So basically you are questioning the meaning , ontological status and normative value of counterfactual propositions?

Stated this way, we can hopefully avoid at least some of the circularity and vagueness concerning the meaning of free-will (or determinism).

When asking counterfactual questions like "What if Hitler had won the war?", there are philosophers who regard such questions as referring not to our past, but to either the potential outcomes of potential new experiments here or elsewhere, or to the histories of other potentially existing Earth-like planets whose circumstances are sufficiently identical to ours to be considered suitably analogous to answer such questions.

To me, this interpretation of counterfactuals seems to avoid the main epistemological concern of 'world-intervention' skepticism - that the past could merely be a story in which we play our part. For even if the past is merely a story, counterfactual inferences under the potential outcomes interpretation presumably remain viable, assuming that one isn't also skeptical of induction. For our story might be a-causal, but who is to say that it cannot follow a pattern?

Is it? Explain to me then the mechanism, the neurological difference between being influenced by something and being determined (in part) by that thing. How does an 'influence' have a non-deterministic effect on our neurology? You sound like you're confusing deterministic with sufficient. For something to have a deterministic effect doesn't require that it and it alone causes the consequence. Only that it is one of an exhaustive set of factors which together result in the consequence. — Isaac

The point is that if some event determines someone to a particular action, then there is no possibility that the determining event could obtain without the ensuing action obtaining. If some event is merely an influence then it could obtain without the ensuing action obtaining, although it might arguably increase the likelihood that the ensuing action would obtain. As I see it that is the logical distinction between determination and influence.

This is the 'free will' problem that I think Streelight is referring to. We have to invent a magical force to make up the last bit of this process simply to account for Evil. It is not sufficient for us to admit that the brain is so unbelievably complex that we couldn't possibly work out how people will behave in response to factors with any accuracy. — Isaac

No, I am not claiming there is any "magical force" just that there would be other influences at play when some event could be said to be an influence towards a certain action being committed, such that the influence could not be counted as strictly determinant. In other words, the subject might randomly favour some influences over others in the moment.

I mean in the real world it is always a nexus of counter-balancing forces at work on people's actions. It is only if we posit that nature is strictly deterministic that we can say that all those influences are strictly deterministic and that what a subject does is totally dependent on which determinant is the prevailing one, disallowing the possibility of any merely random variance.

there's nothing intrinsically wrong with it being a natural event. Floods are natural events. Doesn't stop us from trying to prevent them. It's only for the problem of Evil that we need to place some 'free-will' type of culpability on the individual, rather than simply a pragmatic culpability. Otherwise, what exactly is the problem with there being no moral justification for punishment? There's no moral justification for plumbing, but we still have it. — Isaac

I'm not saying there is anything wrong with considering human actions to be merely natural events; but thinking that way is not logically consistent with imputing moral responsibility and culpability, that is all I am arguing.

The difference between plumbing and punishment is that the latter causes significant harm and would seem to be unfair unless we can impute moral culpability. But again, I am not primarily wanting to claim that the world is, or even should be, fair (of course, I would prefer if it was, though); I am merely trying to unpack the logic that underpins the ideas of moral responsibility, culpability, praise and blame and punishment.

The point is that if some event determines someone to a particular action, then there is no possibility that the determining event could obtain without the ensuing action obtaining. — Janus

Ah. I see where our crossed wires have been now, to a certain extent. Saying that an event determines some particular action (in combination with others) is not the same as saying an event is sufficiently causal. To say an event is determinate is to say that it is a part of the the state of the world at time t which taken together is a part of the same connected system as the events at time t1.

In terms of the 'free-will' debate, we are forced into talking in causal terms in order to answer the issues raised by those who wish to argue for free-will, but causality doesn't really make sense here once free-will is consigned to the wastebin. We are free then to look at the complex system as including the time dimension, and potential quantum weirdness (which I do not even pretend to understand), and say something is determined if is has all of its links within this system.

