I don't think once you've ever really been able to understand what I was saying. Including at the start of this thread, where I still believe that you have no idea what I was getting at re perception.

You also very comically were unable to grasp the Euthyphro idea in that other thread.

You also very comically were unable to grasp the Euthyphro idea in that other thread.

Are the reasonable approved by Terrapin because they are reasonable, or are they reasonable because approved by Terrapin?

So yes, either matter comes to exist spontaneously, or it's always existed (those are the only two options for whatever we're positing ontologically) and we can explain how minds come to exist by explaining stellar and planetary development, explaining how certain materials in certain conditions amount to life, explaining evolution and how it leads to brains, etc. — Terrapin Station

And then poof minds arise out of brains.

So what, at least roughly, would you analogously do for an ontology where mind somehow exists first and creates things like planets? — Terrapin Station

You can have a primary mind that imagined what we call the universe, and we would be part of that mind.

If only minds exist on your view, then how would you claim that you can ever observe anything, including other people/other minds, aside from your own mind? In other words, how would you establish anything other than solipsism? — Terrapin Station

Our minds would be connected in some way, I'm not saying we would all live within our own mind disconnected from others.


I have shown my good faith answering your questions, now it would be nice if you could start answering mine. Your view is the realist one, so discussing it would be more on topic than discussing mine. But it seems like you stop reading my posts after one or two sentences, so I'm not even sure you're gonna read that.

Matter can be passive in the reception of an imposed form — Dfpolis

Can we say matter can be passive in its reception of an imposed form?

How is the form imposed? Where does the imposed form originate? What forces are in play to impose the form?

And then poof minds arise out of brains. — leo

There's not much "poof" to it. That's simply the properties of the matter in question, from the frame of reference of being the matter in question.

Our minds would be connected in some way, I'm not saying we would all live within our own mind disconnected from others. — leo

But just "some way" doesn't really answer it. We just have no idea how it's supposed to work other than "some way," and then don't worry about it?

it would be nice if you could start answering mine. — leo

Sure but one thing at a time. Let's keep the posts short. I like to do this more or less just like we'd talk if we were having a conversation in person. (Which is what ideally I'd prefer, and then I'd prefer a phone conversation, then online chat.)

There's not much "poof" to it. That's simply the properties of the matter in question, from the frame of reference of being the matter in question. — Terrapin Station

I don't see how that's not rephrasing the "poof" in a more complicated way.

But just "some way" doesn't really answer it. We just have no idea how it's supposed to work other than "some way," and then don't worry about it? — Terrapin Station

"Some way" is how I feel about your explanation for how minds arise from brains. I agree that saying minds interact in some way is not a satisfying answer, but I also think there is a lot to discover by looking in that direction, I'm not saying it's a final answer.

Sure but one thing at a time. Let's keep the posts short. I like to do this more or less just like we'd talk if we were having a conversation in person. (Which is what ideally I'd prefer, and then I'd prefer a phone conversation, then online chat.) — Terrapin Station

Okay, but as I said this is a thread on realism, and you are the one holding a realist view, and I don't see how discussing my idealist view can help me understand your view and answer the questions I asked. As I had explained in other threads I used to be a realist and as I explained in this thread I'm willing to tentatively let go of idealism to try to understand your point of view, so I don't see how it is useful to discuss idealism in order to eventually address my questions.


Here they are again:

I'm willing to do my best to entertain and understand your point of view. So you say there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location, and that it's meaningless to talk about how the world is without reference to a spatio-temporal location.

So it means that from your spatio-temporal location "there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location" is true, whereas that might not be true from another spatio-temporal location? Or is the statement "there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location" made without reference to a spatio-temporal location?

Then, from your spatio-temporal location, if you see someone say that they have seen a ghost who was as real as a tree and that they weren't hallucinating, does it mean to you that they really saw a ghost from their spatio-temporal location, or that they hallucinated a ghost, and how do you reach that conclusion? — leo

So it means that from your spatio-temporal location "there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location" is true, whereas that might not be true from another spatio-temporal location?
— leo

Without getting into issues about truth, yes. What's the case at reference point x might not be the case at reference point y. For example, at reference point x, F is round, while at reference point y, F is oblong. This is easily shown via perspective in realist art, for example.

Re the ghost thing, I answered that already.

Without getting into issues about truth, yes. What's the case at reference point x might not be the case at reference point y. For example, at reference point x, F is round, while at reference point y, F is oblong. — Terrapin Station

So you agree that the statement "there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location" is true from your spatio-temporal location, but this statement might not be true from another spatio-temporal location? So for instance one could say that "there is no real way the world is from some particular spatio-temporal locations", and it could be true from their spatio-temporal location? And while their statement is not true to you, it could be true to you as well if you were at their spatio-temporal location?

