Some typos there due to my phone presumpively but wrongly predicting my words

of course it matters. Nothing incoherent about my premises.

are you seriously saying I haven't presented arguments? Blimey - do you even know what one is? I have presented arguments - good ones. Sound ones. The problem is that none of you can say anything that challenges them and that makes you all cwoss.

Why are you so angry?

of course it matters. Nothing incoherent about my premises. — Bartricks

Yes, there is. Saying that something is a value to no one in particular makes no sense. Value doesn't work that way.

i'm not. Dingo Jones is. I am cool as a cucumber. I just think most people couldn't care less where an argument leads if it leads to a view they don't like and I think those people need to be "taken outside and shown how it is", to quote bundy rich.
But anyway, it's the argument that is important not the arguer. And it's a good argument

Buddy Rich.

Did you not realize you would create confusion by not being explicit about your idealism?

I think it is quite clear what I am arguing here - i am defending, indeed demonstrating, that subjectivism about moral values is true. How far the subjectivity should extend is another matter and far from clarifying it wounder distract. Of course most of those who are taking issue with me would, I am quite sure, prefer it if I argued differently - that is, fallaciously - or just contented them with labels. The tribal tendencies of those who eschew reason being strong and well represented here.

I know more than you do about how value works. See my argument for details (although take a course in logic first or it won't make sense)

Don't you deal with your own beliefs? — Terrapin Station

I was referring to the beliefs of others, which are only known to us when they somehow communicate them.

Which is not to mention that what was at dispute isn't whether a linguistic expression can be correlated with a belief, but whether linguistic expressions literally are beliefs. — Terrapin Station

That is exactly what "isomorphic" refers to. It does not mean that two things are identical.

It just means that the mapping is structure preserving with regards to particular operations on both sides. For example, a Google map is isomorphic with the territory that it depicts, with regards to connecting points on both sides and measuring distances. If a one-inch line on the map corresponds to one mile in the territory, then a two-inch line will correspond to two miles.

So, a language expression is meant to be isomorphic with a belief with regards to logical operations that you could perform on both sides.

You're confusing the expression of a belief with the belief itself. If I write on a piece of paper that "I believe it is Sunday" I have not created a belief made of paper. — Bartricks

The language expression is an abstraction that seeks to represents the belief. It is the language expression that we communicate. It is processed in lieu of the belief. The map is obviously not the territory.

That kind of mappings obviously have their flaws and abstraction leaks, but they are part of what we experience as objectivity.

But you're not challenging anything I've argued.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable (if P, then Q)
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (not Q)
3. Therefore moral values are not my values (therefore not P)

That argument is valid and sound. You can run it again with yourself mentioned in premise 1 and 2 rather than me and it will remain valid and sound. — Bartricks

First order predicate logic is needed because different domains are forwarded and their variables need to be quantified. For example, when stating, I value something, two separate variables share a relation to the predicate value:

∀ = for all, ∃ = there exists a least one.
Predicate V = value, M = moral.
Variables x = not y nor z, y = person(implied by I or my), z = something,
Necessarily = ∆.

∀x∃y∃z[
1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)→ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx)
2. Vyz→¬∆(Vx&Mx)
3. Vx&Mx→¬Vy
]

Firstly, line 1 via Hypothetical Syllogism, is Vx&Mx →Vx&Mx, which is circular.
Secondly, the modality is switched with no justifying premises.
Thirdly, even if line 1 is accepted and the switched modality ignored then the other premises don't follow as the correct version of Modus Tollens would be:

∀x∃y∃z[
1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)→ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx)
2. ¬ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx)
3. ¬(Vx&Mx→Vy)
]

Which is saying something different to what you're stating because Vyz→¬∆(Vx&Mx)
doesn't have the same truth value as ¬ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx) and Vx&Mx→¬Vy
doesn't have the same truth value as ¬(Vx&Mx→Vy).

Now I'm not presuming I'm correct but if I'm mistaken, then I'd appreciate it if you would type it syntactically in first order predicate logic and define your domains of variables (or constants as the case may be) so we don't have to indulge in semantics.

I agree with you that new theories cannot come about via rationality; if by rationality you simply mean deductive reasoning. Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmati(ci)sm, drew distinctions between deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning. If I remember correctly, Popper denies there is any inductive reasoning (as it is merely expectation that the future will be as the past), but Peirce's abductive reasoning is what Popper would call conjecture. — Janus

I think that all three types of reasoning do not explain why new knowledge is discovered in the first place. They only kick in when we verify if a justification makes sense somehow and supports the conclusion.