Putting the wider concept of determinism aside again. Insofar as this discussion is concerned, we can perhaps intersect our concepts sufficiently to still discuss by saying that some factor F determines some event E if it's part in the web of the world is sufficiently related to E for us as humans to see some part of that relation.

So back to your example, the issue is...

I am not claiming there is any "magical force" just that there would be other influences at play when some event could be said to be an influence towards a certain action being committed, such that the influence could not be counted as strictly determinant. In other words, the subject might randomly favour some influences over others in the moment. — Janus

[my bolding]

The favouring. is at the moment a magical force. If the subject's 'favouring' is not also a linked part of the interconnected system (one whose connections we could theoretically trace to other factors), then it must be outside of that system ie supernatural/magical.

It's possible (though I personally don't hold to this) that quantum randomness might manifest eventually in a truly random selection from options, but that, even if true, certainly wouldn't get us moral culpability because the selection would be random, not 'freely' chosen.

'm not saying there is anything wrong with considering human actions to be merely natural events; but thinking that way is not logically consistent with imputing moral responsibility and culpability, that is all I am arguing. — Janus

Yes, but it's that argument I'm trying to get you to expand on for me to understand it. At the moment, I don't see the logical inconsistency. If we carry out some punishment it has a high likelihood of bringing about a state of affairs which are better than if we didn't (it has this likelihood because of the deterministic nature of our actions on others). That seems an entirely moral justification for punishment, no?

'm not saying there is anything wrong with considering human actions to be merely natural events; but thinking that way is not logically consistent with imputing moral responsibility and culpability, that is all I am arguing. — Janus


Yes, but it's that argument I'm trying to get you to expand on for me to understand it. At the moment, I don't see the logical inconsistency. If we carry out some punishment it has a high likelihood of bringing about a state of affairs which are better than if we didn't (it has this likelihood because of the deterministic nature of our actions on others). That seems an entirely moral justification for punishment, no? — Isaac

For sure, the conditions you outline there do seem to be "a.... justification for punishment", but I'm not too sure about the "entirely moral" part. In any case they would not be a rational justification for imputing moral responsibility and culpability. You might say there is a pragmatic justification for imputing moral responsibility and culpability, insofar as people might not be inclined to accept the rationale for punishment otherwise.

I don't have time to give adequate responses to the other parts of your post right now.

I'm not too sure about the "entirely moral" part. — Janus

So, when you've time, I'd appreciate if you could expand on this. What do you find immoral about it?

In any case they would not be a rational justification for imputing moral responsibility and culpability. You might say there is a pragmatic justification for imputing moral responsibility and culpability, insofar as people might not be inclined to accept the rationale for punishment otherwise. — Janus

Is doing that which is pragmatic not rational?

I don't think many would say that free will involves making "choices without determining influences". — Janus

How would it be free, then?

In the sense that choices are autonomous, but not without consequence.
It (free will) is free, not dictated, but not peeled off from the universe - so it may influence it, or be influenced by it.

Free will, as you may discern, is a mixture of freedom and will.
To offer an analogy it's half water and half vessel.
Freedom deals with the water, which by itself is formless; whereas will deals with the vessel, which is rigid.

So for free will to function, you would require will to mould freedom; which obviously allots for determinability.

Sorry, but that makes no sense. Let's say that I turn the light on because it's dark. That it's dark is an influence which determines my act of turning on the light. If it was determined, then it wasn't free. It couldn't have been free. That would be a contradiction.

But you don't have to turn on the light; you can, but it isn't necessary.

That your decision may and is influenced does not negate the freedom of the act, but capitalises on it.
The freedom in free will is what allows it to be influenced; if it was absolutely free, it would be no different from absolutey determined and equally unyielding to influence.

I feel we see the same thing, but you're focusing moreso on how the two clash, whereas I, and perhaps Janus, focus on how freedom and determinability compliment each other.