Re the ghost thing, I answered that already. — Terrapin Station

What I'm trying to understand is, do you consider you would have seen a ghost as well if you were at their spatio-temporal location, do you consider that there really was a ghost which could be seen from that spatio-temporal location? Or that if you were at that spatio-temporal location you wouldn't have seen one?

I would say I observe a world that depends on my mind and on other minds — leo

So you're rehashing the old attempt to justify (subjective) idealism. :meh:

So you agree that the statement "there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location" is true from your spatio-temporal location, but this statement might not be true from another spatio-temporal location? — leo

Yes. That's what the word "yes" is doing in this sentence: "Without getting into issues about truth, yes."

So for instance one could say that "there is no real way the world is from some particular spatio-temporal locations", and it could be true from their spatio-temporal location? — leo

It's hard to get into that without getting into a big tangent about truth theory.

Trying to avoid that, I'm not saying anything like, "Whatever anyone claims is what's the case." What I'm saying is something about the relativity of mostly objective properties (I'm only saying "mostly objective" because I'm not excluding that we can be talking about persons' perspectives, too).

What I'm trying to understand is, do you consider you would have seen a ghost as well if you were at their spatio-temporal location, do you consider that there really was a ghost which could be seen from that spatio-temporal location? Or that if you were at that spatio-temporal location you wouldn't have seen one? — leo

Although I love the fantasy of ghosts, it's difficult for me to say what would be required for me to believe that I actually saw one. Chances are that I'd be skeptical of it no matter what, because I can't figure out how to make the idea of them coherent.

By the way, what you're asking about doesn't have much to do with realism per se. You're asking about what I call my ontological "perspectivalism" (for want of a better, less misleading term).

So you're rehashing the old attempt to justify (subjective) idealism. — jorndoe

Nay, it is idealism that is the default. The burden is on the realist.

Trying to avoid that, I'm not saying anything like, "Whatever anyone claims is what's the case." — Terrapin Station

But when you say that what a being experiences is what the world really is like from their spatio-temporal location, it seems like you're saying that as long as people don't lie then what they claim is what's the case.

Although I love the fantasy of ghosts, it's difficult for me to say what would be required for me to believe that I actually saw one. Chances are that I'd be skeptical of it no matter what, because I can't figure out how to make the idea of them coherent. — Terrapin Station

Just to make sure, when you talk of reference point it seems to me you're not just referring to a spatio-temporal location, rather you're referring to a spatio-temporal location in addition to what is present at that spatio-temporal location. So for instance two beings present at approximately the same spatio-temporal location could disagree about what the world really is like not in virtue of their different spatio-temporal location, but in virtue of them being different beings.

Which implies that in your view, what the world really is like doesn't just depend on spatio-temporal locations, it also depends on beings. It seems to me your ontological primitives are spatio-temporal locations and things such as beings, rather than a world that contains spatio-temporal locations and beings. Is that correct?

But when you say that what a being experiences is what the world really is like from their spatio-temporal location, it seems like you're saying that as long as people don't lie then what they claim is what's the case. — leo

When you brought up hallucinations the first time, I said, "So first, hallucinations and illusions are real hallucinations and illusions. (Where we're not using 'real' in the traditional manner to refer to something objective or that exists extramentally.)"

I'm not saying anything like "Whatever someone believes to be the case is the case where that's not a hallucination, not an illusion, etc."

I'm not saying anything like "Perceptions can not be mistaken."

What I'm saying is "Perceptions can be accurate." Contra claims that they can't be or that there's no reason to ever believe that they are.

rather you're referring to a spatio-temporal location in addition to what is present at that spatio-temporal location. — leo

There's no difference. Space and time never exist "on their own."

So for instance two beings present at approximately the same spatio-temporal location could disagree about what the world really is like not in virtue of their different spatio-temporal location, but in virtue of them being different beings. — leo

That would be possible, but it's important to remember that I'm not focusing on creatures. When I say something existing at a spatio-temporal location it can be something like a proton or whatever.

Which implies that in your view, what the world really is like doesn't just depend on spatio-temporal locations, — leo

I never said anything like "what the world really is like DEPENDS on spatio-temporal locations." I said that properties are different at different spatio-temporal locations, and there's no way to be absent a spatio-temporal location. I'm not talking about dependencies, though. What things are like depends on properties, and everything has unique properties, including beings.

