Emphasizing the Connection Perspective

Isaac

I think we might be talking past each other here. The "unwarranted assumptions" I'm referring to, as I tried to explain to Wayfarer, are about the very fact you're using to determine what science cannot say about consciousness.

Let me try it like this. You claim that because consciousness is X, science cannot say Y about it with any degree of certainty.

But in order to make such a claim, you have to say X about it with absolute certainty.

In order to make a claim about how the nature of consciousness makes it difficult for science to investigate, you have to first make a claim about the nature of consciousness, the one thing you've just argued cannot be done with any certainty.

khaled

↪Isaac

Let me try it like this. You claim that because consciousness is X, science cannot say Y about it with any degree of certainty. — Isaac

X is “cannot be measured” and Y is “needs the specific mental processes in our brain”

But in order to make such a claim, you have to say X about it with absolute certainty. — Isaac

Yes. I am absolutely certain we don’t have a consciousness-o-meter that detects subjective experiences. Note how I didn’t claim such a device is impossible (though I cannot fathom it), just that we don’t have it.

In order to make a claim about how the nature of consciousness makes it difficult for science to investigate, you have to first make a claim about the nature of consciousness, the one thing you've just argued cannot be done with any certainty. — Isaac

When did I say we cannot make any claims about the nature of consciousness? I said science cannot make the claim that our specific mental processes are necessary for consciousness as it doesn’t have the evidence to say so. You’re conflating that with me saying “consciousness is voodoo magic we can’t know anything about”.

Is it or is it not true that we have no way to detect consciousnesses?
If so, then how can a scientist make a theory of consciousness with only one data point? A scientists has one test subject he knows displays the property of consciousness: himself. He can’t make a general theory out of that.

And even if the scientist assumes all humans are conscious, he cannot then make the further assumption that humans are the only thing that is conscious. That’s a bit too unscientific no? There is absolutely no evidence to support either of those assumptions. I’ll let one slide but not the other one.

BlueBanana

But that's not how language and concepts work. We first experience a thing which we determine, entirely subjectively, to be separate enough from other things to have its own name. We then call that thing "self-awareness". So the question "why are we self-aware? " makes no sense at all. We are "self-aware" because 'self-aware' is the word we decided to give to the thing we are. — Isaac

That's not true. The question isn't "Why does the word 'self-aware' apply to us?" but "Why do we have the property that the word 'self-aware' refers to?", and to question that property isn't any more absurd than to question any other property of us. Neuroscience doesn't have an answer to the hard problem of consciousness and it can't be proven that any people have any more consciousness than a chatbot - in fact, it should first be proven that any living creatures are conscious before any theory of ts emergence can be claimed to have any reputability.

Isaac

Is it or is it not true that we have no way to detect consciousnesses? — khaled

Depends entirely on your definition of consciousness, which constitutes a listing of its properties. Under some definitions, yes, we do have a way to detect consciousness. Most neuroscientists in the field detect consciousness by patient reports of sensory stimulation, ie awareness sufficient to log memory of the fact that a sensory stimulation occurred. Some prefer to use electrical signals of wakefulness, others rely on historical patient reports to highlight areas of the brain in fMRI scans and then continue to use those as a proxy.

how can a scientist make a theory of consciousness with only one data point? — khaled

They don't have only one data point. That's only the case if you define consciousness as being the feeling you have. If you define consciousness as the term for the collection of phenomena we see displayed in others, then we have more than one data point.

even if the scientist assumes all humans are conscious, he cannot then make the further assumption that humans are the only thing that is conscious. — khaled

Of course he can. If absolutely nothing else shows the same set of phenomena we have just previously determined constitute our definition of consciousness, then that is exactly what he can assume. That's how assumptions in science work. We don't test every single day that gravity is still working, we don't say that we can't make any assumptions about things falling at 10m/s/s until we have tested every single thing. We make such assumptions all the time, it's a normal part of knowledge, there's nothing special about consciousness in this regard.

Isaac

"Why do we have the property that the word 'self-aware' refers to?" — BlueBanana

And what is the property that 'self-aware' refers to?

it should first be proven that any living creatures are conscious before any theory of ts emergence can be claimed to have any reputability. — BlueBanana

You can't prove nothing is conscious. conscious is just a word, it applies to a set of phenomena. If no such set of phenomena existed we wouldn't have a word for it would we? We can prove that consciousness isn't what we thought it was, but we can't prove it doesn't exist. You're making the same mistake that Wayfarer made - presuming that the concept 'consciousness' exists objectively and then trying to match stuff to it. That's just not how language works, concepts don't pre-exist language, there isn't a whole set of fully formed real concepts out there which we gradually find and give names to. We create them by language use.

