but the ground-and-consequent nature of the argument ought to be clear.
— Wayfarer

Great, then provide a short summary of it, not the two claims which you quoted — Isaac

When it comes to an understanding of 'the nature of being', Nagel's argument, in brief, is as follows:

1. Science has given rise to extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature.

2. However it is dependent on a crucial limiting step at the start, specifically, subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose.

3. We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of the universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else.

4. However, a purely physical description of the neuro-physiological and other physical processes that give rise to experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, will therefore omit the subjective essence of the experience without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the argument is that the objective science - neuroscience being one - will always be deficient in respect of providing an account of the nature of experience.

Agree or disagree, but don't pretend it's not an argument.

Firstly it is analytically self-evident that unpredictable behavior cannot be exhaustively explained or modeled in mechanistic terms, because the idea of a mechanism is the idea of something which is deterministically predictable. This applies to the behavior of animals of sufficient neural complexity as it does to humans. It also applies to weather systems and other complex natural processes.

So, science relies on mechanical models for the "exact sciences", and the only way to model complex systems is statistically and/or algorithmically; and the latter kind of modeling does not constitute exact science in the sense that physics might be thought to be an exact science.

So, the things you say science "extracts" from its investigations are the things which cannot be mechanically modeled, like "consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose". Individual instantiations of these things cannot be modeled, but their manifestations in populations can be, with some accuracy, statistically modeled and predicted. But again it is not an exact science like physics.

Perhaps only chemistry and cosmology can be understood purely in terms of physics, and the more a science deals with complexity, the less possible it is to understand in terms of physics. So, of course

a purely physical description of the neuro-physiological and other physical processes that give rise to experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, will therefore omit the subjective essence of the experience without which it would not be a conscious experience at all. — Wayfarer

this is self-evident, although I would rather say "the subjective aspect of the experience" because I don't think talking in terms of essences is helpful on account of its undesirable tendentiousness.

So, I have said all of this "argument" is self-evident, which means that it is true on account of the definitions of the terms, and the investigable scope of the terms that those definitions allow. In a way then, this is all just tautologous, and doesn't constitute a cogent argument at all.

Even if it were granted that this is an argument, though; it seems incomplete. What further conclusions are we to draw given acceptance of the veracity of this argument? Are we merely to conclude that physical science cannot explain everything? That would not seem to even be controversial, though; except among adherents of scientism. Where else does this argument lead, beyond being merely a bridle to curb scientific hubris?

What further conclusions are we to draw given acceptance of the veracity of this argument? — Janus

Perhaps reading the book, or the remainder of the column from which the argument was summarized, might answer that question.

Are we merely to conclude that physical science cannot explain everything? — Janus

Do you agree with the claim is that 'the nature of consciousness is strictly a matter for neuroscience'? If not, then I'm probably not addressing your position.

So the argument is that the objective science - neuroscience being one - will always be deficient in respect of providing an account of the nature of experience. — Wayfarer

Yes, for the public account can't show the private experience, this ability appearing to be impossible.

We might work toward a consolation prize by trying to surround and coral experience to be in the brain, or at least get closer to this.

Perhaps reading the book, or the remainder of the column from which the argument was summarized. — Wayfarer

I'd prefer to hear what you have to say about it.

Do you agree with the claim is that 'the nature of consciousness is strictly a matter for neuroscience'? If not, then I'm probably not addressing your position. — Wayfarer

I think the only possible inter-subjectively testable investigation of consciousness would be, just as with all other things, an empirical investigation and/or a philosophical investigation based on empirical findings. But of course such investigations will not be examining what subjective experience is like for each of us; we must do that for ourselves if we can, and what we may find cannot be inter-subjectively tested beyond talking with one another and agreeing or disagreeing about what we think we have found; in other words it will be a phenomenological investigation.