For example, there is no rational explanation why Einstein felt like publishing his 1905 paper and how he discovered its content. In fact, the main ingredient could not possibly have been mere reasoning. There is no mechanical procedure known that will lead to that kind of results, and according to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, such mechanical procedure cannot even exist. Reasoning is just about verifying that Einstein's conclusions follow from the evidence he presented. In that sense, reason plays just a minor role in the entire mental effort and activity surrounding his 1905 paper.

But you're not challenging anything I've argued. — Bartricks

I think moral values are demonstrably subjective. — Bartricks

I do not think that moral values are necessarily subjective.

A group of people can objectively share a moral system, by accepting the language expressions that represent the basic moral rules and by accepting the rulings -- also language expressions -- that necessarily follow from these basic moral rules.

It is the use of language and communication between these people that allows for some objectivity. Language is itself a common understanding meant to facilitate some measure of objective understanding, i.e. objective belief.

No, I can't do that. Not sophisticated enough - sorry.

If water and gold are one and the same, then if I have some gold I necessarily have some water, do I not?

And yet if I have some gold, I do not necessarily have any water, do I? (I may have some water as well, but I won't have water just in virtue of having some gold)

And so I can now conclude that water and gold are not one and the same.

If moral values and my values are one and the same, then if I value X, X is necessarily morally valuable. I mean, how could it not be if my values and moral values are one and the same?

And yet if I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable. It may be morally valuable too. But it won't be morally valuable just in virtue of the fact I am valuing it.

And so I can now conclude that moral values and my values are not one and the same.

I don't know what you mean by an 'objective belief'. I am not following you.

I have defined 'subjective' as meaning 'made of a subject's mental states'. All beliefs are going to be subjective according to this definition, because beliefs are always the beliefs of some subject or other.

But anyway, my argument is not about beliefs. It is about moral values. And I am arguing that moral values are subjective because moral values must be a subject's values, as only a subject can value something. But as moral values are clearly not made of my values - my mental states - (for I cannot make something morally valuable just by valuing it - I mean, sometimes that may make something morally valuable but it won't necessarily do so) , or yours (for I take it you'd agree that the same holds true for you), then moral values must be the values of some other subject.

Some seem to think I need to say more about this subject, but I don't - the above reasoning, so far as I can tell, establishes that moral values are the values of a subject.

I do not see how what you're saying challenges this conclusion.

So, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences? — Janus

yes, the subject - the one whose values are moral values - is an experiencer. A subject of experiences. Like me. Like you. And what - what - is your objection? — Bartricks

Again, you are saying that Reason is a subject - "LIke me. Like you" - and hence in light of that claim we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences?

Last chance...answer the fucking question that I have conveniently underlined for you...answer it with a yes or no? I'm betting you dare not answer it, for it will reveal the incoherence of your position, whatever answer you give.

I have answered numerous times.

So, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences? — Janus

Yes.

You: what do you mean by 'yes'. Do you mean 'turnip'? Answer my fucking question!!!.

Me: no, I mean 'yes'.

You: I don't see how you could mean anything other than turnip. Do you mean turnip? Answer my fucking question and don't be rude to me, you fucking fuckstick. Why are you so rude to me.

Me: I did answer. I said 'no, I mean yes'.

You: you mean no means yes - you total fuckstain What does that even mean!!! Grrr. I am so righteously indignant.

Again, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences? "LIke me. Like you" — Janus

Yes.

You: Answer the fucking question.

Yes.

The answer to your question is 'yes'. Y. E. S. Yessy yessy yes yes.

For example, there is no rational explanation why Einstein felt like publishing his 1905 paper and how he discovered its content. — alcontali

Sure, but that's a different thing though. I haven't claimed that there is a rational explanation for that; I am claiming that Einstein's discoveries involved abductive reasoning, that is involved thinking of new possibilities, theories, that he conjectured might turn out to be explanatory of what is observed.

For example a newly conjectured hypothesis or theory might be explanatory of anomalies that Newtonian physics could not explain, such as the observed procession of the perihelion of Mercury.

Yes is not sufficient, it is merely an ungrounded affirmation.You can say "yes' until you pass out, but that will not make your assertion true or even understandable unless you can explain what you mean. You need to provide some kind of coherent account or your assertions are nothing more than "pouring from the empty into the void".

