Is it? Explain to me then the mechanism, the neurological difference between being influenced by something and being determined (in part) by that thing. How does an 'influence' have a non-deterministic effect on our neurology? You sound like you're confusing deterministic with sufficient. For something to have a deterministic effect doesn't require that it and it alone causes the consequence. Only that it is one of an exhaustive set of factors which together result in the consequence. — Isaac
This is the 'free will' problem that I think Streelight is referring to. We have to invent a magical force to make up the last bit of this process simply to account for Evil. It is not sufficient for us to admit that the brain is so unbelievably complex that we couldn't possibly work out how people will behave in response to factors with any accuracy. — Isaac
there's nothing intrinsically wrong with it being a natural event. Floods are natural events. Doesn't stop us from trying to prevent them. It's only for the problem of Evil that we need to place some 'free-will' type of culpability on the individual, rather than simply a pragmatic culpability. Otherwise, what exactly is the problem with there being no moral justification for punishment? There's no moral justification for plumbing, but we still have it. — Isaac
The point is that if some event determines someone to a particular action, then there is no possibility that the determining event could obtain without the ensuing action obtaining. — Janus
[my bolding]I am not claiming there is any "magical force" just that there would be other influences at play when some event could be said to be an influence towards a certain action being committed, such that the influence could not be counted as strictly determinant. In other words, the subject might randomly favour some influences over others in the moment. — Janus
'm not saying there is anything wrong with considering human actions to be merely natural events; but thinking that way is not logically consistent with imputing moral responsibility and culpability, that is all I am arguing. — Janus
'm not saying there is anything wrong with considering human actions to be merely natural events; but thinking that way is not logically consistent with imputing moral responsibility and culpability, that is all I am arguing. — Janus
Yes, but it's that argument I'm trying to get you to expand on for me to understand it. At the moment, I don't see the logical inconsistency. If we carry out some punishment it has a high likelihood of bringing about a state of affairs which are better than if we didn't (it has this likelihood because of the deterministic nature of our actions on others). That seems an entirely moral justification for punishment, no? — Isaac
I'm not too sure about the "entirely moral" part. — Janus
In any case they would not be a rational justification for imputing moral responsibility and culpability. You might say there is a pragmatic justification for imputing moral responsibility and culpability, insofar as people might not be inclined to accept the rationale for punishment otherwise. — Janus
But you don't have to turn on the light; you can, but it isn't necessary. — Shamshir
That your decision may and is influenced does not negate the freedom of the act, but capitalises on it.
The freedom in free will is what allows it to be influenced; if it was absolutely free, it would be no different from absolutey determined and equally unyielding to influence.
I feel we see the same thing, but you're focusing moreso on how the two clash, whereas I, and perhaps Janus, focus on how freedom and determinability compliment each other. — Shamshir
It was determined - but partly, not fully.But I did so, and that was determined. So whence the supposed freedom? Isn't that just an assumption, and an assumption contradicted by the acknowledgement that my course of action was determined? — S
It is difficult to describe as anything but an innate understanding; but essentially, if flux permeates then that would allot for chaos which would subsequently allot for freedom in place of necessity.How do know you that there's a lack of necessity? Is it anything more than a feeling that you have freedom of choosing between doing this or doing that? — S
Whether free will is a misnomer, I'm not sure — Shamshir
It is difficult to describe as anything but an innate understanding — Shamshir
So if we trust our awareness, flux is indubitable and thus this would allow someone to know that there is free will, with its lack of necessity. — Shamshir
Even if the person in question was puppeteered, he would share in the free will of his autonomous operator. — Shamshir
It's not that the puppet would possess free will, it's that the puppet is an extension of the puppeteer who possesses free will, and thus that free will would be relayed to the puppet; so the puppet by itself isn't autonomous, but autonomous in regard that it is being autonomously operated.No he wouldn't, that's just wordplay. The puppet would have no free will over his actions at all. — S
It's not that the puppet would possess free will, it's that the puppet is an extension of the puppeteer who possesses free will, and thus that free will would be relayed to the puppet; so the puppet by itself isn't autonomous, but autonomous in regard that it is being autonomously operated. — Shamshir
So, when you've time, I'd appreciate if you could expand on this. What do you find immoral about it? — Isaac
Is doing that which is pragmatic not rational? — Isaac
How would it be free, then? — S
I think there is a continuum between constraint and freedom. It is not a black and white polarity. — Janus
A fully determined world is fully mechanical; it doesn't support will. — Shamshir
It's not a funny feeling but a logical observation. Like how ships traveling behind the horizon and back would imply the world is rounded. — Shamshir
I haven't. I told you, and you can quote me, it's an innate understanding with basis in observations that should be plainly obvious.You've changed your tune. I thought that it was an "innate understanding", i.e. a funny feeling. — S
I haven't. I told you, and you can quote me, it's an innate understanding with basis in observations that should be plainly obvious. — Shamshir
To use the ship example - you observe ships hind and forth the horizon; and you either get what it means, or you don't.
No amount of analysis is going to change that; which I also implied earlier on. — Shamshir
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