I'd prefer to hear what you have to say about it. — Janus

Too bad I'm dogmatically slumbering, then. :razz:

Trick question. I don't. I believe they're a deterministic aspect of sentience endowed existence — javra


That's actually what I meant by "come about", I should have been clearer. I meant to distinguish it from my understanding that such laws are made-up, like maths. I don't believe laws can evolve. I don't really believe in laws at all, other than as a human-constructed convenience. — Isaac

Laws being "human-constructed" is, to me, a very clear means of saying that they "come about". So I'm not very certain of your stance in terms of opposition to the "coming about" of laws of thought. If they evolved to so be, they came about - holding presence after a timespan in which they did not. If they are a byproduct of human society, they likewise came about. Etc. Until you can better clarify you stance, I'll use the terminology as I best understand it.

As to natural laws, here including laws of thought, being non-constructed:

First and foremost, let it be presented that the presence of being is (in the strict philosophical sense of the term) 100% absurd. Absurd because it is, and can only be, arational (meaning beyond the scope of reasoning (and not irrational, i.e. erroneous reasoning)). There is no possible sufficient reason for why there is being rather than ubiquitous nonbeing. Being just is.

That said, laws of thought can either a) emerge somewhere in the course of being (i.e., "come about") or b) they are as ubiquitous to being as is being itself (i.e., they're a (pre)determined aspect of being). Take the law of identity. One imperfect variant of its expression that to me seems adequate: "No given shall be other than itself at any given time". Again, either this property of being developed during the course of being or, else, it always was and always will be in time-invarient ways. Were it to have developed over time, hydrogen atoms might have been other than hydrogen atoms long before helium atoms came about - and so might have helium atoms, etc., till the law of identity presented itself within being. If one cares to argue for this, one will, I believe, quickly slip into nonsense - at the very least, when addressing the history of physical reality (which we address and know of via thought). If, however, the law of identity holds presence in time-invariant ways, then it is a deterministic aspect of being. And no quantity of empirical science can explain why it is present to being:

One does not first learn of laws of thought prior to applying them (children, for instance, utilize laws of thought prior to being aware of them). Rather, our knowledge of laws of thought stem from introspective observation of referents that are, at least in one sense, immutable. One cannot do without the law of identity and remain cogent, to not address mentally healthy. This can be paralleled to our knowledge of the law of gravity. We still don't know exactly what gravity is, but it is immutable, and to jump off of a tall building in the belief that gravity is not ubiquitous is to shortly thereafter no longer be. The referents which we address as "laws" are immutable aspects of being - hence the term we provide them of "laws". Our knowledge of them, however, is less than perfect. Here, I'm thinking of laws of thought in a Kantian manner, as per his categories.

If laws of thought are an innate aspect of being, and if the presence of being is (technically) absurd, then the best and only thing we can do to better understand them is enquire into them via philosophy. The empirical sciences is the cart that is guided by the horse which pulls (the latter here representing laws of thought). For the former to address the latter in non-philosophical manners is for the horse to be guided and pulled by the cart.

Supplementary question: if the empirical sciences cannot address laws of thought (whatever they turn out to be), then how would philosophy have a better chance? Empirical science's measure of rightness is predictability, what would philosophy's be? — Isaac

If it were easy, I suspect it would have already been done. Philosophy too is driven by the same laws-of-thought horse, so to speak. But to address the second question: Firstly, science's measure of rightness consists of far more than predictability (unless one obfuscates the two separate fields of technology and science); it also consists of the replication of data, it consists of fully falsifiable hypotheses that are tested, as well as many of the same principles that generally guide (or, imo, should guide) the measure of rightness in philosophy: parsimony (such as Occam's Razor), consistency (e.g., no contradictions), and explanatory power (how much is explained by the addressed given). One big difference between philosophy and the empirical sciences is that the former can and does address that which is not observable via our physiological senses (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.). Maybe ironically, thoughts, emotions, intentions, awareness, and will, among other aspects of mind, are not givens that can be observed via our physiological senses. Science, after all, is founded upon philosophy, namely the philosophy of science. And not the other way around. So, for example, that "all humans have thoughts" is not philosophy-devoid science. Rather, to the extent this trivial fact might be scientific, it is science built upon a foundation of philosophy.