Wayfarer

Awareness obviously must exist before any theory.
— Wayfarer

How can awareness possibly exist before any theory, there must first be a theory as to what 'awareness' is in order for us to name it thus. — Isaac

No, awareness is pre-theoretical. Animals and insects possess rudimentary awareness, and they're certainly not in possession of any kind of theory. Human cognitive capacities are plainly well in advance of theirs', but even so, awareness or consciousness is necessarily pre-theoretical, in the sense that you have to be aware/conscious to even begin to theorize. You can be a conscious, aware, sentient being without having any 'theory of consciousness' whatever.

studying someone else's consciousness meets both of your criteria. — Isaac

You're still not responding to my point, which is central to the so-called 'hard problem'. If we study consciousness as a phenomenon - how it appears in others - then we're still basically in the domain of cognitive science, of seeing how conscious beings act and react. But knowledge of our own awareness or consciousness is of a different order to that, because we ourselves are that which is aware. Again, we're the subject of experience, so in that sense, we can't stand outside ourselves and examine consciousness from an objective perspective. It doesn't appear to us as an object, unlike bats, balls, mountains, galaxies, chairs, apples, airplanes, and practically everything else in the encyclopedia. :-)

In order to make a claim about how the nature of consciousness makes it difficult for science to investigate, you have to first make a claim about the nature of consciousness, — Isaac

Right - that is the claim that I'm making. And it's also very closely related to, or even the same as, what David Chalmers says is the 'hard problem of consciousness'. As a matter of interest, are you familiar with that argument?

Isaac

No, awareness is pre-theoretical. Animals and insects possess rudimentary awareness, and they're certainly not in possession of any kind of theory. Human cognitive capacities are plainly well in advance of theirs', but even so, awareness or consciousness is necessarily pre-theoretical, in the sense that you have to be aware/conscious to even begin to theorize. You can be a conscious, aware, sentient being without having any 'theory of consciousness' whatever. — Wayfarer

I feel like I'm banging my head against a brick wall here. 'Awareness' is just a word. You cannot say animals possesses awareness without first knowing what awareness is to claim they possess it. You can't say that you have to be conscious in order to theorise without first knowing what consciousness is in order to determine it is necessary.

In order to make these claims about what science can and cannot do with consciousness, you have to know the properties of consciousness. The very thing you're claiming it to be impossible to do.

we can't stand outside ourselves and examine consciousness from an objective perspective. — Wayfarer

But that's only relevant if you assume that the subjective experience we have is something other than the internal feeling associated with the phenomena we observe externally in others. Why would you assume that when there's no cause or evidence to suggest it might be?

As a matter of interest, are you familiar with that argument? — Wayfarer

Yes, I am familiar with the basics of it.

khaled

↪Isaac

I feel like I'm banging my head against a brick wall here. 'Awareness' is just a word. You cannot say animals possesses awareness without first knowing what awareness is — Isaac

Yes you can. Some things work like that. Other examples include: shape, space, time. All of these things you know before any theories about them have been developed. Some words don’t need definitions

Isaac

Yes you can. Some things work like that. Other examples include: shape, space, time. All of these things you know before any theories about them have been developed. Some words don’t need definitions — khaled

Well, I'm not buying that just on your say so. How do we just know? What evidence do you have to justify that proposition? Are you suggesting there's absolutely no disagreement whatsoever about what 'awareness' is? If there is disagreement then what happened to the people who are wrong to make them that way?

Wayfarer

I feel like I'm banging my head against a brick wall here. — Isaac

The wall is all yours. 'Awareness' is demonstrably possessed by sentient creatures, so you can't say it's 'just a word' and dismiss it on that account. It is a word that has a meaning, and the meaning is directly relevant to the issue. The fact that it's difficult or impossible to define has no bearing on that. You're not going to theorise if you're unconscious, obviously.

But that's only relevant if you assume that the subjective experience we have is something other than the internal feeling associated with the phenomena we observe externally in others. Why would you assume that when there's no cause or evidence to suggest it might be? — Isaac

Because, if something hurts me, then that experience has a vastly different quality to something happening to another. There is the first-person experience of pain, which can't be reduced to an objective description, even though, objectively, an account can be given of the physical systems that are involved in such an experience. The first-person nature of the event is significant.