But you don't have to turn on the light; you can, but it isn't necessary. — Shamshir

Regardless of whether that's true or not, I did so, and that was determined. So whence the supposed freedom? Isn't that just an assumption, and an assumption contradicted by the acknowledgement that my course of action was determined?

That your decision may and is influenced does not negate the freedom of the act, but capitalises on it.
The freedom in free will is what allows it to be influenced; if it was absolutely free, it would be no different from absolutey determined and equally unyielding to influence.

I feel we see the same thing, but you're focusing moreso on how the two clash, whereas I, and perhaps Janus, focus on how freedom and determinability compliment each other. — Shamshir

But you haven't explained how that's even possible. You're just saying things without proper explanation.

But I did so, and that was determined. So whence the supposed freedom? Isn't that just an assumption, and an assumption contradicted by the acknowledgement that my course of action was determined? — S

It was determined - but partly, not fully.
That's what I'm trying to get at.

And this is not my assumption, but observation - though if my explanation isn't sufficiently thorough, perhaps Janus or someone else may offer a better one?

Perhaps though, this isn't something to be analytically explained at all - and is more so something to be innately understood, as for instance - time?

It was determined - but partly, not fully. — Shamshir

Which part are you claiming wasn't determined, and how do you know this? And besides, it wouldn't then be free will, but partly-free-and-partly-determined will, or partially free will.

It was partly non-determined due to a lack of necessity.
Until it happened, it was in the state prescribed to Schrödinger's cat - in that it equally could and could not happen.

This lack of necessity in due allows for the action to be free - but as aforementioned, the rigidness of the happening or acting is what makes it partly determined. Earlier I likened this process, to moulding water through a vessel.

If there is no rigidness, or this determined part - there can be no acting.
Likewise, there needs to be some freedom to allot for this rigidness.

All in all, you're quite right that free will is partly-free-and-partly-determined will.
It is essentially a flux, that allows for free interaction - but interacting itself, obviously requires determinability.

Interesting article about probability.

So "free will" is a misnomer, then. How do know you that there's a lack of necessity? Is it anything more than a feeling that you have freedom of choosing between doing this or doing that? How could anyone possibly know whether that's actually the case?

And you still haven't specified which part of the example scenerio you think wouldn't be determined, or would lack necessity.

Whether free will is a misnomer, I'm not sure; but at least I personally believe it isn't, as it is a compound of Freedom and Will, which should be fairly obvious to discern in the aforementioned context. Perhaps certain types of interpretation can induce the feeling of 'free will' as a misnomer or oxymoron; it wouldn't be surprising.

How do know you that there's a lack of necessity? Is it anything more than a feeling that you have freedom of choosing between doing this or doing that? — S

It is difficult to describe as anything but an innate understanding; but essentially, if flux permeates then that would allot for chaos which would subsequently allot for freedom in place of necessity.
Obviously this does not wholly exclude necessity; as we've discussed, flux includes necessity in order to have freedom function.

Regardless if our interaction is autonomous or scripted, flux is present and we are aware of it.
If flux is somehow a falsity, then the question falls void - as nothing is actually happening.
So if we trust our awareness, flux is indubitable and thus this would allow someone to know that there is free will, with its lack of necessity.
Even if the person in question was puppeteered, he would share in the free will of his autonomous operator.

Whether free will is a misnomer, I'm not sure — Shamshir

I am, because it isn't free, only partly so. Why not call it "determined will", on that same basis?

It is difficult to describe as anything but an innate understanding — Shamshir

So it's as I suspected: just a feeling. Nothing substantial to go by.

So if we trust our awareness, flux is indubitable and thus this would allow someone to know that there is free will, with its lack of necessity. — Shamshir

Flux? What on earth are you talking about, and how on earth does that allow someone to know that there is free will?

Even if the person in question was puppeteered, he would share in the free will of his autonomous operator. — Shamshir

No he wouldn't, that's just wordplay. The puppet would have no free will over his actions at all.