Hope I've address the most pertinent parts of your questions.

The evidence we have is that consciousness arises when certain biological processes are present... — khaled

Do we have evidence that it "arises" at that point? This seems to imply that it wasn't there before the arising. Perhaps it is more a matter of elements of the world becoming so organized and integrated that they, as a system, become capable of articulating and reporting the otherwise less organized consciousness that is always already present.

If you seem to arise from unconsciousness in waking in the morning, emerging from anaesthesia, and so on, this doesn't prove that no consciousness was there in that state. Maybe you are just unable to remember and report what it was like. To be able to remember and report something has a lot to do with what information you have access to. And maybe nothing was recorded. But that doesn't mean nothing was experienced!

Suppose we temporarily render you paralyzed and also unable to retain memories for longer than a minute and then give you all sorts of experiences. When we release you from this condition, what will you report as your condition during that time? Unconsciousness? You will likely draw a blank about that time. But does that show that there was indeed no experience?

If there is a drug that truly turns off your capacity for experience and another drug that merely paralyzes you and renders you unable to remember experiences had under the drug's influence, how would we tell the difference?

I worry sometimes a little that our anaesthetics really don't save people from the tortures of surgery! Maybe they really don't! How would we know?



What is death but a form of amnesia? After all, isn't matter as it persists and carries information about past states something of a form of memory? The body persisting over time in a state of some similarity to earlier states seems rightly regarded as a kind of memory.

it is dependent on a crucial limiting step at the start, specifically, subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. — Wayfarer

This is the exact claim we are arguing about and no argument is forwarded in it's support, it is merely claimed as if it were fact. I'm beginning to think there is no argument in favour of this position and it is simply taken as dogma, but in the spirit of charitable interpretation, I'll ask one more time. Do you have an actual argument supporting the claim that the science cannot/does not study anything mental?

I'm beginning to think there is no argument in favour of this position and it is simply taken as dogma, but in the spirit of charitable interpretation, I'll ask one more time. — Isaac

I think the central claim is a matter of common knowledge: that at the formation of modern science, a conception of nature was formed that excluded from the physical world as an object of study everything mental - consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose'. You don't think that is so? Or, you don't think it's meaningful?

First and foremost, let it be presented that the presence of being is (in the strict philosophical sense of the term) 100% absurd. — javra

I'm afraid I have no idea what you're talking about here. I don't recognise a thing 'being' to say whether it's presence is absurd or not, I don't know what 'being' is. This makes it rather difficult to understand your following paragraphs fully, but I'll try to interpret them as best I can.

Were it to have developed over time, hydrogen atoms might have been other than hydrogen atoms long before helium atoms came about - and so might have helium atoms, etc., till the law of identity presented itself within being. — javra

How does a human way of thinking affect physics? There's no such thing as hydrogen atoms, there's no such thing as helium atoms, these are both human constructs, there is only stuff (presuming you are a realist about the external world at all). A sea of heterogeneous stuff. It is is human who decide this is a hydrogen atom, this a helium atom. Where does the hydrogen atom end and the stuff surrounding begin - we decide that. Our laws of thought are about the way we've decided to break up the world, so they're an entirely human invention too (although I think some animals may we have evolved the same or similar tactics). As Wittgenstein said "if a lion could speak, we could not understand him." What he meant was that the way a lion constructs the world and the laws of though a lion needs for it's form of life would not necessarily be the same as ours. Lions may not have atoms even if they became as advanced scientists as we have, they may simply have constructed the world completely differently.

our knowledge of laws of thought stem from introspective observation of referents that are, at least in one sense, immutable. — javra

The evidence (which I know is unpopular around these parts) contradicts this idea. Very young children do not necessarily display an innate understanding of the law of identity, nor of object permanence, nor theory of mind. If I were to take a stab at summarising a massive field of research into a single sentence it would be that very young children seem to innately be solipsists. They're initial outlook and approach to the world treats it without much of an internal/external divide and as far more malleable than it turns out to be.