In order to make these claims about what science can and cannot do with consciousness, you have to know the properties of consciousness. — Isaac

Right - you have to define it, make it an object of analysis, which we can't do, for the same reason the eye can't see itself or the hand grasp itself.

What are the paradigmatic objects of the hard sciences? Why, they're objects. They're objects that can be perfectly described and understood in terms of the dimensions of theoretical physics - mass, energy, velocity, position, momentum, and so on. Modern science relies on objectification and quantification - it is built on that from the ground up. And we're so immersed in that, so embedded in that framework, that we can't see what it can't see - which is the blind spot.

khaled

↪Isaac

Depends entirely on your definition of consciousness, — Isaac

Something is conscious if it has subjective experiences.

Most neuroscientists in the field detect consciousness by patient reports of sensory stimulation — Isaac

Are subjective experiences necessary for a report of subjective experiences to be made?

Some prefer to use electrical signals of wakefulness — Isaac

Are these electrical signals necessary for consciousness not just sufficient?

They don't have only one data point — Isaac

Yes they do. That’s why solipsism is uncounterable. It is the case that a world where there are no other subjective experiencers other than yourself is possible. And our world could very well be that world.

If absolutely nothing else shows the same set of phenomena we have just previously determined constitute our definition of consciousness — Isaac

What are these phenomena? That subjective experiences are occurring there? Again I ask, how can we detect subjective experiences. Reports of subjective experiences hardly constitute evidence for actual subjective experience do they? If we’re being honest. And if reports are everything to go by would you believe your toaster if it played the message “I am conscious”?

We don't test every single day that gravity is still working — Isaac

That’s not what I’m proposing we do. I’m proposing we don’t arbitrarily decide “yup, gravity is the only force” upon discovering it.

All we can say about consciousness is: we have found a way in which consciousness arises in humans

That doesn’t imply: this is the only way consciousness can ever arise

khaled

↪Isaac

What evidence do you have to justify that proposition? — Isaac

That if every single thing required a definition or a theory and made no sense without it that nothing would make sense. Because you’d be defining words ad infinium.

Are you suggesting there's absolutely no disagreement whatsoever about what 'awareness' is? — Isaac

There is disagreement about what the word should indicate. There is no disagreement about the things being indicated. An easier example: the word “tree”. When you teach a child what a tree is he might misunderstand and call broccoli a tree. In that case there is disagreement between you and the child about what a tree is, but the tree outside your house is not affected by this disagreement.

I’m saying we all have “packets of sense” we start with that we use to reason with. We can slice these packets up in different ways and put different words on them but that doesn’t change the initial packet. In other words, I’m saying disagreements about awareness are a product of language not a product of people having different awarenesses.

Some things that are in this packet of sense are concepts like: shape. Try to define: shape

Isaac

'Awareness' is demonstrably possessed by sentient creatures, so you can't say it's 'just a word' and dismiss it on that account. — Wayfarer

Great, well lets have the demonstration then. What properties does awareness have which sentient creatures demonstrate?

You're not going to theorise if you're unconscious, obviously. — Wayfarer

Not by my definition of unconscious, no. But my definition is related to self-reported memory logging of sensory inputs, so It's clear to me that I can't theorise without being able to log sensory inputs. What I don't understand is how, with your voodoo version of what this mysterious consciousness is, you can say that I can't theorise without it. Maybe I can. How would you go about proving I can't?

There is the first-person experience of pain, which can't be reduced to an objective description — Wayfarer

Why not? What is preventing your experience from being objectively described?

Right - you have to define it, make it an object of analysis, which we can't do — Wayfarer

I thought you just said we could define it?

And we're so immersed in that, so embedded in that framework, that we can't see what it can't see — Wayfarer

Well that's perfectly possible, but if we can't see things which are not themselves objects in some way (though science has no trouble with gravity, which is not an object, so I'm not sure what you're saying here), then what are we to do. That turns the 'hard' problem into the 'impossible' problem.

Wayfarer

What properties does awareness have which sentient creatures demonstrate? — Isaac

Poke them, and they respond.

What I don't understand is how, with your voodoo version of what this mysterious consciousness is, you can say that I can't theorise without it. Maybe I can. How would you go about proving I can't? — Isaac

You’re doing a great job of making my case here.

BlueBanana

If no such set of phenomena existed we wouldn't have a word for it would we? — Isaac

Circular reasoning. If all humans are p-zombies with no experiences, we'd indeed have the word for it merely because humans under determinism would have said it.

