Your 2 is that one can't describe the way that possibilities are grounded in the physical world, so if that's your justification for 2, that's circular. — Terrapin Station
I disagree. I’m not saying they can’t be grounded in the physical world by simply assuming they can’t; rather I’m offering you the chance to disprove the premise - if the justification was circular it wouldn’t be open to that disproof. If you were to offer one and I rejected it by simply assuming the premise then in that case it would be circular. — AJJ
So I suspect what you’d be doing there is begging the question, i.e. more circularity. — AJJ
But I have actually shown them (in a non-circular fashion) to be groundable that way, in the divine intellect. — AJJ
1. There are possibilities
2. They can’t be grounded materially in the physical world
3. So they must be abstract objects
4. If they’re abstract objects they can’t exist in the physical world but must exist in a mind or collection of minds
5. To remain possibilities in the absence of contingent minds they must exist within an absolutely necessary mind — AJJ
1.There are possibilities
2. They can’t be grounded nonmaterially in the nonphysical world
3. So they must be an upshot of material facts
4. If they’re upshots of material facts, they can’t exist in the nonphysical world but must exist in the physical world — Terrapin Station
the whole idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent. It's not worth bothering with. — Terrapin Station
I'm not just assuming for no reason that possible worlds can't exist nonmaterially. It's via reasoning that we justify that they can't exist nonmaterially. — Terrapin Station
but it has a serious consquence for our account of possible worlds: they cannot exist all (since existing things are actual). — TheWillowOfDarkness
You asked what properties non-material existents can have. On my view possible worlds are non-material existents and have properties in the way I described. — AJJ
Remember the problem was supposedly that possibilities had to exist, had to possess the univocal or equivocal sense of an actual state. — TheWillowOfDarkness
My view is potentials have being, but in a sense analogical to the sense in which actuals have being: not in the same way, but not in an entirely different way. — AJJ
In which case you are really in little disagreement with the nominalist: like you, they hold potentials are non-existent. — TheWillowOfDarkness
An analogy that's entirely different than what we're analogizing? — Terrapin Station
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