If laws of thought are an innate aspect of being, and if the presence of being is (technically) absurd, then the best and only thing we can do to better understand them is enquire into them via philosophy. — javra

I don't follow this line of argument. Are atomic forces not an innate aspect of being? I mean life would be impossible without them. We also have no idea why atomic forces came to be so. Does that mean that atomic forces should be studied by philosophy also?

One big difference between philosophy and the empirical sciences is that the former can and does address that which is not observable via our physiological senses (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.). — javra

The fact the it talks about it is not evidence that it addresses it. Otherwise the same is true of psychology. It definitely talks about "that which is not observable via our physiological senses", so why does philosophy get the honour of 'addressing' the problem?

Science, after all, is founded upon philosophy, namely the philosophy of science. And not the other way around. So, for example, that "all humans have thoughts" is not philosophy-devoid science. Rather, to the extent this trivial fact might be scientific, it is science built upon a foundation of philosophy. — javra

Agreed. Science needs philosophy to both guide its methods and to interpret its results. I don't see this as mutually exclusive groups, and a lot of scientists are perfectly adequate philosophers. The thing about philosophy is that there is no body of knowledge. Absolutely every position is it possible to hold is held by some philosopher somewhere, and on most matters there is still widespread disagreement. Philosophers must defer to scientists about the facts of the matter, but scientists do not have to defer to philosophers about the methodology or interpretation because they are just as capable of thinking as the next man.

I think the central claim is a matter of common knowledge: that at the formation of modern science, a conception of nature was formed that excluded from the physical world as an object of study everything mental - consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose'. You don't think that is so? — Wayfarer

Well obviously not. What do you think psychology is the study of? Neuroscience? Sociology? Psychiatry? - These are all fields of science studying mental phenomena. they do so by assuming that the external signs of such phenomena that we observe in others indicate the same mental events which we experience when we display those signs. The exact same assumption we all engage in every day every time we talk to other, treat people in pain, feed the starving child...

Are they assumptions? Yes.

Are they justified assumptions? Absolutely. They're not shaky assumptions that could come crashing down any minute, they are the assumptions upon which the whole of human interaction is built. You can knock them down if you want to, all assumptions can be taken away, because none have any foundation beneath them (that's the point). But I'm frankly terrified of your world in which we can't assume that a child in pain is having the same experience I'm having when I show those external signs.

What do you think psychology is the study of? Neuroscience? Sociology? Psychiatry? - These are all fields of science studying mental phenomena. they do so by assuming that the external signs of such phenomena that we observe in others indicate the same mental events which we experience when we display those signs. — Isaac

Not relevant to the issue at hand. Remember what we're discussing: Patricia Churchland (and her husband, Paul) are both advocates of strict materialist philosophy of mind. Their view (and yours from what you have said) is that the mind is the output of the brain, and that therefore understanding the mind is a matter for neuroscience. That is what is being discussed. Again this is a philosophical issue.

I don't know what 'being' is. — Isaac

We're 'beings', and objects are not 'beings'. That is an ontological claim. Philosophers have traditionally been rather interested in the question of 'the nature of being'.

I'm frankly terrified of your world — Isaac

You shouldn't be. This is a philosophy forum and the purpose of it is to discuss just these ideas, which you're not going to encounter elsewhere.

in which we can't assume that a child in pain is having the same experience I'm having when I show those external signs. — Isaac

There's nothing I have said that can remotely justify this claim, although why you think that is interesting.

Not relevant to the issue at hand. — Wayfarer

You asked me if i agreed that science had removed everything mental from it's field of study. The answer is emphatically no. How's that not relevant?

