One can simply posit nonmaterial particulars. — Terrapin Station
What would an example of a 'nonmaterial particular' be? — Wayfarer
It's difficult for me to give a descriptive example of a nonmaterial anything, because personally I don't believe that the idea of nonmaterial things makes any sense. — Terrapin Station
If one is an idealist, where one rejects that anything whatsoever is physical/material — Terrapin Station
It seems to me what you’ve said there is to the effect that “possibilities obtain because there are possibilities.” — AJJ
If for example there’s a possible world where the laws of physics (however you understand them) are radically different from the ones we have, — AJJ
You were arguing that one didn't have to be a materialist to be a nominalist, because you could posit a non-material particular, but when pressed as to what this might be, you can't answer the question! — Wayfarer
Idealists don't reject that things are physical and/or material; — Wayfarer
What else would we be doing if we're explaining what possibilities are/how they obtain? — Terrapin Station
As I mentioned above, I'm not a realist on laws of physics. — Terrapin Station
So you’ve explained that possibilities are possibilities (how things could have been), but you haven’t as far as I can tell explained how, on your terms, they obtain. — AJJ
What I'm saying there is the fact that enables multiple possibilities. So why wouldn't that be an explanation? What other sort of thing would you be looking for as an explanation? — Terrapin Station
If I asked you for an explanation why it rains sometimes and you said “because there is a fact that enables there sometimes to be rain” — AJJ
I explain possibilities by positing abstract objects called possible worlds, with this world being a manifestation of some of them. — AJJ
What would be the explanation of rain that wouldn't be identical to the fact(s) that enable(s) rain? — Terrapin Station
I explain possibilities by positing abstract objects called possible worlds, with this world being a manifestation of some of them.
— AJJ
On your view, isn't that the fact that makes possible worlds obtain? If so, how is that an explanation per your criteria? — Terrapin Station
You'd have to explain why on your view the fact that the world isn't strongly/causally deterministic isn't an explanation for how possibilities obtain. — Terrapin Station
Saying the world isn’t “strongly/causally deterministic” is to my mind just another way of saying there are possibilities. — AJJ
So "positing abstract objects called possible worlds" isn't another way of saying there are possibilities? — Terrapin Station
There can be a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist because the possibility is an abstract object that exists independently of the material world. — AJJ
That's just saying what a possibility is on your view. — Terrapin Station
The problem I have with yours is it doesn’t actually offer a proper justification, — AJJ
As you could probably guess, I don't think that positing real abstracts is either right or reasonable. So should I say you're not offering an explanation? — Terrapin Station
You could, but that would be another assertion. I’m not asserting that you’re not providing a justification for the point under discussion - it seems to me I’ve demonstrated that. — AJJ
What did you do different than I did? — Terrapin Station
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