of course it matters. Nothing incoherent about my premises. — Bartricks
Don't you deal with your own beliefs? — Terrapin Station
Which is not to mention that what was at dispute isn't whether a linguistic expression can be correlated with a belief, but whether linguistic expressions literally are beliefs. — Terrapin Station
You're confusing the expression of a belief with the belief itself. If I write on a piece of paper that "I believe it is Sunday" I have not created a belief made of paper. — Bartricks
First order predicate logic is needed because different domains are forwarded and their variables need to be quantified. For example, when stating, I value something, two separate variables share a relation to the predicate value:1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable (if P, then Q)
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (not Q)
3. Therefore moral values are not my values (therefore not P)
That argument is valid and sound. You can run it again with yourself mentioned in premise 1 and 2 rather than me and it will remain valid and sound. — Bartricks
I agree with you that new theories cannot come about via rationality; if by rationality you simply mean deductive reasoning. Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmati(ci)sm, drew distinctions between deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning. If I remember correctly, Popper denies there is any inductive reasoning (as it is merely expectation that the future will be as the past), but Peirce's abductive reasoning is what Popper would call conjecture. — Janus
But you're not challenging anything I've argued. — Bartricks
I think moral values are demonstrably subjective. — Bartricks
So, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences? — Janus
yes, the subject - the one whose values are moral values - is an experiencer. A subject of experiences. Like me. Like you. And what - what - is your objection? — Bartricks
So, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences? — Janus
Again, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences? "LIke me. Like you" — Janus
For example, there is no rational explanation why Einstein felt like publishing his 1905 paper and how he discovered its content. — alcontali
#1. If I value eating ice cream, then necessarily eating ice cream is morally valuable — Bartricks
1. if P then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P — Bartricks
Are you saying that Reason is a sentient, sapient being? — Janus
I have defined 'subjective' as meaning 'made of a subject's mental states'. All beliefs are going to be subjective according to this definition, because beliefs are always the beliefs of some subject or other. — Bartricks
She knows more than other sentient beings because she knows more than them - indeed, she is the source of all knowledge given that to have knowledge is to have a belief that she endorses — Bartricks
I am not playing (you are, as ever, extremely bad at drawing conclusions). — Bartricks
that I think the 'J' in your name is surplus to requirements — Bartricks
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