That's just not how language works, concepts don't pre-exist language, there isn't a whole set of fully formed real concepts out there which we gradually find and give names to. — Isaac

What is the alternative? That things pop into existence when words are invented for them? No, what symbols refer to exist before symbols for them are made up.

Most neuroscientists in the field detect consciousness by patient reports — Isaac

Behold: a conscious AI.

print("I am conscious")

Isaac

Something is conscious if it has subjective experiences. — khaled

What are 'subjective experiences'?

Are subjective experiences necessary for a report of subjective experiences to be made? — khaled

Depends what 'subjective experiences' are.

Are these electrical signals necessary for consciousness not just sufficient? — khaled

Yes, if you define consciousness as the property indicated by these electrical signals.

They don't have only one data point — Isaac

Yes they do. That’s why solipsism is uncounterable. — khaled

The full quote of mine is

They don't have only one data point. That's only the case if you define consciousness as being the feeling you have. — Isaac

Please don't respond to partial paragraphs out of context, it's complicated enough as it is to keep everyone's line of argument in mind. I said they don't only have one data point...if... The 'if' is important.

What are these phenomena? — khaled

Whatever we decide they are. That's how language works. Consciousness is the property defined by whatever phenomena we decide define the concept. The 'correct' collection of phenomena does not pre-exist the term for them.

how can we detect subjective experiences. Reports of subjective experiences hardly constitute evidence for actual subjective experience do they? — khaled

Again, it depends entirely on what 'subjective experiences are.

All we can say about consciousness is: we have found a way in which consciousness arises in humans — khaled

No it's not. We could say "this thing we've found arises in humans in this way - we'll call that consciousness. Anything similar we find elsewhere at some later date, we'll call something else"

Isaac

, but the tree outside your house is not affected by this disagreement. — khaled

There is no 'tree' outside my house prior to me defining it. There is an entirely seamless continuum of atoms. I decide that some of them together are a 'tree'.

Isaac

Poke them, and they respond. — Wayfarer

Great. So responding to being poked is what awareness is. Everything which responds to being poked is aware. Now we can test whether things respond to being poked with certain types of brain damage, under certain brain states and find out what causes awareness.

Isaac

What is the alternative? That things pop into existence when words are invented for them? No, what symbols refer to exist before symbols for them are made up. — BlueBanana

Yes. That is exactly the alternative. The world is seamless sea of atoms (or waves, whatever) along what lines it is carved up into individual things is entirely arbitrary human invention.

Isaac

Behold: a conscious AI.

print("I am conscious") — BlueBanana

But the ability to print the words 'I am conscious' isn't one of the things we ask patients to report, so why would that be indicative. I've already explained, we ask them to report the logging to memory of responses to sensory stimuli.

SteveKlinko

But Science has no Theory, Hypothesis or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons — SteveKlinko
In response I said "That is not true." In order to justify that statement, all I have to show is that "science" has theories, hypotheses, and speculation about it. I propose all I have to do is show that at least one reputable scientist has. The book I read is "The Feeling of What happens," by Antonio Damasio. Whether or not he is correct in what he thinks, he is a reputable scientist with theories, hypotheses, and speculations. It is my understanding he is not the only one. Again, I am not qualified to give a scientific review of the book, but Damasio's ideas seemed plausible. — T Clark

Damasio says things like "A feeling arises when the organism becomes aware of the changes it is experiencing as a result of external or internal stimuli". That's no Explanation for the Feeling itself. If we ask the question: "How does Neural Activity produce the Experience of Redness?, Damasio has no answer.

BlueBanana

Yes. That is exactly the alternative. The world is seamless sea of atoms (or waves, whatever) along what lines it is carved up into individual things is entirely arbitrary human invention. — Isaac

Still, the objects that the concepts refer to are real. Their existence comes first, second comes humans making up their concepts, and last humans making up words to refer to those concepts.

But nevertheless, how is that relevant? We can ask questions about and discuss these things and their reasons for existence even if your way of viewing this is in any way more correct than mine. You don't answer "why does this chair I'm sitting on exist?" with "the question is meaningless because the chair doesn't exist, it's a concept that exists because you named it; the answer is 'because you call the thing you're sitting on right now a chair'."

But the ability to print the words 'I am conscious' isn't one of the things we ask patients to report, so why would that be indicative. I've already explained, we ask them to report the logging to memory of responses to sensory stimuli. — Isaac

The actual words don't matter, the point is that patient reports are not trustworthy because a p-zombie would lie and say anything to make it seem like they're a conscious being.

