And I was referring to the notion of substance sans properties. — Dfpolis

Which is another way of saying "mentally separable" — Terrapin Station

No, it is not. An Aristotelian substance is always a whole. Properties are what we separate mentally.

You just wrote this: "The point made by Aristotle is that some properties can change, and the whole remains the same kind of thing (fits the same definition) — Terrapin Station

This statement can be taken phenomenologically or ontologically, but it it certainly does not mean "the whole remains simpiciter." Some aspect of it no longer remains. Still, ostensible unities have a phenomenological continuity to from before to after phenomenological changes. Or, are you denying that?

My understanding is that the notion of a substance without properties serves to demonstrate that such a thing cannot exist, and it’s that which makes it necessary to have properties (form) as part of the metaphysical picture together with substance (prime matter). I think Aquinas presents it that way; perhaps Aristotle does also. — AJJ

I think they both would see substances (ostensible unities) as givens, not requiring an argument. Then, on mental analysis, we find and name various aspects of the whole (logical accidents) and rejoin them with the whole in judgements expressed by predication.

The idea that as we abstract properties from wholes we remove them, like picking the raisins out of a pudding, leaving behind an empty, unintelligible matrix which is substance, is an absurd misunderstanding of the Aristotelian doctrine.

This statement can be taken phenomenologically or ontologically, but it it certainly does not mean "the whole remains simpiciter." Some aspect of it no longer remains. Still, ostensible unities have a phenomenological continuity to from before to after phenomenological changes. Or, are you denying that? — Dfpolis

You're not understanding that comment at all.

The material beginning with "the whole remains . . . " is presumably about ontology, right?

Meanwhile, it turned out that "the whole remains" was saying something about, or that hinged on, definitions.

Definitions are something we do with language. Insofar as we're talking about definitions, we're talking about language.

Well, something I said about Aristotle's metaphysics earlier, something that you disagreed with, was this: "Arguably he also seems to conflate ontology and linguistic analysis."

It the material beginning with "the whole remains . . ." is supposed to be ontology*, then that's an example of conflating ontology and linguistic analysis if the ontological stuff is supposed to be about or hinge on something about definitions.

That's the sort of thing that I'm talking about when I say, "Arguably he also seems to conflate ontology and linguistic analysis."



*otherwise, if "the whole remains..." is supposed to be linguistic analysis, then it's not addressing any ontological issues, which is what I had commented on.

The idea that as we abstract properties from wholes we remove them, like picking the raisins out of a pudding, leaving behind an empty, unintelligible matrix which is substance, is an absurd misunderstanding of the Aristotelian doctrine. — Dfpolis

So there appears to be an irony in that the objection being made against Aristotelian metaphysics here is actually the justification for Aristotelian metaphysics.

From SEP's article https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/, for example:

"Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form."

Matter and form are not a compound. The "two" are inseparable in all respects--logical, physical, conceptual, etc. They're the same thing.

The material beginning with "the whole remains . . . " is presumably about ontology, right? — Terrapin Station

No, it is about what we see. Aristotle has not yet turned to the analysis of the relation between what is perceived and what is. He does that in De Anima iii. Here he is prescinding from that sort of analysis, and discussing how we use language to describe experience. He is not saying that experience revels being, nor is he denying it. It just isn't what he's discussing.

Descartes's confusion of knowledge and belief, and Kant's confused musings about phenomena and noumena had not occurred yet, and so are not part of the problematic he had to deal with.

From that same SEP article:

"Aristotle introduces his notions of matter and form in the first book of his Physics, his work on natural science. Natural science is concerned with things that change, and Aristotle divides changes into two main types: there are accidental changes, which involve concrete particulars, or “substances” (ousiai) in Aristotle’s terminology, gaining or losing a property (see Categories 1–5, Physics i 7). For instance, the changes whereby Socrates falls in a vat of dye and turns blue, or puts on a few pounds from excessive feasting during the Panathenaia, count as accidental changes (in the categories of quality and quantity, respectively). Socrates, a substance, gains the property of being blue, or the property of weighing twelve stone. The other main kind of change is substantial change, whereby a substance comes into, or passes out of, existence. For example, when Socrates dies, or is born (or perhaps conceived, or somewhere in between conception and birth), a substantial change has taken place."


Among other issues, Socrates turning blue, putting on pounds, etc. ARE substantial changes.

And the accidental distinction is subjective--it depends on one's concept. Accidental properties are those that an x (some entity) can have that one doesn't include as a requirement for one to consider or not consider some x an F (to consider the entity a particular type of thing, or to call it by a particular name).

No, it is about what we see. — Dfpolis

So then of what relevance is it to a discussion about Aristotle's ontology?

"We're disagreeing about Aristotle's ontology . . . I know, I'll bring up something that doesn't have to do with ontology as an illustration."