This is a philosophy forum and the purpose of it is to discuss just these ideas, which you're not going to encounter elsewhere. — Wayfarer

I simply don't believe that. People's actions are very much tied to their world-view. The story they construct for themselves about how the world is - a necessary step before the eternity of heaven, a brutal competition for resources, an opportunity for happiness... these all massively affect the world we live in and even people reading this will be affected by the world-views espoused here.

we can't assume that a child in pain is having the same experience I'm having when I show those external signs. — Isaac


There's nothing I have said that can remotely justify this claim, although why you think that is interesting. — Wayfarer

Central to the claim that science cannot study mental events is that mental events are subjective, first-person and cannot be understood by their external manifestations alone. Otherwise as study of the symptoms of pain is the same a s a study of pain, a study of the symptoms of consciousness is the same as a study of consciousness. To separate them out requires that you undo that common understanding that we can identify those experiences in others.

Not relevant to the issue at hand.
— Wayfarer

You asked me if I agreed that science had removed everything mental from it's field of study. The answer is emphatically no. How's that not relevant? — Isaac

Because it's a philosophical discussion of the relationship of mind and matter. Of course there is 'psychiatry' - but some psychiatrist might be a materialist, i.e. believes that mind is ultimately reducible to brain, and another might believe something very different. And that difference is not a matter for psychiatry! As for neuroscience, central to the philosophical issue is the truth of the Churchland's claim that 'mind is what brain does'. But that's not an issue for the science of neuroscience (although the studies of Wilder Penfield is interesting in this regard - don't know if you're familiar), as science's aims are predominantly medical and scientific, and have produced countless and inestimable goods in that regard.

Secondly, Thomas Nagel is speaking about something very specific, but also widely understood: that modern science was founded on the presumption that objectifiable, material phenomenon were the proper object of study for science, and that the notion of the mind was relegated to the domain of 'secondary qualities'. That doesn't rule out the 'study of the mental' but it generally supposes that 'the mental' supervenes on, or is a product of, physical processes - which is the underlying conviction of much modern science. (However, again, that's not to denigrate methodological naturalism, if you can appreciate the distinction.)

Central to the claim that science cannot study mental events is that mental events are subjective, first-person and cannot be understood by their external manifestations alone. — Isaac

Well, they can't be! You might or might not recall that the publication of DSM IV, the 'handbook for diagnosis of mental diseases', was embroiled in a years-long controversy about what constituted a mental illness. Mental conditions and the mind, generally, are categorically different to the study of physical entities, of which physics is the paradigmatic example. So too are the social science, psychology, sociology and the like; it's not coincidental that the so-called 'replication crises' in scientific method are often associated with these kinds of subjects.

Yes, and "what it's like" there is doing the job of "similar but not necessarily identical". — Isaac

Sorry, I don't think it is. I know I didn't use it to convey that meaning. :razz:

know what it is (like) to
to be familiar with how it feels to be or do something — Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus

Full dictionary entry here.

Drug companies have a huge financial interest in promoting their drug, it's not the same thing as research scientists who have no interest other than knowledge acquisition. — Isaac

And who pays the wages of these pure and unbiased scientists? Oil companies; tobacco companies; pharmaceutical companies...? Do you think they would carry on paying if the results (of the scientists' work) went against their capitalistic needs? :chin:

'mind is what brain does'. But that's not an issue for the science of neuroscience — Wayfarer

No, it's not an issue for anyone. What started this whole line of argument was the assertion from philosophy that neuroscience couldn't adequately describe/investigate consciousness. Not the assertion from neuroscience that philosophy couldn't.

Whether mind is what brain does, is not a matter for scientific investigation. It is not a matter for any investigation whatsoever. It is a fundamental belief about the type of thing one is attributing the word "mind" to. There is no right answer to that because humans invented all such linguistic classifications. It would like trying to answer what the 'right' properties of a unicorn are.