It seems to me your ontological primitives are spatio-temporal locations and things such as beings, rather than a world that contains spatio-temporal locations and beings. Is that correct? — leo

My ontological primitives are matter and relations, where the relations are often dynamic.

Can we say matter can be passive in its reception of an imposed form? — Mww

Well, if we understand matter as stuff we can, and the kind of matter that is passive is stuff that is shaped in some way -- like rubber of marble. In a natural process, the matter (hyle) is never a thing or a stuff. It is always a tendency (what Aristotle calls a "desire" in Physics i, 9).

How is the form imposed? Where does the imposed form originate? What forces are in play to impose the form? — Mww

Since this is the artificial case, the form comes from the artificer. In the natural case it is implicit in law-like tendencies that anticipate the later idea of laws of nature.

Simple as that, huh? Cool.

Guess the explains why there are no statues based on the inverse square law.

In a natural process, the matter (hyle) is never a thing or a stuff. — Dfpolis

Yet another incoherent idea. Nothing exists aside from "things or stuff."

"Imposed form" would refer to forces applied to something (that already has a form, and the forces are applied from something that has matter/form, too.). It's not "passive." See Newton's third law.

Guess the explains why there are no statues based on the inverse square law. — Mww

Yep

I don’t suppose a real thing such as a man, to be passive stuff upon whom is imposed a form of justice, that shapes him in some way? Wrong kind of shape?

I don’t suppose a real thing such as a man, to be passive stuff upon whom is imposed a form of justice, that shapes him in some way? Wrong kind of shape? — Mww

I think we become just by actively willing to make just decisions.

True enough. But there is a judicial system now, and there was in Greek antiquity as well. Besides, you’re on record has denying a priori determinations in general, which would be imposing a form, your “actively willing”, on ourselves, as opposed to an administrative doctrine that imposes justice as its due course.

Again, I realize this is not in line with the subject matter, but nobody else is talking, so......

How does Aristotle treat what we now understand as established entirely subjective predications?

How does Aristotle treat what we now understand as established entirely subjective predications? — Mww

Aristotle does not talk much about subjective decisions, except for his discussion of proairesis. Proairesis is the process leading to a decision. He sees it very rationally, proceeding iteratively. If we want A, we have to effect B, If we want B we have to effect C, etc., until we come to something we can do now to get the process started -- and that is what we should do now. He sees the goal of human behavior as happiness, and ethics as studying the means for attaining happiness.

His general view of ethical reasoning is that it is very imprecise and it is an error to expect it to be as exact as the other sciences.

He also had agents in the field with Alexander the Great, documenting the "constitutions" of the nations encountered -- in other words, how they ruled themselves. In so doing, he placed political science on an empirical footing. That suggests to me that he wanted to find out what worked rather than approaching the subject more theoretically as Plato seems to have done.

I will have to admit to being more interested in his views on metaphysics, nature, and epistemology than in his work on ethics, art and politics.

My interests also, obviously from a more historically evolved point of view.

I, essentially, agree with the OP and I often think that it makes sense to say that "reality" refers to experience of reality.

This is why I think that if we're in a Matrix then it doesn't matter: this so-called 'unreal' world is more real than the so-called 'real' one that we never get to experience.

But I think we can use the term 'objective reality' in two different ways. If by 'objective reality' we are referring to the reality that is actually signitifantly real, the reality that matters, and the only reality that we can know actually exists, then that is, indeed, experiential reality.

If we are, on the other hand, referring to the possibility of a reality consisting of things-in-themselves, apart from how they are experienced, if that's what we mean by objective reality, then objective reality is not experiential.

But, in that case, I would say that objective reality doesn't exist. Because EVERYTHING is experiential. But, because subjects are actually a subcategory of objects, objects do exist so it would be really weird to say that. A world of real objects should really be considered objective reality. But, I guess, most people think of an 'object' as necessarily ontologically distinct from a 'subject'. Most people think that an object refers to an object that necessarily has no subjectivity. In which case, it's just that most people are wrong. Objects having subjectivity is no more problematic than brains having minds.

But, basically, from the point of view of those who believe in a noumenal world of things-in-themselves-apart-from-experience: I can understand why they call that objective reality. It just makes no sense to me, because I'm a panexperientialist, and, also, because experience is by definition the only thing that we can ever have any evidence of.

Evidence is empirical and empiricism is experience-based. What's more, something is only evident if it's evident to someone, a subject, so, again, evidence is entirely experience-based. Nothing non-experiential is evident—and nothing non-experiential ever can be evident.