Besides, is that indicative of consciousness? AIs can response to stimuli and have a memory.

Wayfarer

So responding to being poked is what awareness is. Everything which responds to being poked is aware. — Isaac

So you're honestly saying we have no way of knowing what is the difference between an aware being and an object?

The world is seamless sea of atoms (or waves, whatever) along what lines it is carved up into individual things is entirely arbitrary human invention. — Isaac

So, you don't recognise anything that could be called 'an ontology'.

Wise old sage has advice: when in hole, stop digging. :wink:

khaled

↪Isaac

What are 'subjective experiences'? — Isaac

You know what subjective means.
You know what experience means.
I don’t see the issue.

Subjective experiences are what you’re having right now (assuming you’re conscious). They’re kind of like “shape” in which they are a self evident concept that no one asks for definitions for seriously.

Yes, if you define consciousness as the property indicated by these electrical signals. — Isaac

But that’s not a definition anyone is using

Please don't respond to partial paragraphs out of context, it's complicated enough as it is to keep everyone's line of argument in mind. I said they don't only have one data point...if... The 'if' is important. — Isaac

My bad. But I don’t define consciousness as the feeling I have per se. I define it as the capacity to have a feeling

this thing we've found arises in humans in this way - we'll call that consciousness — Isaac

Well, if the definition of consciousness literally includes “arises in humans” then obviously being human would be a necessary condition.

Anything similar we find elsewhere at some later date, we'll call something else — Isaac

I was calling them the same. So what name do you propose for this thing? Not-human-consciousness? That seems too long for me. Why are we making a destination when finding the same property in something else?

khaled

↪Isaac

There is no 'tree' outside my house prior to me defining it. There is an entirely seamless continuum of atoms. I decide that some of them together are a 'tree'. — Isaac

Yes, but your decision did not impact the atoms in any way. That’s what I’m saying. Disagreements about concepts don’t change the world. Would be a big problem if it did.

T Clark

Damasio says things like "A feeling arises when the organism becomes aware of the changes it is experiencing as a result of external or internal stimuli". — SteveKlinko

Woody Allen said "I took a speed-reading course and read War and Peace in twenty minutes. It involves Russia." Why did I think of that when I read your post? (That's for you, @Serving Zion - a rhetorical question. We'll see how well it works).

That's no Explanation for the Feeling itself. If we ask the question: "How does Neural Activity produce the Experience of Redness?, Damasio has no answer. — SteveKlinko

We clearly are not convincing each other. I don't think we will. I'll give my understanding one more time.

Human mental processes develop directly out of human biological and neurological processes. There are no intermediate steps or additional explanations or factors. None are needed. In my opinion, the hard question of consciousness is an illusion brought about by an inability or unwillingness to accept that our experience of ourselves is nothing special.

I've taken my best shot. I'll leave the last word to you if you'd like it.

T Clark

They don't have only one data point. That's only the case if you define consciousness as being the feeling you have. If you define consciousness as the term for the collection of phenomena we see displayed in others, then we have more than one data point. — Isaac

I've been thinking of bringing this up, i.e. that human consciousness is not just internal experience. It also manifests as observable behavior. I think it's fair to say that consciousness primarily manifests as observable behavior. Only one seven billionth of our evidence for consciousness comes from introspection.

T Clark

Yes. That is exactly the alternative. The world is seamless sea of atoms (or waves, whatever) along what lines it is carved up into individual things is entirely arbitrary human invention. — Isaac

Based on what I read here, your understanding of the nature of reality and consciousness's role in creating it is the closest to mine I've encountered on the forum. From your point of view, I'm not sure if that's a good or a bad thing. It's a hard sell to others, though. It just doesn't work well with the way people see existence, being, reality.

Although I come from science and engineering, I got to my understanding with some help from Lao Tzu. Any eastern philosophy in your porfolio?

Deleted User

But that's a separate issue. It's as if you don't need to justify since he hasn't. If he has asserted it comes from other processes or sources, sure, he needs to justify that. But that doesn't take away your onus. Now you both need to justify.
— Coben

Apparently you and I have different understandings of what it means to justify something. Here are some from the web:

to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable
to defend or uphold as warranted or well-grounded
to show or prove that it is reasonable or necessary.

