Don't quite understand what you mean, sorry. Care to elaborate? — ChatteringMonkey

In other words, how would it come to be as an existent? What's it supposed to be a property of? Where would we find it? How would it arise? etc.

It's a type of convention, which originate in dialogue and agreement between people roughly speaking. You can find it in the brains of people, but not in one particular person individually, which is why the label 'subjective' doesn't really apply. Like paper money, which doesn't have any inherent value (for people), it has tangible consequences because people agreed on it and believe in it.

It's a type of convention, which originate in dialogue and agreement between people roughly speaking. You can find it in the brains of people, but not in one particular person individually, which is why the label 'subjective' doesn't really apply. — ChatteringMonkey

"Subjective" refers to something being located in brains, by the way. Re agreement, that's just sounds that people make. The meaning part occurs in brains. So value only occurs in brains. It's fine noting that we can agree on things, but that's not where the valuing part occurs.

For "intersubjective, not subjective or objective" to amount to anything substantial, you'd need to be locating the valuing part somewhere other than just persons' brains or in the world outside of their brains. (Whatever would be left.)

For "intersubjective, not subjective or objective" to amount to anything substantial, you'd need to be locating the valuing part somewhere other than just persons' brains or in the world outside of their brains. (Whatever would be left.) — Terrapin Station

My goal, and I would say the goal of philosophy is not to amount to anything "substantial" whatever that means, but to make sense of the world. I don't see why 'intersubjective', though i prefer collective, doesn't do exactly what I want it to do, and that is to make relevant distinctions that help me make sense of the world.

I believe that moral statements can be emotive or cognitive, and it's all about speaker meaning. Some people say moral statements purely on emotions, others rely on moral principles.

To elaborate a bit more, if you say morality is subjective because the valuing happens in the brain, you need some additional explanation to say that eventhough it is 'merely' subjective there are other mechanisms that make it a bad idea to act only one your individual subjective idea of what is moral. And unlike say preference in taste, there are definitely consequences to acting on you own subjective morals only... so it seems to me the distinction between things that are individual and collective is a usefull one here.

Not a result of reasoning? Let's start at square one. Terrapin: is murder wrong, yes or no?
— tim wood

Sure, I feel that it is wrong. That's not a result of reasoning. It's an emotional disposition that I have. — Terrapin Station

Answer the question if you're able to. You were not asked how you felt. Your answer is not appropriate - shall we count the ways?

Yup I agree. I'm saying there is no stopping the fool by calling him a fool. He doesn't think he is, he thinks we're the fools. I'm not taking that stance, I'm pointing out that taking the stance of reason cannot stop someone from taking a stance of anti reason....

The only point I'm making is that reason is society bound which is why using it against those who don't want to use it will never work. Calling a fool a fool doesn't do anything.... I, personally, am a fan of reason but if someone isn't there is nothing I can do to convince him. Calling him a fool won't work (if he truly is anti reason) but I still WILL. That's all I'm saying — khaled

Super good points and instructive in many ways, thank you! You're absolutely right: the fool is still a fool. Now a small point or two back. "Reason is society bound." Attitudes towards reason may well be "society bound." And society may well determine how reasonable it will be. But reason itself is reason bound, or it's not reason - sez I.

And how shall we be governed - or govern ourselves where we have the option? Neither by fools nor foolishness if we can help it. And the fool? If he does wrong, do we say, "Oh, that's all right, for after all he's just a fool; let him go to do it again"?

My point is that there are moral rights and wrongs. And there must be. If Terrapin murders someone because he feels like it, do the rest of us put him in prison because we feel like it? And if Terrapin doesn't feel like going to prison, what then?

You were not asked how you felt. — tim wood

Yes, I was. You asked my moral stance on it. Moral stances are dispositions--preferences or feelings, basically, that individuals have about interpersonal behavior that they consider to be more significant than etiquette.

You might think that moral stances are something other than that. You'd be factually incorrect about that.

To elaborate a bit more, if you say morality is subjective because the valuing happens in the brain, you need some additional explanation to say that eventhough it is 'merely' subjective there are other mechanisms that make it a bad idea to act only one your individual subjective idea of what is moral. And unlike say preference in taste, there are definitely consequences to acting on you own subjective morals only... so it seems to me the distinction between things that are individual and collective is a usefull one here. — ChatteringMonkey

Subjective shouldn't have a "merely" first off, as if it's simpler or inferior or whatever.