That doesn't rule out the 'study of the mental' but it generally supposes that 'the mental' supervenes on, or is a product of, physical processes - which is the underlying conviction of much modern science. — Wayfarer

I'm not disagreeing with this, but you can't go from a statement of fact here to a conclusion that it is therefore missing something. You have to first prove the 'something' exists. Physics doesn't deal with ghosts, but that's not a problem unless ghosts exist. Nagel doesn't prove that first-person subjective experience exists (in any sense that can be investigated) so he cannot then say he has argued that science is missing something, one cannot miss something which never existed.

Mental conditions and the mind, generally, are categorically different to the study of physical entities, of which physics is the paradigmatic example. — Wayfarer

Again you're just repeating the same assertion that is supposed to be the very matter we are discussing.

Yes, and "what it's like" there is doing the job of "similar but not necessarily identical". — Isaac


Sorry, I don't think it is. I know I didn't use it to convey that meaning. :razz: — Pattern-chaser

Oh, well that clears that up to everyone's satisfaction then. What exactly did you mean by it?

know what it is (like) to
to be familiar with how it feels to be or do something — Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus


Full dictionary entry here. — Pattern-chaser

I wasn't querying the epistemic element of the expression. Note how they put the word 'like' in brackets, the very word I queried the meaning of isn't even necessary to the sentence you've given as an example of its use.

I'll ask you the same as I asked TS, in clarification. What words would you use to answer "what is it like to be conscious?"

And who pays the wages of these pure and unbiased scientists? Oil companies; tobacco companies; pharmaceutical companies...? Do you think they would carry on paying if the results (of the scientists' work) went against their capitalistic needs? — Pattern-chaser

Well, in my country, the government, charities, and university fees. Private companies are only one of the possible sources of income and they generally do not fund the peer reviewers if they've also funded the research programme. There are, of course, numerous cases where the system has been abused, (and whole fields such as medical science) but that's no reason to dismiss the whole process, that would be childish.

the very word I queried the meaning of isn't even necessary to the sentence you've given as an example of its use. — Isaac

<yawn>

What words would you use to answer "what is it like to be conscious?" — Isaac

I would love to have words to answer that question. So would many other philosophers. We've been trying to answer this since at least Hume, if not before. :chin:

I would love to have words to answer that question. So would many other philosophers. We've been trying to answer this since at least Hume, if not before. — Pattern-chaser

Then if you don't have the words to define it, how do you determine that the words neuroscience uses aren't it? What measure are you comparing potential descriptions to that those of neuroscience fail to meet?

Are you still banging on about "like" signalling a comparison? :roll:

"‘Like’ isn’t a lazy linguistic filler – the English language snobs need to, like, pipe down"

Like has many uses, listed in many dictionaries. Look here, and see how many different uses the Cambridge English dictionary lists.

I may be autistic, but I am pretty convinced you're just being awkward because you misunderstood a simple and common English idiom, and you're embarrassed, and this has made you annoyed. :chin:

Like has many uses, listed in many dictionaries. Look here, and see how many different uses the Cambridge English dictionary lists. — Pattern-chaser

Well, that's a great start. Which of those definitions did you mean when you said "will it give us any understanding at all of what it's like to be a conscious human being?"

I'm afraid I have no idea what you're talking about here. I don't recognise a thing 'being' to say whether it's presence is absurd or not, I don't know what 'being' is. — Isaac

Being can be expressed as the generalized notion of "anything which was, is, or will be", although as @Wayfarer noted, in many philosophies it is more typically expressible as "any awareness which was, is, or will be". Either way, I stand by my claim that it is 100% absurd - due to its presence being arational.

... from nothing to being there is no logical bridge. — William James quoted on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being

How does a human way of thinking affect physics? There's no such thing as hydrogen atoms, there's no such thing as helium atoms, these are both human constructs, there is only stuff (presuming you are a realist about the external world at all). — Isaac

Hold on a minute. This to me sounds like a confusion between the epistemic and the ontic ( -ology is usually added to indicate "the study of"). (BTW, I was addressing the known beginnings of our physical universe after the Big Bang.) We can only use the epistemic to reference the ontic. Much of the human epistemic can be well argued to be a human construct - but not the ontic which it references. There are such things as hydrogen and helium atoms - even if our knowledge of them is imperfect and perpetually improving. You do not agree?