It seems clear to me that justification doesn't have to mean absolute certainty. That's not possible. There will always be uncertainty. I would go further. I think the level of justification required varies from situation to situation based on the consequences of being wrong. If people will die if I get things wrong, I need much stronger justification than I will if I'll fail to convince someone on a philosophical forum. — T Clark

This all arose from your statement.

I guess I would turn it around. What is the evidence that mental processes come from anywhere other than biological processes?
— T Clark

he is asking you for more information about your position and instead of going into that, you 'turn it around'. That's not really relevant. It is as if his response to this request would somehow fill in for his request. But since you both could have faulty positions on the issue or faulty reasoning it is beside the point in the context of his questioning.

I never said anythign about absolute certainty or certainty.

Again, picking on me behind my back. Boo hoo. And again, misrepresenting what I said. Everybody hates me except Isaac. I didn't say anything about the consensus of science. — T Clark

Isaac, or whoever it was, the person I was responding to, did say something in that vein. I was responding to the way he framed your response in a post aimed at him and his post.

As I've claimed, I believe I am justified in saying there is credible scientific work being done to establish a biological basis for mental processes. I can understand that philosophy may have a role in judging whether the conclusions of that work are adequately justified. Other than that, what role does philosophy have in the process?

And now you are entering this particular exchange and making it seem like that's a stopping point.
— Coben

Oddly enough, I welcome Isaac's input. — T Clark

It's odd that you welcome someone's input who is defending your position?

Just because he suggests we may be at a stopping point, that doesn't mean you have to stop.

Yes, I know. I hope I didn't come off as a victim, but rather as someone critical of what he seemed to be suggesting.

Here's the original post I jumped into as a third party...

You don't know that.
— khaled

It is my understanding of how things are based on 1) a limited amount of specific reading on the subject and 2) my underlying belief in the way things work. What we see in the world is what we get. There aren't any places where secret knowledge is hidden.

I would like to see those theories.
— khaled

I'm not the right one to have a detailed discussion of the state of cognitive science. If you want to know more, you'll have to do some research.

Like for example: that biological processes are necessary for mental ones.
— khaled

I guess I would turn it around. What is the evidence that mental processes come from anywhere other than biological processes?

Upon third read, now, it seems less cagey then when I first read it. But what got me into it was: he says you don't know that and I felt like that was a simple thing to acknowledge. You do present quite honestly where your understanding, as you put it, comes from. And kudos. It was a very honest, for philosophy forums and probably discussion forums in general, way of describing your justification. However I think it sidestepped the direct response to him saying 'you don't know that' though it is in a sense implicit.

IN the middle of this honest response you say that you are not the person to have a detailed discussion of cognitive science. To me this also felt evasive. That was not what he asked for. He asked to see those theories. This is a request to see the theories - writing by experts that convinced you - or research - that you did read in your limited reading. He's asking to see what your sources are.

You said :

They have developed theories about how mental processes in general and consciousness specifically develop from biological processes.

His question is not odd after reading that. It makes sense to ask you. Your response makes it seem like he was asking for you to walk him through cognitive science in relation to consciousness. He wasn't. He wanted to know what you based your conclusion about theories on.

Your response raises, for me, begins to raise the question of why you believe what you believe. If you're not the right person to show him on whose work you are basing your ideas, why would you trust your on conclusion and call it an understanding.

Isaac came in not to much later and gave me an utterly strawman situation where someone denies, when presented with the research by scientists, something that has overwhelming consensus in the scientific community. But that's not what happened here. What Khaled got was that you've read some stuff and it is your impression that the scientific community has concluded something.

You appreciate what Isaac contributed, but to me he reframed the issues in a way that made it seem like something else happened. Something which might have happened if you'd answered his question.

Of course, maybe you don't remember, don't want to spend the energy trying to find out who it was you read, etc. But that would have been a real answer. You reframed his question to make it into something else, which affects my posts, and affects Isaac's posts.

As far as philosophers engaging in these issues, that's a complicated issue and this post is huge. I am going to leave this here because it involves four people and has strained my mind to it's limits. Context is everything and, even if you still think my posts were off or unfair, I hope perhaps you got a sense of what I was reacting to.

Take care, see you in here elsewhere.

T Clark

That was not what he asked for. He asked to see those theories. This is a request to see the theories - writing by experts that convinced you - or research - that you did read in your limited reading. He's asking to see what your sources are. — Coben

In case you haven't seen it, in another response I told Khaled that my primary source was "The Feeling of What Happens" by Antonio Damasio.

Emphasizing the Connection Perspective

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