Free: occurring without coercion within circumstantial and situational constraints imposed by normal conditions. — Pathogen
Free: occurring without coercion within circumstantial and situational constraints imposed by normal conditions.
There has to be some logically sustainable rendition of “free” in order for the will to do its job. — Mww
libertarianism — rlclauer
Just drop the qualifier — rlclauer
a range of options that appear to be able to be subjected to conscious deliberation on our part — rlclauer
it seems to us as if we are making choices. Therefore, it might be safe to say that we have a "will." — rlclauer
The general job of the will might be to insure the person's future in combination with reflecting the person as s/he has become as of that moment. — PoeticUniverse
The fuss is about the consistency of the will — PoeticUniverse
IMO, if we seem to deliberating, then we ARE deliberating. Similarly with the act of making choices.epistemologically, it is not possible to know if we are actually deliberating or if it just appears that we are, for all intents and purposes, it seems to us as if we are making choices. Therefore, it might be safe to say that we have a "will." — rlclauer
The "automated process" consists of mental processes; they are performed by a mind. The output of this process would not come to be were this specific mind (which includes its beliefs, dispositions, desires, habits of thought...) not doing the processing.The fuss is about the consistency of the will, which, although appreciated as nature's useful means toward one's survival and keeping one to basically remain as true to one's self, leaves the person to necessarily be an automated process, which is not well received emotionally, since, well, then it seems one is not in control, whatever 'control' means, really, and who knows what benefit it could confer over the quick and deep process of two hundred trillion neuron connections figuring things out quite well. — PoeticUniverse
The fuss is about the consistency of the will, which, although appreciated as nature's useful means toward one's survival and keeping one to basically remain as true to one's self, leaves the person to necessarily be an automated process, which is not well received emotionally, since, well, then it seems one is not in control, whatever 'control' means, really, and who knows what benefit it could confer over the quick and deep process of two hundred trillion neuron connections figuring things out quite well. — PoeticUniverse
IMO, if we seem to deliberating, then we ARE deliberating. Similarly with the act of making choices.
Please explain how the SEEMING can be an illusion.
You begin by suggesting the matter be treated simply as will, which I am not immediately opposed to on the grounds that it is implicitly understood to be free. However, you then go on to undermine the purpose of this discussion by suggesting that will itself is merely an illusion, presumably by deterministic principles. While I agree that portions of our world are governed by deterministic principles there is no reason to assume all of it is, going to a physical example consider quantum mechanics in which there is very little that could be said to be determined until an ill-defined event called an observation takes place. The point is that we do not know how things work at this point and assuming that everything must be deterministic from the greatest cosmos to the tiniest atoms is jumping the gun a bit. Additionally I agree with @Relativist, if we seem to be deliberating then we are in fact deliberating.
— rlclauer
Vision produces beliefs about the world; some of the beliefs may be false: illusions.IMO, if we seem to deliberating, then we ARE deliberating. Similarly with the act of making choices.
Please explain how the SEEMING can be an illusion.
Optical illusions are a great example. Also, our brain filling in missing information is another good example.
Vision produces beliefs about the world; some of the beliefs may be false: illusions.
Why think the perception of deliberative control is an illusion? This seems like arguing for solipsism. Like with solipsism, it can't be proven false. But also like solipsism: nobody actually believes it. We actually innately believe there is an external world with other minds, and we innately believe we actually perform deliberations. Determinism doesn't falsify that. So you need some justification to consider it illusory- something more than logically possible.