OK, so in what sense could we think of Reason as being an experiencer, given that the common notion of an experiencer is of a sentient, perhaps sapient, being. Are you saying that Reason is a sentient, sapient being?

What evidence do you have for that? What could it even mean to imagine that in the absence of any evidence? How could Reason sense things? How could Reason know things? How could it be a subject without being an entity (which you have already rejected)? How could it establish the absolute truth of moral values without being an absolute subject or entity? And if you say it is an absolute entity, then how would it differ form the common philosophical (never mind religious) conceptions of God?

I'm still not getting this. Let's just stick to #1.

#1. If I value eating ice cream, then necessarily eating ice cream is morally valuable — Bartricks

As far as I can tell, this statement ( assertion / proposition / whatever-you-want-to-call-it) is clearly false.

1. if P then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P — Bartricks

#3 is only true iff both #1 & #2 are true. Since #1 is clearly false, we cannot determine the truth value of #3.

But maybe I'm still missing something. Can you please clarify?

I have answered your question. A question I have answered numerous times before and that you could have read the argument and seen the answer to.

Reason, the source of moral values, the valuer whose valuings constitute moral values is a subject of experiences, a.k.a. an experiencer.

I think by this time even my cat - ignorant fool that she is - has understood me. My cat, who spends most of her date licking her own anus - she, now, understands me. She too, incidentally, is a subject of experiences. Her values - which are sick - are not moral values. But she's a subject of experiences. As am I. As are you. As is the one whose values are moral values.

Are you saying that Reason is a sentient, sapient being? — Janus

Sentient - yes. Sapient - no. She could be - but no, I don't think she is, because I think this argument is going to be sound no matter which human it names:

1. If moral values are made of Bartrick's valuings, then if Bartricks values something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If Bartricks values something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. .Therefore, moral values are not make of Bartrick's valuings.

Ah, sorry - that was a typo on my part. The first premise, using your ice cream example, would be this:

1. If my values are moral values, then if I value eating ice cream then necessarily it is morally valuable for me to eat ice cream.

That one is clearly true.

OK, that leaves me with absolutely no idea how Reason could be considered sentient. You say "she" is probably not sapient, if so how could she know, any more than any other merely sentient being, such as your anus-licking cat, could know, which values are moral?

(P.S. I have come to the conclusion that either you are incredibly obtuse or you are just fucking around. I suspect the latter, and have suspected it for some time. So I am just playing along for the entertainment, I don't expect to get any coherent explanation out of you).

Something is made morally valuable by her valuing it, for what it is for something to be valuable is for her to be valuing it. Crickey.

She knows more than other sentient beings because she knows more than them - indeed, she is the source of all knowledge given that to have knowledge is to have a belief that she endorses

I am not playing (you are, as ever, extremely bad at drawing conclusions). But as you are, I am not responding to you any more. And as you've given me your assessment of me, irrelevantly, let me say - equally irrelevantly - that I think the 'J' in your name is surplus to requirements.

I have defined 'subjective' as meaning 'made of a subject's mental states'. All beliefs are going to be subjective according to this definition, because beliefs are always the beliefs of some subject or other. — Bartricks

A belief expressed as language may not depend on any subject's mental state. If you represent a belief as a language expression and feed such expression to a machine, e.g. "a=5; b=7; print(a+b)", the output will not depend on any subject's mental state. The language expression still represents a belief. I can happily believe or not believe that "a=5 and b=7".

Furthermore, what exactly can be known about beliefs that are never expressed in language?

There are beliefs that can be expressed in language and can be shared even with a machine, who can then even manipulate these beliefs. Of course, this is not possible for all beliefs even if they can be expressed in language.

Language expressions can represent moral rules and rulings derived thereof. A machine can then verify if the ruling necessarily follows from the moral rules. Such ruling will be a new shared belief, shared by people who accept these moral rules. Hence, a measure of objectivity is possible in morality. I have never said that it would be universally shared. But then again, objectivity does not need to be universal. It is usually context-dependent.

She knows more than other sentient beings because she knows more than them - indeed, she is the source of all knowledge given that to have knowledge is to have a belief that she endorses — Bartricks

And yet she is not sapient! Shows how much you care for consistency.

I am not playing (you are, as ever, extremely bad at drawing conclusions). — Bartricks

I didn't draw any definite conclusion, just listed the possibilities; so, since you are not fucking around (or at least claim not to be) I guess that leaves me with the alternative.

that I think the 'J' in your name is surplus to requirements — Bartricks

Lame pun-generated insults will get you nowhere...