter of reality, and its possibilities, everything must relate to how a human understands it. Parsimony dictates, therefore, that the form reside internally and it be that to which the impressions on our perception relate. Descartes’ perfections, Hume’s sentiments/passions, Kant’s intuitions.......all the same in kind as Aristotle’s forms, except for their location.
———————

Me: Information could in fact be present to cognition, which makes the presence of the information known, and still be unintelligible.
You: The is a contradiction in terms. To be known, something has to be knowable (aka intelligible) which means it can't be unintelligible.

Yours is correct, but it doesn’t reflect on what I said. I can easily know a presence and surmise there to be a content in it, without knowing what the content is.

Point/counterpoint. No harm, no fowl.

So you're saying that Aristotle is doing ontology "The whole remains..." by analyzing language. Which is something I said above that you disagreed with. — Terrapin Station

I did not say "the whole remains," you did. I said that some properties could change and the substance would still satisfy the definition. That is a linguistic claim.

And I was referring to the notion of substance sans properties. — Dfpolis

Which is another way of saying "mentally separable"

I did not say "the whole remains," you did. — Dfpolis

You just wrote this: "The point made by Aristotle is that some properties can change, and the whole remains the same kind of thing (fits the same definition). That relates to extramental reality, but not not exclusively, because it is humans who define things."

That was the point. In order to get to "the self is still there" we need to do something theoretical — Terrapin Station

That's one way to get to the self, yes, to infer it. But I think we can also do it, as it were, reflexively. We attend to a phenomenon, and then deliberately attend not just to the phenomenon but the self that experiences it. We can be aware of ourselves in a way that does not necessarily involve inference.

That's one way to get to the self, yes, to infer it. But I think we can also do it, as it were, reflexively. — bert1

Sure. I wasn't at all denying that. Hence why I asked the question this way--note the bolded words:

The first thing I'd wonder is if that's really the way all phenomena are to you. For example, it's never [?] for you just that there's a tree, say. It's always [?] that you have something like "I'm a conscious entity, aware of a tree" present?

For me, there's often just a tree (or whatever).

By the way, I asked dfpolis this just a couple posts into the thread, and then on just on page 11 he gets around to asking how I'm using the word "phenomena"

TP, we have reached agreement!

There should be some sort of official PF thing for when this happens. Like a flying pig gif or something.

:up:

knowledge is the reception and processing of intelligible information — Mww

I am saying we have no actual knowledge until we are aware of the processed information.

Physical possibility: always derived from experience — Mww

I'd say that physically possibility is prior to our experiencing/knowing it.

Each part of the matter of reality is existentially independent, even if not necessarily ontologically independent. — Mww

I don't know what the difference between ontological and existential would be.

Logical possibility is thought, physical possibility is experience — Mww

Experience informs thought. Uninformed thought can have no impact on what is logically possible.

everything must relate to how a human understands it. — Mww

There is no reason to reject the existence of things to which we do not relate. It is just that our knowledge is human knowledge, which is to say knowledge of how reality relates to us.

Parsimony dictates, therefore, that the form reside internally and it be that to which the impressions on our perception relate. — Mww

I think that, since reality constantly surprises us, it is more than an internal mental state, The reason for this is that no state is truly mental unless we are aware of it. A state can be potentially mental (intelligible) without awareness, but it can't be actually mental sans awareness.

all the same in kind as Aristotle’s forms, except for their location. — Mww

No, not their location, but their very dynamics differ. Anything "internal" in the sense of "mental" is an object of awareness. Most Aristotelian forms are not. Most are intelligible, but not actually known. That makes them radically different, and gives them an explanatory value internal forms necessarily lack.

I can easily know a presence and surmise there to be a content in it, without knowing what the content is. — Mww

Agreed.

And I was referring to the notion of substance sans properties. Aristotle never speaks of it. — Dfpolis

My understanding is that the notion of a substance without properties serves to demonstrate that such a thing cannot exist, and it’s that which makes it necessary to have properties (form) as part of the metaphysical picture together with substance (prime matter). I think Aquinas presents it that way; perhaps Aristotle does also.