I'm not saying anything like "Perceptions can not be mistaken."

What I'm saying is "Perceptions can be accurate." Contra claims that they can't be or that there's no reason to ever believe that they are. — Terrapin Station

Okay, but you do say that what a being perceives is what the world really is like from their spatio-temporal location, correct?

So how can you distinguish between perceptions that are accurate and perceptions that are mistaken? If a being perceives A from reference point P1, how can you tell whether A is accurate or mistaken? If you compare A with other perceptions from other reference points to reach the conclusion that A is mistaken, how do you know in the first place that the other perceptions are accurate and not mistaken?

It seems to me that in the first place you necessarily assume that some specific perceptions are accurate in order to conclude that a given perception is mistaken. And the issue I see with this is that if at the beginning we take a different set of perceptions that we label as accurate, then we wouldn't reach the same conclusions as to which perceptions are mistaken. Which means there is an irreducible arbitrariness in labeling some perceptions as hallucinations rather than some others.

There's no difference. Space and time never exist "on their own." — Terrapin Station

Is there such a thing as what the world really is like from a reference point where there is no being perceiving? For instance in your view is there such a thing as what the world really is like from the reference point of a rock?

I said that properties are different at different spatio-temporal locations, and there's no way to be absent a spatio-temporal location. I'm not talking about dependencies, though. What things are like depends on properties, and everything has unique properties, including beings. — Terrapin Station

My ontological primitives are matter and relations, where the relations are often dynamic. — Terrapin Station

Okay. To make sure we understand each other, I'm going to rephrase your view in two different ways, let me know which one is correct, if any.

1) In your view, matter is the fundamental thing, the constituent of every thing, and matter has unique properties. Matter can be related to other matter in various ways. A thing has unique properties, which depend on the relations between the matter that compose the thing. A rock and a being are examples of things. In turn, there are relations between things, so for instance there are relations between a rock and a being, which depend on the relations between the matter that makes up the being and the matter that makes up the rock.

2) In your view, there is no such thing as matter existing in isolation, there is always matter in relation to other matter, every thing is matter in relation to other matter. When you talk of a thing such as a rock or a being, you always refer to the thing in relation to its surroundings, so for instance strictly speaking a being is not a thing, but "a being and its surroundings and the relations between them" is a thing, which has unique properties.

If we are, on the other hand, referring to the possibility of a reality consisting of things-in-themselves, apart from how they are experienced, if that's what we mean by objective reality, then objective reality is not experiential. — luckswallowsall

Depends.
You cannot experience another's self-awareness (or you'd be them instead), so, unless you go by solipsism, there are already things always just over the horizon.
Feel free to call them ding-an-sich if you like.
Individuation, self-identity, ..., already always presupposed one way or other, or our chat loses meaning.
Shouldn't conflate ontology and epistemics.
But experiences occur like whatever else; the "subjective versus objective" thing can be misleading.

Okay, but you do say that what a being perceives is what the world really is like from their spatio-temporal location, correct? — leo

It's what some part of the world is like at that spatio-temporal location, sure, including possibly their brain--if they're hallucinating, for example.

So how can you distinguish between perceptions that are accurate and perceptions that are mistaken? — leo

I already addressed this. So why are we going through it again? Keep your responses shorter and let's settle one thing at a time so we don't have to repeat stuff.

So let's stop here for a minute and make sure there's no issue with the first part ("It's what some part of the world is like . . .") so that we don't have to repeat that bit.

So let's stop here for a minute and make sure there's no issue with the first part ("It's what some part of the world is like . . .") so that we don't have to repeat that bit. — Terrapin Station

Sure.

It's what some part of the world is like at that spatio-temporal location, sure, including possibly their brain--if they're hallucinating, for example. — Terrapin Station

You're saying what a being perceives at a spatio-temporal location is "what some part of the world is like at that spatio-temporal location".

What do you mean exactly by "including possibly their brain--if they're hallucinating". Are you talking about the being perceiving their own brain, or are you saying that the spatio-temporal location possibly includes their brain?

You're saying what a being perceives at a spatio-temporal location is "what some part of the world is like at that spatio-temporal location".

What do you mean exactly by "including possibly their brain--if they're hallucinating". Are you talking about the being perceiving their own brain, or are you saying that the spatio-temporal location possibly includes their brain? — leo

I wouldn't actually call a hallucination a perception--I reserve perception for information acquired from external things via one's senses. But at any rate, hallucinations give accurate info about the world, information about how one's brain is working. Hallucinations can be related to/in response to perceptions, but the bulk of of isn't a perception.