Here’s something from Edward Feser’s book on Aquinas. It clarifies the distinction between matter and form (substance and properties) very well I’d say:

For instance, the rubber ball of our example is composed of a certain kind of matter (namely rubber) and a certain kind of form (namely the form of a red, round, bouncy object). The matter by itself isn’t the ball, for the rubber could take on the form of a doorstop, an eraser, or any number of other things. The form by itself isn’t the ball either, for you can’t bounce redness, roundness, or even bounciness down the hallway, these being mere abstractions. It is only the form and matter together that constitute the ball.

"Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form."

Matter and form are not a compound. The "two" are inseparable in all respects--logical, physical, conceptual, etc. They're the same thing. — Terrapin Station

I am sorry that "compound" confuses you. It may not be the best term. I discuss the relation of matter and form in my article, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle," The Modern Schoolman LXVIII (1991), 3, pp. 225-244. Briefly, "form" (eidos or morphê) names what a thing actually is while hyle (conventionally and poorly translated "matter") names its tendency/potential (Aristotle calls it a "desire" in Physics i, 9) to become something else. Clearly, these are not the same and also are present in all physical objects. "Compound" names this mentally distinguishable, but ontologically inseparable, co-presence.

Re your extended SEP quotation:

The Physics is not, for the most part, a book on "natural science" as we now define it. It is a philosophical analysis of nature.

Among other issues, Socrates turning blue, putting on pounds, etc. ARE substantial changes. — Terrapin Station

Only if you equivocate on Aristotle's use of the term, He explains:

As regards one of these simple 'things that become' we say not only 'this becomes so-and-so', but also 'from being this, comes to be so-and-so', as 'from being not-musical comes to be musical'; as regards the other we do not say this in all cases, as we do not say (1) 'from being a man he came to be musical' but only 'the man became musical'.

When a 'simple' thing is said to become something, in one case (1) it survives through the process, in the other (2) it does not. — Physics i 7

So, your absurd claim is that Socrates does not survive being dyed blue or gaining weight.

And the accidental distinction is subjective--it depends on one's concept — Terrapin Station

No, it is not subjective. A substance is an ostensible unity (tode ti). When Socrates dies, he does not continue as a unity but decays into constituents which are no longer a unified organism.

The material beginning with "the whole remains . . . " is presumably about ontology, right? — Terrapin Station

If you take it so. It can also be about what we perceive. As Aristotle is not distinguishing the two (as he is not a post-Kantian), it is not meant as an ontological vs a phenomenological claim. That distinction is an anachronism you are imposing.

Meanwhile, it turned out that "the whole remains" was saying something about, or that hinged on, definitions. — Terrapin Station

Which properties are essential hinges on our definitions because Aristotle defines essence as the basis in reality for a certain kind of definition. Whether Socrates survives turning blue or or a weight gain does not depend on a definition.

No, it is about what we see. — Dfpolis

So then of what relevance is it to a discussion about Aristotle's ontology? — Terrapin Station

You are the one confusing the analyses in the Organon with ontology.

For instance, the rubber ball of our example is composed of a certain kind of matter (namely rubber) and a certain kind of form (namely the form of a red, round, bouncy object). The matter by itself isn’t the ball, for the rubber could take on the form of a doorstop, an eraser, or any number of other things. The form by itself isn’t the ball either, for you can’t bounce redness, roundness, or even bounciness down the hallway, these being mere abstractions. It is only the form and matter together that constitute the ball.

At any moment, the matter and the form are identical, and you don't have identical matter or form in another moment, in another instance, etc.

The matter by itself IS the ball. The doorstop matter wouldn't be identical to the rubber ball matter. And the form IS the ball. You can't bounce redness, but redness is just a part of the matter. Redness isn't a mere abstraction. It's a property of matter, and inseparable from it. Same for roundness, etc.

The mistake of this sort of view is that it sees matter as something that can be given, or can have taken away, properties, while still being the same matter. That's incorrect.

Edward Feser’s book on Aquinas. It clarifies the distinction between matter and form (substance and properties) very well I’d say — AJJ

Feser, following Aquinas, does not pay enough attention to the difference between artifacts (which have their form imposed from without), and natural objects (which have their form as a result of internal principles of motion). Matter can be passive in the reception of an imposed form, but it has to be active to generate a new natural form. That is the point of my hyle article,

"form" (eidos or morphê) names what a thing actually is — Dfpolis

What is "naming what a thing actually is"? Things actually are whatever they are, and you can name them whatever you want to name them. There's not a correct/incorrect way to name something.

I'm not going to address every problem because this would be thousands of words long. One thing at a time.

So, your absurd claim is that Socrates does not survive being dyed blue or gaining weight. — Dfpolis

Just in case we don't get to this, nothing is literally/objectively identical through time.

At any moment, the matter and the form are identical — Terrapin Station

No, they never are. What something has the potential to become is never identical with what it is. The problem is that you are using your notion of matter (which is a poor translation of hyle), not Aristotle's. For him, hyle is always potential -- active in natural objects and passive in artifacts.