Our laws of thought are about the way we've decided to break up the world, so they're an entirely human invention too (although I think some animals may we have evolved the same or similar tactics). — Isaac

I'm very on board with lesser animals using the same pivotal laws of thought we ourselves use. But - to keep things more concrete - the law of identity is something that we've invented??? When do you suppose this invention occurred?

For the record, my previous post was an attempted argument for pivotal laws of thought, such as that of identity, being time-invariant givens that are thereby non-invented/created - but which instead just are - so I naturally disagree with your current stance.

The evidence (which I know is unpopular around these parts) contradicts this idea. Very young children do not necessarily display an innate understanding of the law of identity, nor of object permanence, nor theory of mind. — Isaac

First off, I said "children" (which can include at least young adolescents) and not "infants" or "toddlers" - only the latter do not exhibit mastery of object permanence (and, possibly, if young enough, of a theory of mind). But please explain how any of the aforementioned do not exhibit use of the law of identity.

If laws of thought are an innate aspect of being, and if the presence of being is (technically) absurd, then the best and only thing we can do to better understand them is enquire into them via philosophy. — javra

I don't follow this line of argument. Are atomic forces not an innate aspect of being? I mean life would be impossible without them. We also have no idea why atomic forces came to be so. Does that mean that atomic forces should be studied by philosophy also? — Isaac

Atomic forces are not blatantly arational. We thereby hold the capacity to obtain sufficient reasons for them. As to your concluding question: Why not? As you've mentioned toward the end, philosophy and science are not "mutually exclusive". They rather benefit from each other.

The fact the it talks about it is not evidence that it addresses it. Otherwise the same is true of psychology. It definitely talks about "that which is not observable via our physiological senses", so why does philosophy get the honour of 'addressing' the problem? — Isaac

I've had the privilege of doing some research in cognitive science psychology as well as in neuroscience. Cog Sci had far less confounding variables and biases of measurement than did the neuroscience research I was exposed to (in other words, cog sci was a "harder science" than neuroscience - this in my particular exposure to both). That mentioned for balance, when it comes to psychology as per Freud, Jung, and others: how is this type of psychology more science than philosophy? I find it to be rather the opposite: it is more philosophy rather than an empirical science. Hence, it is yet philosophy that 'addresses' the problem (as best it can).

BTW, in science, testable hypotheses are basically the testable presumption of a given set of scientists' philosophy regarding a certain topic. Again, philosophy and science are by no means mutually exclusive.

The thing about philosophy is that there is no body of knowledge. Absolutely every position is it possible to hold is held by some philosopher somewhere, and on most matters there is still widespread disagreement. — Isaac

But there are common bodies of knowledge in philosophy - its just that these are not always (especially not historically) obtained via the empirical sciences' peer review method. A ubiquitous and thereby trivial example: all philosophers agree that being holds presence. How is this not knowledge?

I could expand a bit, but have written enough as is for now.

EDIT: I forgot to ask somewhere along the way: How can the empirical sciences discover, for example, what knowledge entails? Is this aspect of mind not the proper subject for philosophy?

Being can be expressed as the generalized notion of "anything which was, is, or will be", although as Wayfarer noted, in many philosophies it is more typically expressible as "any awareness which was, is, or will be". Either way, I stand by my claim that it is 100% absurd - due to its presence being arational. — javra

How are you concluding arationality? Rationality is a property of an argument, or a chain of thought, how is it a property of a notion? Things clearly do exist, we interact with them all the time, and some of those things appear to be aware of their own responses. So how is it absurd? Are you saying it's absurd that we have a word to describe such a state of affairs, or that it is absurd that such a state of affairs should be the case? What would the alternative be, what state of affairs would you rationally expect to be the case?