Whether something is a bad idea is also subjective, of course.

Morality is dispositions about interpersonal behavior. So that means that by definition, it's not just about one's own behavior. And by definition, it's dispositions that people feel strong enough about that they'd take forcible action to prevent,and sometimes to obligate, some behavior (otherwise it would just be etiquette). So of course there's a social aspect to it, but moral stances, moral valuations themselves are individual and subjective.

Yes, I was. You asked my moral stance on it. — Terrapin Station

I did absolutely nothing of the kind. Here it is:

Let's start at square one. Terrapin: is murder wrong, yes or no? — Terrapin Station

So far, you appear to be incapable of answering. If you cannot answer, then I disqualify you as a communicant of ideas and reduce you in rank to ignorant ranter, worthy of neither attention nor respect, and requiring a toxicity warning to accompany all future posts. But I rather imagine that in fatigue you misread/misunderstood my question. Please try it again.

"Murder is wrong" is a moral stance.

You don't agree with that?

"Murder is wrong" is a moral stance.

You don't agree with that? — Terrapin Station

You're asked a fair - and basic - question. But you refuse to answer. And that seems to say everything anyone needs to know about Terrapin Station, until and unless you make the correction. Don't be a troll.

You're asked a fair - and basic - question. But you refuse to answer. — tim wood

Funny that you're trolling but characterizing it as me trolling.

Well, if "funny" means "typical."

Answer the question.

Answer the question. — tim wood

I did. You don't agree that I did. So I'm trying to explain that to you. Of course, either you're trolling or you're incredibly dense, so it might be difficult, but in either case, I'm willing to try to explain it to you.

Hence why I asked if you didn't agree that "Murder is wrong" is a moral stance.

Subjective shouldn't have a "merely" first off, as if it's simpler or inferior or whatever. — Terrapin Station

Merely in quotes... It is less people, particular only to an individual.

Whether something is a bad idea is also subjective, of course. — Terrapin Station

It's a bad idea, if you hold the value that you don't want whatever the negative consequences are of disregarding morality. The value is subjective, not the 'fact' that to obtain that value you'd better don't disregard some intersubjective morality.

Morality is dispositions about interpersonal behavior. So that means that by definition, it's not just about one's own behavior. — Terrapin Station

Sure, but morality being about interpersonal behaviour doesn't make the disposition itself interpersonal. If it's only an individual disposition, then you are missing something.

And by definition, it's dispositions that people feel strong enough about that they'd take forcible action to prevent,and sometimes to obligate, some behavior (otherwise it would just be etiquette). So of course there's a social aspect to it, but moral stances, moral valuations themselves are individual and subjective. — Terrapin Station

You are missing something. The social aspect is the vital part. For a women in a radical muslim country it doesn't matter if her moral view is that everyone should be able to wear what they want, she will still have to act according to the dominant mores... unless she can find enough likeminded people to change those societal mores. If you're the only one holding a certain view, then you merely have a view on morality, but that does not constitute an actual morality that is enforced socially.

It's a bad idea, — ChatteringMonkey

"Bad"/"good" are ALWAYS subjective assessments, and there's never a guarantee that any two people will come to the same assessment about the same thing.

morality being about interpersonal behaviour doesn't make the disposition itself interpersonal. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't know if that's what you meant to type, but I couldn't agree more.

If it's only an individual disposition, then you are missing something. — ChatteringMonkey

What would you be missing?

she will still have to act according to the dominant mores... — ChatteringMonkey

If she wants particular consequences, etc., sure. But that in itself isn't actually morality. Morality is value assessments of interpersonal behavior.

then you merely have a view on morality, but that does not constitute an actual morality that is enforced socially. — ChatteringMonkey

Sure, there's no law or no mores etc. backing up your personal view. That's often the case, isn't it?

