is unintelligible. There ain’t no such thing."representation" or "appearance" of phenomena from noumena — Arthur Rupel
Or does he discuss sensory perception from another context.? — Arthur Rupel
Importantly, for Kant, sensibility involves both what he calls 'matter' and 'form'. 'Form' involves the a priori conditions of space and time, while 'matter' involves 'sensation in general': — StreetlightX
From what I understand noumena is the external reality, "the real of the "real." We can never have knowledge of noumena. You are right, we have no use to us other than it is the external reality upon which our reality is based. — Arthur Rupel
.......We can never have an appearance from nothing. It must come from something (Kant's statement) — Arthur Rupel
......and that something is the "thing in itself," — Arthur Rupel
one view of noumena. — Arthur Rupel
how do we get phenomena from noumena. — Arthur Rupel
The only bridge there is between us and noumena is sensation. There must be an implicit order given given by noumena to sensation, otherwise even the unity of sensation with the apriori concepts could never give meaning
Since this order already comes pre-prepackaged with sensation, — Arthur Rupel
The only bridge there is between us and noumena is sensation. — Arthur Rupel
Kant seems to give a low priority to sensation — Arthur Rupel
There must be an implicit order given given by noumena to sensation, otherwise even the unity of sensation with the apriori concepts could never give meaning — Arthur Rupel
All this says simply that the real external world has order and structure. Sensation and this "inherited' order come to us already prepackaged. — Arthur Rupel
The Greek word νοούμενoν nooúmenon (plural νοούμενα nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν noeîn "to think, to mean", which in turn originates from the word νοῦς noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος nóos[a] "perception, understanding, mind."[3][4] — Wiki
That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term the form of appearance. That in which alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form, cannot itself be sensation; and therefore, while the matter of all appearance is given to us a posteriori only, its form must lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensation." (A20/B34).
One of the fundamental points about noumena is that it is absolutely separate from awareness. — Arthur Rupel
requirement that knowledge is equally informed by perception — Wayfarer
percepts without concepts are blind, concepts without percepts are empty'. — Wayfarer
As I said.....curious. Not argumentative, or correctional. — Mww
Intuition and concepts … constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Thoughts without [intensional] content (Inhalt) are empty (leer), intuitions without concepts are blind (blind). It is, therefore, just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible—that is, to add an object to them in intuition—as to make our intuitions understandable—that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers, or capacities, cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification can cognition arise. (A50–51/B74–76)
Percepts' is an unusual word, but I take it to be 'perception of sense-able objects'. — Wayfarer
I find this particular passage both profound and intriguing, although it hasn't elicited much response here when I've mentioned it previously. — Wayfarer
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