No. I'm pointing out the fact that we DO believe our senses - and this belief is not a product of deduction; it's natural. Optical illusions prove that we can be mistaken, but they don't imply our natural trust is misplaced. It doesn't imply we should immediately start questioning every bit of sensory input we receive. The implicit trust is reasonable. Trusting that we are free to make choices based entirely on factors internal to ourselves is similar - we naturally trust that we're controlling it, and just like with vision, we shouldn't question this control except in those instances where we have reason to believe otherwise. Surely you DO actually have this implicit trust in your own ability to make choices, just like you also trust there is an external world despite the possibility that your mind is all that exists.Where we disagree is you think given the evidence, we should just err on the side of our perception being correct. — rlclauer
The two AIs DO have a causal role, just not a conscious one - since they aren't conscious. The critical issue is that there's no basis for holding them accountable. (more on this later).If you have two AI's interacting with information and with each other, and those interactions alter their code, given certain deterministic programming and overseeing supervisory programs, are you gonna say that if the code is altered the AI is now a conscious agent. — rlclauer
You don't need agency to HAVE compassion. You need agency to act on this compassion.Why do you need to invoke agency in order to have compassion? — rlclauer
You're analyzing an instance of an optical illusion - which are notable only because they are exceptional. I'm talking about sensory input IN GENERAL. You don't skeptically analyze all the objects you encounter in the course of your everyday life simply because of the possibility you are misperceiving them.As far as acting on your senses in a natural and non-deductive analysis, your point dissolves as information is obtained. If the first reaction to an optical illusion is to naturally believe it, then information which discloses the nature of the illusion is disclosed, now deduction will be applied to the viewing of phenomena similar to the optical illusion. This simply means that once deduction is introduced, naturally relying on sensory information no longer totally explains how that information is interpreted by the brain. Therefore, invoking natural responses dissolves as information is gained, and thereby, invoking it as a bit of evidence for free will, also dissolves. — rlclauer
My position is that "free will" is a concept associated with responsibility and accountability.A brief comment on compatibilism. Compatibilism simply redefines free will, and is only a viable argument given a lack of information about the system. Therefore, libertarianism and compatibilism are equally incoherent, as compatibilism acknolwedges causal determinants, but kicks the can into unexplained territory, and then claims, see free will must exist in this space! — rlclauer
The fuss is about the consistency of the will, which, although appreciated as nature's useful means toward one's survival and keeping one to basically remain as true to one's self, leaves the person to necessarily be an automated process, which is not well received emotionally, since, well, then it seems one is not in control, whatever 'control' means, really, and who knows what benefit it could confer over the quick and deep process of two hundred trillion neuron connections figuring things out quite well.
— PoeticUniverse
The "automated process" consists of mental processes; they are performed by a mind. The output of this process would not come to be were this specific mind (which includes its beliefs, dispositions, desires, habits of thought...) not doing the processing.
My point is that determinism does not negate the fact that our minds are causal agents, agents whose beliefs (among other things) are factors that lead to the choice that is made. Yes, the beliefs were determined by prior experiences (as well as the DNA it started with), but they are still beliefs, and they are part of the processing. — Relativist
we can continually reflect on, evaluate and alter the factors that lead to our actions — Possibility
In pro-active thinking processes future actions are not necessarily determined by previous experiences, conditioning, genes, etc. but rather may instead arise purely from intellectual processing towards some outcome. People do this all the time when they plan for possible future situations. — Pathogen
Honestly though, I have read and thought a fair bit about it and I have never seen a good argument for free will, nor have I even come across a clear definition of it that I think really captures what I intuit. — petrichor
And the Libet results, IMO, are usually horribly misinterpreted. The experiment involves instructing the person to allow the rising random impulses in the nervous system to complete as actions, basically uninterfered-with, after first priming it with it a request for a certain kind of impulse. Given the instructions, the results don't surprise me at all, and they certainly don't show that all behavior at all times is entirely the outcome of impulses that are already in motion before awareness of the intention to act occurs. — petrichor
So my argument for "will," would basically be Dennett's position. We have a range of options that appear to be able to be subjected to conscious deliberation on our part, and the range is determined by cause and effect, and it seems to be the case, that we can choose between these options. So epistemologically, it is not possible to know if we are actually deliberating or if it just appears that we are, for all intents and purposes, it seems to us as if we are making choices. Therefore, it might be safe to say that we have a "will." — rlclauer
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.