If he does wrong, do we say, "Oh, that's all right, for after all he's just a fool; let him go to do it again"? — tim wood

No we usually jail him. Again, I never said you have to tolerate foolishness even if the foolish see us as being fools for that. You just can't stop them because you have no argument to convince them by. Same if the fool tries to convince you to become one. He can't convince you and you can't convince him so then it's just survival of the fittest. Note this entire paragraph could have been stated by said fool looking at a person employing reason. That's what I mean by survival of the fittest. Neither the fool nor the reasoable person has a claim over which method is "better", it's just that most of the fools died

But reason itself is reason bound, or it's not reason - sez I. — tim wood

True. What I meant was the choice to use reason is society bound

My point is that there are moral rights and wrongs. And there must be. — tim wood

Depends on how you define them. We seem to have a pretty clear cut difference here at least when it comes to morality.

Me: Morality is intersubjective, but you don't need an objective rule to foist your moral codes onto someone else, that just depends on who can do it more effectively

You (at least how I'm reading it): Morality is objective, because you need objective rules before foisting your moral codes onto someone else

If Terrapin murders someone because he feels like it, do the rest of us put him in prison because we feel like it? — tim wood

Yes, at least to me. The main point of jail is so he doesn't do it again. Why do we think he shouldn't do it again? Because none of us wants to die. So ultimately it is because we don't feel like letting him kill any more of us.

And if Terrapin doesn't feel like going to prison, what then? — tim wood

We throw him in anyway. I don't think you need an objective morality to foist your values onto someone else. Nothing is stopping you except how much you CAN foist said values

morality being about interpersonal behaviour doesn't make the disposition itself interpersonal.
— ChatteringMonkey

I don't know if that's what you meant to type, but I couldn't agree more. — Terrapin Station

It is what i meant to type... but you may be interpreting it not as I intended. But i don't think it matters, I agree, dispositions are not interpersonal. Though I'd say that the dispositions are not the same as a morality.

If she wants particular consequences, etc., sure. But that in itself isn't actually morality. Morality is value assessments of interpersonal behavior. — Terrapin Station

Your are using a different definition then, I suppose. As I said, a value assessment of interpersonal behaviour is 'merely' a view on morality, not an an actual morality.

Sure, there's no law or no mores etc. backing up your personal view. That's often the case, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

The mores are the morality.

The mores are the morality. — ChatteringMonkey

But you can't make any sense out of the mores without adding in meaning, value judgments, etc.

But you can't make any sense out of the mores without adding in meaning, value judgments, etc. — Terrapin Station

I don't see why that is a problem, that's part of it sure. Money also doesn't make sense without humans giving it meaning and valuing it, though there's an aspect to it that's more then that... more than an individual valuation that is.

But I think it would be wrong to dismiss the different role the justification plays for moral stances as opposed to emotions.
— Echarmion

I'm not sure what this is saying. — Terrapin Station

I am saying that your justification for a certain brain-state is a useful distinction for different "classes" of brain-states.

"Simple" emotions are not connected - mentally - to a requirement of a specific kind of justification. Moral stances are. So they can be differentiated from said emotions on that basis. This also means we can evaluate different moral stances, including our own, in a way we cannot do with "simple" emotions. This might not qualify as a truth value to you, but it nevertheless makes the claim that moral stances are just like emotions inaccurate.

I don't see why that is a problem, that's part of it sure. Money also doesn't make sense without humans giving it meaning and valuing it, though there's an aspect to it that's more then that... more than an individual valuation that is. — ChatteringMonkey

It's not a problem. Morality is just something different than the social enforcement of morality.

This also means we can evaluate different moral stances, including our own, in a way we cannot do with "simple" emotions. — Echarmion

Ah, okay. And what would you say is an example of this?

It's not a problem. Morality is just something different than the social enforcement of morality. — Terrapin Station

I didn't mean to say that It's just one aspect. It's the entire thing, including that, but not only that.

"Bad"/"good" are ALWAYS subjective assessments, — Terrapin Station

Really? How about, "Bad is bad." Or, "Good is good." When, then, you say "always," you apparently mean "not always." Or you do not mean anything at all. Which you are forcing me to conclude.

I did. You don't agree that I did. — Terrapin Station

Whether you did or not is a matter of fact, and the fact makes you a liar, because you did not do what you are here claiming that you did do. Either you cannot or will not answer the question. One last try: murder is wrong, yes or no?

Really? How about, "Bad is bad." Or, "Good is good." — tim wood

Yes, in those cases, too, if those terms are used as assessments.

Whether you did or not is a matter of fact, — tim wood

Where would that fact obtain?