The mistake of this sort of view is that it sees matter as something that can be given, or can have taken away, properties, while still being the same matter. That's incorrect. — Terrapin Station

Really?? So the rubber injected into the ball mold is not the rubber in the ball?

Feser, following Aquinas, does not pay enough attention to the difference between artifacts (which have their form imposed from without), and natural objects (which have their form as a result of internal principles of motion). Matter can be passive in the reception of an imposed form, but it has to be active to generate a new natural form. That is the point of my hyle article, — Dfpolis

Is this not the same or very similar to noting the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic final causes? Because I have heard/read him make mention of that.

Just in case we don't get to this, nothing is literally/objectively identical through time. — Terrapin Station

You are equivocating yet again. The identity here is not immutability. It is numerical identity or dynamic continuity.

Also, Aristotle is quite aware of the difference. Accidental changes do not affect numerical identity, but substantial changes do.

No, they never are. — Dfpolis

Yes, they always, necessarily are.

So, this is what I mean by Aristotle making a mistake about this. You misunderstood my language, but this was what I was saying. Aristotle separates them so that they're not identical. That's a mistake. They're identical. It's incoherent to suppose them to be otherwise.

What something has the potential to become is never identical with what it is. — Dfpolis

This is wrong. Even putting aside your wonky ontology of potentials/possibles, which I don't at all agree with, what something is is necessarily identical with something it has the potential to be, otherwise it couldn't be what it is.

Aside from that, nothing is identical through time. We form conceptual abstractions of things being identical through time, as it's easier to deal with the world that way--it's an evolutionary necessity, but nothing is actually identical through time.

My notion of matter isn't a translation of anything, lol.

So the rubber injected into the ball mold is not the rubber in the ball? — Dfpolis

Correct, it is not identical to it. Things change through time. After all--that's what time is in the first place. Change/motion.

You are equivocating yet again. The identity here is not immutability. It is numerical identity — Dfpolis

Things are not NUMERICALLY IDENTICAL through time. "Dynamic continuity" is not identity.


Look, at this point it seems as if we're not going to agree on a single thing.

Why don't we make that a challenge? See if you can come up with some simple claim that we'd agree on? And then we could try to go from there. (Maybe if you'd say something that's the opposite of what you think is the case that would work?)

Is this not the same or very similar to noting the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic final causes? Because I have heard/read him make mention of that. — AJJ

It is analogous, but has different implications.

Fair.

I'm still wondering, by the way what the heck "naming what a thing actually is" is supposed to be talking about. As I said, things actually are whatever they are, and you can name them whatever you want to name them. There's not a correct/incorrect way to name something.

So, this is what I mean by Aristotle making a mistake about this. You misunderstood my language, but this was what I was saying. Aristotle separates them so that they're not identical. That's a mistake. They're identical. It's incoherent to suppose them to be otherwise. — Terrapin Station

You refuse to understand that you are using Aristotle's language equivocally. I tried to explain this, but you ignored my explanations.

What something has the potential to become is never identical with what it is. — Dfpolis

This is wrong. Even putting aside your wonky ontology of potentials/possibles, which I don't at all agree with, what something is is necessarily identical with something it has the potential to be, otherwise it couldn't be what it is. — Terrapin Station

You are so fixed on justifying your ideas that you are not even reading what I wrote. I said has "the potential to become," not "the potential to be what it is."

Things are not NUMERICALLY IDENTICAL through time. "Dynamic continuity" is not identity. — Terrapin Station

You will not even allow me to define my own terms.

You're right. You are not open to what others say, so we will never agree.

I tried to explain this, but you ignored my explanations. — Dfpolis

You tried to explain. I showed you things wrong with the explanation (that is, philosophically wrong with it), and then you ignore addressing the objection. That's your standard operating procedure. (And to my memory it always has been, but I forgot who you were for a bit . . . I kind of get the impression that you can't do much but regurgitate bits of Aristotle in a very confusing, word-salady way.)

You are so fixed on justifying your ideas that you are not even reading what I wrote. I said has "the potential to become," not "the potential to be what it is." — Dfpolis

If x is a ball, obviously it has the potential to become a ball.

So how about trying to start off with something really simple and obvious (in your view) that you think we could agree on?

So how about trying to start off with something really simple and obvious (in your view) that you think we could agree on? — Terrapin Station

I am done wasting my time.

That would only be the case if you give all of this up and focus on watching TV or something.

That would only be the case if you give all of this up and focus on watching TV or something. — Terrapin Station

I am happy to dialog with reasonable people, even if we disagree. Constant equivocation and twisting what is said is not reasonable.

I am happy to dialog with reasonable people, even if we disagree. Constant equivocation and twisting what is said is not reasonable. — Dfpolis

I hope you're not assuming that I ever thought you were reasonable.

I hope you're not assuming that I ever thought you were reasonable. — Terrapin Station

I had no such expectation.