There are such things as hydrogen and helium atoms - even if our knowledge of them is imperfect and perpetually improving. You do not agree? — javra

No. There are no such things as hydrogen atoms, there is only stuff. It is humans who decided that where weak nuclear forces become insignificant we will call it the end of one thing and the start of another. There is no universal law as to where one thing ends and another begins, we make that up.

to keep things more concrete - the law of identity is something that we've invented??? When do you suppose this invention occurred? — javra

Yes. I don't know when we invented it, but if we didn't invent it then where was it before we evolved to think it?

But please explain how any of the aforementioned do not exhibit use of the law of identity. — javra

You said you've some background in psychology (my academic background also). You'll be familiar with the work of Jean Piaget and later Margeret Donaldson or Alison Gopnik? Basically there's little evidence that very young children even recognise object properties such as extension and positional relation. They do not respond as if they expect objects to retain the extension they occupied before. You'll no doubt have heard it describedas as an "acid-trip soup" of sensory stimuli.

all philosophers agree that being holds presence. How is this not knowledge? — javra

Do they? What leads you to that conclusion? (and you'll have to explain what on earth "being holds presence" means).

But you just said that consciousness can be identified in philosophy by presuming the experiences of others are the same as ours, that's how we can talk to each other about the topic. So why can't science presume that when people say they're experiencing something, they are experiencing what we experience, and call the same thing? If science can't make that presumption (and still claim to be investigating 'consciousness'), then how can philosophy claim to be talking about 'consciousness with other philosophers without having the same identification problem? — Isaac

Firstly, science is always more focused on provably factual information than philosophy due to its nature. Philosophers are allowed to make more speculations than scientists.

Secondly, is that even the case? Science does make this assumption of consciousness in psychology and sociology, for example, but can't make it in the research of consciousness itself. The same does hold for philosophy - we make the assumption that other living beings are conscious in ethics, but when it comes to discussing the very nature of consciousness, Descartes' cogito, ergo sum is almost universally accepted.

Yes, but "so far haven't" doesn't even make sense here either. What I'm asking is how can there possibly be coherently a concept which we presume is there but can't properly identify. On what grounds do we presume it's there other than having identified some pattern which we wanted to give a name to? — Isaac

Sorry if I'm repeating myself or forgetting something's that already been said, but on what grounds are you saying the pattern of consciousness can't be identified? If you by identifying its pattern mean recognizing it and being capable of naming it, that's trivial just by being conscious. However this structure seems not to be one that one can put into words beyond naming it, making it merely ineffable, which is not the same thing as to say that we can't identify the pattern at all.

I agree, but where I disagree is in saying that if some pattern in reality exists but we can only identify it by it's relation with other patterns, not by its structure, then it's relationship with other patterns is all it is. That is what we've identified and given a name to, so that is what the name refers to and nothing more. It doesn't then go on to refer to some imagined structure which we simply presume is the way we imagine it to be. — Isaac

Why? Words can be defined to mean anything, they can be symbols that refer to anything. Why couldn't a word refer to a thing that has certain relationships with other things, rather than the relations themselves?

I'm not disagreeing with this, but you can't go from a statement of fact here to a conclusion that it is therefore missing something. You have to first prove the 'something' exists. Physics doesn't deal with ghosts, but that's not a problem unless ghosts exist. — Isaac

Human beings exist. The nature of human existence, the kinds of problems we experience, the meaning of existence, the meaning of experience - these are all the subjects of philosophical discourse. You believe that philosophy is a disconnected mishmash of ideas, the irrelevant ramblings of amateur thinkers that can say nothing coherent, but you demonstrate no grasp of the discipline or its history and any attempt to explain it meets with derision and scorn, based on your assumption that it's a meaningless subject.

Furthermore if, as you say, the meaning of words is fixed solely by convention, and nothing has inherent meaning, then science itself would be impossible and nobody would ever communicate anything. But that, of course, is another philosophical matter, and so probably, in your book, unable to ever be satisfactorily explored.

Yes, it is too bad, but you could wake yourself up if you wanted to. :wink:

What do you call a Greek skydiver?