No he wouldn't, that's just wordplay. The puppet would have no free will over his actions at all. — S

It's not that the puppet would possess free will, it's that the puppet is an extension of the puppeteer who possesses free will, and thus that free will would be relayed to the puppet; so the puppet by itself isn't autonomous, but autonomous in regard that it is being autonomously operated.

To be concise - the puppet doesn't posess free will but is possessed by free will.

It's not that the puppet would possess free will, it's that the puppet is an extension of the puppeteer who possesses free will, and thus that free will would be relayed to the puppet; so the puppet by itself isn't autonomous, but autonomous in regard that it is being autonomously operated. — Shamshir

So my left foot is autonomous? No, I still think that that's just wordplay. And there's no case for free will, anyway, if it's just a feeling.

No, I still think that that's just wordplay. — S

That's fine.

So, when you've time, I'd appreciate if you could expand on this. What do you find immoral about it? — Isaac

I didn't say it was "immoral". Amoral perhaps.

Is doing that which is pragmatic not rational? — Isaac

I follow Kant in making a distinction between pure and practical reason. We might perform acts which are pragmatically justified and yet are inconsistent with, or even contradictory to, our purely rational moral principles.There is not merely one kind of reason. There is deductive reason, inductive reason and abductive reason, for example.

How would it be free, then? — S

I think there is a continuum between constraint and freedom. It is not a black and white polarity.

I think there is a continuum between constraint and freedom. It is not a black and white polarity. — Janus

Okay, so you also think that will is only partly free. Can you do any better than Shamshir at providing an acceptable basis for how you supposedly know this to be the case? The determined part seems more supportable, whereas this idea of free will seems only to warrant scepticism at best.

A fully determined world is fully mechanical; it doesn't support will.

A fully determined world is fully mechanical; it doesn't support will. — Shamshir

Then there would only be what seems to be will, but isn't. And that's the point: from what you've said about the idea of free will, you don't really know that we have it, but are just going by a funny feeling you have.

It's not a funny feeling but a logical observation. Like how ships traveling behind the horizon and back would imply the world is rounded.

Those who believe in free-will be like

It's not a funny feeling but a logical observation. Like how ships traveling behind the horizon and back would imply the world is rounded. — Shamshir

You've changed your tune. I thought that it was an "innate understanding", i.e. a funny feeling. Those are your words, and I don't see why my interpretation of them is really any different, in practical terms. What's the difference? I have an innate understanding that ghosts are real. I have a funny feeling that God exists. And so on.

If it's logical, then you should be able to put together an argument in logical form. But you haven't done so in response to my enquiries. I have no reason to believe that it's anything like your example about the shape of the earth. You don't even have a premise, do you? What's the observation that's supposed to be like that of observing ships travelling behind the horizon and back?

I do, on the other hand, have reason to believe that it's like the meme above.

Will?!?

You've changed your tune. I thought that it was an "innate understanding", i.e. a funny feeling. — S

I haven't. I told you, and you can quote me, it's an innate understanding with basis in observations that should be plainly obvious.

To use the ship example - you observe ships hind and forth the horizon; and you either get what it means, or you don't.
No amount of analysis is going to change that; which I also implied earlier on.

I haven't. I told you, and you can quote me, it's an innate understanding with basis in observations that should be plainly obvious. — Shamshir

We can forget about the appeal to funny feelings, or "innate understandings", as you call them. Just get on with describing these observations and put together a valid argument with them as a premise.

To use the ship example - you observe ships hind and forth the horizon; and you either get what it means, or you don't.
No amount of analysis is going to change that; which I also implied earlier on. — Shamshir

I'm not questioning the shape of the earth. Get on with it. I haven't got all day. Things to see, people to do.

Funny how an 'innate understanding' had to be invented by theologians a couple of hundred years ago before which it was nowhere to be found.

Of course, feelings in general are themselves all bio-social inventions too, but that's another story.